Côte d'Ivoire's Good Faith Implementation of the Peace Accords
From the Office of President Laurent Gbagbo
The dangerous standoff in Côte d'Ivoire concerns the implementation of two sets of political accords agreed upon by the government of President Laurent Gbagbo, the political opposition and armed rebel groups. These are the Linas-Marcoussis (LM) protocols agreed after talks in France in January of 2003, and the Accra III accord signed in Ghana in July, 2004.
Both agreements oblige the rebel movements to disarm and demobilize, creating conditions for them to join a government of national unity with a view to contesting elections scheduled for October 2005. And the same agreements require the government to implement, via legislation, a series of political reforms designed to broaden and deepen Ivorian democracy.
The salient reality in Côte d'Ivoire is that the rebels have flagrantly ignored their disarmament obligations, to the alarm not only of the Ivorian government, but also of the international community as expressed through statements by the UN Security Council, the African Union, the European Union and the United States.
The rebels do not deny their failure to disarm; they insist they have no intention of disarming before the government has completed the political reforms proposed by the LM and Accra III agreements. This position is simply not sustainable on even the most cursory reading of either agreement - both LM and Accra III make rebel disarmament an absolute and unconditional demand, and neither links it to the government's progress in implementing the political reforms. Thus the unambiguous statements by the UN Security Council and the EU's representatives in Côte d'Ivoire demanding unconditional rebel disarmament by October 15, 2004. The rebel militias have, of course, simply ignored these entreaties.
While the rebels have failed to honor their basic pledge in the LM and Accra III agreements, President Gbagbo has vigorously, and in good faith pursued their implementation despite fervent opposition from the Ivorian electorate, many of whom decry the agreements as externally imposed and favoring the rebels. An objective assessment of the government's performance in implementing the proposed political reforms will conclude that while not yet complete, the process is nonetheless well under way, and is being pursued in good faith by President Gbagbo.
In January, 2003, the government moved to create the government of national unity envisaged in the agreements by appointing consensus personality, Seydou Diarra as prime minister, with the full range of executive powers permitted by the constitution.
In March, 2003, national unity government was established with representation from all of the political parties and rebel paramilitary organizations that had signed the LM agreement. Key cabinet posts to leaders of the political opposition and the rebel paramilitary organizations, including the defense and security ministers selected from among the four names proposed by the LM signatories.
Once the national unity government was established, the process as envisaged by the LM agreement required that the rebels begin the disarmament and allow the government to reassert security and administrative control over its entire territory – which they have still not done, 18 months later. Still, the government has during that time addressed 15 of the 16 pieces of reform legislation proposed by the LM agreement: Seven of these have been signed into law, five are making their way through the legislative process in parliament, and three are in committee at cabinet level. The seven pieces of legislation voted into law by parliament are:
An amnesty ratified on August 6, 2003, allowing for the reintegration of those who joined the rebellion into units of the security forces;
The LM agreement's proposed modification of the laws on identity and the residence-status of foreigners;
The law establishing a Commission on Human Rights;
The law authorizing the president to ratify the LM agreement's protocol on the free movement of people, and their right to residence and settlement;
The LM agreement's proposed modification of land tenure laws;
LM's proposed law on the heritage of presidential candidates; and
The law on the funding of political parties and public financing of elections.
On December 7, 2003, the government also released prisoners captured during clashes with the rebels.
The government has embraced a further five pieces of legislation, which it has proposed for adoption in the legislature:
A bill authorizing the president to adopt a protocol on the rights of residence and settlement, whose adoption has been deferred by parliament pending further clarification;
A bill amending the law defining the composition, attributes and responsibilities of the Independent Electoral Commission;
A bill modifying the nationality code;
A bill on media regulations; and
A bill modifying the law on identity documents and the residence of foreigners.
Three pieces of legislation remain under discussion in the Council of Ministers, ahead of sending them to the legislature for ratification. These are:
communications law;
bill on the status of the opposition in government; and
bill designed to suppress economic enrichment by illicit means.
The LM agreement's proposed amendment of article 35 of the Ivorian constitution on eligibility to run for president has been adopted by the Council of Ministers, but a constitutional amendment can only be enacted via a referendum. Such a referendum is required by the constitution, which would require rebel disarmament as a precondition. That's because the constitution explicitly forbids the holding of a referendum as long as the territorial integrity of Côte d'Ivoire is compromised.
Rather than embrace the possibilities of democratic politics offered by the LM and Accra III agreements, the rebels have instead offered only partial, and often hostile and combative participation in the government of national unity. The key rebel leader, Soro Guillaume, has refused to take up his cabinet post, and instead behaves as a head of state might in the northern part of the country, which is under the control of rebel paramilitaries. These organizations run their own "justice" system, loot national financial institutions and illegally traffic in Côte d'Ivoire's natural resources via neighboring countries. Thus, in one part of Côte d'Ivoire there is a democratically elected government, in another there is rule by warlords, foremost among them, Soro Guillaume.
The only restraint on President Gbagbo's efforts to implement the agreements has been the Ivorian constitution itself, which he is sworn to uphold and is not abrogated by the agreements reached at LM and Accra. And in the course of implementing those agreements, President Gbagbo has shown great leadership in convincing Ivorians to accept the necessity of their implementation.
Attempts to force President Gbagbo to violate the constitution of his country in order to hasten the implementation of the Accra III agreement make a mockery of efforts to promote democracy and good governance in Africa -- if constitutions could be arbitrarily tampered with by executive authority on the basis of political expedient, then democracy would have no institutional and legal foundation.
