

## **U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 2005-2007**

*Prepared by Daniel Volman, Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC [dvolman@igc.org]. Information from the U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2007, and from various U.S. Defense Department web sites and newspaper articles. Information is current as of 1 March 2006.*

### **U.S. MILITARY COMMANDS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

Most African countries fall within the area of responsibility of the U.S. European Command (which also covers Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union). However, a number of countries in northeast Africa (Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya) and the Seychelles are within the area of responsibility of the U.S. Central Command; the U.S. Pacific Command covers the Comoros, Madagascar, and the Indian Ocean, including the island of Diego Garcia. These commands (along with the U.S. Special Operations Command and the various branches of the armed forces, i.e. the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines) are responsible for conducting active military operations in Africa, including training exercises, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, evacuating civilians from unstable countries, and other operations.

Most arms sales are conducted through the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which falls under the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Certain military hardware (including handguns, rifles, shotguns, electronics, police equipment and crowd control chemicals, and explosives) is sold under a licensing program administered by the Office of Defense Trade Controls under the authority of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

### **U.S. MILITARY LOANS & ARMS SALES TO AFRICA**

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is the process used by the U.S. government to sell weapons and other military equipment to foreign governments through the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). FMS sales to African states (including North Africa) rose from \$39.2 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 to \$59.8 million in FY 2006 and are then expected to fall to \$27.9 million in FY 2007. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program is used by the DSCA to provide low-interest loans to foreign governments to finance arms purchases from the U.S. government or from private U.S. companies. In the case of all sub-Saharan recipients, the U.S. government waives the repayment of these loans. Beginning in FY 2003, the U.S. government has allocated funds for a new African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP). ACBSP provides specialized equipment, training, and intelligence data to selected African countries for efforts aimed at combating smuggling, piracy, and other cross-boundary threats to internal and regional security. In FY 2006, \$4.0 million was appropriated for this purpose and another \$4.0 million was requested for FY 2007. In 2003, the

Department Office of Defense Trade Control in the given year. Even though these sales have been licensed or approved, they are not always completed. One noteworthy recipient is Algeria, which has been permitted to buy very large quantities of sophisticated counter-insurgency hardware—including night-vision equipment—to outfit the army and other internal security forces for operations against armed Salafist groups.

### U.S. ARMS SALES AND MILITARY LOANS TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES

(Dollars in thousands)

Country	U.S. Government FMF Loans			U.S. Government FMS Sales			U.S. Private Sales (CS)		
	2005 Actual	2006 Estimate	2007 Request	2005 Actual	2006 Estimate	2007 Request	2005 Actual	2006 Estimate	2007 Request
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	276,063	6,191	11,056
Angola	0	0	0	150	200	0	6,933	2,114	10,564
Botswana	496	0	0	1,723	500	300	7,976	3,625	5,787
Cameroon	0	0	0	150	150	0	90	0	0
DR Congo	0	0	0	0	2,400	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	4,468	3,960	4,000	10,877	9,500	2,000	4,661	225	1,108
Eritrea	0	0	0	200	240	0	0	18	91
Ethiopia	7,050	1,980	2,000	250	8,000	5,000	68	572	2,810
Gabon	0	0	0	8	0	0	53	8	14
Ghana	496	495	400	1,145	1,300	500	1,722	288	883
Guinea	0	0	0	201	0	0	160	362	1,789
Kenya	0	495	25	304	7,080	0	3,933	407	1,225
Liberia	2,976	1,980	1,600	0	0	2,000	225	19	97
Malawi	0	0	0	110	0	0	2,210	750	3,092
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	1,000	0	800	4,000
Morocco	15,128	12,375	12,500	16,016	10,000	17,000	18,613	3,909	10,843
Nigeria	0	990	800	2,318	1,500	0	2,209	223	1,041
Rwanda	0	0	0	500	0	0	563	619	2,997
Senegal	496	495	400	707	2,000	500	38	2	1
South Africa	0	0	0	137	0	0	5,706	1,763	21,938
Tunisia	10,407	8,415	8,500	1,137	9,930	9,930	3,290	3,330	12,476
Uganda	1,984	0	0	2,106	300	0	5,706	1,763	1,296
Zambia	0	0	0	600	0	0	21	1,002	5,004
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
African Coastal/ Border Security Program	3,968	3,960	4,000	0	0	0	0	0	0

## **U.S. JOINT MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

Countries where the U.S. has conducted joint military training exercises in recent years: Benin, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda.

Beginning in Fiscal 2006, American funds for peacekeeping training in Africa are now being channeled primarily through the new Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), incorporating the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program and other U.S. aid channels. African states will receive much of the \$80 million allocated for GPOI in FY 2005, and of the \$100.4 million requested for FY 2006 and the \$102.6 million requested for FY 2007. In FY 2007, ACOTA will train and equip new battalions and specialty units in partner countries such as Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Mali, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Gabon, and Nigeria; the ACOTA program may expand to new partner countries, such as, but not limited to, Angola and Namibia.

In FY 2002-03, the United States allocated approximately \$16 million in Africa peacekeeping money to establish the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). The PSI funding was used to deploy teams of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to provide counter-terrorism training and equipment to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. This effort entailed the provision of training and equipment to six light infantry companies in the four countries. As a result of strenuous lobbying by U.S. military officials, PSI was transformed into new Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in March 2004 and expanded to include the important energy-producing countries of Algeria and Nigeria, as well as Senegal and Tunisia, along with the original PSI participants. The TSCTI program obtained initial funding of \$3 million in FY 2005 and, according to initial reports, was to receive \$100 million annually from FY 2007 to FY 2011, for a total of \$500 million; the Bush Administration, however, has only requested \$16.8 million in GPOI funds for the program in its FY 2007 budget, along with an additional \$7.2 million in Non-proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs funding for anti-terrorism training and \$6 million in Economic Support Funds.

## **U.S. PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF AFRICAN MILITARY OFFICERS**

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is used to provide professional training to African military officers from forty-four countries at U.S. military colleges and other military facilities in the U.S. In FY 2007, IMET expected to provide training to some 1,400 officers from Sub-Saharan and North African countries (excluding Egypt) at a cost of \$15.6 million.

**U.S. IMET PROGRAMS**  
(Dollars in thousands)

Country	2005 Actual	2006 Estimate	2007 Request
Angola	313	396	400
Algeria	920	743	840
Botswana	710	693	690
Cameroon	396	248	295
Chad	470	247	295
DR Congo	196	248	220
Djibouti	239	322	345
Equatorial Guinea	0	49	45
Eritrea	241	247	445
Ethiopia	72	594	640
Gabon	292	198	245
Ghana	648	569	640
Guinea	508	347	345
Kenya	139	297	45
Liberia	0	198	245
Malawi	362	347	355
Morocco	1,920	1,856	1,975
Mozambique	220	213	215
Nigeria	0	792	590
Rwanda	296	223	270
São Tome and Príncipe	194	198	200
Senegal	1,222	1,089	1,135
Sierra Leone	270	322	325
South Africa	0	49	45
Sudan	0	49	100
Tunisia	1,860	1,856	1,975
Uganda	293	238	295
Zambia	181	223	245

**U.S. USE OF AFRICAN MILITARY BASES**

The United States maintains important military facilities at a base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. Although the U.S. government established these facilities under a treaty with Britain, which claims sovereignty over the island, the African country of Mauritius continues to assert that Diego Garcia and other islands of the Chagos archipelago are part of its territory. The U.S. government uses the island to base a floating stockpile of tanks, armored vehicles, ammunition, and other military hardware sufficient to equip an Army brigade of up to 3,500 troops and a division of 17,300 Marines. The U.S. Air Force also bases B-52 and B-2 bombers at airfields on Diego Garcia. The facilities at Diego Garcia played a significant role in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and the war with Iraq.

The United States does not possess its own bases on the African mainland, but relies on the agreement of African governments to use local bases and other military facilities in times of need. The United States has therefore gained access to basing facilities in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, primarily to support anti-terror operations in the region. After 9/11, the United States received permission from Djibouti to use Camp Lemonier as the headquarters for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, a multinational naval force led by the United States that monitors and interdicts possible terrorist travel routes at sea and suspected terrorist activities in adjacent countries, specifically in Somalia. Along with the headquarters element, 800 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) troops have set up base at Camp Lemonier. Likewise, under an agreement reportedly signed in July 2003 during Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's visit to Washington, the United States was granted the right to use the airfield at Tamanrasset, in southern Algeria, for the deployment of US P-3 Orion aerial surveillance aircraft. (In March 2004, P-3 "Orion" aerial surveillance aircraft based at Tamanrasset were reportedly used to gather intelligence on the activities of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to forward this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the Salafists.)

However, to ensure that the United States can deploy troops and equipment to Africa, particularly in times of emergency when even a few days might be too long to wait, the United States is now beginning to establish a basing infrastructure in Africa, again following the trajectory first seen in the Gulf and the Caspian regions. In recognition of Africa's colonial past and likely popular resistance to anything resembling a permanent military garrison, the United States does not seek elaborate installations but rather "bare-bones" facilities – usually an airstrip, basic communications links, and a warehouse or two – that can be tended by local troops or contract personnel most of the time, until needed by American forces for particular operations. Although Pentagon officials tend to emphasize the threat from terrorism when discussing the need for such facilities, they have also expressed a need to protect the flow of oil. In 2003, for example, a senior Pentagon official told Greg Jaffe of the *Wall Street Journal*, "a key mission for U.S. forces [in Africa] would be to ensure that Nigeria's oil fields, which in the future could account for as much as 25 percent of all U.S. oil imports, are secure."

Among the countries that have reportedly been considered as a potential site for the establishment of a U.S. military base in Africa is the island state of São Tomé e Príncipe. São Tomé is located in the Gulf of Guinea near the major West African oil producers, yet is conveniently distant from the ethnic and political strife that has often overtaken countries on the mainland; it is also expected to be a major oil exporter itself, in conjunction with Nigeria (with which it has established a Joint Development Zone in the Gulf of Guinea.) Although the United States has not formally expressed an interest in acquiring a base there, the Deputy Commander of the U.S. European Command (EURCOM), which exercises command authority over much of sub-Saharan Africa, visited the islands in July 2001 to examine possible basing locations.

The first country to conclude a formal agreement with Washington for the use of local military facilities was Kenya, which signed an agreement in February 1980. The Kenyan agreement allows U.S. troops to use the port of Mombasa, as well as airfields at Embakasi and Nanyuki. These facilities were used to support the American military intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 and have been used in the past year to support forces from the United States and other coalition forces involved in counter-terrorism operations in the region. The United States has signed

agreements with Ghana, Senegal, Gabon, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia to allow American aircraft to refuel at local air bases. In its efforts to secure other basing options, the United States has negotiated agreements granting it access to airfields and other facilities in several African nations. These facilities are often referred to as “lily pad” facilities, because American forces can hop in and out of them in times of crisis while avoiding the impression of establishing a permanent – and potentially provocative -- presence. They include Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where the United States has built two “K-Span” steel buildings to house troops and equipment; an airfield near Bamako, the capital of Mali; an airfield at Dakar, Senegal; an airfield in Gabon; and airfields and port facilities in Morocco and Tunisia.

## **EXPANDING U.S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN AFRICA**

In recognition both of Africa’s growing role as a supplier of oil to the United States, the U.S. Navy has significantly increased its presence in African waters. Much of this activity is focused in the Gulf of Guinea, the body of water closest to the major West African oil producers and itself the site of some of Africa’s most promising offshore oil reserves. The U.S. Navy has also conducted joint training operations with the naval forces of African states and engaged them in joint discussion of security problems in the region. A number of recent naval exercises and other events are evidence of the active interest in Africa now being taken by the U.S. Navy.

In May 2003, NATO Supreme Commander General James Jones indicated that in the future, U.S. naval forces under his command would spend much less time in the Mediterranean Sea. Instead, he predicted, “I’ll bet they’ll spend half the time going down the west coast of Africa.” The most impressive demonstration of this new posture came in July 2004, when the United States carried out the “Summer Pulse 04” exercise. This exercise was explicitly designed to show that the United States could carry out naval operations simultaneously in every part of the world and, thus, that U.S. naval forces could respond to a crisis in one part of the world even if it was already engaged elsewhere. The African element of the exercise was conducted off the coast of Morocco, where the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise commanded a U.S. carrier battle group that led a massive joint exercise with naval forces from nine countries, including NATO countries and Morocco itself. The exercise involved a total of 20,000 personnel (both sailors and marines) on board 30 ships.

In October 2004, the U.S. European Command (EURCOM) hosted a three-day Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Conference in Naples, Italy (headquarters of the U.S. Sixth Fleet). Participants included naval leaders from Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, São Tomé, and Togo, along with personnel from the United States, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The conference reportedly focused on common efforts to combat threats posed by piracy, smuggling, and drug trafficking, as well as the fight against terrorism. It ended with joint statement pledging participants to engage in ongoing dialogue, cooperation, and joint activities.

In January 25, 2005, the U.S. Navy commenced a two-month Gulf of Guinea Deployment with participation by the USS *Emory S. Land*, carrying about 1,400 sailors and Marines. The deployment was the direct result of the 2004 Maritime Security Conference held in October

2004, and involved port calls at Douala, Cameroon; Port Gentil, Gabon; and Sekondi, Ghana. Instructors and sailors from Cameroon, São Tomé, Gabon, Ghana, and Benin also participated in the operation. A second Gulf of Guinea Deployment was conducted in May-July 2005, with participation by the US Coast Guard Cutter *Bear*.

From late-June to early-July 2005, the U.S. Navy held ten days of exercises in the Mediterranean Sea with naval forces from Britain, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The exercises, known as “Barbary Thunder II,” consisted of joint maritime interdiction operations by U.S. Marines along with their counterparts from Italy, Morocco, and Algeria.

And on September 27, 2005, the U.S. Navy commenced a five-week West African Training Cruise (WATC) exercise with the deployment of the dock landing ship USS *Gunston Hall* and the high-speed vessel *Swift*. Host nations for the WATC include Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, and Morocco. Planned activities include small boat training, live-fire exercises, and amphibious raids. At the same time, American sailors and Marines participated in Exercise Green Osprey, a British-led amphibious landing exercise on the coast of Senegal.

These operations are particularly significant because they constitute the necessary preparation for what are, in fact, the most likely scenarios for direct U.S. intervention in Africa. While land bases would be required for large-scale ground operations—as, for example during humanitarian relief operations or to actually try to occupy and control large parts of a country like Nigeria should that ever be contemplated—they would not be needed for more focused attacks, such as air strikes or airborne assaults against insurgents who threatened to interrupt oil supplies. Not only would Washington prefer to avoid establishing a highly visible, and thus highly provocative, presence on the ground in Africa, it would actually be easier for the United States to conduct such operations from an off-shore naval armada which could be rushed to oil-rich regions of Africa at short notice in less than a week.

#### **LINKS TO INFORMATION SITES ON U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS IN AFRICA**

Information on the Commercial Sales program, the U.S. government budget for foreign operations, and U.S. policy toward Africa can be obtained through the web site of the U.S. State Department: <http://www.state.gov>

Information on the Foreign Military Sales program, military loans, military education and training programs, military exercises, and other military issues can be obtained through the web site of the U.S. Defense Department: <http://www.defenselink.mil>

Additional information can be found at the web site of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars: <http://acas.prairienet.org>