6 May 2004
opinion
ZIMBABWE - 'THE GOVERNMENT WANTS THE PEOPLE TO GIVE UP HOPING'
Steve Kibble
'Give ZANU-PF credit, it has ridden the crisis, seen off the opposition and now all it has to do is manage the crisis and aim for re-election and then change the constitution' - Zimbabwean human rights lawyer, early 2004.
How are we to reconcile Zimbabwe's seemingly inevitable slide towards being a 'failed state' and the continued confidence within ZANU-PF that they can handle the crisis and stay in power until after parliamentary elections due in 2005? More pertinently, what is the popular response to the multilayered crisis of the Zimbabwean state?
Since the government's defeat in the February 2000 constitutional referendum, ZANU-PF has largely succeeded in reimposing its control through a 'holistic strategy of repression'. A peace activist described the strategy as a sort of 'scorched earth policy in terms of social formations while it wants to hold elections so as to appear democratic it wants to prevent thought, communication, information, and analysis.'
Broadly speaking the strategy entails a continuation of the militarisation/securitisation of the country, under which these sectors are immune from the law and occupy increasingly prominent positions in intelligence, provincial administration, electoral administration and the like. Secondly, it includes the use of presidential powers - supposedly introduced as part of attempts to clamp down on corruption - allowing police to hold opponents of the regime in prison for up to a month without legal process on charges of 'subversion'. Thirdly, the regime continues its sustained attack on any foci of independence or opposition.
This strategy has the following elements:
A state-driven violent land occupation process without resolving contradictions in the rural economy.
· The use of the police and security apparatus against opponents, including the use of sexual violence as retribution.
· The use of terror and judicial intimidation as well as ideological demonisation of the opposition to shut down space for independent voices.
· The 'restructuring' of the judiciary towards complete compliance.
· Legal and extra-legal harassment of the independent media, notably through the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act which shut down the Daily News.
· Destabilisation of trades unions, NGOs and other civic bodies. The draft legislation already exists for NGOs to be the next target.
· Widespread torture and intimidation. The opposition has been softened up by four years of sustained repression and abuse. There has been a crackdown on the human rights sector, although brutal intimidation has often been replaced by more subtle forms.
· The co-option or denigration of religious leadership.
· The reorganisation of ZANU-PF structures to ensure a strategy of coercive mobilisation.
· Use of violence as an election strategy with the bodies responsible for electoral administration firmly under government control including use of military personnel.
· The use of the land reform process, the indigenisation strategy, the stripping of state assets and the politically partisan use of government-controlled food as a 'primitive accumulation' tool to create a new economic bloc based on party affiliation and loyalty (although its sustainability is open to question).
· An authoritarian economic nationalist ('anti-imperialist') rhetoric that has resonance in the region and continent, bringing together race, land and historical injustice in order to demonise the internal opposition and legitimise and maintain ZANU-PF's rule through repression.
ZANU-PF rides out the crisis?
Since the decision in December 2003 by Harare to react to continued suspension by withdrawing from the Commonwealth, events have seemed to turn ZANU-PF's way. There have been victories in by-elections marked by the usual violence and intimidation, including retaking the urban constituency of Zengeza in late March 2004.
The Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono responded to recent dramatic collapses in the banking sector linked to endemic corruption by changing the foreign exchange system leading to an initial decline in inflation. This was combined with a drive against corruption. A prominent ZANU-PF MP and proponent/symbol of black economic empowerment, Philip Chiyangwa, was briefly (and illegally) detained over charges of corruption. Indeed the anti-corruption drive in April 2004 claimed the arrest of the recently appointed finance minister but political lightweight Chris Kuruneri on charges of corruption in terms of illegally dealing in foreign currency.
Does this mean that after years of presiding over gross corruption, systemic human rights abuses, and spectacular economic and political decline, the Mugabe government is about to reform (as in the February Cabinet 'reshuffle'), re-enter the 'civilised world' (as a victory for the 'quiet diplomacy' of the Mbeki government) and aim for clean parliamentary elections in 2005?
Certainly Thabo Mbeki has given June 2004 as a 'final deadline' for serious negotiations to be underway and (hopefully for him) lead to a government of national unity under a reformed ZANU-PF, but not necessarily under Robert Mugabe. Few in the region and even fewer in Zimbabwe find this believable: so many promises, so many broken - and so many basically untrue claims from Mbeki that genuine talks are about to start.
Perhaps a greater indication of South Africa's stance was its backing at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva on 15 April 2004, just before South Africa's own elections, for a successfully carried African/Asian/Russian 'no action' resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe - for the second year running.
Brian Kagoro, coordinator of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, said: 'It is disheartening that ... the human rights of the people of Zimbabwe have been reduced to the flexing of muscles between the global South and the global North.' As long as Mbeki still (in public at least) accepts the Mugabe rhetoric that the crisis is not about 'governance' and human rights but about resolving the triangle of race, land and colonial dispossession, serious pressure or ending of South African financial support seems unlikely.
The arrest of Chiyangwa is supposedly linked to the three factions fighting within ZANU-PF over the succession to Mugabe - John Nkomo, party boss, Emmerson Mnangagwa, and Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi. Mugabe is thought to have removed his support for Mnangagwa after the latter was named in a recent UN report as heavily involved in the illegal diamond trade from the Democratic Republic of Congo. However both Mnangagwa and Sekeramayi are long term Mugabe allies and were involved in the massacres in Matabeleland in the 1980s. Conversely the Nkomo group are his key allies inside Matabeleland.
This is all part of what appears to be conflict between continuing the 'succession debate' on behalf of Mnangagwa and having no succession debate, meaning Mugabe stays in power. The easiest strategy is for Mugabe to put the succession on hold and proclaim he is staying out his period of office until 2008. This does little, however, to resolve internal and external questions of the legitimacy and sustainability of the regime or Mbeki's diplomatic strategy.
ZANU-PF is likely to continue a strategic mix of coercion, bribery and electoral manipulation for the forthcoming 2005 parliamentary elections. According to the Justice in Agriculture Group there is likely to be a 'ring around the cities' with land being granted to pro-ZANU-PF settlers in peri-urban areas plus some redrawing of urban constituencies to draw in rural dwellers under the party's control. The Harare government thus hopes to get a 'free and fair' verdict which would take the heat off, challenge the international community to lose interest and then be in a strong position to have the upper hand in post-election negotiations with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
In terms of negotiations after elections some elements of the MDC, weakened and weary of constant repression, infighting and lack of direction, may well be tempted to join a 'government of national unity'. Civil society would of course reject such a course given their demand for broad-based negotiations rather than elite deals but their capacity to push this demand is very limited at present.
Another element of the ZANU-PF strategy is the continued use of food as a political weapon in a situation where an estimated five million Zimbabweans will be reliant on food aid. The Famine Early Warning System estimates that Zimbabwe's 2004 season is likely to see a harvest of between 800,000 and 900,000 tonnes, 33 to 38 per cent below its cereal requirements. The government however has stockpiled 240,000 tonnes of maize, has supposedly bought 70,000 tonnes from South Africa and according to diplomatic sources has additional stocks that it has seized. Although the World Food Programme and international NGOs report little overt political interference, the grain at the government's direct disposal provides it with a powerful weapon at election time.
Nor have the Zimbabwean churches in what is a very religious society managed to present a united voice in response to the crisis (or crises). It seemed in mid 2003 that there had been a recovery of the prophetic voice when the leader of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches publicly apologised to Zimbabweans for not bearing witness to the crisis, but this has now been downplayed by the churches seeking to push a negotiations and peace building strategy. The church leaders' dialogue process with ZANU-PF and MDC appears on and off - possibly depending on how much pressure ZANU-PF feels itself under electorally, regionally and internationally (seemingly little at present).
Even if ZANU-PF has the upper hand it has substantial problems. According to the IMF in April 2004, 'Zimbabwe's economy has experienced a sharp deterioration in the last five years. Real GDP has declined by about 30% and is still contracting. Inflation doubled in each of the last three years to reach 600% at the end of 2003 Unemployment is high and rising, poverty has doubled since 1995, school enrolment declined to 65% in 2003, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic [affecting 25% of the sexually active population] remains largely unchecked.'
After a staff visit in March 2004, the IMF called for tripartite talks between government, business and the unions. This was in response to Kuruneri's attempt to reach accommodation with the IMF by making some small repayments to service debt. The IMF had suspended technical assistance in 2002 and in late 2003 initiated Zimbabwe's compulsory withdrawal due to Harare's lack of cooperation and unwillingness or inability to repay the US$273 million owed (53 per cent of its quota). Nor did Zimbabwe pay US$110 million owed to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) - the first and only country ever to have protracted overdue obligations to the PRGF.
It is unlikely that the dual interest rate regime, or the continuing fast track resettlement with its lack of recognition of property rights for either commercial farmers or the new settlers, will appeal to the IMF any more than Zimbabwe's chronic inability to pay its debts.
Nor is Gono's financial strategy guaranteed success economically or politically. Politically, big questions arise immediately - did the Cabinet understand the strategy and will Gono have the heavyweight political backing to carry it through? As Lovemore Madhuku asked, what happens when key ZANU-PF 'untouchables', such as those given licences to import oil without open tendering or favoured by other forms of party/state patronage, become dragged into the war against corruption?
There is little strategy either to address what a local activist in the Catholic church described as the country's simultaneous deprofessionalisation (driving professionals overseas and destroying the sector's autonomy) and decapitalisation. Fifteen to 20 per cent of the population (ie 2-3 million) is living outside the country, mostly as economic refugees, and 500,000, largely farmworkers, are internally displaced.
Even with all of its strategies for staying in power, most delivery systems have collapsed in Zimbabwe making it hard to sustain patronage systems, especially in the rural areas where ZANU-PF needs to maintain its iron grip. And whilst the factions inside ZANU-PF may have been temporarily silenced over the succession, the struggle remains ready to erupt again within the context of fighting over the Gono recovery strategy. Although renewed targeted sanctions against the elite are unlikely to have much material impact, the elite resents them, and they suggest not just (some) international disapproval, but also unwillingness to invest or lend money (not that Zimbabwe has much to offer at present).
There remains the possibility that Mbeki, freshly mandated from the April 2004 elections in South Africa and ready to concentrate on outside matters (although it would seem that peacekeeping in Burundi is of higher importance), will actually put more weight behind his June 2004 deadline. Few Zimbabweans I spoke to would, however, welcome a government of national unity, given that it would be a rerun of the Unity Accord of 1987 when ZANU-PF forced PF-ZAPU into the shotgun marriage of a de facto one-party state.
Without substantial constitutional and electoral changes, any such government of national unity would be suicidal for the MDC. Whilst opposition forces including the MDC have weakened under sustained assault inside the country they appear to have some hope that they are regrouping internationally and in the region. The MDC are currently examining whether or not they should contest the next elections given the manifest impossibility of them being free and fair.
What can outsiders do? What does the future hold?
Many of Zimbabwe's problems are of long term duration. The inheritance of violent colonial dispossession and dehumanisation with the response of (in Brian Kagoro's words) a 'violent and hegemonic struggle for decolonisation culminated in a largely symbolic independence devoid of material gain for the majority black population.' This meant an authoritarian elite unable/ unwilling to transform the repressive state colonial structures into democratic institutions, and the emergence of neo-patrimonialism and clientilist structures along with long lasting cultures of intolerance and impunity.
What development there was in the 1980s was concerned with state-building rather than nation-building, within the context initially of apartheid destabilisation, followed by structural adjustment. Once the post-apartheid, post Cold War moments arrived the implications of this history in terms of repression, corruption and abuse became clearer (except of course for kneejerk 'anti-imperialists').
So where do progressives go from here? There is still a massive ideological battle to be won between the prescriptions of what Patrick Bond has called 'exhausted nationalism' and global neo-liberalism, in line with many of the directions pointed to in the various world and regional social fora. Equally Bond points to an existing tradition inside Zimbabwe itself with work on alternate policies having in the past been pursued by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the coalitions on debt, the United Nations Development Programme, and not least the National Working People's Convention of 1999.
This may help to counter the pessimism of a Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) partner who saw at present 'a dearth of "thinking", a sort of anti-intellectualism in nearly every quarter and essentially a kind of absence of politics in the real sense, of positions and ideological clarity and coherence, of strategic thinking and organising.' He added that it is 'very significant that there is a very deep malaise and unhappiness among a large proportion of traditional leaders and spirit mediums, about the disregard for tradition and cultural wholeness.'
Certainly Zimbabweans, while happy to observe stayaways, have not shown great keenness to face the overwhelming firepower of the state on the streets. The sheer struggle for survival and the fact that remittances from abroad are helping keep them alive (and as Gono is aware, the economy as well) cannot be discounted in terms of seeming passivity in the face of desperate circumstances.
There is little leadership either from the MDC - which in any case has done well just to survive itself - from the trade unions or indeed the churches. Although there have been calls, notably by Morgan Tsvangirai, for a much greater coherence amongst opposition forces, notably the ZCTU, the National Constitutional Assembly and the MDC, the sector has great difficulty in doing this. It also has difficulty agreeing on tactics, including on mass action and what its aims are - overthrow Mugabe, force ZANU-PF to the negotiating table, etc. One thing that is unlikely to occur is any kind of armed response.
Outside Zimbabwe there have been a number of initiatives regionally and North-South in bringing together activists and academics in understanding the nature of the crisis. A particularly resonant one was the bringing together of the Zimbabwean and South African diasporas in London. There could be much greater North-South solidarity in a number of fora - NGO, academic, church and use of links with southern African organisations. Outside organisations need to provide support for those in Zimbabwe and the region who are providing information about the human rights and general situation inside Zimbabwe, and those under threat standing up to repression.
There is continuing need for pressure on the ANC government including from within the region. Pressure also needs to be directed at the other elements in the tripartite alliance such as the trade unions and the Communist Party, given Pretoria's assurances to the outside world that Mugabe would step down and serious negotiations would commence. What is it about a transition to democracy inside Zimbabwe that worries them more than the 'chaos that they know'? The International Crisis Group believes that the focus should be on promoting a free and fair election for March 2005 rather than pursuing the chimera of inter-party talks.
There should also be pressure for the long-delayed African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights report on Zimbabwe to be released as called for by Zimbabwean, regional and human rights organisations.
* Steve Kibble is the Africa/Yemen Advocacy Coordinator for the Catholic Institute for International Relations
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN AFRICA
Oduor Ong'wen
Throughout history, international trade has generated considerable controversy. While conceding that some trade was imperative, Aristotle observed that trade was disruptive of community life. Until the 19th Century, most European powers viewed trade as a form of undeclared warfare. Their objective was - and still remains - the maximization of benefits accruing to themselves and minimization of those accruing to rival nations. The weapons of choice in this warfare were import barriers.
The idea of trade as a mutually beneficial activity only gained currency and political momentum following David Ricardo's elaboration of the theory of comparative advantage in 1817. Today the free trade doctrine reigns supreme. Trade negotiations - at multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral levels - all focus on reduction and eventual elimination of trade barriers (a kind of disarmament treaty).
The removal of trade barriers in rich countries can accrue certain benefits for impoverished countries. But this can only occur when the economies of underdeveloped countries are accorded the right space to respond first and foremost to the fundamental developmental needs of these countries. Rapid import liberalization imposed on underdeveloped countries via structural adjustment programmes has more often than not intensified poverty and inequality.
The IMF, the World Bank, and most industrialized country governments are strong advocates of trade liberalization. In the case of the two Bretton Woods institutions, advocacy has been backed by loan conditions which require countries to reduce their trade barriers. Largely as a result of these loan conditions, poor countries have been opening their economies much more rapidly than industrialized countries. Average import tariffs have been halved in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, and cut by two-thirds in Latin America and East Asia.
Problems with Trade Liberalization
The popular view is that trade liberalization is an outcome of negotiated trade agreements. But, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) emphasizes that the principal vehicles for trade liberalization are the conditions attached to IMF and World Bank loans. That is, the IMF and World Bank disburse loans as, or when, borrowing governments comply with conditions, including trade-related conditions that are sometimes part of Structural Adjustment Programmes. The work programme of the Doha Agenda have been incorporated in IMF and World Bank SAPs for years.
Trade As If Nothing Else Mattered
Economists' training prepares them to build and have unshakeable belief in models that have not been successfully challenged. But they are not very well trained in how to rigorously verify their policy relevance for specific contexts. The models are often deployed on the assumption that they are relevant to a specific context without the benefit of supporting justification.
The assumption of applicability is perhaps the most widely deployed, yet unstated, auxiliary assumption used in economic policy analysis. It is especially concerning models dealing with underdeveloped countries where many of these assumptions below are routinely violated - especially those based on smoothly mobile labour and capital, complete and functioning markets, and perfect information flows.
Regional Integration and Regional Trade Agreements
Integration is once again a concept so much in vogue. The promoters of economic globalization are using it to justify the unprecedented expansion of the power of transnational corporations. The underdeveloped world, especially Africa, is being constantly reminded that it has to be integrated into the world economy if it is survive. The validity of this position will be examined briefly at some later stage. Integration means different things to different people. For some, it is an all-embracing union of contiguous countries and includes both economic and political areas. The United States of America, the United Kingdom and the former Soviet Union are perfect examples of this type of integration. For others, it is agreement among a group of countries to remove various kinds of trade barriers. In between these two extremes lie numerous types of arrangements. In all these arrangements, the overarching concern is the formation of a body with a common purpose, usually to increase human welfare.
Integration in Africa has been driven by two competing forces - one internal and the other external. Internal impetus to integration of African economies has been provided by the realization that the continent has over the centuries suffered wanton exploitation of its natural, material and financial resources at the hands of imperialist forces. The global economic arrangement since the 15th Century has defined for Africa its place in the international economic division of labour - to produce and export primary commodities in line with its perceived comparative advantage. Value adding by way of processing, manufacturing, packaging, branding etc. is left to industrialized countries. In other words, Africa produces what it does not consume and consumes what it does not produce.
The motivation for internally-driven integration derives from the following expected benefits:
- More efficient use of the region's capital, labour and natural resources, which are often less than optimally utilized nationally and has been exploited extensively by the industrialized countries.
- Developing the market, so that instead of fighting and bending backward to be 'granted' access to the markets of Europe and North America, Africa can begin producing first and foremost for its own markets.
- Reduced Costs of transaction within the region, as a result of reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers. This reduces monopolistic profits and leads to efficiency gains.
- Training effect, as national producers are gradually exposed to the regional market before the world market, since it is easier to compete in the regional market than in the global market. This could be a stepping stone to the outside world.
External interests also push for regional integration in Africa but for different reasons. The overarching motivation for externally-induced regional integration is to maintain the historical division of labour that assigns Africa the role of green field that feeds Northern industry with raw materials. Below are characteristics of externally-driven integration:
- High-tech, Low-value ghettoes: With the increasing demands for higher wages, improved working conditions and environmentally sound production methods, many transnational corporations are increasingly looking at Africa as possible sites for the assembly of their high technology exports such as electronics, auto and engineering products.
- Raw material reservoirs: In order to keep feeding the Northern industries with the necessary raw input, it is in the interest of industrialized economies to secure the source of minerals, agricultural commodities and other natural resource-based inputs. As it is cheaper to deal with a bigger entity with uniform policies and procedures than individual states with differing policies and often changing political moods.
- Entry points for multilateral negotiations: As resistance to many issues fronted by industrialised countries in the WTO intensifies, the North finds it easier forcing the issues through regional fora.
- Captive markets: Trade and trade negotiations are about accessing markets. Expansion and securing of African markets rank very high in the scheme of corporate interests in industrialized countries. It is the essence of integration of Africa into the global economy.
Cotonou Agreement
Perhaps the most important trade agreement outside the WTO agreements is the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and the European Union (EU) relation under the Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000. As a successor to the Lome Convention, which had guided these relations since 1975, the Cotonou Agreement has the following new characteristics;
- It breaks the solidarity of ACP countries by creating regional differentiation through negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).
- It introduces reciprocity.
- It seeks to be WTO compatible (Indeed, the EU proposals are WTO-plus).
- Creates uncertainty and confusion among Least Developed Countries.
AGOA
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), though not a trade agreement, deserves serious attention for its destructive effect on Africa's economy. The eligibility criteria undermine policy autonomy of African countries. Some of the worrying items in the criteria include:
- US strategic interests clause (War against terrorism).
- Rules of origin
- Free Trade Areas with SSA
- Monitoring and review
- Study on improving agricultural practices in Africa (GMOs?)
- Elimination of restrictions to US investments
Oduor Ong'wen heads the SEATINI Office in Kenya, in which this article was first published.
'AFRICA NEEDS ACTION NOT WORDS'
Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem
On Tuesday the first formal session of the embattled British Prime Ministers Commission for Africa took place. The commission of 14 including Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, South Africa's Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel and Dr K. Y. Amoako, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa and Live Aid hero and former Rock star turned global campaigner against poverty, Bob Geldof, was appointed earlier this year by Blair to study the causes of poverty in Africa.
The commission is also required to recommend concrete actions that can be taken globally to arrest the deteriorating condition of Africa in relation to other continents of the world in terms of growth and development.
The commission faces a lot of cynicism. This is understandable given the fact that the causes of poverty in Africa are not unknown. There have been too many reports on the condition of Africa. Therefore to many critics what has been lacking is the global political will to help Africa and Africans to develop the political will to help themselves.
The Blair Commission also invites parallels to a previous commission, the Willy Brandt Commission, of the 1980s. It made the right noises but its not-so-radical recommendations were not acted upon by the forces that matter internationally who had the power to reverse the image of Africa as the poor cousins of the rest of humanity.
Enthusiasts for the Blair initiative have three main arguments. One, Willy Brandt's Commission was composed of ex-heads of government, principally former German Chancellor Willy Brandt himself and former British Prime minister, Edward Heath. It could only recommend but had no power or authority to put its pocket where its mouth was. Inevitably, the commission's report became yet another document of pious hopes that governments could pay lip service to but not act upon without any political repercussions domestically or internationally. But this one has the backing of a sitting head of a major government and the representation of other powerful countries including the USA and Europe.
Two, the Blair Commission will benefit from two unprecedented historic coincidences. Tony Blair and Britain will be heading both the Vultures Club of the worlds dominant economic powers, the G8 and its first cousin, the European Union. And the British Premier would like to put Africa on top of the agenda. Finally, Blair's people insist that he is very committed to Africa and would like to use all his powers to convince other global leaders to do something for the continent.
Now let us look at the other side of the argument. On Brandt's Commission I will agree that an assembly of ex-this or ex-that could not have had any power of enforcement but only be hopeful of influence. However, the Brandt Commission failed not because of that but because it sought to realign Africa within the same global unequal economic relationship that has continued to disadvantage our peoples and other developing countries. It did not challenge the assumptions, it merely called for a pious change of heart from the beneficiaries of this systematic exploitation without asking for a fundamental change of the system.
It relied too much on the goodwill of the west without any faith in the ability of the poor and exploited peoples of the world to change their condition for the better, even though history teaches us that the goodness of oppressors is not enough and that reforms do not happen unless those who are oppressed are organised and able to resist to the point of threatening the whole system.
So a strategy that concentrates on mere change of heart at the top is doomed to become just preaching. Is the Blair Commission different in any way? It is dominated by Westerners! Even at the governmental level, Blair chose his African partners instead of going through Africa's own multilateral organisations be they regional or continental (AU). If there is no African consensus during the process, why should there be one after the report?
The voice of civil society in Africa is absent and even that of Europe has to rely on the maverick Geldof. One has to surrender disbelief to believe that the historic coincidence of Blair holding the G8 and EU Presidency in 2005 will make any difference to Africa. First, the G8 has had Africa on its agenda since but especially from its Genoa to Canada meetings.
The African pushers of the NEPAD agenda had false hope encouraged by Blair that a window of opportunity existed for the G8 to make a difference but where has that left them and their 'kneepad' now? As for Europe, the reputation of Blair and the influence of Britain are in grave doubt. He will be heading the EU at a time when his country may be in the middle of an election campaign to be followed by a rancorous referendum on Europe. Is this the prime minister that would influence his European counterparts to renew any commitment to Africa? A prime minister that has shown that his commitment to being poodle to Bush against Europe, the UN and the rest of the world, has lost any authority or influence to play a missionary for Africa.
And as for Blairs alleged commitment to Africa, I ask myself: how many British people will buy a used car from their prime minister now? But more importantly there is no shortage of reports, conferences, and workshops on Africa: Millennium Development Goals (MDG), UN Action Plan for Africa, G8 Action Plan and others. In Africa itself we have a whole raft of home grown initiatives from the African Alternative to Structural Adjustment Programmes. It is not words that Africa needs but concrete action from its peoples and the international community.
Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is General Secretary of the Global Pan African Movement, based in Kampala, Uganda and also Director of Justice Africa, based in London.
ZIMBABWE: HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS FACE CONTINUED HARRASSMENT
The Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) has condemned the continued rising wave of arbitrary arrest and detention of activists and human rights defenders in Zimbabwe. ZimRights' Deputy National Chairperson, Sheba Phiri was arbitrarily arrested by plain clothes police on 28 April, 2004 and detained at Bulawayo Central Police station together with other activists Mr Felix Mafa of PIFT, Goden Moyo of National Constitutional Assembly, Reggie Moyo of Bulawayo Agenda and two others. They were detained, interrogated and released two hours later.
AFRICA: REVIEWING THE BEIJING DECLARATION
"We are deeply concerned about the rapid spread of HIV infection in our countries and the millions of deaths caused by AIDS, which is testimony to the continued unequal power relations between women and men in our societies. The June 2001 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS established a clear link between women's inability to exercise their human rights and their vulnerability to HIV infection. As the majority of the continent's care givers women and girls experience first hand the devastating and severe impact of the diseases. We recognize that given women's subordinate position and lack of power special measures will be required to protect Africa's women and girls from all forms of public and private sexual and gender based violations." This is according to a communique that was presented by a SADC Gender NGO Focal Points Working Session that met in Lusaka 25 April to the Sub-regional Decade Review Meeting on the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA - Beijing + 10), on April 26 - 29. The meetings discussed and reviewed the main constraints and challenges encountered in implementing the 12 critical areas outlined in BPFA as obstacles to the advancement and well being of women.
BURKINA FASO: ELECTORAL CODE CHANGED AHEAD OF PRESIDENTIAL POLL
Burkina Faso's parliament has voted to change the country's electoral code, which the opposition fears will clear the way for another term in office for President Blaise Compaore in elections scheduled for November 2005. These changes, which were passed through parliament late Tuesday, will see the electoral unit of Burkina Faso changed from the region of which there are 15, to the province, which number 45.
NIGERIA: GOVERNANCE GROUP URGES CAUTION
Against the backdrop of the recent anti-Obasanjo demonstrations in Abuja and Lagos, Independent Advocacy Project (IAP), the good governance group, has called on the federal government and the police to exercise restraint in dealing with the situation. While noting that freedom of assembly is a fundamental right of all Nigerians, IAP however urged organisers of the rally to use only lawful means in protesting against the Obasanjo-led administration.
AFRICA: APPOINTMENT OF IMF HEAD DENOUNCED
The selection of the new Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Rodrigo Rato, confirms that the institution is controlled by a small number of governments, none of which are IMF clients, says the 50 Years is Enough Network. "The programs mandated by the IMF benefit business and investor interests in that same small groups of countries, but have done inestimable harm to literally billions of people in the rest of the world over the last 25 years. No Managing Director chosen by the IMF board would be likely to change the direction of the institution," said 50 Years is Enough in a statement.
SUDAN: A CULTURE DROWNED
Ali Askouri
The Merowe Dam, proposed for the Nile in Northern Sudan, demonstrates how not to plan and build a dam in the post-World Commission on Dams era. This project appears to violate virtually all of the WCD's strategic priorities. It will displace more than 50,000 people (mainly small farmers living along the Nile, whose lives will never be the same), have far-reaching environmental consequences, and inundate a historically rich area. The dam's impacts are expected to be great, and yet there is no project environmental impact assessment. Project planning has been non-transparent, and people who will be directly affected by it have not had their voices heard. Dissent against controversial dam projects in Sudan has been met with harsh government repression, and this project is no exception.
LESOTHO: CORRUPTION TRIALS KEEP ROLLING ALONG
Ryan Hoover
Few would have predicted that a small, impoverished mountainous kingdom in southern Africa would set new precedents in the global fight against corruption, but, against all odds, the government of Lesotho continues to do just that. For the past five years, Lesotho has been doggedly prosecuting multinational companies who paid approximately $2 million in bribes to the former chief executive of the World Bank-funded Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a massive dam scheme that affected thousands of rural families. Their efforts have been remarkably successful. The former chief executive was sentenced to 12 years in prison; a South African man pled guilty to acting as a conduit for the bribes; and, most importantly, three multinational companies have been convicted and fined.
AFRICA/GLOBAL: EDUCATION KEY IN AIDS BATTLE
Bradford McIntyre
Education is paramount if we are to reach individuals infected with HIV and those living with AIDS. Obviously, our best resource is from those who are affected by the disease! Information is not reaching those most in need and there is a certain mistrust of science and medicine. People are afraid. Many have only seen or heard of people dying and many people believe the drugs will kill them. It is important that they learn from those whose lives have been saved and who have benefited from the drug treatments, renewing a quality of life they would not have had otherwise. Who better to explain the realities of living with HIV?
AFRICA: GROUPS PROTEST AT WFP OVER GM
More than 60 groups representing farmer, consumer, environmental and development organisations from 15 African countries have sent an open letter of protest to the World Food Programme (WFP). These groups are protesting against the pressure exerted by the WFP and USAID on Sudan and Angola over their respective decisions to impose restrictions on GM food aid. The groups are demanding that the WFP and USAID immediately desist from misleading the governments of Angola and Sudan with a scenario of 'No Choice', and forcing them to accept GM food aid.
AFRICA/GLOBAL: PRESS FREEDOM SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL WORLDWIDE DECLINE IN 2003, SAYS FREEDOM HOUSE
Press freedom suffered a substantial worldwide decline in 2003, according to a major study released by Freedom House. Legal harassment, political pressure, and violence by state and non-state actors against journalists combined to worsen conditions in many countries, resulting in the second consecutive year of a global decline in freedom for news media. The report was released to mark World Press Freedom Day on May 3. The survey assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and Internet freedom in every country in the world and assigns to each a category rating of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. It analyzes events during the calendar year 2003.
AFRICA: CREDO CALLS FOR REPEAL OF ANTI-MEDIA LAWS
On the occasion of World Press Freedom Day 2004, CREDO for Freedom of Expression and Associated Rights emphasised the importance of press freedom and freedom of expression to democracy, stability and development. While agreeing with UNESCO's global theme of conflict as a serious threat to the media, CREDO's Coordinator Rotimi Sankore stated "it is important to pay attention to the causes as well as the consequences of conflict. A significant cause of conflict in many countries is a lack of the freedoms of expression, association, assembly and political participation." "In this context the greatest threat to the media and individual journalists in Africa remains the legal and institutional framework for media law and practice. Criminal defamation laws, sedition and insult laws, absence of freedom of and access to information, illegal licensing of media outlets and journalists, and systematic intimidation is still being used to attack the media, undermine democracy and pave the way for conflict which in turn, further endangers the media."
BENIN: JOURNALIST SCHEDULED TO REAPPEAR IN COURT
Jean-Baptiste Hounkonnou, publication director of the Beninese independent daily Le Nouvel Essor, has been granted a provisional release after spending six weeks in jail on criminal defamation charges. On April 27, Benin's Court of Appeal granted Hounkonnou's request for provisional release, and he was freed the same day, according to sources. He is due to reappear in court on May 27 and could face jail time again if he loses the appeal.
SOUTHERN AFRICA: MISA RELEASES STATE OF THE MEDIA REPORT
The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) released on World Press Freedom Day its annual publication, "So This Is Democracy?: State of media freedom in Southern Africa". This is the tenth consecutive year in which MISA has issued this publication, which records incidents of media freedom violations monitored by MISA in the previous year. The current edition therefore details media freedom violations in 2003. MISA issued 188 alerts in 2003 about media freedom and freedom of expression violations in SADC countries. This is a decrease of 9,7 per cent over the 208 alerts recorded in the previous year.
AFRICAN DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT DAY
Hundreds of Africans and their organisations will gather on Saturday 3rd July 2004 at London's City Hall for African Diaspora and Development Day. The day has become the biggest gathering of Africans in the UK involved in supporting Africa's development. Featuring seminars, workshops, exhibitions, an African development market, and a keynote address by renowned West African gender activist, Yassine Fall, the day will also provide an opportunity for African diaspora organisations to meet with other development agencies - donors, policy-makers, pan-African development institutions and international NGOs - to share information and chart a way forward for the UK diaspora's role in Africa's development.
DAY SCHOOL ON NEOCOLONIAL PROXY WARS IN AFRICA
15 May 2004, London, United Kingdom
The African Liberation Support Campaign Network (ALISC Network) and the Hackney Stop The War Coalition are jointly organising a Day School on Neocolonial Proxy Wars In Africa.
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