11 April 2005
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Where the population really gets invested in this is when they do the election, which is between the third and fourth year. That's when, for the first time the old parties, and any new parties that emerge, including, I assume, some of these Darfurian rebels, will be able to demonstrate their popular support in a way that will change things in the legislatures - the legislatures in the provinces, but also in the center.
For a number of reasons, because of the six-year transition agreement, the presidency itself is held until the end, so that the top man, if you will, the man with the most to lose in a new Sudan to some degree, will be in place until a lot of this change takes place. But it's really possible if the DUP and the Yuma parties still have their old robustness, and the labor unions that used to be so significant in old Sudan, if they begin to reappear as political actors, there's every reason to believe that they can demonstrate that power. And then, the very last thing after the referendum for the south, they move on to a presidential election.
The last real election was '86, the last civilian government was thrown out in '89. These institutions have all atrophied over 14 years. They need the time to revitalize themselves. We in the West need time to help them revitalize. The Arab league needs the time, since a lot of these are Arab parties, to re-establish them as real parties. So the fact that this transition is slow, maybe slower than some want, has some good news hidden in it, and all that begins with this constitution process, flawed though it is. It's a way to take down a hard-line government, expand it and open it, in a fashion in which there may be a new Sudan when we're done, that will be less violent and a hell of a lot more prosperous. And hopefully begin to find a way to reconcile the huge number of ethnic groups inside Sudan in some kind of a system that represents them. Maybe not perfectly, but much more perfectly than now.
So that work is starting. What comes next?
Once the constitution is passed, ratified, then for the first time John Garang's position as the leader of the government of the Southern Sudan, and his position as vice-president exists. That's the moment in which the government really becomes a transition government. They've already begun discussing how they share the cabinet spaces and power, and they've learned from past agreements that failed. The old Addis agreement called for a universal sharing of all the cabinet positions. This one actually divides the cabinet positions up into five or six boxes, in which there are four or five cabinet offices. And they've agreed to split these positions more or less fifty/fifty in some of the key boxes.
I would hope that the smarter politicians would find a way to bring in to this coalition some of the other smaller parties, give them some of these seats, [looking ahead] to the fact that this government has to stand for a real election three or four years.
What is the time frame for getting the constitution and new government into place?
The 'pre-interim period', as we called it - the six months before the six years - was supposed to start from the day of the signatures - January 9. Theoretically they're supposed to be done by July 9 with the constitution and with Garang being in position and the transition government being in place. My guess is they're running about two months behind.
Even though the constitution-writing formation process is behind, the forming of the cabinet - since they're having these discussions anyway - could move rapidly [and] make up some of the time lost, though not necessarily all of it. I'm thinking we're not going to hit July 9, but I'd be unhappy if we didn't hit early September.
How will Darfur impact the Oslo conference?
Darfur has to some degree injected a large 'but' clause, with some donors now saying: 'I'm prepared to give "x" number of dollars, but I won't release some of the infrastructure money until I'm convinced that the Darfur situation is on the road to resolution.'
I doubt that anybody will take the view that it has to be resolved. That would be probably a bridge too far in Sudan in its current circumstances, but I think there has to be a clear sense its on its way to resolution. I think you'll see some serious pledging going on in the south, because there's no reason to believe with the peace and tranquility since that was a disadvantaged area, that some infrastructural projects couldn't proceed. But again unless you're approaching this holistically, including Darfur, and the northern part of the country, there are limits to what you can do to real infrastructural development, that doesn't risk making the situation even worse. You'll see a very mixed picture - good in terms of money pledged, but also some conditionality.
What role do you foresee for private sector involvement in Sudan?
The real tragedy of Sudan will be if we don't get Darfur under control and don't take advantage of this probably once-in-a-decade opportunity to jump-start Sudan, probably all the way into the lower middle-income class. The country is potentially rich, thanks to the oil wealth, and to some degree actually to its wealth in its people. Sudan is one of those places where there are refineries. Sudan is a country that can manufacture its own weapons and ammunition. Not that that's a good thing, but that kind of sophistication and technique can also be applied to manufacturing automobiles and other kinds of things.
Sudan can be a real success story, but what it needs is the kind of debt relief and World Bank assistance that it won't get unless Darfur is turned around and unless the abuse of the populations in the marginalized areas ceases. That's the big 'but' across the board.
We're the largest debtor to Sudan. We will not do anything about that until we're convinced that Darfur is headed on the way to success. And without that, a lot of the international financial institutions won't provide the funds to build another pipeline, double the size of the pipeline, put the port facilities back into shape, put in a road system.
Sudan could actually become the bread basket of the Middle East, never mind the oil merchant in the horn of Africa. There has not been a sophisticated assessment of the oil probably in 15 years, since Chevron left. I suspect the oil pool is larger than the current statistics everyone's using. So there's a reason to believe that the wherewithal to drive this is there.
How much of a factor, or how serious, is the HIV/Aids situation there?
It's a very mixed picture in Sudan. It's not a major problem in the north. Considering the population, it's not the kind of problem you would expect. It's not even as large a problem as you would expect in the south, given the chaos over the years. It's a case where a decent medical infrastructure being put in as part of this development project could actually help them get ahead of this crisis.
We still have a chance to get ahead of it, but it depends on getting pledges at the Oslo conference, getting the health and education sector empowered, getting the women's issues, and the empowerment of women, which we've found in many places to be one of the key things in to turning the HIV/Aids thing. All those development projects are really the answer, because it's not yet out of control in Sudan. We have a chance to do the right thing here.
You mentioned the constitution. How much consultation with civil society was done in its drafting?
It's based on the existing Sudanese constitution, which went through the fire in the '80s, was then modified when the Islamicists came in, who turned it into a more Islamic constitution. But many of the underlying features, many of the paragraphs, actually are still untouched.
There's never been anything wrong with the underlying Sudan constitution. The problem has always been the execution and implementation. The Islamic features are modified by the agreement that's been made, the comprehensive peace agreement. One of the first problems they solved is the Sharia problem, which now has to be codified and pieces of the constitution changed. That's what this interim committee is supposed to do.
Is state-sponsored terrorism still a problem in Sudan?
They've done almost everything we've asked them to do on the terrorist front. We're fairly well satisfied with that. From a practical point of view, in terms of international terrorism, I give them a better than `A' grade. But again, you've got that "but" problem. With Darfur not being resolved in a satisfactory fashion, there's a question mark over the whole counter-terrorism thing.
Snyder, who heads the Office of Sudan Programs in the State Department, served previously as principal deputy assistant secretary of State Africa and then as acting assistant secretary during late 2003 and early 2004.
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