Toronto — In an open letter to President Yoweri Museveni published recently, Professor Mahmoud Mamdani makes reference to Dr Kizza Besigye's trial and its implications for the "demilitarisation of the political process." Given that the term is usually synonymous with state failure, some commentators, including John Nagenda, have questioned its relevance to Uganda. The underlying argument, emphasized a few months ago by Information Minister, Dr Nsaba Buturo, is that Uganda is not a failed state. Yet, the debate as to whether or not Uganda is a failed state misses the crucial point, which is that it is a weak state, and one that is edging dangerously in the direction of failure.

The phenomenon of state failure is much more nuanced than the simplistic dichotomy between "failed" and "functional" states would suggest. There is, in particular, a wide continuum between these two extremes, one which ranges from "functional" states, through "weak" ones, and "failing/failed" ones, to "collapsed" states.

While the criteria at each stage may vary across countries, there is broad agreement that weak states are those characterised by general crisis, including widespread corruption, inefficient public services, repeated violations of the rule of law, and ethnic/religious or other inter-communal tensions.

Interestingly, such states may also appear to have a functional democratic system (marked by elections), which, nonetheless, only masks a deeper detachment between state and citizenry. Indeed, the only factor that stands between "weakness" and "failure" is the absence of widespread (as opposed to localised) conflict.

Even the most blinkered commentator will find it hard to argue that none of the foregoing criteria apply to Uganda. In other words, Uganda may not be a failed state, but it most definitely is a weak one. Furthermore, it is one that is not only emerging from conflict, but remains vulnerable to a relapse into widespread violence.

Contextualised this way, the demilitarisation of politics becomes relevant. The term generally relates to situations where a state with a history of civil conflict is making a transformation to a non-violent political dispensation. Conflict often creates an ethos that differs significantly from that of a non-violent order.

The most visible (though not the sole) manifestation of this is the emergence of a "war economy" in which several individuals acquire vested interests in the prevalence of violence and push for the perpetuation of conflict. More importantly, this violent way of life is largely a mindset which cannot be destroyed by merely arranging multiparty elections. Stated differently, every country recovering from conflict needs to make an effort to transform erstwhile soldiers, rebels, and other protagonists of conflict into progressive agents acting within a peaceful dispensation. This requires an unequivocal demonstration of non-violent means as being more beneficial (politically and economically).

While Uganda's diverse ethnic constituencies make it unlikely that it will ever become a culturally homogenous "nation state", an effort can, and should be, made towards achieving a more heterogeneous and, thus, appropriate nationhood, and thereby become a "territorial state". The earlier process that would have lead to such nationhood (which is a condition sine qua non of functional statehood) was, sadly, disrupted, first by colonialism, and thereafter, by a largely illegitimate post-colonial state structure which relied mostly on coercion, while making little effort to earn genuine legitimacy from its citizenry.

Overcoming the ensuing legacy of conflict and dysfunctional statehood will, therefore, require much more than impressive economic indicators or multiparty elections, and particularly calls for a re-ignition of the nation-building process. The point here is that the relative peace and prosperity enjoyed by Uganda over the last twenty years should not divert attention from the fact that its nationhood still needs construction. Similarly, the ongoing transition to multiparty democracy, while positive, must not be allowed to obscure the fact that Uganda is still coming to terms with a strong legacy of past and ongoing conflict.

It is against this background that Dr Besigye's trial must be viewed. Whatever its (de)merits in terms of justice and the rule of law, the trial is bound to send a signal to other (erstwhile and present) soldiers and rebels as to whether it is possible to make a safe and rewarding transition from military to civilian political and economic life.

Justice and national security ought to rank high on any state's list of priorities and the argument here is not that such goals should be ignored.

As Liberia's 1997 experience demonstrated, even a free and fair election will not suffice to ensure long term stability, if such election is not under-girded by a conscious effort at demilitarisation, reconciliation, and nation-building.