Daniel Volman
25 May 2006
(Page 2 of 2)
Expanding U.S. Naval Operations in Africa
In recognition both of Africa's growing role as a supplier of oil to the United States, the U.S. Navy has significantly increased its presence in African waters. Much of this activity is focused in the Gulf of Guinea, the body of water closest to the major West African oil producers and itself the site of some of Africa's most promising offshore oil reserves. The U.S. Navy has also conducted joint training operations with the naval forces of African states and engaged them in joint discussion of security problems in the region. A number of recent naval exercises and other events are evidence of the active interest in Africa now being taken by the U.S. Navy.
In May 2003, NATO Supreme Commander General James Jones indicated that in the future, U.S. naval forces under his command would spend much less time in the Mediterranean Sea. Instead, he predicted, "I'll bet they'll spend half the time going down the west coast of Africa." The most impressive demonstration of this new posture came in July 2004, when the United States carried out the "Summer Pulse 04" exercise. This exercise was explicitly designed to show that the United States could carry out naval operations simultaneously in every part of the world and, thus, that U.S. naval forces could respond to a crisis in one part of the world even if it was already engaged elsewhere. The African element of the exercise was conducted off the coast of Morocco, where the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise commanded a U.S. carrier battle group that led a massive joint exercise with naval forces from nine countries, including NATO counties and Morocco itself. The exercise involved a total of 20,000 personnel (both sailors and marines) on board 30 ships.
In October 2004, the U.S. European Command (EURCOM) hosted a three-day Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Conference in Naples, Italy (headquarters of the U.S. Sixth Fleet). Participants included naval leaders from Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, São Tomé, and Togo, along with personnel from the United States, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The conference reportedly focused on common efforts to combat threats posed by piracy, smuggling, and drug trafficking, as well as the fight against terrorism. It ended with joint statement pledging participants to engage in ongoing dialogue, cooperation, and joint activities.
In January 25, 2005, the U.S. Navy commenced a two-month Gulf of Guinea Deployment with participation by the USS Emory S. Land, carrying about 1,400 sailors and Marines. The deployment was the direct result of the 2004 Maritime Security Conference held in October 2004, and involved port calls at Douala, Cameroon; Port Gentil, Gabon; and Sekondi, Ghana. Instructors and sailors from Cameroon, São Tomé, Gabon, Ghana, and Benin also participated in the operation. A second Gulf of Guinea Deployment was conducted in May-July 2005, with participation by the US Coast Guard Cutter Bear.
From late-June to early-July 2005, the U.S. Navy held ten days of exercises in the Mediterranean Sea with naval forces from Britain, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The exercises, known as "Barbary Thunder II," consisted of joint maritime interdiction operations by U.S. Marines along with their counterparts from Italy, Morocco, and Algeria.
And on September 27, 2005, the U.S. Navy commenced a five-week West African Training Cruise (WATC) exercise with the deployment of the dock landing ship USS Gunston Hall and the high-speed vessel Swift. Host nations for the WATC include Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, and Morocco. Planned activities include small boat training, live-fire exercises, and amphibious raids. At the same time, American sailors and Marines participated in Exercise Green Osprey, a British-led amphibious landing exercise on the coast of Senegal.
These operations are particularly significant because they constitute the necessary preparation for what are, in fact, the most likely scenarios for direct U.S. intervention in Africa. While land bases would be required for large-scale ground operations—as, for example during humanitarian relief operations or to actually try to occupy and control large parts of a country like Nigeria should that ever be contemplated—they would not be needed for more focused attacks, such as air strikes or airborne assaults against insurgents who threatened to interrupt oil supplies. Not only would Washington prefer to avoid establishing a highly visible, and thus highly provocative, presence on the ground in Africa, it would actually be easier for the United States to conduct such operations from an off-shore naval armada which could be rushed to oil-rich regions of Africa at short notice in less than a week.
The Search for Bases in Africa
However, to ensure that the United States can deploy troops and equipment to Africa, particularly in times of emergency when even a few days might be to long to wait, the DoD is now beginning to establish a basing infrastructure in Africa, again following the trajectory first seen in the Gulf and the Caspian regions. In recognition of Africa's colonial past and likely popular resistance to anything resembling a permanent military garrison, the DoD does not seek elaborate installations but rather "bare-bones" facilities – usually an airstrip, basic communications links, and a warehouse or two – that can be tended by local troops or contract personnel most of the time, until needed by American forces for particular operations. Although Pentagon officials tend to emphasize the threat from terrorism when discussing the need for such facilities, they have also expressed a need to protect the flow of oil. In 2003, for example, a senior Pentagon official told Greg Jaffe of the Wall Street Journal, "a key mission for U.S. forces [in Africa] would be to ensure that Nigeria's oil fields, which in the future could account for as much as 25 percent of all U.S. oil imports, are secure."
Among the countries that have reportedly been considered as a potential site for the establishment of a U.S. military base in Africa is the island state of São Tomé e Principe. São Tomé is located in the Gulf of Guinea near the major West African oil producers, yet is conveniently distant from the ethnic and political strife that has often overtaken countries on the mainland; it is also expected to be a major oil exporter itself, in conjunction with Nigeria (with which is has established a Joint Development Zone in the Gulf of Guinea.) Although the DoD has not formally expressed an interest in acquiring a base there, the Deputy Commander of the U.S. European Command (EURCOM), which exercises command authority over much of sub-Saharan Africa, visited the islands in July 2001 to examine possible basing locations.
In its efforts to secure other basing options, the United States has negotiated agreements granting it access to airfields and other facilities in several African nations. These facilities are often referred to as "lily pad" facilities, because American forces can hop in and out of them in times of crisis while avoiding the impression of establishing a permanent—and potentially provocative—presence. They include Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where the DoD has built two "K-Span" steel buildings to house troops and equipment; an airfield near Bamako, the capital of Mali; an airfield at Dakar, Senegal; an airfield in Gabon; and airfields and port facilities in Morocco and Tunisia.
The DoD has also sought basing facilities in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, primarily to support anti-terror operations in the region. After 9/11, the United States received permission from Djibouti to use Camp Lemonier as the headquarters for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, a multinational naval force led by the United States that monitors and interdicts possible terrorist travel routes at sea and suspected terrorist activities in adjacent countries, specifically in Somalia. Along with the headquarters element, 800 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) troops have set up base at Camp Lemonier. Likewise, under an agreement reportedly signed in July 2003 during Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's visit to Washington, the DoD was granted the right to use the airfield at Tamanrasset, in southern Algeria, for the deployment of US P-3 Orion aerial surveillance aircraft. (In March 2004, P-3 "Orion" aerial surveillance aircraft based at Tamanrasset were reportedly used to gather intelligence on the activities of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to forward this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the Salafists.)
Conclusions
It is still early days, but the United States has already dramatically increased its military presence in Africa and its military links with oil-rich African governments. Whether all this will lead to something greater–and potentially far more perilous—is something that cannot be foreseen at this point, but it is certainly something that bears close watching, given the dangers this could pose for the states and peoples of Africa.
Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and the author of numerous articles on US security policy and African security issues.
RESEARCH PAPER:
U.S. Military Programs In Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2007
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