The Reporter (Addis Ababa)
Professor Kinfe Abraha
21 October 2006
analysis
Part II
The Islamist group that now controls Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, has emerged out of a judicial system funded by the powerful business community to try and bring some law and order to a country without a government.
But over the last two to three years (2004-2006), the Union of Islamic Courts has become Somalia's strongest army - forcing the warlords who had controlled the capital for the past 15 years into retreat.
According to the BBC Somali Service editor, Yusuf Garaad Omar, they are currently "the most popular political force in southern Somalia". There are 11 autonomous courts in Mogadishu, some of which have periodically tried to clamp down on robbery, drugs and pornographic films which are shown in local video houses.
At first, they concentrated on petty crimes, but by the mid-1990s they had progressed towards dealing with major crimes in north Mogadishu. Thieves had their limbs amputated and murderers were executed. This has happened in spite of protests from human rights organizations. Yet, it is said that the residents of north Mogadishu were pleased to enjoy law and order - in stark contrast to south Mogadishu, where crime was rampant.
The system has since further expanded and the Islamic courts are said to have validated transactions of the purchase of houses and cars. They also oversee weddings and divorces and have expanded their authority across most of the capital, while staying out of politics until recently. As a result, they were trusted by the people, who had no other institutions to refer to.
Most of the Islamic courts have expressed a clear desire to promote Islamic law rather than clan allegiance, which has divided Somalis over the past 15 years. Nevertheless, all but one of the 11 courts is associated with just one clan - the Hawiye, who dominate the capital, but they are divided into sub-clans. In order to avoid accusations of clan bias, each court tries members of its sub-clan, wherever alleged crimes are committed. Some clan elders in north Mogadishu have now set up their own court, independent of the union.
Until recently, the union's public face was chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate who sought to assure Somalis and the international community that the Islamic Courts were no a threat to international peace and that they only wanted order. Mr. Ahmed, 32, is a law graduate from Libya and a former secondary school geography teacher.
Nevertheless, it is widely believed that the union contains radical elements such as Sheikh Dahir Aweys who recently replaced Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as chairman. The new chairman is clearly radical and close to Eritrea, which is promoting a proxy war on Ethiopia from Somalia. In fact, it is as a result of his close connection with the Eritrean leadership that he recently declared Jihad on Ethiopia. Sheikh Aweys and his associates are also said to have an uneasy relationship with Kenya on which they recently launched a vitriolic allegation. For details on the political and religious position of Sheir Dahir Aweys, please see his pronouncements in annex II.
Two of the 11 courts are seen as militant and one of them is led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. He is on the list of US terrorism suspects. One reason for this is that he was the former leader of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, which is linked to al-Qaeda. According to Mr Aweys, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya no longer exists, but this is seriously contested by Somalia analysts. He also denies accusations by some western diplomats and observers that there are training grounds for Islamic fighters in Somalia. Further, he is strongly critical of the United States and its "war on terror".
Western diplomats are also concerned by Afghanistan-trained militia commander Adan Hashi Ayro, whose militiamen have been implicated in numerous killings of Somali nationals, as well as five foreign aid workers and a BBC producer, Kate Peyton.
It is alleged that the extremist leaders derive their support from rank and file Somalis who had increasingly turned to their faith for some sort of solace and comfort. One visible evidence of this is that before the civil war began in the 1980s, very few women wore headscarves in Mogadishu, but at present almost every woman wears a headscarf and an increasing number are wearing veils covering their faces, with just narrow slits for the eyes.
Even those Mogadishu residents who are wary of Islamic extremism may welcome a single group being in control of the capital for the first time in 15 years, hoping that there would at least be some form of authority and control. This does not however mean they wouldn't look for a democratic alternative government such as an empowered TFG and an eventual elected government.
Nevertheless, there is no doubting the fact that they were averse to the warlords who looted the city since 1991 and rendered it anarchic. As a result, according to Yusuf Garaad Omar, the warlords were hated even more because of the widespread belief that they were being backed by the United States to fight the Union of Sharia Courts. This is so because most Somalis in Mogadishu are suspicious of the US because of the legacy of the humanitarian intervention which went disastrously wrong leading to the death of about 1,000 Somalis and 18 US troops in 1993.
Conclusion
The conflict which still afflicts Somalia remains a serious challenge to the region as well as African and global security. As noted earlier, the situation has been exacerbated by the defeat of the faction leaders or warlords by the Union of Islamists Courts (UIC) on June 7, 2006, in Mogadishu.
The changed situation has precipitated a new crisis in Somalia. The meetings held on July 7 and September 2-4, 2006, between the TFG and UIC in Khartoum under the auspices of the Arab League in an attempt to narrow the gap between the two have resulted in a number of important agreements. These include the agreement to maintain the truce of June 7, 2006, form joint police and armed forces and a decision to hold another meeting on October 30th, 2006 to address the issue of power sharing and political settlement.
The above accords augur well for an eventual resolution of the current conflict peacefully. Nevertheless, these would still require a lot of lobbying and persuasion on the part of the international community, including the UN, Arab League, African Union, EU, the US and IGAD countries which are key interlocutors in the Somalia crisis.
The above should be seen against the backdrop of all previous peace efforts, from Sodere (Ethiopia, 1996-98), Arta (Djibouti, 2000) through Eldoret and Mbagathi (Kenya, 2002-2004) plus several other initiatives, including those of some Arab states like Egypt and Yemen which did not fully succeed in restoring peace and statehood to Somalia.
The new crisis in Southern Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, is also an indirect consequence of the poor leadership provided by the warlords of Mogadishu which resulted in their humiliating defeat at the hands of the UIC.
Unfortunately, the absence of unity of purpose among the Somali faction leaders was also reflected in the lack of interest witnessed among some of the external players or interlocutors. At times, the absence of some Frontline IGAD States and other important interlocutors had a divisive effect on the pursuit of peace. Nonetheless, the 5th IGAD Ministerial Facilitation Committee Meeting, held on May 6, 2004 in Nairobi, and attended by Ministers from all the IGAD countries had made a significant headway by way of fostering cohesion. This active engagement of IGAD countries should also be continued in the context of the new crisis which faces Somalia.
In the above connection, Ethiopia, Kenya and the other IGAD countries, the US as well as the IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF), League of Arab States (LAS) and the international community at large that have been trying to assist Somalia achieve peace and statehood, should continue to be seized with the pursuit of a peaceful settlement to the conflict between the TFG and the UIC.
The above failing, the international community should adopt a multi-pronged strategy of alternating carrots and sticks as appropriate. Further, in the context of power-sharing the political clout, social base and capacity of the different political actors to cause damage which can have adverse effect on the future of Somalia should be given serious consideration. This would call for a strategy of damage control. A mechanism of preventing an assault coming from the UIC should also be given due consideration by extending all necessary financial and military support to the TFG in order to maintain a balance of power which would make it possible to mediate between the two adversarial forces currently operating in Somalia.
This is important in view of the negative impact of the prevailing insecurity partly caused by the proliferation of arms in the country which has dire consequences on the social fabric of the Somali society and the daily livelihood of ordinary people. This has recently been compounded by the interference of external players such as Eritrea which the United Nations arms monitoring group has accused of making large shipment of personnel and weapons to Somalia adding to the current state of instability in the country.
Given the above, the international community, the AU, IGAD member states, League of Arab States, the UN, United States, EU and others should remain seized with finding a durable solution to the current problem with which Somalia is embattled because of the confrontation between the TFG and the UIC.
Concerted efforts should also be made in the upcoming meetings of the UIC and TFG, including the one scheduled for October 30, 2006. This should include talking to the two groups separately in an attempt to persuade them to make all necessary concessions in order to narrow the gap and bring them together in the interest of Somalia and the Somali people at large. Here, the role which the League of Arab States can play together with the AU and IGAD member states need not be over emphasized.
Annex I
Excerpts from the Report of the Arms Embargo Violation Monitoring Group, submitted to the United Nations Security Council
Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde arrived in Asmara on or about 14 November 2005 from Saudi Arabia. Indohaadde went to Eritrea to obtain assurances that arms would be supplied by the Eritrean authorities to the Al-Itihad leadership in Mogadishu. Indohaadde returned to Somalia, arriving in Mogadishu on or about 21 November 2005.
Also, on or about 14 November 2005, officials from the Eritrean Foreign Office who were posing as businessmen arrived in Mogadishu. The team met with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. The same delegation also met with the spokesman of the members of the transitional federal institutions in Mogadishu,
Colonel Omar Hashi Adan briefed them on the situation in Somalia and thereafter appealed for extensive Eritrean support to match the continuous assistance allegedly given to the TFG by Ethiopian. The Eritrean officials told Colonel Hashi to put his request to the Eritrean representative in Mogadishu. The delegation also expressed a keen interest in supporting the militant fundamentalists for the purpose of using them as a platform to mobilize and support an anti-Ethiopia agenda, also directed at the Ethiopian opposition elements (insurgent groups).
The Eritrean envoy in Mogadishu is Elias Habteselassie. As his ability to move freely around Mogadishu is limited, he operates through an informal local network of people, including a number of local assistants. The envoy's activities are dominated by dealings with dissident Ethiopian ethnic groups who are concentrated in Banaadir and the Lower Shabelle regions. Accordingly, he has been instrumental in developing good cooperation between the militants and the dissident ethnic groups.
During the aforesaid periods, the Government of Eritrea provided at least four separate consignments of arms, ammunitions and military equipment. This was directly sent from Asmara to Baledogle airport (Lower Shabelle region). The types of weapons and equipment sent are given below:
200 boxes of Zu-23 ammunition (anti-aircraft);
200 boxes of B-10 ammunition (anti-tank);
200 boxes of DShK ammunition (anti-aircraft);
200 boxes of Browning M2. 50 ammunitions (heavy machine guns) Ammunition for ZP-39 (anti-aircraft);
50 rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) launchers and boxes of ammunitions (anti-tank);
50 light anti-armour weapons;
50 M-79 grenade launchers; and
Communications equipment to be mounted on technicals.
The consignments were delivered by Elias Habteselassie to Sheikh Abdisalan Ali Ibrahim, a military commander of the militant fundamentalists;
Around 5 March 2006, an aircraft arrived at Baledogle airport from Eritrea, containing the following arms, ammunitions and military equipment:
1,000 AK-47 (short version);
1,000 pairs of binoculars;
1000 remote-control bombs;
1,000 anti-personnel mines;
Ammunitions for 120mm mortar;
Around 7 March 2006, and again around 14 March 2006, a vessel arrived from Eritrea at the port of El Ma'an, north of Mogadishu. The vessels contained ammunitions for the UIC.
Annex II
Selected Pronouncements by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Leaders of the Council of Islamic Courts
"We must follow the rule of law laid down by Allah. I do not think Somalis will oppose the adoption of the rule of Allah...America is not our God and they are not our leaders. We feel much more superior than America. We are people who believe in Allah; let them do whatever they want."
-Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys
June 27, 2006
"If being a Muslim is crime, I am a Muslim...We will negotiate with [the 'Transitional Federal Government'], discuss and remove the secular articles that are opposed to the Islamic law. The TFG should accept this because the TFG members are also Muslim."
-Ibid.
"We are Muslims and we must work at implementing Quranic law. Democracy will never work."
- Sheikh Mohammed Siad
June 13, 2006
"I would rather not answer this."*
- Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad
June 16, 2006
"I don't think anybody will ask us to do that [arrest terrorist suspects]. We are not assigned to arrest people for them, as you know...[The United States has] no right to do that. As you know, we don't work for the Americans."
-Idem, June 9, 2006
"There are different reports on who is responsible [for the 9/11 attacks]: al-Qaeda, the Jews, even the Americans themselves. It is not right for us to talk about it when real facts are not available."
-Ibid.
"All Somalis must defend the Islamic Courts because this is not inter-clan fighting, but war against the infidels. The fighting is between those who support Islam, and godless invaders and those who support them."
-Sheikh Nur Barud
June 7, 2006
"I personally wrote a letter to Bush to tell him that he will lose the war he is waging against the Somali people. The American government doesn't want Somalia to return the rule of law and order, because it is afraid of the emergence of an Islamic government for Somalia that will rule the nation under Sharia law."
-Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys
May 16, 2006
"Democracy is contrary to Islamic teachings and I told Mr. Geddi [prime minister of the 'Transitional Federal Government'] to fear Allah and stop working for our enemies. Democracy originated in Greece and it allows the public to control the government...It is anti-Islam."
-Idem, May 9, 2006
"We will fight fiercely to the death any intervention force that arrives in Somalia."
-Idem, March 25, 2006
"I'm telling that if IGAD or the UN were impulsive to send troops to Somalia, there would be bloodshed and a new destruction."
-Idem, March 21, 2006
"The Western world should respect our own ideas in choosing the way we want to govern our country, the way we want to go about our own business. That is our right...can influence all of my people with the faith and our religion. The existing government is not an Islamic one and we will be having our own Islamic faith and we will be very strong in influencing our people."
-Idem, October 12, 2005
"High-ranking Ethiopian military officers have been in Jowhar, 90 km away from Mogadishu for the past few months. We must wage Jihad against them...We have been mobilizing all of our assets in the past few months and we are ready to die for saving Somalia."
-Idem, September 7, 2005
"We must be wary of actions of non-believers who want us to follow their leadership."
-Idem, September 10, 2000
These excerpts were cited in the Internet as well as in the study entitled Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa by Dr. J. Peter Pham.
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