The implication of the rise of SCIC is now more than clear with the recent declarations of leaders of SCIC on several issues including neighboring countries, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya.

Even if Kenya and Uganda has been mentioned as enemies of Somalia, since the main target is Ethiopia, this paper focuses on Ethiopia's concerns which may be concluded in the following five points:

1. Long History of Border Disputes and Expansionist Threat of "Greater Somalia"

Ethiopia and Somalia have a long history of border disputes. Somalia had an expansionist territorial claim over one-third of Ethiopian territory, including the Ogaden region, south-eastern part of Ethiopia. This dispute led to a border war famously known as "The Ogaden War". For Ethiopia, the Ogaden War was a war against invasion by Somalia. On the contrary for Somalia, it was an extension of the expansionist establishment of the "Greater Somalia" dream. The war ended when Somalia was severely defeated by Ethiopia. SCIC chairman Sheikh Aweys officially declared that SCIC's intention to make the 'Greater Somalia' dream a reality. He said, "We will leave no stone unturned to integrate our Somali brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somalia."

2. The Threat of State-backed Terrorism and Domestic Islamic Fundamentalism

Another important, and perhaps the most serious one, is the threat of state-backed terrorism in the region and its seeping effect in encouraging domestic Islamic fundamentalism. With the leadership of SCIC, who are on the UN list of terrorists and the US President's Executive Order, this is a clear and present threat to Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a country with a population of around 74 million. According to the Central Statistics Authority of 1994, the population's composition is estimated to be 53 percent Orthodox and other Christian and 45 percent mainly Sunni Muslim. This makes Ethiopia the only country in the region with huge followers of both Islam and Christianity in its population. However, historically, political power was dominated by Ethiopian Christian rulers. For this reason, Ethiopia has been considered a Christian state amongst countries with overwhelming Muslim population: Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt and the Middle East. Islamic radicalization of neighboring countries threatens Ethiopia's stability. Ethiopia fears the spillover and seeping effects of religious radicalism in Somalia to its Muslim population. This becomes even more salient when the ethnic ties of inhabitant populations of the disputed border area are taken into consideration. Coupled with the porous border control, ethnic and religious ties of the Somali population make the threat even more serious and complicated.

The cleavage of territorial expansion under the 'Greater Somalia' banner and religious resentment fused with ethnic ties provided historical and religious justifications to mobilize moderate Somalis and radical Islamists within and out side Somalia. Historically speaking, the marriage of Islamic fundamentalism and 'Greater Somalia' expansionist ambition concluded in the early 1990s with popular uprising commonly known as the Dervish Resistance led by Mahammad Abdille Hassen, from the Daarood clan. The uprising was subdued only after 20 years when Abdille Hassen was killed by the British Royal Air Force. The Tariqa Salihiyaa Islamic movement started with this uprising.

In the early 1990s, Al-Itihhad was engaged in several acts of terrorism within Somalia and Ethiopia. For many Islamic fundamentalism groups in Somalia, the Horn of Africa and some Arab countries, Somalia was a failure to their aspiration of making Somalia the source of Islamic political power in the Horn of Africa. This has led to attacks on neighboring countries. Ethiopia is a prime target of these forces, particularly attacks from Al-Itihhad, because Ethiopia is the major power in the region with a capability and willingness to effectively crush any territorial expansion and the ambition of Al-Itihhad to arm radical groups as they seek to establish Islamic states in the Horn or Africa. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys has repeatedly accused Ethiopia of interfering in Somalia's internal affairs. Recently he declared Jihad on Ethiopia and officially announced his council's stand on Ethiopia. He said: "Ethiopia is the Israel of the Horn of Africa and we shall not allow it to meddle in the internal affairs of our country".

Moreover, growing tension and recent violent conflicts in several parts of Ethiopia between the followers of the two largest Ethiopian religions - Orthodox Christian and Muslims - which were known for their peaceful and mutual respect throughout the history of Ethiopia with the exception of a few wars and conflicts, also adds to the seriousness of this concern. Thus, Ethiopia's concern in regard to threats of terrorist attacks and state-backed terrorism in the region can be considered as legitimate. The UNGMS has clearly pointed this concern:

A widespread and protracted war in Somalia involving not only the ICU and the TFG, per se, but the multitude of other combatants has clear Regional implications including the reasonable possibility of re-igniting a state-to-state war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and fomenting acts of terrorism in very vulnerable neighboring states.

3. Secessionist Threat of the Ogaden Part of Ethiopia

As discussed above, the spill-over effect of the ethnic irredentism in Ethiopia is clear. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) (formerly known as Western Somalia Liberation Front-WSLF) was established soon after the defeat of Somalia in the "Ogaden War". The change in designation was a clear manifestation of the interest of the new leadership of ONLF to stay under the rule of Ethiopia if Ethiopia becomes democratic. For this reason, ONLF joined the newly established Ethiopian Transitional Government in 1991 and won elections in Ogaden district in 1991. ONLF, however, rejected a new Federal Constitution in 1994 and started an armed struggle since then. The genesis of WSLF-ONLF makes it abundantly clear that it was a creation of Siad Barre's regime. Armed struggle by WSLF-ONLF could be seen as an extension of the war for "Greater Somalia". The support to ONLF and the recent jihad declarations on Ethiopia by leaders of SCIC is 'Ogaden War' by other means - this time using Ethiopian Somalis with false and genuine grievances as an instrument for its undying project of "Greater Somalia".

Historically, most secessionist movements aim at establishing an independent state. WSLF-ONLF is not struggling for the establishment of an independent republic of Ogaden. Rather its struggle is for integration of the Ogaden region with Somalia. Hence, strictly speaking, WSLF-ONLF, both from its creation and objective, is not a secessionist 'proper'. It is rather an instrument of territorial expansionism. The ONLF threat should be seen as a 'Greater Somalia Project' rather than a secession threat. However, addressing the genuine grievances of the Ogaden people (any other group) within a constitutional framework is necessary for the stability of Ethiopia.

4. Ethiopia's Longest and Porous Border with Somalia

Ethiopia and Somalia have a common border of 1,600 km. Somali inhabitants on both sides of the border are pastoralists. Compounded with the absence of central authority in Somalia and a nearly absent border control, the border is a cause of serious concern to Ethiopia. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons, illegal imported goods and smuggled drugs are extensively prevalent. Trade of small arms and light weapons is a hot market. The most armed you are, the stronger you become. Competition for possession of arms is high. Moreover, Somalia is not only the destination of trade in small and light weapons but also a transit to neighboring countries. This particularly affects countries with internal armed conflicts and long porous borders with Somalia such as Ethiopia and Kenya. Many threats to Ethiopia are also related to the porous border. These include the seeping effect of Islamic fundamentalism to the Ethiopian Muslim community, infiltration of terrorists to Ethiopian territory and the insurgencies by secessionist groups in Southern eastern Ethiopia.

5. Threats of Somalia as Ground for Proxy War

Another source of concern for Ethiopia is the relentless use of Somalia by Eritrea for its war. As a former province of Ethiopia which seceded through violent civil war, Eritrea could not have a more friendly government in Ethiopia than the EPRDF-led federal government. However, this would change after the 1998 border war erupted. Ethiopia defeated Eritrea in 2000. The Boundary Commission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (BCEE), seated at The Hague International Court of Justice, rendered its final and binding decision on the Ethio-Eritrea border dispute. Ethiopia rejected it and Eritrea wants a full and immediate implementation. Although it might be still early to conclude with certainty, all indications at present suggest that the decision has not successfully brought an end to the border dispute, which led to a bloody, two-year long war and massive humanitarian crisis - i.e. deportation and huge internal displacement of people living in the border areas. Eritrea resents this and there is "no love lost" between the two governments. Eritrean government became arch-foe of Ethiopia, living no stone unturned to destabilize Ethiopia. It started to arm and train ONLF, Oromo Liberation Front, the TNG and Al-Ittihad. It also facilitated the Asmara, Egypt, Sudan tripartite diplomatic effort to convince the international community to oppose Ethiopia's position on Somalia and IGAD's support to TFG. Djibouti sympathizes with the Asmara-Egypt-Sudan circle. The AU, UN and the US extended their support to the TFG. IGAD, as institution and Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia as its members actively support the TFG. This made Somalia a battlefield for regional proxy war. Even if both Eritrea and Ethiopia deny the presence of their soldiers, UN reported that more than 6000 Ethiopian mechanized soldiers are stationed "in or near Somalia's border with Ethiopia" while about 2,000 Eritrean troops have joined the militiamen of the SCIC. The Eritrean government believes that such threat of regional war and domestic instability in Ethiopia would pressure the international community to force Ethiopia to accept the border decision. Eritrea's foreign relationship seems devoid of long-term consideration of its unintended consequences. The 1998 Eritrean border hostilities to Ethiopian government-led by EPRDF came as shockingly surprising for not only to Ethiopians and international commentator but also Eritreans as EPRDF led Ethiopian government is the most friendly government they can ever have. Regional upheaval on religious basis would first victimize Eritrea-as a country demographically.

By Mehari Taddele Maru (Harvard University)