We interviewed MONUC force commander General Babacar Gaye, who spoke on the current security situation in the east of the country, MONUC's joint operations with the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC), MONUC's contribution to security sector reform in Ituri district with the training of FARDC integrated brigades in Rwampara, as well as the third phase of the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process, which commenced on 21 July 2007.

What is the current security situation in North Kivu?

The security situation in North Kivu is very volatile, and is characterised firstly by a humanitarian disaster with 600,000 displaced. Along with the Special Representative, I saw them when we recently visited Kiwanja.

It is also a situation characterized by an integration process that has stalled, with five mixed Brigades who absolutely must progress to brassage*, and this situation poses another problem.

Finally it is a situation that is characterized, as everyone knows, by intense diplomatic activity to avoid a confrontation which carries a lot more risk.

Therefore, it's a province which is the focus of our concerns, and because of this we have deployed all means possible to fulfill our mandate, which includes protecting the local population and supporting the FARDC.

Can you explain the joint operations with the FARC in the east. What is the assessment to date, and the future plan?

I believe that the joint operations with the FARDC in the east of the country are among the things which constitute the characteristics of MONUC. We started at the beginning of 2005 by giving support to units which, at the time, were not even integrated because we knew that it was necessary for us to operate very quickly with the FARDC, and we did this at the end of 2005.

We launched our first large scale joint operation against the ADF/NALU -"Operation North Night Final"- where we lost an Indian adjudant. Then we later developed this concept in Ituri as well as South Kivu.

The assessment is positive insofar as now we know how to operate jointly with the FARDC. We measured all the difficulties of the joint operations, and we were followed by UN DPKO and the Security Council who gave us the mandate to involve the brigades and the battalions who are deployed in the east of Congo.

Therefore, the operational concept of our peacekeeping department which is the result of joint operations is now well controlled and I believe that it bore fruit, in particular in Ituri where all the armed groups are moving gradually towards integration.

Obviously, the situation in Kivu remains volatile and the problem of the FDLR affects the whole country.

But finally the concept of joint operations is now well planned in relation to the humanitarian aspect, and in this phase of planning and implementation we already have contacts with the chiefs of staff of the FARDC, where we are doing everything to improve the interoperability between our forces and those of the FARDC.

Certain media have accused MONUC of arming Laurent Nkunda through the mixed brigades. What is your view?

This charge of arming Laurent Nkunda, I acknowledge that I have never heard it. It is a new charge and if it is just an accusation, it does not worry us. But if you want my answer, obviously, we do not have the right to arm Laurent Nkunda and consequently, we don't.

President Kabila gave an ultimatum to Laurent Nkunda. Can MONUC take part in joint operations with the FARDC against Nkunda?

It is not the option which we prefer. There was intense diplomatic activity, with much work led by the Special Representative. There was also a very important declaration at the same time from the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary General who said that the option of armed confrontation was absolutely to be avoided.

Therefore, it is within this dynamic that we focus our actions. I had working sessions with the FARDC chief of staff General Kahembe where I said to him that it was absolutely necessary to avoid arriving at this scenario, and that it was necessary to develop a policy of communication which would make it possible for everyone to understand why the additional integrated brigades would be deployed in the Kivus, more particularly in North Kivu.

I also explained to him the importance of placing this possible reinforcement within the framework of the protection of the population, and of creating all the conditions so that people can go forward for mixing voluntarily in the most secure way, and under the best possible logistical conditions.

You will go next week to visit Rwampara training camp in Ituri. What is the objective of your visit, and the FARDC/MONUC training programme overall?

As you know this training is a mandate of the Security Council, and I have the advantage of going to Ituri with the chief of staff of the FARDC, who will see his units in training.

The objective of the training is to improve the interoperability between our blue helmet forces and the FARDC. It forms part of the short-term vision, which is for the FARDC to be able to operate efficiently in joint operations before our mandates ends, which for the moment runs until 31 December 2007, and will probably be prolonged into 2008.

Therefore, it is a contribution, however modest, to security sector reform as we try to consolidate brassage which for the moment will resume in the next 45 days, and they will have more cohesion in the brassage centres.

Concerning the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) phase III which began in Bunia on 21 July, what is the assessment to date?

In the military plan which relates to me directly, each time we aimed to create the conditions to find negotiated solutions, from political solutions to military problems, we did our work. Consequently we are very attentive to the results of this DDR phase, and the 18th of September is the scheduled date for the closing of the transit sites, which is a very important reference point for us.

This is because we will make a new evaluation of the programme, and we hope that we will not need to recommence operations to force reluctant groups to deposit their weapons and progress to DDR.

*Brassage is the process whereby demobilised ex combatants from all over the DRC are retrained and reintegrated to form integrated brigades of the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC).