allAfrica.com: Uganda: Military Action Forced LRA to Peace Talks (Page 1 of 2)

I write in response to Peter Quaranto's article titled "New threats to peace in Northern Uganda" (The New Vision, October 12, 2007). There are no threats to the LRA. On the contrary, the different players indicated by Quaranto are only performing their responsibilities.

The statements by US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer, the Belgian Prime Minister and the resolutions of the Ngurdoto Agreement between Uganda and DRC on September 8, 2007, are merely reminders to the LRA that they can't eat their cake and have it; they should talk peace or else face condemnation, isolation, pursuit and/or arrest.

The Ngurdoto resolution on negative forces in eastern DRC (LRA inclusive), is a reminder to the LRA of their obligation to leave Garamba and assemble in Ri- Kwangba in a specified period of time.

The LRA flouted previous peace initiatives by the Government and instead used the ceasefires to abduct, train, farm, re-arm, rejuvenate collaborator networks, rest, re-organise and generally regain lost war initiative to resume a cycle of terror.

For example in 1993 shortly after Government through Betty Bigombe had initiated talks with the LRA, the same LRA made contacts with the Government of Sudan where they were promised training bases, arms and other logistics. After the peace initiative of 1994, Vincent Otti in 1995 led a massacre in his own home village of Atiak in Gulu where about 250 people were killed.

After several failed attempts to have peace talks, President Museveni declared a general amnesty for the LRA and accepted mediation by the Carter Centre, but called for the involvement of the Khartoum government.

In 2000, shortly after the Community of Sant' Egidio and Carter Centre had tried in vain to make contact with Kony, the LRA carried out a gruesome attack in Mucwini, Kitgum district, where babies were hit on tree trunks.

In June 2001, Col Walter Ochora and two UPDF coordinators held three rounds of talks with LRA.

In April 2002 the Government sent Ibrahim Nyeko and Capt. Oketch Kuru, to meet LRA in Pader district. The emissaries were killed!

Despite the declaration of the amnesty for all armed groups by the government in 2001, the religious leaders' mediation efforts of 2002-03, and the Presidential Peace Team of 2003, all of which were followed by declarations of cease fires, the LRA under the command of Otti attacked Omot Sub-county in Pader District, killed civilians and boiled their body parts in cooking pots.

Okot Odiambo in February 2004 attacked Barlonyo in Lira where at least 200 people were massacred.

Betty Bigombe's second attempt of 2004/05 left the Government peace team stranded in the jungles of Paluda, Palabek subcounty in Kitgum, on December 31, 2004 as the LRA did not turn up to sign a ceasefire agreement but instead attacked the UPDF on January 1, 2005.

In all this suffering of the people meted out by LRA, the civil-military strategy of the UPDF was strengthened. Civilians had to bear the hardship of settling in Internally Displaced Peoples' (IDP) camps whose protection was guaranteed by the military. This strategy left the LRA completely isolated and it became easier to pursue them.

Can the region's militaries contain and 'mop up' the LRA if it withdraws from the Juba talks?

Since 1986, the Government and the NRA/UPDF have successfully neutralised the UPDA/M, UPA, WNBF, NALU, ADF and the Holy Spirit Movement, and brought others such as the UNRF I and II on board.

The LRA war was prolonged by Khartoum's continued support for the LRA. It had become a hide and seek game: LRA gets arms and training from Sudan, enters Uganda, kills, maims and abducts, is engaged by the military, many are killed and the bounty seized, the survivors retreat to safe havens in Sudan, they relax, train, are re-armed and come back and the cycle resumes. This was a hopeless situation.

By 2000, for example, the LRA had grown to about 5,000 troops with about 3,000 armed with weapons such as SPG9,82mm recoilless rifles and surface-to-air missiles.

LRA also had training bases in Southern Sudan, controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SPAF) whom at some point in 1998 clashed with UPDF troops, where 112 were taken captive.

At this point the Khartoum government realised it was unwise to continue supporting the LRA that had also been labelled a terrorist organisation.

The withdrawal of the Sudanese support, followed by the signing of a protocol between Sudan and Uganda in January 2002 allowing Uganda's military to pursue the LRA inside Sudan, in an operation code named "Iron Fist" was a turning point. The operations saw UPDF access the heart of LRA (Wat-Odwongo, Nisitu, Lubang-tek, Odek, Kempacho, Jablen, Bin-rwot and Lalar camps) and left the LRA completely dislodged to a point of no recovery.

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