The Reporter (Addis Ababa)
17 November 2007
interview
Mehari Taddele is a fellow of three prestigious programs at Harvard University: the Eleanor Roosevelt at Harvard Law School, the Global Advocacy Fellow at Human Rights Program and Mason Fellow at John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is Executive Director of African Rally for Peace and Development and Programme Coordinator at African Union Commission. He holds MPA from Harvard University and MSc from the University of Oxford and LLB from Addis Ababa University.
He has Postgraduate Diplomas in international human rights law, including International Protection of Human Rights from Abo Akademi Finland, the Right to Adequate Food from Central European University and Ethno-Political Conflict Studies from the University of Pennsylvania, in Peace, Human Rights and Justice from United Nations University for Peace; and Comparative Studies on Federalism and Multinational States from University of Fribourg. Prior to joining Harvard University, he has served as Legal Expert at African Union Commission and as Director of the Addis Ababa University Office for University Reform. His works have been published in several reputable journals.
Bruck Shewareged interviewed Mehari on the Darfur crisis which, coupled with the recent problems in Southern Sudan and other parts of the country, could put the very survival of the country itself in question. Excerpts:
There are a number of factors that are said to be the causes of the Darfur conflict, including the need to secure natural resources (water) as one World Bank study put it. In your opinion, what is the primary cause of the crisis in that region?
In terms of causes of conflicts in Africa, we have several theories that are being tabled for discussions. If we come to Darfur, clearly the environment has a serious impact on the conflict as the cause i.e., environmental degradation making survival of life in general very difficult and expansion of populations to areas were they can find grazing land and water. Generally, we can put competition for resource and control of land as one major cause. But is that a new one? Competition for resource has been a major cause for many conflicts.
The reason why Darfur has been an example rather has to do with the state being able to penetrate to peripheral areas which naturally and historically have never been the case, central government going to peripheral areas and trying to control the resources and the peripheries trying to remain independent. In a way it is between Khartoum and Juba (South Sudan), Kessela (East) and Khartum.
So, generally speaking, it is the government being able to penetrate peripheral areas and in many cases using transnational companies with government approval to exploit resources of different kind. This can include petroleum. There are cases were explorations are going on by different companies including ANCA, EPICO, SUDAPEC, JUNIPOC which is also a merger of several kind of petro companies.
I also see resistance to this kind of control by the government from the peripheral people including Darfuri, Southern Sudan and Beja people in North Eastern Sudan. This is, generally speaking, the case. The only difference I see in the Darfur case is that it is very globalized, too internationalized to be handled by regional powers or by the government of Sudan unlike the case in Northern Uganda conflict which we don't hear about though the humanitarian crisis is of the same genre in terms of number of deaths, displaced people or destruction of property that has been happening. In the Democratic Republic of Congo also, you see also people dying not from direct violence but due to diseases or malnutrition.
There are some assertions that the peace agreement signed between Khartoum and Southern Sudan rebels served as an immediate cause or a catalyst to the conflict in Darfur. How so?
Basically the conflict in Southern Sudan has been there since the 1970s. There were several peace initiatives which were not successful. The first one was initiated by Ethiopia under the auspices of Emperor Haile-Selassie. All were not successful compared to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). CPA has granted real power, written or de jure power to Southern Sudan people. The first part of the agreement was to hold a referendum whether South Sudan wants to remain with Sudan or become independent. The second part of this agreement is equal share of the revenue which was not really seriously calculated in terms of the amount of revenue that can be generated, essentially the oil produced in the South. And the oil exploration areas are mainly bordering Southern Sudan and the other parts of Sudan specially Northern Sudan.
This can be a cause of conflict in the long term even if Southern Sudan secedes from Sudan in general.
The CPA, which has given de jure power to Southern Sudan, initiated and encouraged the Darfuri people, and some of the movements have been sponsored by SPLA of Southern Sudan. There was hope that Darfur will get the same kind of attention that Southern Sudan has acquired through the struggle. It encouraged other groups also to claim that kind of attention from Khartoum. And in many cases, guns have been used as a means to be heard. And many would consider that a very good amplifier of the voices of these people who are neglected.
You can see Sudan being a patch of Peace Agreements (PAs) where you have peace agreement with the South (CPA), peace agreement with Darfur (DPA), with Eastern Sudan (EPA), and now the Bejas are demanding the same kind of agreement, and what is remaining in North Western part of Sudan which might also come. So, basically, the peripheries, as I said earlier said, are asserting their power to come up with a peace agreement with Khartoum. And this is if you wish, a really new case with the exception of Ethiopia where you have rebel groups starting from rural areas coming to the capital and controlling and establishing a system.
But this is basically about separate initiatives coming together to push Khartoum to come into terms of peace agreements. Basically and legally speaking, the constitution is amended, and amended seriously. The laws that are now in place are governing as a constitution i.e., CPA, DPA, EPA. I don't know how the constitution can be considered as a really a constitution of Sudan. So Sudan is a patch of PAs in general.
With so many Darfuri liberation groups existing - there are two Justice and Equality Movements (JEMs) to my knowledge at least - will they ever be heard and seriously reckoned with? Can the Darfuri people be really represented?
There are two serious questions that you raised. One is the legitimacy issue in terms of representing the Darfuri people. The second is, "Is it possible to have an impact if the rebel groups are not unified?" My answer on this has actually been in a sort of disagreement with several international organizations, one of which is the International Crisis Group (ICG). They have been pushing for unification of the Darfuri rebel groups. And I was saying imposed unification will not work for several reasons but mainly imposition is against democratic principle. If unification is imposed on rebel groups I don't think they will be democratic internally and the fracture and fragmentation will increase exponentially. And that has been seen. I have been raising this concern, including with the United Nations and several other international organizations. That has not been addressed. We have seen in Arusha (Tanzania) rebel groups going there originally from two rebel groups, SPLM and JEM. Now you have about twenty factions, including Group Four, Commanders Team of Ninety, JEM itself being split into two, Khalil Ibrahim's group and other commanders within JEM. So basically, this has to do with the democratic nature of rebel groups and the role of armed groups taking their own destiny and determining also the destiny of the Darfurian people in general.
I think one of the major mistakes committed by the international community is its reliance on rebel groups as if they are legitimate de jure representatives of the Darfuri people. I have been again raising this concern that at most the rebel groups have to be seen as de facto legitimacy bearers. They shouldn't be taken as the sole decision makers on the destiny of Darfur and on negotiations. So the best way to deal with this kind of fracture and fragmentation which is becoming very difficult for the negotiation to succeed is to include representatives from internally displaced people (IDP) and refugee camps to be involved in these negotiations, and to the extent possible to bring the negotiations from Abuja, Arusha, Lybia to Darfur itself by carving out security zones where IDPs and refugees can negotiate on the term of Darfur. I believe that this is one of the difficulties that the international community has to address.
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