Zachary Ochieng
26 November 2007
opinion
Nairobi — The failure of the Abuja peace talks that produced the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is widely blamed on its being a deal between an unrepresentative government in Khartoum and only the three rebel groups recognised by the African Union mediator.
At least two significant rebel factions were not at the table.
In the end, only one rebel group signed the DPA - Minni Minawi's Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) faction - but it lacked and still lacks popular support in Darfur.
Soon after, many of Minawi's forces became paramilitaries for the government of Sudan, committed atrocities, and engaged in widespread banditry and attacks.
The African Union mediators clearly failed to give the people of Darfur and the victims of the conflict - particularly women, internally displaced persons, and non-aligned Arab groups - an adequate voice at the talks, opting to secure buy-in from Darfurians after the agreement was signed through a process called the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.
However, the DPA was dead on arrival, rendering the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue meaningless before it could begin.
To guard against such glaring omissions, a report by Enough titled A strategy for success in Sirte has given a number of recommendations.
The joint mediation team must broaden the process to ensure that all the stakeholders have ownership, the final agreement. In the absence of such a participation, any agreement will lack broad support from the people of Darfur and collapse the way DPA did.
In order to succeed, the talks must include Sudan's government of National Unity (GNU), the rebel signatory to the DPA (Minni Minnawi's SLA faction), non-signatories and other rebel alliances as well as the civil society.
Equally, the countries with the most leverage - the United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom - should deploy full-time and fully-staffed special envoys to the region to support the joint mediation. Otherwise, warring parties rarely reach durable peace agreements without sustained external pressure.
To avoid a repeat of the Abuja talks, where a cacophony of mid-level international voices failed to compel compromise between the parties, the US, UK, France, and China - all permanent members of the UN Security Council with senior diplomats focusing on Sudan - should convene an informal "quartet" to support the joint mediation team.
The US specifically should designate a full-time senior envoy as the point person for a comprehensive strategy for peace in Sudan, including the Sirte talks and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Currently, there is no clear leader on Sudan within the US government while the policy is incoherent. The lines of policymaking authority for Sudan at the State Department are muddled and competing US policy agendas - Darfur, the CPA, and Sudan's co-operation on counterterrorism - will only be resolved with strong White House leadership.
The mediation team - accompanied whenever possible by special envoys from the US, China, France, and the UK - need to take the draft agreement on the road and conduct shuttle diplomacy - if rebel leaders refuse to come to the peace talks, then the mediation team and its international partners have to take the process to them.
The most high profile rebel hold-out is Abdul Wahid of the Fur community, the founder of the SLA. Despite a minor military presence on the ground (in western Jebel Marra), Wahid is a folk hero among many internally displaced persons, especially among his Fur people.
His decision not to attend peace talks until the hybrid peacekeeping force arrives is popular. He risks political suicide if he buckles under international pressure and travels to Libya.
The mediators and special envoys must work with the French to pressure Mr Wahid to appoint a representative to attend the talks in Sirte, enabling him to save face publicly but engage politically.
Mr Wahid lacks the military capacity to play spoiler, and if the negotiations gather momentum without him, he will likely be compelled to join.
Diplomats supporting the Sirte talks must work equally hard to bring other rebel holdouts - including Khalil Ibrahim (JEM), Ahmed Abdel Shafie (SLA), Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (JEM), and Khamis Abdullah Abakar (SLA) - into the process. Though many rebel leaders object to Libya as a venue for the talks, stronger international engagement through senior diplomats and a strong draft agreement would serve as an effective carrot.
Since the start of the conflict, Chad, Eritrea, and Libya have jockeyed for influence with the rebels and maintain considerable sway over Darfur's rebel factions. These neighbouring states have strong interests in the political future of Sudan and the potential to undermine progress at the negotiating table if they feel their interests are not being met.
Eritrea has hosted most of the rebel leadership at one time or another and the Eritrean government has supported multiple initiatives to unify various rebel factions. The Chadian government has openly supported various Darfur rebel factions since early 2006 and developed a symbiotic relationship with rebel commanders who have operated in tandem with the Chadian army in exchange for logistical and materiel support from N'Djamena.
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has supported nearly all sides of the conflict at one time or
another, and retains considerable influence through his ability to infuse the conflict with money and weapons.
As a way forward, the mediation team and its international partners should designate lead nations to use their leverage with the rebels to respect a ceasefire agreement and adopt realistic positions at the negotiating table.
Equally, the international community should seek to engage Eritrea through an intermediary that President Isaias Afewerki trusts - Norway. Eritrea has a long involvement with Sudan's civil wars, and recently brokered a deal that ended a simmering conflict between the National Congress Party and rebels based in eastern Sudan.
As a frontline state, Chad has a strong interest in the outcome of the talks and how the rebel factions it supports will be represented in the final agreement on political arrangements.
Because of gradually improving relations between Tripoli and Washington, the US is best suited to blunt Libyan leader Gaddafi's bizarre public statements and his predilection for quick fixes at the negotiating table.
Many rebel groups are justifiably critical of Libya as a venue for the talks after Gaddafi's recent comment that the crisis in Darfur is a "quarrel over a camel."
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