Zachary Ochieng
7 January 2008
The success of the new United Nations-African Union hybrid force being deployed in Darfur will depend on its ability to overcome limitations that hobbled the original AU Mission in the region.
The AU mission (Amis) was roundly criticised by analysts and the displaced people themselves as ineffective. Some of the displaced persons have even held demonstrations against it and barred its troops from entering their territories.
A lot of this hostility arose from the fact that the AU mission was a key implementer of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which many see as flawed. However, criticism began even before the DPA and was largely due to the AU mission's inadequate firepower and men to carry out its civilian protection mandate.
Amis troops are deployed in permanent camps in all three Darfur states. They are mandated to patrol the region and protect civilians and humanitarian operations from attacks. Amis also provides armed escorts to humanitarian agencies on request.
However, AMIS is a small force of some 7,000 peacekeepers that is not properly equipped to undertake its protection mandate in such a vast, rugged, and hostile region. It has had no attack helicopters, which are necessary for rapid response activities, such as conducting real-time surveillance, immediate ceasefire violation investigations, and search and rescue missions.
Armoured personnel carriers provided by Canada were blocked from entering the country for months by the Sudanese government. Equipment for night activities have also been lacking. They have faced persistent lack of interpreters and experienced female staff to address issues of sexual and gender-based violence.
Amis's various elements — military observers, protection force, and police — do not always share information and lack intelligence gathering technology and analysis techniques. These inadequacies have also left the force unable to defend itself. Between January and July 2007, Amis lost 11 personnel to armed attacks and several of its vehicles were ambushed and hijacked.
The African force's mandate states that it should protect civilians "under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity" and within its "resources and capability." While resources appear to have been the critical factor in Amis's poor response to civilian protection, the loose language may have also camouflaged a lack of political will to undertake robust operations that might result in peacekeeping casualties.
Additionally, Amis's Rules of Engagement and Standard Operating Procedures — which guide commanders and troops on how and when to use force — were unclear. In May 2006, the DPA outlined more detailed responsibilities for Amis, which added to the confusion.
In 2005 NGOs lobbied Amis to conduct "firewood" patrols to reduce sexual attacks against women and girls going outside camps to collect wood, hay, and water, and to farm. In some areas, women welcomed the troops and believed they did help reduce sexual violence. However, in many instances, these and other patrols were cancelled because Amis had too few armed soldiers, or gaps existed between the time when one group of soldiers left their duty station and their replacements were operational.
In other instances the patrols have failed since people distrust AMIS because its patrols are accompanied by the much-distrusted Sudanese police, and because they believe that the patrols merely displace, rather than prevent violence.
The civilian police component of Amis was given the crucial role of monitoring Sudan's Police force, investigating conflict related crimes, and conducting capacity building activities to help strengthen the police. Amis police have no powers of arrest and are not mandated to serve as a domestic policing force. It too was plagued by insufficient personnel, including a limited number of female staff with expertise in sexual and gender-based violence and too few interpreters. AMIS police also failed to communicate effectively with the people they were mandated to serve.
According to analysts, displaced persons, and international workers, Amis police are often inexperienced and ill-prepared, not trained in the laws of Sudan and international policing standards, suffered from an inability to work with international humanitarian and human rights groups, and failed to report on police misconduct. People living in camps also accuse AMIS police of being too close to the Sudanese police and not exerting enough pressure on the government to improve their practices.
Along with a protection force and police, Amis also has military observers to monitor the ceasefire agreements. The 2004 N'Djamena ceasefire commission was active at first, but made little progress in the run up to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, which established a new ceasefire commission.
The new commission is yet to address many substantive issues. It has instead become bogged down in debates over the government's refusal to allow non-signatories to join the commission and the insistence by non-signatory rebels that the commission judges them only on commitments of the 2004 ceasefire agreement that they signed.
Given the task before it and the limited resources available, Amis was handicapped from the beginning in its efforts to meet the expectations of the Darfurians. Amis, however, also contributed to the distrust and in some cases hostility of Darfurians through its own actions. Consequently, many displaced persons have been altogether dismissive of the force even when it offers services that could improve the security situation. The fact that Amis was tasked with helping implement the DPA worsened its already tarnished image with the large number of Darfurians who did not support the DPA.
The UN mission in Darfur — UNAMID — may have up to 26,000 military and police peacekeepers, which should improve matters, but the challenges still remain enormous. The lessons learned from Amis demonstrate that boots alone will not be enough to ensure UNAMID's ability to carry out its civilian protection mandate. UNAMID will need to be widely and strategically dispersed throughout Darfur, have strong rapid response capabilities, carry out regular daytime and night patrols — including firewood and market day patrols — employ well-trained and well resourced policing units, and contain human rights officers who can publicly report on their findings.
UNAMID should have a large number of staff who are experts in sexual and gender-based violence, as well as children's rights. UNAMID should also be equipped to provide a safe environment for humanitarians organisations to work in.
Similar to the AU mission, UNAMID should be widely and strategically dispersed in stations throughout Darfur, so that its forces have access to the civilian population and to especially volatile areas. Wide deployment to remote rural areas also acts as a deterrent against attacks and is necessary for increasing the potential for people to move more freely and for displaced persons to return home. It will take considerable time to complete permanent bases for the large force and even then there will be a number of areas with no permanent base. Peacekeepers should, therefore, be equipped and authorised to deploy temporary bases for short- and medium-length stays.
The peacekeepers will need to be mobile, with the ability to travel outside these temporary or permanent bases. A sufficient number of land vehicles and aircraft, including helicopters, will be needed since travelling through Darfur by road is always difficult and can be all but impossible in the rainy season.
UNAMID must have strong rapid response capabilities — much stronger than ever achieved by Amis — that could include carrying out reconnaissance missions, placing peacekeepers in positions to protect civilians prior to expected attacks, provide armed protection to civilians who come under attack, conducting search and rescue missions if humanitarian or other convoys are hijacked, or investigating ceasefire violations immediately after they occur.
This will require sufficient personnel, attack helicopters and armoured personnel carriers, and real-time and accurate information gathering and analysis technology. They must also have the capacity and equipment to carry out rapid response activities after dark and in the early morning. UNAMID's police, military observers, protection forces, and other relevant actors will need to establish effective lines of communication and share intelligence for all these resources to be utilised effectively.
UNAMID peacekeepers should carry out regular "firewood" patrols, market day patrols, foot patrols inside camps, as well as other day and night patrols inside and outside camps and towns, especially in volatile areas.
One of the main lessons from Amis's experiences with "firewood" patrols is that units must meet regularly with the local community to build confidence and gather information about when and where these patrols are needed and under what conditions they will take place. UNAMID should contact nomadic communities, rebels, and other armed groups in advance, and on the day of patrols.
Throughout the patrols UNAMID should provide visible deterrence and be close enough on the ground to hear or see probable attackers, but not so close as to interfere with people's normal routines. If government security forces join patrols, their roles should be clarified in advance and written into patrol guidelines.
Because of the above mentioned deficiencies in Sudan's own police system, investigating police abuses, visiting detention facilities, and carrying out training activities should be top priorities for UNAMID police.
Along with monitoring government police, they may also have to monitor rebel policing activities in areas controlled by rebels. UNAMID's police must therefore have experience with protection issues relevant to Darfur, such as sexual violence.
Female officers who are able to secure people's trust and ensure the security of information provided by victims, witnesses, and others, will be crucial to the success of their mission.
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The people of Sudan have been suffering for about thirty years from civl wars that started with southern Sudan war and, as that was about settled, the Darfur war was forced on the country. Both warring parties are definitely weary and will like to settle amicably but the foreign backers of the Darfur militants that are providing the ammunition and training are pushing the Darfur militants not to go for peaceful settlement. The plan of the foreign backers of the militants is to continue the war in order to continue to drain the economy of the Sudan government with the hope that the Sudan government could be forced into near bankrupcy and finally give up its rule in Darfur and southern Sudan so that it can be colonized and reduced to the situation in the DRC. It is estimated that about ten million civilians have been killed in the Congo since the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961 but the total civilians killed in the Sudan is estimated at about 2.5 million. Civilian kilings are continuing in both countries but, paradoxically, the kilings in Sudan are seen as genocide whilst those in Congo are not. The same foreign manipulators are behind the wars in both countries for the sake of acquiring the natural resources from these countries free of charge or by looting.