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Côte d'Ivoire: Ensuring a Peaceful Political Transition
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United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC)
DOCUMENT
1 December 2007
Posted to the web 14 January 2008
Dorina Bekoe
The March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA), signed by Laurent Gbagbo, president of Côte d'Ivoire, and Guillaume Soro, leader of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel movement, holds great promise for ending the current political stalemate and reuniting the country.
The political crisis began in September 2002 with an attack by military officers protesting the government's decision to demobilize them; according to some, it was also, an attempted coup d'état. The uprising generated other rebel groups, which took control over the northern part of the country and ignited a civil war. Even after the brunt of the fighting ceased, the country remained divided, with northern Côte d'Ivoire devoid of public services and the state's administration. The OPA is the sixth peace agreement directed at ending the political crisis; the previous five were never fully implemented due to, among other factors, disagreements about the selection of the mediator, the absence of political will among the signatories, and the tense relationship between the government of Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations. Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso, mediated the negotiations leading to the signing of the OPA. Burkina Faso remains the facilitator of the agreement's implementation.
Under the OPA, a new government of national unity is in place to undertake the tasks necessary to organize elections and guide the country out of the political crisis. Key tasks that must take place include: providing identification cards to undocumented residents; demobilizing and disarming the FN and the militia groups; updating the voters' registry; and organizing elections. With grievances of citizenship and identity at the heart of the political crisis, the identification process is among the most critical tasks.
USIP/WANEP-CI conference in Cote d'Ivoire.
USIP and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding—Côte d'Ivoire (WANEP-CI) organized a workshop in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, from November 6-9, 2007, on strategies to ensure a peaceful political transition and electoral process. The workshop included nearly 50 civil society organizations (CSOs) from all parts of the country, representing the media, human rights and democracy advocates, economic development groups, and religious and traditional leaders. Madame Fatoumata Traore, the vice president of the independent electoral commission, and Moussa Soro of the Ministry for African Integration, jointly opened the workshop. Traore also participated in the panel on democracy on the first day; she returned on the second day with an electronic copy of the voters' list, which provided participants an opportunity to verify their personal details and correct any errors. This USIPeace Briefing summarizes the outcome of the workshop and includes additional observations gained from discussions on the ground and other reports.
Summary
The workshop had three inter-related goals: to increase knowledge of electoral violence, build civil society's capacity to prevent violence and defuse tension, and create an information-sharing network of CSOs. The workshop concluded with recommendations and proposals for the way forward to ensure a peaceful transition.
Primarily, the workshop sought to broaden participants' knowledge of triggers of electoral violence and opportunities for reducing tension during the electoral period through analyses of both peaceful and troubled transitions in Africa. Thus, over the course of three days, participants discussed successful and unsuccessful means by which other elections had taken place—namely those held in Togo, Benin, Ghana, and Zanzibar, Tanzania. This comparative approach was used to draw lessons for Côte d'Ivoire's presidential elections—now scheduled for June 2008—and outline the potential roles for civil society.
Secondly, through panels on democracy, social reconciliation and peacebuilding, and the role of regional and international organizations, the workshop aimed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to prevent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire's upcoming elections. In addition, the participants took part in a simulation exercise depicting a politically troubled country about to embark on elections. The purpose of the exercise was to enable participants to play different roles—including government representatives, opposition groups, student leaders, electoral commission members, and civil society—and develop strategies for defusing tension during the electoral process.
Finally, USIP and WANEP–CI endeavored to create a network of civil society representatives from across Côte d'Ivoire to share information on early warning of electoral violence and expertise on reducing tension. With many nongovernmental organizations based in Abidjan, it is critical that links are formed between the urban and rural civil society groups.
Current Political Climate and Status of the OPA
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The OPA called for the creation of a new transitional government to guide the country through implementation and, eventually, presidential elections. To this end, Soro was designated prime minister in March 2007, and he named a new 33-member cabinet that included representatives of a cross section of political parties and civil society. The new government includes nine members from the ruling Front Populaire Ivoirien; seven members from the FN; five representatives each from the Rassemblement des Républicaines and Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire; and seven members representing civil society and smaller political parties. 1
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