---

---

Uganda: Ugandans Want Kony to Pay for Injustices

Zachary Ochieng

25 February 2008

---

interview

Louise Khabure, Uganda Analyst, International Crisis Group

The Cessation Of Hostilities Agreement has been extended to end of February. Do you think this will be sufficient time to reach a peaceful agreement?

With negotiations, it is hard to tell which way they will go. However, slight progress has been made such as the annexure on accountability and reconciliation, a draft on comprehensive solutions, etc. The trickier and potentially lengthier bits include the accountability and International Criminal Court issues - what to do with Kony. This matter is sensitive and depending on how it is tackled, it might incense the rebels or bring them closer to a final deal.

Other developments, such as change of the LRA negotiation team and representatives of the monitoring team, the confirmed death of Vincent Otti, alleged LRA attacks in Southern Sudan, the presence of the EU and US in the talks - including allegations of the US trying to hijack the process and the rejection of demands by the Ugandan government - are all new factors that may delay the talks. With the end of February barely two weeks away and the LRA team in Nairobi this week, the deadline may be too soon.

So, a further extension would be appropriate, as it will also demonstrate that negotiations are being given the best chance possible and not immediately allude to a military offensive by the Uganda government and other regional countries.

What is your response to suggestions that this timeline was fixed in response to Museveni's earlier threats that the LRA must sign an agreement by January 31 or face military action?

This position will obviously cause anger among the rebels. However, I doubt that the rebels feel pressured enough to sign an agreement.

Rather, it may harden their positions and confirm the notion that the government is not fully committed to the talks and always intended to resolve the problem militarily. It may push the rebels to resume attacks as well and even possibly enable resumption of external support from Sudan, as was previously

However, military action by the government has previously failed. Therefore, the government has to be very clear about the form and support that this intended military action will take. Is it aware of the real strength and numbers of the LRA? Will the military action bear in mind that the LRA and Kony himself are always accompanied and surrounded by abducted innocent women and children, who were the most vulnerable victims of this whole war? Is the military action willing to sacrifice the lives of these innocent victims? Or will the military action target only Kony?

Is that viable?

It is now official that Kony killed his deputy commander, Vincent Otti, who was seen as the face of the peace talks. How is his death likely to impact on the progress of these talks?

The death of Otti is most probably as a result of differences between him and Kony. The likely impact is that these differences might run through the talks, the representatives and possibly between the rebels themselves. If Otti was the face of the talks, then it is highly probable that some of his supporters will plan to scuttle the talks.

On the talks and representatives, we now see new faces and new demands like Cabinet posts, army recruitment procedures, awarding of contracts, etc.

These new dimensions will certainly affect the proposed deadline. We need to interrogate these demands. Are they Kony's, LRA's or the representatives?

The circumstances of Otti's death also need to be understood so as to ensure that his wishes and those of his supporters are incorporated in the talks and in the final agreement. Whatever the case, his death has caused confusion.

Kony recently fired his chief negotiator Martin Ojul, only three months after firing the deputy chief negotiator under similar circumstances as well as other members of the peace delegation. How are these changes likely to affect the outcome of the peace talks?

I sense that the killing of Otti and the firing of Ojul and others is linked. It is said that Ojul was 'Otti's man.' These changes are likely to affect the ongoing talks and the outcome because it is unclear if Ojul and his team will stay away from the talks. Will they give the negotiations a chance or will they keep interfering with the process?

Will they push Otti's agenda? Are they potential spoilers? If the new team is genuine and keen to find a lasting solution, then they need to clarify these questions. The composition of the team reflects that the LRA is looking to have a more detailed and comprehensive peace agreement. However, some time needs to be spent by the mediation team in understanding who they are and isolating the interests they serve.

What would be the best option to offer Kony now that the ICC warrants have not been withdrawn and there is no agreement yet on the alternative justice mechanism?

First, whatever the option, justice is paramount. The Ugandan people and the world need to see that the options taken exhibit the promotion of justice (restorative and retributive) and accountability and not create a culture of impunity. Take the recent killing of Otti and if true, the LRA attacks in Southern Sudan. Action must be taken against these killings, which have taken place while negotiations are ongoing. The mediation team has to communicate strongly and clearly to Kony through his representatives that justice is paramount and that he has to 'pay' in some way rather than be rewarded for his actions.

Secondly, the best option for Kony needs to be linked with a guarantee for his (and his family) security and the will of the people of Uganda. The will of the people is for the matter to be dealt with locally through the alternative justice mechanisms. Already, a lot of work is going on into developing an acceptable mechanism that will satisfy international standards.

The new LRA team comprises four able lawyers and the mediation team has been working closely with legal experts on these issues. This work, together with close collaboration with the ICC, should take priority and could form part of the parallel process that the lead mediator is proposing.

Lastly, another option being floated around is settling Kony in a third country. As far as I know, no country has volunteered to host Kony. Therefore, a discussion on this has to start - incorporating security guarantees, potential threats, financing, etc. Unlike the Obotes, Amins or Taylors of this world, Kony has lived in the bush for 20 years and I am not sure he will be wholly enticed by a big house and a quiet neighbourhood in a strange country. So this has to be carefully thought out as well.

Any other comments on the Juba peace talks?

There is need to capitalise on the presence of both the US and the EU. The proposed parallel process also needs to embody the principles of ownership, transparency and accountability.

It is important to establish whether the LRA is behind the recent attacks in southern Sudan, including checking if Khartoum is involved.

The money factor and financial management in these talks as well as the interests of the new LRA team also needs to be assessed.

Be the first to Write a Comment!

---