allAfrica.com: Botswana: New Political Regime Pre-Empts Oversight At BDF (Page 1 of 2)

Even if Karl Marx, or one of his disciples, was correct in making the rather astute observation that 'history never repeats itself', it is equally true that it often gives that impression.

It took 40 years for the cycle to turn full circle from the dusty Botswana of 1966 under the prime ministership of Seretse Khama, to the presidency of Seretse Khama, with the variation of 'Ian'.

Then, the country was firmly in the grip of a handful of Batswana teachers, traders, pastoral and cattle farmers, who relied only on the force of feudal relations of production akin to those of medieval Europe, without a standing army, to impose their political will upon a stultified peasantry that only knew and understood deference to kings. Pan Africanist and leader of the leading Botswana Peoples Party Phillip Matante made the proposal - in retrospect a treacherous one - that Botswana should build its own army.

Eleven years later, by way of a parliamentary motion in April 1977, his wish was fulfilled, though the impression is that his adversaries at the Botswana Democratic Party were reluctant, as they always were when faced with proposals of the opposition.

Paul Sharp and Louis Fischer in their "Inside the 'crystal ball': understanding the evolution of the military in Botswana and the challenges ahead", make the observation: "Unlike other countries in the rest of Africa, Botswana did not inherit any military establishment at independence. The leadership at the time did not see any value in creating an army. While there were debates over the creation of a military establishment at independence, the country's elite vehemently resisted the move to create a Botswana Defence Force. Concerned with the phenomenon of military intervention in politics, Botswana deliberately deferred the creation of the military despite the fact that at independence the constitution provided for its existence.

During the transition to independence, Prime Minister, Seretse Khama rejected as "ridiculous" opposition calls for the creation of an army. Other authors during this period, such as Welch, expressed the same sentiments that creating an army at independence brought with it the intractable budgetary, political, ethnic and other problems associated with colonial armies. It was regional events that would eventually play a decisive role in later years, necessitating the creation of the military in Botswana.

With the liberation struggle intensifying, especially in the mid to late 1970s, Botswana was increasingly bearing the heat of the conflict. This was primarily due to incursions into Botswana territory by both freedom fighters and those bent on their annihilation. In particular, the Smith government from Southern Rhodesia inflicted damage upon Botswana when its security forces violated Botswana's territorial integrity on several occasions.

The BDF was thus conceived as a response to the then prevailing political and military situation in the region. In a nutshell, the BDF is a product of a reluctant but inevitable response".

It was found that the incessant raids of the Rhodesian and South African armies into Botswana, kidnapping and killing political exiles, required the transformation of the quasi military Police Mobile Unit, with a force of about 1,000 men, into something of a defence force.

BDF operations were guided by the principles of:

* peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness

* non-interference in the affairs of other nations, and

* not using Botswana as a springboard for attacks on any of its neighbours.

The activities of the BDF, as it turned out, were skewed towards the third principle with a deliberate emphasis on intelligence work among the political exiles and uncovering of weaponry destined for use by the guerrilla armies of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The PMU, and soon after, the BDF were used to quash civilian protests such as University of Botswana Lesotho and Swaziland student demonstrations against the arrest one of their own, Sergeant X Tswaipe, for ordering fire on uniformed foreigners in the Tuli Bloc. Similarly, the army was used to suppress the Selebi Phikwe miners' strike around the same time. Where the opportunity arose for demonstration of its purpose of protecting civilians against outside attack the BDF was reluctant to act. Once more, another of their own Sergeant X Kgentlepe was secretly tried at the BDF camps, ostensibly of 'cowardice', having failed to secure approval to intervene as suspect foreign soldiers proceeded to their destination under his watch.

Most dramatically, in 1985, the Botswana defence failed to respond to the South African Defense Force raid on Gaborone in which 14 people were killed, because, as Lt General Mompati Merafhe would explain, there would have been a bloodbath if the BDF had intervened. The rest of the pages about the evolution of the BDF recount tragic incidents such as that of Lesoma. The BDF has turned to other tasks, among them anti-poaching and disaster management.

Asked about spending on the BDF, a retired civil servant said: "Once you have established this thing, you just have to keep feeding it, and feeding it". There will be no reluctance, as the country begins the second cycle in its political life, on the part of the soldiers who now sit at the helm of government to keep feeding 'this thing' which, for all intents and purposes appears to have outlived its purpose.

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