Rampholo Molefhe
14 March 2008
column
Gaborone — Even if Karl Marx, or one of his disciples, was correct in making the rather astute observation that 'history never repeats itself', it is equally true that it often gives that impression.
It took 40 years for the cycle to turn full circle from the dusty Botswana of 1966 under the prime ministership of Seretse Khama, to the presidency of Seretse Khama, with the variation of 'Ian'.
Then, the country was firmly in the grip of a handful of Batswana teachers, traders, pastoral and cattle farmers, who relied only on the force of feudal relations of production akin to those of medieval Europe, without a standing army, to impose their political will upon a stultified peasantry that only knew and understood deference to kings. Pan Africanist and leader of the leading Botswana Peoples Party Phillip Matante made the proposal - in retrospect a treacherous one - that Botswana should build its own army.
Eleven years later, by way of a parliamentary motion in April 1977, his wish was fulfilled, though the impression is that his adversaries at the Botswana Democratic Party were reluctant, as they always were when faced with proposals of the opposition.
Paul Sharp and Louis Fischer in their "Inside the 'crystal ball': understanding the evolution of the military in Botswana and the challenges ahead", make the observation: "Unlike other countries in the rest of Africa, Botswana did not inherit any military establishment at independence. The leadership at the time did not see any value in creating an army. While there were debates over the creation of a military establishment at independence, the country's elite vehemently resisted the move to create a Botswana Defence Force. Concerned with the phenomenon of military intervention in politics, Botswana deliberately deferred the creation of the military despite the fact that at independence the constitution provided for its existence.
During the transition to independence, Prime Minister, Seretse Khama rejected as "ridiculous" opposition calls for the creation of an army. Other authors during this period, such as Welch, expressed the same sentiments that creating an army at independence brought with it the intractable budgetary, political, ethnic and other problems associated with colonial armies. It was regional events that would eventually play a decisive role in later years, necessitating the creation of the military in Botswana.
With the liberation struggle intensifying, especially in the mid to late 1970s, Botswana was increasingly bearing the heat of the conflict. This was primarily due to incursions into Botswana territory by both freedom fighters and those bent on their annihilation. In particular, the Smith government from Southern Rhodesia inflicted damage upon Botswana when its security forces violated Botswana's territorial integrity on several occasions.
The BDF was thus conceived as a response to the then prevailing political and military situation in the region. In a nutshell, the BDF is a product of a reluctant but inevitable response".
It was found that the incessant raids of the Rhodesian and South African armies into Botswana, kidnapping and killing political exiles, required the transformation of the quasi military Police Mobile Unit, with a force of about 1,000 men, into something of a defence force.
BDF operations were guided by the principles of:
* peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness
* non-interference in the affairs of other nations, and
* not using Botswana as a springboard for attacks on any of its neighbours.
The activities of the BDF, as it turned out, were skewed towards the third principle with a deliberate emphasis on intelligence work among the political exiles and uncovering of weaponry destined for use by the guerrilla armies of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe and South Africa.
The PMU, and soon after, the BDF were used to quash civilian protests such as University of Botswana Lesotho and Swaziland student demonstrations against the arrest one of their own, Sergeant X Tswaipe, for ordering fire on uniformed foreigners in the Tuli Bloc. Similarly, the army was used to suppress the Selebi Phikwe miners' strike around the same time. Where the opportunity arose for demonstration of its purpose of protecting civilians against outside attack the BDF was reluctant to act. Once more, another of their own Sergeant X Kgentlepe was secretly tried at the BDF camps, ostensibly of 'cowardice', having failed to secure approval to intervene as suspect foreign soldiers proceeded to their destination under his watch.
Most dramatically, in 1985, the Botswana defence failed to respond to the South African Defense Force raid on Gaborone in which 14 people were killed, because, as Lt General Mompati Merafhe would explain, there would have been a bloodbath if the BDF had intervened. The rest of the pages about the evolution of the BDF recount tragic incidents such as that of Lesoma. The BDF has turned to other tasks, among them anti-poaching and disaster management.
Asked about spending on the BDF, a retired civil servant said: "Once you have established this thing, you just have to keep feeding it, and feeding it". There will be no reluctance, as the country begins the second cycle in its political life, on the part of the soldiers who now sit at the helm of government to keep feeding 'this thing' which, for all intents and purposes appears to have outlived its purpose.
Precisely as a result of the manner in which the army came into existence - at best a superficial deterrent to marauding armies from hostile neighbouring countries - there are no sturdy measures for oversight on budgetary requests and spending. The army is exempted from appearance even in the country's labour surveys which boldly state that 'these figures exclude numbers of people employed at the BDF'. Any oversight is carefully pre-empted by the National Security Act, the Official Secrets Act and much more recently, the security and Intelligence Act, all emanating from contrived state obsession with 'national security'.
According to the SADCI Defence Digest: covering trends from 1990 to 96: "Some countries in Southern Africa, such as Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe have made significant purchases of weapons since 1990, despite the regional pattern of disarmament and downsizing of armed forces.
"Countries such as Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe have made a number of significant arms purchases in recent years, prompting concerns of a mini regional arms race. Botswana began the build up in 1990; steadily increasing purchases during the ensuing years. Zimbabwe has followed suit, provoked by the build up next door. Namibia, although a small defence spender in comparison to its regional neighbours, has also entered the regional arms race with its own purchases and increasing defence budget.
A glimpse at Botswana's purchase order shows the country bought FGA Aircraft, 1996 from Canada, helicopter, 1990 Canada, transport aircraft, 1996 Indonesia, scout car, 1992 Israel, transport aircraft, 1993 Spain, trainer aircraft 1990 Switzerland. Recoilless Launcher, 1996 Netherlands, transport aircraft, 1996 USA, APC 1996 UK, light tank, 1996 UK, portable SAM, 1992 UK, Towed Gun, 1996 UK Transport Aircraft, 1990 UK
According to Reuters: "The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Botswana, and Uganda all doubled their military spending between 1985 and 2000. The warnings of the early leaders of the country were eventually forgotten and discarded as the new generals began to enjoy the luxuries of army life, and guaranteed job security without any obligation to 'live' service behind a rifle butt on the frontlines. Englishman Kgabo cautioned government to guard against "greedy, self-seeking leaders of the military who might undermine Botswana's democracy with a coup". He could not have anticipated that a bloodless BDF coup would happen at State House and Parliament to feed the insatiable appetite of that voracious idle monster at the Botswana Defence Force.
With BDF graduates camped there, the likelihood of the desired oversight befitting a liberal society such as Botswana claims to be, is seriously undermined. Fischer and sharp also point out that "in Botswana, two key committees constitute the core mechanism of parliamentary oversight over defence. These are the public accounts committee (PAC) and the parliamentary committee on trade, foreign affairs and security.
The PAC relies on periodic reports from the auditor general on the state of BDF accounts and financial procedures; and, as a way of ensuring checks and balances, the committee comprises members of the ruling and opposition parties. However, given the low level of expertise on military issues among members of Parliament, commentators have observed that there must surely be minimal scrutiny of defence issues.
Sandy Grant and Brian Egner also allude to the fact that details of the BDF's budgetary requirements are not publicly available and are only sketchily considered in the National Assembly.Inevitably, this poses a problem for parliamentary oversight and casts serious doubt on the legislature's ability to act as a 'watchdog'. But as Giraldo rightly points out: 'The need for the legislature to approve and review expenditures is a permanent source of influence'.
The BDF has enjoyed the largest budget allocation of the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration. For the period 1988 to 1996, military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 4.1percent. This figure has increased considerably over the years". Some estimate that it has risen to between seven and eight percent of GDP. "While critics have questioned this expenditure, those supporting the establishment of a strong and professional defence force have argued that since the BDF did not inherit any infrastructure, it needed these seemingly high budgets in order to establish itself. Some have claimed that rising BDF budget figures are indicative of failure on the part of the executive to provide oversight and to keep the BDF accountable. Under the incoming regime, there is little chance of that happening.
Batswana will be compelled, in the coming years, to keep an eye on military spending, particularly as it compares with expenditure on health and education, for which the taxpayers are now required to pay a portion.
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