It's no a longer a conspiracy theory. We can no longer simply wish it away. Within the next 10 years three of the country's large-scale gold mines will close.

However, the country is not yet set to benefit significantly from these mines.

Why are we in such a gloomy state? We once observed a former chief economist and senior vice-president of the World Bank turning into a critic of International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

We noted his confession that at the World Bank he "saw that decisions were often made because of ideology and politics. As a result many wrong-headed actions were taken, ones that did not solve the problems at hand but that fit with the interests or beliefs of the people in power".

Let's revisit his confession with respect to a recent report on "A Golden Opportunity? How Tanzania is failing to benefit from Gold Mining". The report reminds us that it's the 1989 and 1992 World Bank papers on the mining sector that "called for Tanzania to develop private investment in mining and attract foreign capital".

This call to liberalise was not enough to change our mindset. We had to be structurally adjusted. Hence the World Bank went ahead to fund a Mineral Sector Development Technical Assistance Project in 1994. This intended to promote fiscal reforms that would make that neoliberal call a reality.

The full-realisation of such a call had been delayed for over half a century. Not least because of a nationalist leader who thought it is the State, not the market, which should control mines. Before we won independence in 1961, he even trusted the "social welfare" of the colonial state more than the corporate social responsibility of private multinationals.

His 1946 call attests to this relative trust: "We want all the chief resources of this country such as gold, coal, diamond and tin mines to be developed by the government and the money used for education and general development." This alternative call became almost a reality in 1967, when he promulgated the Arusha Declaration. Nationalisation of foreign capital became the order of the day.

This move drastically curtailed the development of the private sector in mining. However, 10 years afterwards it re-emerged in the context of a severe economic crisis.

In dealing with this crisis, the Government went as far as to produce a manual for attracting investors in 1980.

The IMF/World Bank chipped in with structural adjustment programmes. The nationalist leader refused to adjust. Then he tried to adjust in our own terms. But at the end of the day, the IFIs had an upper hand. Our diehard nationalist couldn't take it anymore.

He retired as President and CCM chairperson in 1985 and 1987, respectively. Butiama beckoned.

When his successors issued the Zanzibar Declaration in 1991, they officially crowned the reign of the private sector through IFIs. No wonder the World Bank started working effectively on this then long overdue call for private investment in mining. By 1997 a mineral sector policy was in place.

It reduced the role of our government to that of a regulator. As such it emphasized the primary role of private companies. One of the outcomes of this initiative was the controversial Mining Act of 1998.

As the authors of the above cited report note, the initiative created a new tax and mining regime that favours foreign investors at our expense. They note that this regime offers a raft of tax incentives that amounts to hidden subsidies for the foreign mining companies.

These include "low royalties rates (three per cent on gold exports), low taxes on imports of mining equipment, the ability to employ an unlimited number of foreign nationals, and the ability of companies to carry forward losses and offset these against tax."

Moreover, "the Government takes no stake in gold mining operations, allowing foreign companies 100 percent ownership". No wonder they can sell our mineral rights to other companies.

Incidentally, the above cited former vice-president of the World Bank started working at there in 1997 and left in 2000. One wonders whether he viewed the moves to steer Tanzania toward private investment in mining as what he now terms "wrong-headed actions". Perhaps he did for he is now busy instructing us how to undo these actions.

Ironically, he has now co-edited a book entitled, "Escaping the Resource Curse". It defines the terms resource curse as the failure of resource-rich countries to benefit from their natural wealth. This happens when resources are extracted at the expense of the citizenry.

Interestingly, his own chapter is entitled, "What is the role of the State?" It criticises the timing and manner of privatisation. For instance, privatisation has often "occurred before institutions that can collect tax and enforce contract are in place." Intuitively, he recommends three principles to guide governments in lifting the resource curse unleashed by

privatisation: "Transparency: Open and transparent agreements, openly arrived at"; "Ownership: The developing country should remain the ultimate owner of the natural resource"; "Fairness: Natural resource rents belong to the country; foreign companies should get only a fair rate of return, adjusted for the risks they face."

What we can we learn from our stint with the World Bank-inspired privatisation of our mining sector? Do we need the confessions of "economic hit men" to know we have been taken for a ride? Shall we wait for diviners to tell us a resource curse is upon us? Let us reconsider the evidence.

The wailing of our degraded environment speaks volumes. Some 600 metres of black holes bear witness. The 400,000 small-scale miners who are now jobless testify. Three per cent royalties make government coffers tinkle like empty tins.

Could it be that the evidence at hand is a blessing in disguise? Isn't this a golden opportunity to start escaping from this resource curse before it is too late? Would the presidential committee on reviewing mining contracts seize this golden moment?