allAfrica.com: Zimbabwe: The Case for Letting Mugabe Feel Threat of African Force (Page 1 of 2)

ALTHOUGH the government has ruled out military intervention in Zimbabwe, there is a case for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to save what is left of its credibility by making clear to President Robert Mugabe the possibility of such intervention.

Analysts argue that doing so could reduce the likelihood that Mugabe will proceed with the coup-by-stealth that appears to be under way, subverting the will of his people as expressed in the March 29 presidential elections.

Two weeks ago, Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad told the media: "I want to stress what the Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka has said (on her visit to the Netherlands last week), that if we South Africans suddenly go into an illusionary frame of mind that what we think can happen, or must happen, then we are living in very dangerous times.

"There is no South African government that will try to impose its will by force, and that will never happen," he said emphatically.

But Laurence Caromba of the Centre for International Political Studies argues that Mugabe could be more inclined to relinquish control if he was convinced that the consequences of illegally holding on to power might include regional military intervention.

Caromba, a researcher at the University of Pretoria, says that President Thabo Mbeki -- in conjunction with fellow SADC members -- has a legal right to launch military action intervene in Zimbabwe to defend the election results in that country.

Such action would be to in line with the African Union (AU) charter, which was amended in 2003 to permit military intervention in countries facing "a serious threat to legitimate order".

This move was also reinforced at subregional level in 2004, when the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security legalised intervention in cases of "a threat to the legitimate authority of the government (such as a military coup)".

Caromba says that such a "legal government intervention" is an important tool in the conduct of foreign policy. It was used successfully in three instances in the past 10 years to restore order in Sierra Leone, Lesotho and, most recently, in the Comoros.

In 1997, Nigeria sent troops into Sierra Leone to depose Maj Johnny Koroma , a young military officer who had successfully toppled the elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

"Kabbah went on to serve two terms before stepping down, during which he successfully brought the Sierra Leone civil war to a conclusion. Sierra Leone has remained a constitutional democracy to this day," Caromba says.

In 1998, SADC forces invaded Lesotho to prevent an imminent military coup and restore the civilian government to power. Despite the grave mistakes, coupled with unexpectedly heavy resistance from mutinous elements of the Lesotho Defence Force, and widespread looting in Maseru, "order was restored, military rule was averted and, as a result, Lesotho is today a reasonably healthy and robust democracy".

As recently as a month ago, the AU launched an amphibious invasion of Anjouan, an island in the Comoros, to overthrow Col Mohamed Bacar, who had ruled the island as a virtual fiefdom after holding rigged elections and declaring himself president.

After a day of fighting, with troops from Sudan, Tanzania and Senegal participating, aided by logistical support from Libya and France, the intervention forces routed Bacar's forces, and the colonel fled to the nearby French island of Mayotte.

As with previous African interventions, this right would stem not only from humanitarian concerns, but from Mugabe's illegal seizure of power.

"Legal government intervention" is an African innovation: an international law response to the cycle of coups and counter-coups that has plagued African states for decades. Both in treaties and in practice, African states have subtly shifted away from their traditional fixation on sovereignty, and begun to assert the right to intervene to prevent unconstitutional changes of government.

As the situation stands in Zimbabwe, the bulk of the evidence suggests Mugabe is slowly unleashing pro-government militias and effectively dismantling the constitutional order. He pointedly refused to attend a SADC summit aimed at defusing the crisis, while war veterans march through the streets of Harare in shows of force and soldiers beat up opposition supporters for holding "premature" victory celebrations, pending the release of delayed presidential election results.

"The AU charter does not call on member states merely to prop up incumbent governments, but to protect the legitimate order. Conceptually, there is little difference between illegally assuming power and illegally maintaining power after losing an election," Caromba says.

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