Dani W. Nabudere
4 May 2008
opinion
The recent failure by Joseph Kony to show up for the purposes of signing the final peace agreement with the Uganda government to end the 21-month peace negotiations was indeed a blow to those Ugandans who had placed faith in the peace process in the hope that such an agreement would bring to an end the 20-year conflict in the northern region.
Most disappointed were the thousands of Ugandans encamped in the IDP camps scattered around the region. On reflection, however, such behavior on the part of Kony was not surprising in view of the fact that Kony, like all of us, is a victim of his own environment most of which is beyond his control.
Factors such as the physical environment in which he lives, the psychology of the conflict and the calculations of physical survival, the regional geo-strategic factors in the countries in which he is operating, and the social forces surrounding him - all go to determine the way he is bound to think and act.
It should not be forgotten that in the 20 years war in northern Uganda, Kony has developed a high sense of mistrust of the government in Kampala as well as the SPLM/A, who were at one time combined in fighting his forces. The mediation of the talks by Dr Riek Machar should therefore not be seen as something welcome by Kony.
Indeed, at one time he complained that Dr Machar was not a neutral party to the talks and that he wanted a change of mediators and even the venue to Kenya or South Africa.
It should also not be forgotten that at the beginning of the proposal to enter in peace talks, Kony rejected various offers of amnesty made by President Museveni to him because he did not believe that Museveni can be trusted to make such offers without some traps behind them, and not without reason because of his experiences with the NRM/A, UPDF and the Uganda government in the past. So far from being unexpected, Kony's failure to show up at Ri Kwangba to sign the final peace deal was not surprising, the ICC warrants notwithstanding.
Furthermore, even the reasons Kony gave for not showing up also were not surprising, the fact that he wanted more clarification about the link between the traditional mato oput justice system and the proposed special division of the High Court to try him and his commanders.
For us not on the firing line, his demand seems illogical given that he had teams of advisers giving him advice on these issues as the discussions on item 3 of the agenda on accountability and reconciliation proceeded. But we are not Kony and our feelings on the issue are irrelevant.
What is notable though is the Uganda governments' reactions to the failure of Kony turning up to sign the agreement have been ambivalent and at times confused. They seem to have adopted the usual stance of threatening 'military action' or 'Plan B.' At the same time, there was the more moderate voice from Ndugu Rugunda reassuring everyone that failure to sign the agreement did not mean an end to the peace process.
The 'Plan B' stance was recently reechoed by Amama Mbabazi at the Great Lakes Peace Conference peace and security meeting. But like all previous threats by him and President Museveni, his threats sounded rather hollow and meaningless in view of the fact that Mbabazi, of all people, should have known that there was no way the Uganda government or indeed, the governments of the Great Lakes region and the UN, could carry out such a threat.
Mbabazi is fully aware that having failed to defeat the LRA militarily while the LRA was operating in Uganda and even later while the LRA was operating in both Uganda and Sudan (remember 'Operation Iron Fist'?), the UPDF is in no position to deal with him while he is now capable of operating in three countries across two regions.
How indeed could the UPDF have defeated the LRA when they had a whole battalion of 'ghost soldiers' supposed to be fighting them and even supplying them with weapons for additional cash perhaps to help them absorb the weapons that were meant for the 'ghost battalion.' So who is serious - Kony or Mbabazi?
The Uganda reactions to the LRA leader's failure to sign are also instructive. President Museveni's meeting with the President of the government of Southern Sudan on the 15th April 2008, revealed his weaknesses in his response to Kony.
His acceptance of the advice of the government of South Sudan that the peace process should continue was a correct stance, but unlike his attitude at the beginning of the peace talks two years ago, he was no longer in a position to impose unrealisable deadlines.
This to some extent demonstrated that the Uganda government had lost the leverage in their dealings with the LRA and that Kony was aware of this weakness. This is a good development, which should be exploited fully by all concerned to ensure that the LRA leader signs the final peace agreement.
To start with, Kony's apparent increased leverage is based on his capability to physically manoeuvre along porous borders in the jungle areas he is operating from. The governments in these areas are weak and are unable to monitor their borders.
This manoeuvreability is however also non-sustainable in the long run because of the fact that Kony cannot for ever go on engaging in abductions of children to build an army that cannot operate effectively inside Uganda.
Moreover, Kony is playing with the continued attractions of the Khartoum government to weaken the government of South Sudan in order to frustrate the full implementation of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement-CPA. This is a very dangerous engagement, which Kony must realise, cannot in the medium and long term pay off for him and his group, since Khartoum's efforts in this case, just like that of Darfur, is bound to fail.
In the end, Kony will find himself abandoned by Khartoum, and without the financial and material support he may now be getting, he will find himself in the wilderment-having burnt all the boats capable of leading him back home. In this situation, he will find himself operating as a bandit in the two regions without any purpose other than mere physical survival.
So both the LRA and the Uganda government must see that the successful signing and implementation of the Final Peace Agreement as the best (and perhaps the only) option for them, for failure to do so will lead to the weakening of both of them to the detriment of the people of northern Uganda and indeed, Uganda as a whole.
So we should stop engaging in gimmicks of the past and be serious in ensuring that Kony is fully explained the implications of the agreement on accountability and reconciliation and its annexure even if this takes longer than was expected.
This will not only remove the grounds for further refusals to sign on the part of Kony, but it will also expose Kony to the people of Uganda that he and his group are not to be trusted. In this way, the Uganda government may regain the confidence of the people of Acholi, which they had never enjoyed before.
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