ENOUGH Project (Washington, DC)
Julia Spiegel and John Prendergast
8 May 2008
(Page 3 of 4)
Some rightly fear the serious risks that go hand-in-hand with military action. But the LRA cannot be allowed to burrow into the vacuum of southeastern CAR, where there is little government presence, even less international support, and thus few actors able to stop the LRA from resurrecting their supply lines to Khartoum. The potential cost of allowing the LRA to build its forces in the region unchecked would be disastrous for civilians in Uganda and its neighbors. The LRA push into the Central African Republic could also potentially pull French forces—based in Central African Republic and supporting its fragile government—and European Union peacekeepers into direct confrontation with the LRA. These concerns highlight the importance of both constructing a well-coordinated and well-planned regional military plan.
The United States, United Kingdom, and France should work quietly with African countries in the region to develop a special forces capability focused on apprehending the remaining ICC suspects, starting with Joseph Kony. This could either be embedded in existing UN missions in the region or parallel to it. The three peacekeeping missions in the LRA’s orbit—MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNMIS in southern Sudan, and EUFOR [14] in the Central African Republic—should create a joint-intelligence cell now that can report to the group of actors that are planning. Other countries with strong intelligence capabilities should also be involved to coordinate communication and the formation of strategies.[15]
ACTION TWO: The international community must sever support to the LRA by a small number of individuals in the Ugandan Diaspora.
LRA supporters in the diaspora who are bitterly opposed to this process will do everything they can to ensure there is no deal. These individuals are few in number but staunchly opposed to the Museveni regime— largely due to over two decades of marginalization of the North—and eager to see a continuation of this war. They are thus likely to support LRA fragments or, in the unlikely event that Kony accepts a deal that does not satisfy either their political demands, a new rebel group.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and other government with intelligence capabilities in the region should work to name, shame, and sanction those diaspora members who are providing support to the LRA. All efforts should be made to try to move these sanctions through the U.N. Security Council as well. A U.N. panel of experts should also be appointed to investigate LRA sources of supply. At the very least, this will put Kony, Khartoum, and diaspora spoilers on notice.
ACTION THREE: Working in conjunction with their respective host country governments, international peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, southern Sudan, and Central African Republic—MONUC, UNMIS, and EUFOR respectively—must deploy forces to the areas where the LRA is likely to attack.
While Uganda is experiencing relative peace, civilians throughout the broader region are at risk and have increasingly fallen victim to LRA attacks. In southeastern Central African Republic, people have already asked the government to arm them, but the government has refused.[16] Civilians in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo are also extremely vulnerable. As one international official said to ENOUGH, “If the people resist, as they did in Uganda, you can be sure the LRA will massacre them just as they did in Uganda.”[17] And if increasing numbers of civilians resist, the numbers of casualties will grow. It is thus critical that efforts are made now to ensure the protection of civilians from this emerging and increasingly dangerous regional threat.
The Pull: Force Kony to make a choice
ACTION: Backed by the dual leverage of a military planning process and continuing investigations by the ICC, the United States and other key actors should quietly construct a channel to Kony that creates an exile option for him and the other indictees to an ICC non-signatory country.
Kony has been able to gain time, money, and medicine out of these peace efforts without making any real commitments. Now he must be forced to make a choice by a certain deadline—determined by the government of Uganda and backed by the international community—so this deliberation process does not last indefinitely. This strategy requires an effective communication channel to be made between the government, the international community, and Kony himself, with a credible proposal that deals with Kony’s personal security and livelihood concerns.
A concerted effort must be made by the Ugandan government and key international players to press Kony to make a choice about his future. Kony has three choices. First, he can sign the peace deal and begin assembling his LRA forces in Ri-Kwangba. Second, he can agree to a third-country asylum arrangement representing exile or banishment from northern Uganda as a consequence for his crimes, thus removing himself from the battlefield and giving peace a real chance. Or third, he can walk away from the agreement and formalize his status as a regional warlord, which will almost certainly trigger a manhunt that could leave him on the run for the rest of his life.
The Ugandan government has voiced an interest in working with religious and cultural leaders to create a direct channel of communication with the rebel leader. Based on the failed peace signing attempt, it has become clear that the "if we build it, he will come" model will not work.
Conclusion
To bring an end to the LRA threat in northern Uganda and the surrounding region, the peace strategy must shift from one that relies solely on negotiations to one that develops leverage through military planning, presses Kony to make a choice about his future, and pushes forward a development and security strategy for northern Ugandans to return voluntarily, even in the absence of a peace deal. Otherwise, absent a concerted effort to address the regional threat that Kony now poses, no civilian within a four-country radius can rest assured that they will not fall victim to the next LRA attack.
Paul Harera Sebikali conducted research for this report.
Endnotes
[1] There were haunting similarities between the last phase of the Juba peace process and the international effort to broker peace in Darfur, the latest iteration of which was an elaborate meeting prepared in Libya which numerous external governments and institutions attended but the rebels boycotted. Both are examples of diplomatic strategies that misdiagnose rebel intentions and fail to develop significant leverage.
[2] The report was withheld “in the interest of peace” during what was supposed to be the final legs of the Juba peace process. The decision to keep this report quiet added to the public delusion that Kony was meaningfully engaging in negotiations.
[3] Numerous insiders have stated that Kony has no interest in this process. And they argue that his main reason for agreeing to a meeting on May 10 is to get more money and airtime. It is critical that the mediators do not fall into this trap.
[4] The U.S. government, and in particular senior advisor on conflict Tim Shortley, has been calling for the de-linking of the Juba peace process from returns and redevelopment in the North. Other international donors should join the call to press the Ugandan government to deliver on these promises now.
[5] Two of the five original International Criminal Court indictees are now dead, so only three, including Kony, remain.
[6] The ICC’s indictments provide essential leverage while not preventing the signing of a peace deal. There are legitimate ways to deal with the warrants short of formal prosecution in The Hague if the LRA chooses—and the LRA is aware of these options. But instead it has chosen to stall and quibble rather than move forward.
[7] ENOUGH interviews, Kampala and Washington D.C., April 2008.
[8] Inter Agency Standing Committee Update on IDP movement, April 2008. Note that the statistics provided in this update refer to total movements as of February, not April.
[9] U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Uganda humanitarian situation report, February 1-29, 2008.
[10] Email correspondence, Adam O’Brien, May 1, 2008.
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The report fails to draw attention to precise aspects of the relationship between between the Acholi people and the government of Uganda and its agencies: for example the historical foundation to the relationship that determined certain structural features; the centemporary imperatives in in Uganda Army activities in Acholi communities; and the relationship between The Uganda Army and recorded artrocities; and the relationship of Acholi communities and the repressive state organs. The Report needs to pose the question of whether uganda government policies in Northern Uganda are enforcing genocide. During most times the policies were incontrovertibly genocidal. Policies today are still genocidal in their impact and conscious intent. Policies have been have been articulated by the dominant interests of the Uganda Goverment in maintaining control. at both domestic and international level Acholi people have been increasingl;y defined as a security problem, as a law and order problem which has legitimised and demanded army intervention.