London — Ghana Telecom's 1.4 million mobile customers represent just over 0.5 percent of Vodafone's global subscriber base of 260 million. How strategic is that for Vodafone?

Even if we achieved 100 percent mobile penetration with a relative small population of 23million people (which is less than 10 percent of Vodafone's subscribers) Vodafone's stated target market share of 25 percent will only represent 2.2 percent of its current total subscriber base and that won't be achieved for another 5 years at least. To the extent, therefore, that this is strategic for Vodafone it must be as a beachhead for further and greater expansion of Vodafone's interests across the sub-region.

Much of the sub-region, however, is French-speaking and given the hold France has over many of these countries, France Telecom/Orange are probably better-placed to dominate in those markets. Vodafone itself has struggled to gain a foothold in France; it has held a substantial but minority stake in SFR France for a long time, but it has been unable to secure controlling interests to date. So it remains to be seen whether or not this turns out to be as strategic for Vodafone as the government assumes it will be for Ghana.

But is it really strategic for Ghana to hand over its fixed telecom network to a company which although is the world's largest mobile provider by revenue, has relatively little experience of running or investing in building fixed telecom networks anywhere in the world? What exactly will Vodafone bring in terms of deep and in-house experience to this business? Yes, in December 2007 Vodafone acquired the assets of Tele2, a fixed telecom operator in Spain and Italy and it has minority interests in Arcor (the German fixed telecom operator). It also provides fixed broadband services in other countries but mainly as a virtual operator using the facilities of the local fixed incumbent.

However, fixed telecom services contributed less than 6% to Vodafone's total service revenues of some £33Bn (US$66Bn) in 2007/2008. The share price, profitability and much of what matters to Vodafone's shareholders are dependent on its mobile revenues and properties and not its fixed telecom, broadband assets or operations. Fixed telecom services are therefore not as strategic to Vodafone as its mobile assets although they clearly see it as complementary. This has anumber of potential implications: (1) if push comes to shove Vodafone can and will jettison that part of the business (2) that part of the business is unlikely to be prioritized for significantly more investment going forward, especially in a place like Ghana where the fixed infrastructure is woefully under-developed.

As we move inexorably toward the digital world, broadband will become strategic for all economies. Today, Ghana Telecom's broadband reach is limited indeed, primarily to a couple of metropolitan areas and it will be in dire need of further investment if we want to extend that reach to many more of our fellow citizens.

The rapid diffusion of internet services in mature economies over recent years has been driven largely by broadband but we are also learning that with increased speeds, our appetite for greater bandwidth consumption is becoming voracious which in turn increases the investment required to upgrade and extend the network . But at the best of times, broadband business cases are hard to justify which is why in places like Singapore, Korea and Japan governments are taking the lead on these investments. I do not expect Vodafone to invest in the extension of broadband in Ghana beyond where it is profitable and much of that will depend on regulation if the current deal stands.

The government's e-government and other ICT initiatives for our schools, hospitals and much of our future economy will depend on a robust broadband infrastructure. Yet this single most important strategic asset has been handed over to Vodafone which has by default become a monopoly provider when few, if any, competitive alternatives exist. We are proposing to transfer a public monopoly to a private one and that cannot be good for the future of our country.

What people forget is, as the so-called Negroponte flip (posited by Nicholas Negroponte, Director of MIT's Media Lab, who argued that over the long term, services that used to be delivered by wireless (e.g. radio and TV) will go over wireline (i.e. broadband) and what used to be available only by wireline (i.e. telephone) will be will accessed wirelessly (e.g. voice calls via mobile)) becomes a reality, power shifts from traditional broadcasters and telecom operators could become important in the delivery of broadcast services. Many of us already listen to our favourite Ghanaian radio stations from JoyFm, to Peace and Adom FM over broadband. As telecom operators deliver TV and other information services - as they already are in many countries around the world - any future national emergency will not only require that the state takes control over Broadcasting House, but also of all telecom network operations centres. With this new reality in mind, do we want to handover our national common carrier to a foreign-owned company?

This deal will not pass in most economies; not in Britain where the monopolies and mergers commission will rule the fixed telecom portion anti-competitive or in Canada, much of the European Union or the United States. Many countries impose strict limitations on the ownership of telecommunications and broadcast services in part because they are deemed a critical public utility, integral to one's sovereignty - and for the security reasons I have hinted at above.

In the United States, Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934 (amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996) imposes foreign ownership restrictions on U.S. broadcast, common carrier, or aeronautical radio station licensees. According to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) guidelines on foreign ownership, Section 310(b)(2) of the Act specifically "prohibits a foreign corporation from holding a broadcast, common carrier, or aeronautical radio station license". The FCC is clear that the "prohibition is absolute" and it "has no discretion to waive it". Section 310(b)(3) of Act limits the holdings of foreign corporation to no more than 20 percent of the "stock of a broadcast, common carrier, or aeronautical radio station licensee."

Under Section 16 of Canada's Telecommunications Act of 1993 a company is eligible to operate in Canada as a telecommunications common carrier only if it is a "Canadian-owned and controlled corporation" and by that they mean 80 percent of the shares are owned by Canadians and an equal proportion constitute the board. In India, where Vodafone purchased Hutchison Essar, the majority of the Board of Directors, including the Chairman, Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer must be resident Indian citizens as should the Chief Technical Officer and Chief Financial Officer.

Furthermore, in the United States, any such sale of a common carrier, especially one that enjoys near-monopoly over international, long distance, and broadband services will be subject to Department of Justice reviews for its antitrust implications.

I have few qualms about spinning off the mobile arm of Ghana Telecom (OneTouch) since we already have a thriving and competitive mobile telecom market. However, we do not have a competitive fixed telecom market so to pass on that monopoly over long distance and international telephone services and most of all, the future of broadband, to a foreign commercial company makes little sense and in time we may come to regret this decision.

This issue is far too serious to be nodded through by parliament without serious debate and detailed scrutiny. There should be no rush to close this deal. Ghana Telecom is not a drain on the nation's resources and US$900m between now and the elections will make no difference. Parliament should take its time and not rush to any decisions until after the next elections.

Ultimately, for competitive and national security reasons, I would urge parliament to reject the proposed sale of Ghana Telecom as currently packaged and ask the government to think again about the structure of the deal and critically about spinning off OneTouch and leaving Ghana Telecom Fixed in public hands until such time that it can be restructured and a competitive fixed telecom environment can be created - notwithstanding previous and failed attempts for example, through the establishment of Westel as an alternative fixed telecom provider - to deliver value and choice for consumers.

The time has come for the government to begin to consider more seriously, alternative capital raising avenues for all future capital projects and sale of national assets, including the dual carriageway between Apedwa and Konongo as well as Ghana Telecom. It is time to we brought an end to this reflex of wanting to sell everything including our future to foreign investors who then charge us to use them for eternity. It is neither sensible nor is it a sound way of securing our future.

When the United Kingdom government privatized British Telecom in 1984, it did not look for a strategic investor; rather it issued stocks, most of which went to institutional investors (who manage investment portfolios and pension funds on behalf of a large number of British citizens and workers) and a substantial part were allocated to ordinary members of the public.

We should give Ghanaians and Ghanaian institutions the opportunity to invest in building their own country which they have so often been denied by this NPP government. The chiefs and people of Kwahu did it in 1923; surely in 2008 we who are better endowed can do it too!