|
|
South Africa: A Distressing Record of Siding With the Bad Guys
 |
 |
|||||||||
|
||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||
|
||||||||||
Business Day (Johannesburg)
OPINION
25 July 2008
Posted to the web 25 July 2008
David Ansara and Michael Meadon
Johannesburg
THE South African government recently rejected a draft resolution of the United Nations (UN) Security Council for sanctions on Zimbabwe following the presidential runoff elections of June 27.
Along with China, Libya, Russia and Vietnam, SA voted against the draft resolution, which called for a return to democracy, imposed an arms embargo, and placed targeted sanctions on the upper echelons of the Zimbabwean government.
SA's UN ambassador, Dumisani Kumalo, said that while the government was worried about the situation in Zimbabwe, SA was obliged to follow the African consensus as expressed by the Southern African Development Community and the African Union, neither of which called for sanctions but simply expressed "grave concern".
There is a tendency to see the South African government's approach to Zimbabwe as an anomaly in an otherwise noble foreign policy agenda. However, a cursory glance at SA's short history on the s ecurity c ouncil tells a different story. The failure to support the Zimbabwean resolution is just one instance in a worrying trend of endorsing authoritarianism. The most notable example of this was in the tacit support for the military regime of Burma.
In its first major action after being elected to the s ecurity c ouncil, SA voted with Russia and China against a draft resolution on Burma that censured the junta over its human rights abuses and called for democratic reforms. This included an injunction to end attacks on Burmese citizens, including sexual assault, abduction and acts of torture against minority groups and opposition supporters.
Since both China and Russia wielded vetoes, SA's vote was technically moot. But its failure to support the resolution had major symbolic repercussions. By refusing to confront the regime, SA put its desire to score points against the permanent members from the west ahead of the emancipation of the Burmese people. As a consequence, SA's international reputation as a guardian of human rights and democracy suffered enormously.
While Russia and China's "no" votes on such matters are to be expected, SA's hostility to punitive measures was unseemly. According to Kumalo, the government was concerned about the situation in Burma but was worried that adopting the resolution would compromise the work of the UN secretary-general's envoy to Burma. He also suggested the resolution had overstepped the mandate of the s ecurity c ouncil set out by the UN Charter and that it dealt with issues best left to the Human Rights Commission (HRC).
The similarities in the positions taken by the South African government in the Burma and Zimbabwe situations are striking. However, the validity of its reasoning in both cases is flawed in several ways.
As dictatorial regimes seldom give up power voluntarily, there has to be a change in the material circumstances of the dictators themselves for meaningful change to occur. The current Zimbabwean talks hold much promise, but it is unclear whether the results will be either lasting or substantive. There is little to suggest that the mere act of "dialogue" can produce results in the absence of a force that compels the incumbents to cede power.
With regards to the s ecurity council deferring to the HRC on questions of human rights, this too is disingenuous. First, the HRC has no power and functions solely as a deliberative body. Second, it is limited because a large proportion of its members are themselves frequent abusers of human rights, such as China, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, SA's voting record on the HRC is itself abysmal -- SA has shielded authoritarian regimes in that forum as well.
Mostly, however, SA is hiding behind an absolutist definition of sovereignty. The idea that national sovereignty -- adopted as a governing principle of international relations for purely pragmatic reasons at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 -- is some sort of grand, unbreakable moral principle is patently absurd. SA should not pretend governments have the right to slaughter their own people. As Kofi Annan declared in his final speech as UN secretary-general , "(Collective responsibility means) that respect for national sovereignty can no longer be used as a shield by governments intent on massacring their own people, or as an excuse for the rest of us to do nothing when such heinous crimes are committed."
Indeed, it is ironic that the African National Congress which benefited from SA's isolation over the "purely sovereign" issue of apartheid, would adopt a reactionary position with respect to the right to freedom of other peoples. As Desmond Tutu exclaimed at the time of the rejection of the Burma resolution: "If others had used the arguments we are using today when we asked them for their support against apartheid, we might still have been unfree." How long will SA continue to vote for authoritarianism?
|
Ansara is an MA Graduate in South African and Comparative Politics from UCT. Michael Meadon is completing his MA in Cognitive Science at UKZN.
I suspect Thabo Mbeki suffers from an overdose of dislike for the West so much that it impairs his judgement at any turn. Time to move on, I am not saying the West has anyone else's interest at heart either
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Copyright © 2008 Business Day. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com). To contact the copyright holder directly for corrections -- or for permission to republish or make other authorized use of this material, click here. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Make allAfrica.com your home page | RSS Feed | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Top | Site Guide | Who We Are | Advertising | Search | Subscribe | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Questions or Comments? Contact us. Read our Privacy Statement. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
