William Gumede
9 October 2008
(Page 2 of 3)
It is hard to see Zuma presenting a progressive response to how to provide stable families, how to make gender equality as set out in the constitution real, and how to set a progressive example of male identity that aligns with the values of the constitution. With South Africa having among the highest HIV/Aids case loads in the world, Zuma believes that having a shower after unprotected sex with a HIV/Aids positive partner will stop infection. He has urged the police to shoot first and ask questions later to combat high crime levels. He will consider the death penalty. He is under fire from his own camp for flip-flopping on economic policy depending on the audience. Zuma has surrounded himself with hard-line demagogues. This will make it difficult for him to bring in new talent from across the colour, ideological and political divide, which is so necessary to energise the country, but which Mbeki has not done.
Under Mbeki, only a relatively small black middle classes benefited from affirmative action, and a dozen oligarchs from black economic empowerment. The white middle class, with the social capital, education and property acquired during apartheid and white business did well too. Yet the majority black poor and working class, and those eking out a living in the informal sector were marginalised. Many rightfully fear Zuma will be held hostage by the special interests, big black business oligarchs, such as the casino magnate Vivien Reddy, the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) moguls Don Makwanazi and the Shaik family, and arms companies like Thint, of which Zuma is alleged to have been bribed to shield them from prosecution.
Competent and decisive leadership is now required to lift the economy, not populism. Economic growth is slowing, inflation and costs are rising, and power shortages are undermining production, while high unemployment and poverty persist, service delivery remains poor, and ANC supporters are demanding urgent redistribution; all this amid the global financial disaster. Zuma has reassured the markets that the post-Mbeki government will steer the same economic path as Mbeki. President Motlanthe has been handed a new government report (Towards a 15-year Review) by his predecessor that concedes that in spite of growth levels averaging 5% the past years, not enough has been done to slash poverty and inequality, and to increase trust in government. Problems identified five years ago had proved more 'deep-seated' than previously recognised, Joel Netshitenzhe, head of policy coordination and advisory services, said: 'Growth has exposed weaknesses ... the increase in the rate of growth does not necessarily result in a reduction in poverty.' Nor had growth reduced inequality, but had rather created a bigger gap between the rich and poor, as Netshitenzhe outlined: 'The state has had to learn new ways of doing things as it implemented, but not always have these been decisive and flexible enough.'
The Left's backing for Zuma is not likely to give them much influence on economic policy. They may be consulted more regularly, of course, but will be told, as Mbeki told them before, that the government cannot risk unsettling the markets. Zuma will have to pay back other supporters - the BEE oligarchs, who were marginalised under Mbeki, but who are now sponsoring Zuma. Others who lost out on the gravy train will want their slice of the pie too. Cosatu and the SACP will have to compete with them for Zuma's ear. The ANC's allies, the SA Congress of Trade Unions and the SA Communist Party, are demanding to be upgraded as 'full partners' instead of junior partners as under Mbeki. Blade Nzimande of the SACP says it wants more of its members on the ANC's candidate list for the 2009 elections, and more appointed as national and provincial ministers, mayors and local councillors, with a 'deployment committee' to pick its people. It has just concluded a policy conference, ahead of an alliance summit with Cosatu and the SACP; Nzimande says the summit should veto government policy.
Instead of stopping the legal problems of Zuma, forcing out Mbeki has actually only increased Zuma's legal woes. When announcing that Mbeki was 'recalled' as president, Gwede Mantashe, the ANC general secretary had said: 'The National Prosecuting Authority's decision to appeal the judgment has become a worry and a point of division for the ANC.' The reality is that Zuma still has very real 16 charges of corruption against him. Judge Chris Nicholson, who cleared Zuma on a technicality - the prosecutors had followed the wrong procedure - emphasised he did not give a verdict on the charges, but proposed the prosecutors recharge Zuma, provided they do so by the book. To rescue their own credibility, the prosecutors have no other choice but to appeal and recharge Zuma.
Moreover, the prosecutors have been under such an attack from Zuma militants now that their very credibility may rest on successfully recharging Zuma. In any event, they know that if Zuma comes to power, the prosecuting unit may be broken up, with members of the team that have been prosecuting Zuma likely be 'redeployed' elsewhere, or simply put under pressure to resign. Furthermore, even if the prosecutors did bow under the pressure and did not prosecute, a number of private prosecutions against Zuma have been lined up - so it is difficult to see how Zuma is going to extricate himself out of this, which have already seen his former financial advisor sent to jail for 15 years. The National Prosecuting Authority has now confirmed that it had applied to appeal against the ruling that sprang Zuma free on a technicality. Mbeki has also formally approached the Constitutional Court to ask that Judge Nicholson's findings be declared unconstitutional and set aside; he says the judgement was 'vexatious, scandalous and prejudicial', cost him his job and damaged his good name and reputation. Zuma is opposing Mbeki's bid to clear his name. If Mbeki won, his sacking by the ANC's executive would be shown to be based on false assumptions, and therefore void.
Following Mbeki's forced exit, the Zuma coalition, consisting of five distinctly different groups, who were all opposed to Mbeki, have lost the glue that hold them together - opposition to Mbeki. Furthermore, with Mbeki gone, all of them are now focusing on securing their own interests in the leadership vacuum. Within the Zuma coalition, not all are set on securing the presidency of South Africa for Zuma. Those who are, though include: the ANC youth league, the pro-Zuma black economic empowerment business oligarchs - both hoping to secure patronage; the Communist Party and the trade unionists, who nave no alternative presidential candidate of their own, think they can manipulate Zuma in power; and those ANC leaders who are being investigated by the National Prosecuting Authority for corruption, because, they argue that if Zuma's case is quashed - especially when he comes to power, theirs will also. So, now the Zuma coalition are divided between those who want Zuma at all costs to become president, such as those seeking a pardon for corruption or patronage, versus those who are prepared to look for a unifying ANC leader that will be pro-poor, the latter include the more serious elements of Cosatu and the SACP. Yet, Zuma is not entirely in control of his own coalition. Ahead of Mbeki's ouster, he opposed efforts to oust Mbeki, because he feared he will inherit a divided party, unprepared to run a general election. However, he was rudely overruled by his own militants.
Furthermore, in the week when Mbeki detractors within the Zuma coalition moved to oust him, all the old presidential rivals of Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa, Mathews and Tokyo Sexwale, again took centre stage within the ANC, dwarfing Zuma, almost like a decade ago. Zuma initially wanted Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of Parliament, and the ANC's chairwoman, a more pliable supporter, as caretaker president. However, he lost out on that. Until yesterday, the Zuma camp, in control of the ANC had planned to appoint Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of Parliament, as interim president, to smooth the way for Zuma and to create an environment for Zuma's legal charges to be withdrawn. Motlanthe was the choice of those in the Zuma coalition, who are more interested in keeping the ANC united, and securing a pro-poor government focus, rather then putting Zuma into the presidency. They have long seen him as an alternative candidate for the presidency if Zuma stumbles over his legal hurdles. Motlanthe does things by the book. In this crisis, their may be openings for other Young Turks of Motlanthe's generation. To contain the Young Turks - Motlanthe, Phosa, Sexwale and Ramaphosa, Zuma has promised to stay as president for one term only, and then allow a competitive election for the leadership between them. But Mothlante obviously now has the inside track, because he is already an MP, the others, including Zuma are not. He will be presiding president for six months, which is enough to show his credentials not only as a unifying figure, but a source of new ideas, energy and principle, and to contrast this to the divisive potential of a populist Zuma.
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