17 October 2008
document
Nairobi — Response by Police and Provincial Administration
In accordance with our terms of reference, one of the main areas of our inquiry was to find out whether and to what extent the local administration and police were prepared for the violence that erupted, and how they ultimately responded to it.
We shall now discuss the evidence presented before us in this area, which indicates that the police and the local administration were caught totally unprepared by the violence.
We shall examine the police response in light of the availability of intelligence information indicating the high likelihood of violence.
We shall conclude this section by discussing whether violence in North Rift was planned or spontaneous with no prior planning, as was the testimony of local administration officials.
The provincial administration and security forces
This issue is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report. We shall limit ourselves to aspects particular to acts and omissions attributed to the police and the administration in the North Rift.
According to Bernard Kinyua, Uasin Gishu's district commissioner and the OCPD of Keiyo Division (previously OCPD of Eldoret Division) Angelus Karuru's testimonies before us, the DSIC was prepared for the possibility of pre-election violence, including the likelihood of some celebratory violence after the election in Uasin Gishu.
However, they did not anticipate widespread post-election violence, had not developed contingency plans for it, and had not beefed up their existing force of 600 police officers.
Their testimony to the commission was nevertheless that they were ready even though when the violence erupted they were forced to call in reinforcements from Baringo, West Pokot and Nairobi for contingents of GSU, the Anti-Stock Unit, the Administrative Police (AP), and some military personnel.
A resident of Langas Estate in Eldoret told commission investigators that the police there were generally ineffective and unable to control roving gangs which surrounded the estate until the police commissioner arrived by helicopter with GSU reinforcements.
That view has the support of a local religious leader who asserted that the security forces were powerless against the violence and furthermore there were ethnic divisions amongst them.
Once reinforced, the district used its forces to unblock the main arteries and to disperse the gangs of young Kalenjin attackers in town and elsewhere.
In conjunction with the DC's office they also assisted victims by bringing them to IDP camps which initially were established in the area at the ASK Showground in Eldoret, in the Mau Forest and in Mathare.
Later they took the initiative to move them out of hostile rural areas when they received intelligence that Kalenjin warriors were planning to attack and evict IDPs from the camps themselves.
The commission was given evidence that the police were obviously overwhelmed by criminal gangs who proceeded in large numbers and appeared to plan their attacks.
Roadblocks were manned and security forces and health care providers denied free movement. This hampered the police's ability to rescue distressed victims of the attacks.
The first time district officials heard of plans by Kalenjin youth to attack the Kiambaa farm, for instance, was during a DSIC meeting on 31 December 2007. According to the OCPD, his office immediately dispatched officers to the area.
However, because the access road was heavily blocked with rocks and old tractors at the turnoff to Kiambaa on the Nakuru-Eldoret road, they could not proceed. By the time they arrived the church at Kiambaa had been burned to the ground, with the charred remains of the victims still inside.
In some cases, police on rescue missions faced not just roadblocks but also attacks by hostile gangs of Kalenjin youths.
The commission heard of an incident in which five policemen in a Landrover on a mission to assist an old Kikuyu man at Soi encountered heavy roadblocks from Huruma to Turbo and from Huruma up to Kitale.
Bows and arrows
They were repelled by gangs of youth armed with bows and arrows, and had to return later to rescue him. A similar situation ensued at Mailu Nne on 31 December 2007. In still other cases, the police themselves were overwhelmed, attacked and even killed.
Beyond this the police took two pre-emptive measures which may have helped to minimise the violence.
First, the OCPD for Uasin Gishu, Angelus Karuru, asked all five petrol stations in town to stop selling small amounts of petrol to individuals as opposed to legitimate motorists. He was acting on intelligence that petrol might have been used to set Kikuyu and Kisii houses on fire.
Second, upon receiving intelligence of possible attacks on IDP camps that had been set up in areas where there had been violence, also mentioned in NSIS' intelligence reports, he immediately deployed forces and vehicles to have them moved to safety in town as did some officials in the provincial administration in other parts of the North Rift.
As witness number 86 from Chegaiya sub location who had lost all his family members and who testified before the commission noted: "We remained in the Administration Police camp for four days. The attackers continued to attack us, even in the camp. The Kalenjin officers in the camp joined their kinsmen in the attacks and the Kikuyu Administration Police officer had to take rifles from them."
Heavy-handed
On the other hand, there were numerous reports of the police and other security forces being heavy-handed and even worse.
During the violence they chased a group of demonstrators near the Moi Referral Hospital in Eldoret and in the process lobbed both tear gas and fired bullets into the hospital.
The DC for Uasin Gishu, testifying before the commission, denied that this had happened, saying that the tear gas must have been a by-product of what was used outside the hospital.
However, both the head of the hospital and its guards told the commission that the police tried to enter the hospital by force. Cross-examination revealed that both canisters and bullet casings were found inside the hospital, the OCPD admitting in his testimony that it was possible that, in fact, tear gas and bullets were fired into the hospital.
The commission also received evidence of numerous other instances of police brutality. Witnesses spoke under oath of horrifying tales of police brutality and indifference.
This included police standing by, doing nothing and not coming to the assistance of individuals and communities under attack, joining in the attacks, including raping already vulnerable victims, and taunting Kikuyu victims with one of Kibaki's campaign slogans "kazi iendelee" (let the work continue) as they stood by watching helpless victims being attacked.
Turned away
In other cases, there were reports of victims under attack seeking police help and being turned away. Among many cases, the commission was able to determine that a senior police officer in Eldoret was responsible for personally shooting a number of individuals.
The commission visited one such victim at a hospital where he had been admitted with wounds sustained from gun fire. Similar allegations were made in the evidence produced by the KNCHR.
The commission was told that some chiefs either passively or actively collaborated with the attackers.
At least 13 of them were later interdicted after reports against them were made. In his sworn testimony, the district commissioner of Uasin Gishu, Bernard Kinyua, admitted to having "received some information that the chiefs were not helpful" and "were not there for the people", although he claimed that he had no information that chiefs were involved in the violence, nor were any names given in the intelligence reports he received.
However, evidence received by the commission tells disturbing stories of chiefs either standing by while violence was being committed, or even actively taking part in the commission of violent acts.
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