Port Louis — The Law Lords have confirmed the Supreme Court verdict to render null and void former ministerAshock Jugnauth's election in July 2005. They have thus dismissed his appeal and recommended that a code of conduct be drafted for ministers and civil servants during elections. Extracts of the judgment follow.

Lord Mance and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (who has delivered the judgment) were part of the panel of Law Lords that came to Mauritius last September to hear a few cases - including pleas from attorneys involved in the Jugnauth appeal case.

(...) The complaint raised four matters. The first arose out of what the appellant was alleged to have said, at a public meeting on 29 June at St Pierre in constituency no 8, about the availability of government money for the acquisition of land to provide additional space for the Moslem section of the local cemetery. The other three matters were broadly similar to one another and were treated together by the Supreme Court. They concerned exercises carried out by the Ministry of Health - of which the appellant was the Minister - to recruit three groups of staff in the period before the general election in July 2005. The three groups were General Workers, Hospital Servants and Health Care Assistants.

After various procedural steps which it is unnecessary to recount, the petition was heard by two judges of the Supreme Court, P Lam Shang Leen and S B Domah JJ. In addition to documentary evidence, witnesses were examined and cross-examined. On 30 March 2007 the court found in favour of the petitioner, Mr Ringadoo, on all four matters. The court accordingly found that the election of Mr Jugnauth should be declared null and void for having been obtained in breach of sections 45(1)(a)(ii) and 64(1) of the Representation of the People Act. Mr Jugnauth appealed to the Board under section 48A of the 1958 Act.

8. The Supreme Court based its judgment to a significant extent on findings of fact which the judges made after due consideration of the oral evidence which they had heard and which they accepted. Normally, such findings would be very difficult to challenge in an appeal to the Board, but in the present case the appellant contends that the judges of the Supreme Court fell into error when, in making their findings, they applied the civil standard of proof, on the balance of probability, rather than the criminal standard, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Before deciding to adopt the standard of proof on the balance of probability, the Supreme Court carried out a meticulous examination of authorities from around the Commonwealth. If the Board does not follow that example, it is only because the principles relating to questions of the standard of proof have been considered in two very recent cases in the House of Lords. Before turning to those decisions, however, like the Supreme Court, the Board thinks it right to point to a material difference between the relevant election legislation in Mauritius and in the United Kingdom.

In the United Kingdom section 113( 1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 provides that "A person shall be guilty of a corrupt practice if he is guilty of bribery." Section 159(1) provides that "If a candidate who has been elected is reported by an election court personally guilty or guilty by his agents of any corrupt or illegal practice his election shall be void." In terms of section 168( 1), a person who is guilty of a corrupt practice is liable to various specified penalties. So any decision by an election court that a member has been personally guilty of bribery entails two consequences: first, he is personally guilty of a corrupt practice and his election is void, and, secondly, the report of the election court, finding him guilty of the corrupt practice, is laid before the Director of Public Prosecutions (section 160(3)) and he must vacate his seat and is incapable even of voting in an election for a specified period (section 160(4)).

Against that background, in R v Rowe [1992] 1 WLR 1059, 1068, Farquharson LJ indicated that the standard of proof in the trial of an election petition was proof beyond reasonable doubt:

"Some consideration was given during argument to the standard of proof required to establish a breach of the subsection. If a person is found guilty of a corrupt practice under section 115 he is liable to be prosecuted on indictment. Furthermore he may be the subject of severe electoral disqualifications under section 160(4) of the Act of 1983. If there is a prosecution there is no doubt that the case must be proved to the criminal standard of proof. What is the position before the electoral court hearing a petition complaining of corrupt practice? Mr Tolson submitted that the civil standard of proof should obtain before an electoral court otherwise elections which should be set aside may stand on the grounds that a corrupt practice had not been proved to the necessary degree of certainty. Although this issue has not been significant in this appeal in my judgment a person accused of corrupt practice before an electoral court should only be held to have committed it if the allegation is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The subsection refers to a person being 'guilty' of corrupt practice, and that connotes a criminal offence. It would not be desirable to have a different standard of proof in different courts on the same issue."

Nolan and Parker LJJ, at pp 1069 and 1070 respectively, were of the same view.

The approach of the Court of Appeal is based on the use of the word "guilty" in section 113(1) of the United Kingdom Act. Because of that express ion, the issue is the same for an election court as for any criminal court: has the member been "guilty" of a corrupt practice? The Court of Appeal considered that, since the issue is the same, the standard of proof shou ld be the same and, since the standard to be applied by a criminal court in determining guilt is unquestionably proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeal readily concluded that the standard to be applied by the election court must also be proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case of the equivalent legislation in Mauritius, section 45, dealing with election petitions is found in Part III which deals with Elections generally. Section 45 envisages an election being avoided by reason of bribery, treating, etc. To discover what these terms mean, you have to look in Part V which deals with Election Offences. More particularly, what is meant by "bribery" is found in section 64( I) which creates the offence of bribery under the Act. And, of course, if anyone is to be convicted of bribery under the Act in a criminal court and punished in terms of section 66, he must be found guilty according to the criminal standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, under section 69, a person who is convicted of bribery "shall, without prejudice to any other punishment, be incapable during a period of 7 years from the date of his conviction ... (b) of being a candidate at an election or, if elected before his conviction, of retaining his seat."

The parallels with the United Kingdom legislation are not hard to see. But, in one material respect, the legislation is different: section 45( 1) does not refer to the election court finding the person "guilty" of bribery, but simply to the election being avoided by reason of bribery. In short, unlike the United Kingdom legislation, it does not use the language of the criminal law to describe the determination of the election court. In Mauritius there is, accordingly, a contrast between the language used to describe the finding of the election court trying an election petition and the language used to describe the finding of the criminal court trying someone for an election offence. The reasoning which influenced the English Court of Appeal in reaching its conclusion that proof beyond reasonable doubt should also apply in election petitions is accordingly not applicable for Mauritius.

15. Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the appellant's contention, that proof beyond reasonable doubt is nevertheless the appropriate standard, is that the court should be slow to set aside the result of a democratic election and should do so only where the bribery etc is established to this high standard. But a powerful argument the other way can also be advanced: if the court is indeed satisfied on the evidence that the result of the election was tainted by bribery etc, then it should intervene and set aside the election in order to ensure that a fresh election can be held in which the result truly reflects the wishes of the electors.

7"A person convicted of bribery "shall,

without prejudice to any other punishment,

be incapable during a period of 7 years from

the date of his conviction ... (b) of being

a candidate at an election or, if elected

before his conviction, of retaining his seat."

An election petition is unquestionably a civil proceeding. Their Lordships are persuaded that, when the legislature used the language which it did in section 45( 1), by contrast with the language used in section 64( 1), it was deliberately choosing to approach the matter, not as one where the criminal standard should apply, but as one in which the court should adopt the civil standard of proof. In other words, it was adopting the second of the possible lines of approach identified in the previous paragraph.

If that is right and the legislature was adopting the civil, as opposed to the criminal, standard of proof, then, even though what is in issue is whether or not the election should be avoided on the ground of bribery, there is no question of the court applying anything other than the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities. In particular, there is no question of the court applying any kind of intermediate standard. The position was explained by Lord Hoffmann in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003]1 AC 153, para 55:

"The civil standard of proof always means more likely than not. The only higher degree of probability required by the law is the criminal standard. But, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead explained in In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, 586, some things are inherently more likely than others. It would need more cogent evidence to satisfy one that the creature seen walking in Regent's Park was more likely than not to have been a lioness than to be satisfied to the same standard of probability that it was an Alsatian. On this basis, cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal that a person has been fraudulent or behaved in some other reprehensible manner. But the question is always whether the tribunal thinks it more probable than not." (...)

It follows that the issue for the election court is whether the petitioner had established, on the balance of probabilities, that the election was affected by bribery in the manner specified in the petition. In practice, as explained in the passages just quoted, as a matter of common sense rather than law, the court is unlikely to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there has been bribery, unless there is cogent evidence to that effect. But the matter is simply one for the court assessing the position in the light of all the available evidence.

In the present case the Supreme Court explained that it would reach its factual conclusions on the balance of probabilities. It was, in their Lordships' respectful view, correct to do so. The court went on, however, to add, as a rider, that allegations of fraud and dishonesty always had to be approached with care and caution by the application of a more stringent degree of probability. As the Board has just explained, that approach is incorrect: the court must simply be satisfied on the balance of probability. But the error of approach is an error in the appellant's favour and so he cannot pray it in aid as a reason for the Board to interfere with the Supreme Court's findings of fact.

Before considering those findings further, the Board must address the important issue raised by section 45(1)(c) which was introduced into the 1958 Act by section 7 of the Representation of the People (Amendment No 2) Act 1976. At the outset of the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant explained that the appellant did not wish to advance any argument based on section 45( 1 )(c). He wished to have his appeal considered on its merits and wanted the Board to allow it on the basis that Mr Ringadoo had not established any corrupt practice on his part. But, as the hearing progressed, it became clear to the Board that the appellant's request that the Board should not consider any defence based on section 45(1)(c) tested on a misapprehension of the nature of that provision. It is not a defence. Rather, as the language makes clear, it prohibits the bringing of a petition or the avoiding of an election on the grounds set out in section 45(1)(c): "Notwithstanding this Act or any other enactment, an election petition shall not be presented against a member and the return or election of a member shall not be avoided" on the specified grounds. So the provision prevents the bringing of a petition and deprives the court of any jurisdiction to avoid an election on these grounds. It follows that the court must consider the applicability of section 45(1 )(c) in this case, irrespective of the attitude initially adopted by counsel for the appellant. It is fair to say, however, that by the time he came to reply, counsel for the appellant had really accepted this and, in effect, adopted the position that the provision did apply and excluded any finding against the appellant in the circumstances alleged in the petition.

Unfortunately, the drafting of section 45(1)(c) of the 1958 Act is far from satisfactory and not all aspects of the provision appear to be coherent. Much the same can be said of section 51(2)(c), which was introduced at the same time by section 8(b) of the Representation of the People (Amendment No 2) Act 1976. Section 51 deals with the authorised amount of election expenditure and section 51(2)(c), as amended, provides that in determining the total expenditure incurred in relation to the candidature of any person at any election, regard shall not be had to "(c) (i) any act done, services rendered or expenditure incurred by a public officer, a local government officer or an officer of a statutory authority or corporation either in thedischarge or purported discharge of the officer's fu nctions while that person was the holder of an office; or (ii) any act done, services used or expenditure incurred by that person while he was the holder of an office." Comparison of section 51(2)(c)(i) and section 45(1)(c)(i) shows that the concluding words are different: the former ends "while that person was the holder of an office" whereas section 45(1)(c)(i) ends "or while the member was the holder of an office",

In section 5 1(2) the concluding words in sub-para (i) appear to be intended to make it clear that the exemption applies only where the act is done etc by someone who not only is a public officer but who held the public office at the relevant time. The add itional words can be criticised as being unnecessary, perhaps, but their purpose can be understood. The real difficulty is in seeing what sub-para (ii) adds.

In section 45(1) there is, at first sight, a readily identifiable distinction between sub-para (i), dealing with acts etc of a public officer, and sub-para (ii), dealing with acts etc of the member while he was the holder of an office. But that distinction is blurred by the concluding words of sub-para (i). Had the model in section 51 (2) been followed, one might have expected to find words designed to make it clear that the exclusion applied only where the person doing the act was a public officer at the time when he did it. Instead, the concluding words seem designed to include, within the ambit of sub-para (i), cases where the member was the holder of the office who did the act etc - the very situation covered by sub-para (ii).

If the Board does not dwell further on these problems, it is because they are secondary to the more basic problem of understanding the scope of section 45(1)(c). What is it intended to do? That is really the point which has to be decided before the Board can determine if the provision applies in this case.

26. The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 45(1)( c)(i) and (ii) is contained in the following passage: "After considering the submissions of all counsel and in the light of the Parliamentary debates as can be gleaned from Hansard and more specially section 45(1)(c)(ii), we are of the view that the word 'or' was either out of place or otiose, ifnot mere surplusage. It is the public expenses which were aimed at and namely those expenses incurred by certain officers, public or para-statal, during election time when the member was in office. The intention of the legislator was made clear from the debates as shown in Hansard and it was translated in both subsections (i) and (ii) of section 45(1)(c). It is also our considered view that the public expenses must be made bona fide and in the ordinary course of the administration of the public affairs notwithstanding that an election was imminent. We are also of the view that that section was not enacted to institutionalise corrupt practices for a class of candidates who held certain offices as defined under section 2 of the Representation of the People Act at the time of an election. Acts done in breach of sections 64 and 65 of the Representation of the People Act by 'a public officer, a local government officer or an officer of a statutory authority or corporation' or 'by the member' to serve the purpose of a cand idate who held an office as defined or by that candidate personally are not saved by section 45(1)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Representation of the People Act, if proved to have been done in utter bad faith and with a corrupt motive." (...)

31. The Board was referred to the Hansard report of the debate in the Parliament of Mauritius in 1976 which led to the enactment of section 7 of the Representation of the People (Amendment No 2) Act 1976, introducing section 45( 1)(c) of the 1958 Act. The lively discussion shows that the then Opposition members regarded the new provision and its Indian origins with considerable suspicion. But the debate also confirms that what the Government professed to have in mind was the kind of situation where, say, a government minister used official transport during an election campaign but did so for the purpose of getting him to some place where he was to carry out some public duty in his continuing ;capacity as a mini ster. Similarly, the Government was thinking of the use of government security officers to protect ministers during the election campaign. The Prime Minister referred to the fact that, after the previous general election, the Government had been faced with many electoral petitions, which, according to him, had proved to be without merit. The Supreme Court judges had these passages fro m Hansard in mind when they were interpreting section 45( 1)(c). The Board also considers that they help to identify the mi schief which the legislation was designed to remedy.

32. One possible view of the scheme of the legislation was discussed during the hearing before the Board. It might be argued that the intention behind section 45(1)(c) was to prevent the raising of election petitions on the ground of a kind of corrupt practice, involving acts of public officials and members and described in sub-paras (i) and (ii), while still leaving it open to the Director of Public Prosecutions, if so minded, to prosecute the member concerned for the relevant election offence. If convicted, the member would lose his seat by virtue of section 69(b). Their Lordships reject that approach. In the first place, it would be startling for Parliament to pass legi slation which would have the effect of giving at least provisional legitimacy to an election which had been obtained by corrupt means. If someone who is involved in such a malpractice will lose his seat if he is convicted of the offence, it seems strange that proceedings in the election court to unseat him should be blocked. Moreover, if that had been the intention, their Lordships would have expected to find that it had been spelled out by the government in the debate so that Parliament was made aware that it was being asked to pass such an extreme measure. But, on the contrary, the passages from Hansard show that ministers denied any such intention and were at pains to stress that the provision was aimed at essentially innocent conduct which might nevertheless give an opening for unmeritorious challenges by way of election petition.

33. The Supreme Court judges regarded section 45(1)(c) as being aimed at public expenses. While that may be one element, the Board would prefer to see the provision as being aimed at preventing elections from being challenged on the basis of some incidental electoral advantage deriving from the legitimate actions of public officials or of members acting in some official capacity.

34. Their Lordships have already noticed that the provision does not take the form of a defence but constitutes a bar to the raising of an electoral petition and to the finding that an election is void: "Notwithstanding this Act or any other enactment, an election petition shall not be presented against a member and the return or election of a member shall not be avoided" on the grounds set out in sub-paras (i) and (ii). The effect is that conduct which falls within those sub-paragraphs isnot to be made the subject of an election petition. In other words, even though a petition can be presented, on the ground, say, of bribery (section 64(1)) or undue influence (section 65), conduct which is fairly and fully described by the terms of the sub-paragraphs is not to be considered as falling within the terms of any of the election offences in the Act. Whether or not the provision is thought of as creating an exception, the Board considers that it shou ld be construed as applyi ng only where the conduct in question falls squarely within its terms. In other words, the sub-paragraphs apply to conduct which has no other signi ficant characteristics beyond those set out in the sub-paragraphs. It fo llows that conduct which can be described, in part, in terms of the sub-paragraphs but which has some additional feature, which means that it constitutes, say, bribery in terms of section 64(1), is not caught by section 45(1)(c). So, if, for example, a public official spent public money to buy food for a minister's constituents in order to bribe them to vote for him, that would not be covered by the exception, even if the official's ordinary job included spending public money on buying food for distribution to alleviate hunger. The corrupt purpose of trying to get the recipients to vote for the minister would take the conduct, considered as a whole, beyond the confines of the conduct described in sub-para (i) of section 45(1)(c). There would be nothing to prevent a rival candidate from raising an election petition, or the court from avoiding an election, on the basis of that conduct.

35. It follows that section 45(1 )(c) would only have deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to avoid Mr Jugnauth's selection if the conduct which the court had found proved could fully and fairly be described in terms of either sub-para (i) or (ii).

36. In turning to consider that point, the Board does so on the basis of the findings made by the Supreme Court. Having decided that the judges made those findings on the basis of a standard of proof which was, if anyt hing, too generous to Mr Jugnauth, their Lordships see no other ground on which they could be disturbed by the Board. The Board is mindful that the Supreme Court judges had the advantage of seeing and hearing a number of witnesses and made good use of that advantage while carefully reminding themselves of the particular risk that witnesses in election petitions may have political and other axes to grind. The Board would add this. Their Lordships would be particularly hesitant about second-guessing the Supreme Court's assessment of the evidence and the inferences which the judges drew from that evidence in a case, like the present, where so much depends on local factors - the exact nuances of expression used by witnesses, the significance of racial divisions in the politics of Mauritius, the importance of Civil Service jobs for employment in Mauritius, etc - about which the Supreme Court judges are inevitably much better informed than the Board. For all these reasons the Board must consider the position in the light of the Supreme Court's findings. (...)

42. In their Lordships' view, the Supreme Court judges' conclusion was one which it was open to them to reach on the facts as found by them. They were entitled to conclude, as they did, that Mr Jugnauth had deliberately misrepresented the decision of the Cabinet to the meeting and that he could only have done so with the intention of inducing the Muslim voters in the audience to vote for his party, in return for the Government donating land worth Rs 2m for the extension of the cemetery. As so described, the appellant's conduct at this public meeting can by no stretch of the imagination be said to fall fully and fairly within the terms of section 45(1)(c). The Supreme Court's conclusion on this complaint must therefore stand.

43. The Supreme Court treated the three other complaints together. Each of them concerned recruitment for Civil Service jobs within the Ministry of Health of which the appellant was the responsible minister at the time. The recruitment exercises had begun before the General Election was announced and they continued during the General Election campaign. The allegation for the respondent was that Mr Jugnauth and his agents had, in effect, used these recruitment exercises as a means of bribing people to vote for his party in exchange for jobs. The defence was that the recruitment exercises had been conducted in a normal way.They continued during the election campaign, but that was just because the normal administration of government had to continue at such times. Mr Jugnauth maintained that, in any event, he had not been personally invo lved in the exercises.

44. The Supreme Court judges heard and analysed a considerable body of evidence, both written and oral, relating to these complaints. In particular, they accepted the evidence of Mr Nikhil Askoolum, who was normally a Labour Party supporter and who had applied for a job as a Health Care Assistant in November 2004. He spoke to various occasions over a period of months in 2005 when things had been said to him by agents of the appellant's political party to the effect that he would have to attend meetings and help the party if he was to get the job for which he had applied. The appellant himself had made such a statement ("You must vote in order to obtain a job; just sitting won't get a job" (translation at a meeting at the Mohit Hall. A week before the election, an employee of the Ministry, who was also an agent for the MSM/MMM alliance, had congratulated him on having been selected for the job. He subsequently received a letter of appointment dated

30 June and telling him to attend for duty on 5 July. When he did so, he was told that the appointments had been cancelled.

45. The judges expressed their conclusions on the evidence in this way: "After assessing the witnesses in relation to the recruitment of General Workers and the Hospital Attendants, we find it not proved that:

(a) it is the respondent who was in any way involved in the request for the list of names from the Ministry of Employment;

(b) the purpose of the request of the list was apparent rather than real;

(c) the purpose of the recruitment was for the specific purpose of creating an illusory expectation in the electorate for fake employment in the civil service.

On the other hand, we are satisfied from the evidence that it has been established beyond a balance of probability that:

(a) the recruitment exercises formed part of the normal functions of government

(b) they were geared in such a way and held at such a time that the respondent could derive political capital out of them;

(c) interviews were conducted so close to the elections with the knowledge and approval of the respondent and in such a manner as to create the impression that they were being offered as exchange for votes;

(d) the respondent as the Minister of Health could not have been, and was not altogether, unconcerned with the various stages involved in the exercises, contrary to what he pleaded as was shown above. Indeed, he was monitoring each and every step of the recruitment and letters of appointment were issued some 3 days before the polls;

(e) one of the purposes, even if not the sole purpose, of the recruitment exercises was to attract voters to vote in return for the jobs in the civil service. With respect to the third case which relates to the recruitment of Health Care Assistants, we find that the undisputable evidence reveals that:

(a) the Ministry had to recruit 388 of them;

(b) the posts, advertised in October/November 2004, fetched some nine (0 ten thousand applicants on account of which the Ministry took some time to complete the interviews which was completed on April 15, 2005;

(c) the list of successful candidates was drawn, it had to be sent, as per procedures to the PSC for approval;

(d) the Ministry of Health and Quality of Life finalised the recruitment of the 388 candidates three days before the polling date and this with the consent and knowledge of the respondent;

(e) the dire urgency of completing the recruitment so close to poll day [of] so many persons for run-of-the-mill jobs, the vacancies of which had been pending for so long, has not been explained except by way of electoral strategy;

(I) the writ of election had already been issued, when the list of selected candidates was sent to the PSC between May 12 and 23, 2005;

(g) the list contained 101 persons from constituency no 8 where the respondent was standing as one of the candidates;

(h) one of the objectives of his Ministry, account taken of the timing of the interviews, the number of interviewees and other circumstances was to procure employment to those voters in order to induce them and other electors to vote for the respondent.

This leaves us with the consideration of the involvement of the Minister and the involvement of his agents in culpable acts of bribery. On this issue, the facts and circumstances show that the respondent exposed himself to the risk and temptation of electoral abuse by the acts and doings of his Ministry and that he did fall into that abuse by his own acts and doings and the acts and doings of his agents; more particularly, by what he stated at Mohit Hall which was not different from what Sunil Beejadhur and Doorgachum had stated to witness Askoolum." (...)

47. Again, the Board is satisfied that, on the facts that they found established, the judges of the Supreme Court were fully entitled to draw the inferences which they did. Of course, if all that had happened had been that the Ministry of Health and its officials had carried out the recruitment exercises in the normal way and this had resulted in appointments which made those appointed more likely to vote for Mr Jugnauth, then those actions would have fallen fully and fairly within the terms of section 45(1)(c)(i) and (ii). Rightly, an election petition based simply on the actions of the officials and the Minister in conducting those recruitment exercises would have been excluded. But, here, the court found that, so far as concerned the General Workers and Hospital Servants, "one of the purposes, even if not the sole purpose, of the recruitment exercises was to attract voters to vote in return for the jobs in the civil service", while with the Health Care Assistants, "one of the objectives of[the appellant's] Ministry, account taken of the timing of the interviews, the number of interviewees and other circumstances, was to procure employment to those voters in order to induce them and other electors to vote for the respondent." Any recruitment exercise which is conducted with these corrupt aims goes well beyond the scope of an act in the discharge or purported discharge of the functions of the ministry's civil servants and so falls outside the protection afforded by section 45(1)(c).

"One of the objectives of[the appellant's]

Ministry, account taken of the timing of the

interviews, the number of interviewees

and other circumstances, was to procure

employment to those voters in order to

induce them and other electors

to vote for the respondent."

48. For these reasons the Board is satisfied that, having made a careful analysis and assessment of the evidence, the Supreme Court was fully entitled to reach the conclusions which it did in relation to these three complaints and - on the basis that, with the appellant's involvement, promises of employment had been made to electors on the understanding that, in return, they would vote for him - to find the grounds of complaint established.

49. The Board will accordingly dismiss the appeal. In doing so, their Lordships would respectfully endorse the recommendation by the Supreme Court that the Electoral Supervisory Commission should draw up a Code of Conduct for ministers, civil servants and others for the period after an election has been declared. As the Supreme Court