Stephen Marks
6 November 2008
(Page 2 of 3)
But despite this tensions have intensified as a result of Washington's announcement of a $6bn arms deal with Taiwan.(11) Although the deal was originally negotiated long before the election in Taiwan, it shows the explosive potential of the Taiwan issue.
However there is no doubt that the expansion in China's naval budget and building programme is intended to enable a key shift in China's stance in the East Asia region. The aim is not only to achieve the hi-tech potential needed to maintain China's defensive potential to deter a Taiwanese declaration of independence, but is also intended to ensure China's wider access to the open waters of the Pacific, thus creating potential friction with Japan and other regional players.(12)
'STRING OF PEARLS'?
There is no reason to believe that developments in the East and South Asian theatres could impact on Chinese strategy in Africa, even taking into account the reports that China, which currently has no aircraft carriers, is planning a three-carrier battle group.(13)
But a more assertive Chinese stance in East Asian waters would certainly impact on Indian attitudes and on India's already active and extensive naval role in the Indian Ocean, including Africa's east coast. India has already signed defence agreements with Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique. It conducts regular naval patrols, by agreement, in the waters of Mozambique, Mauritius and Seychelles. In Madagascar it has opened its first listening post on foreign soil, for radar surveillance of shipping movements, and is reported to be negotiating with Mauritius for a long-term lease of the Agalega islands. It has also conducted joint naval defence exercises with South Africa.(14)
'Its fleet in the Indian Ocean is turning into one of the most powerful naval forces of the region, including new state-of-the-art aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and other surface combatants.'(15)
This has not prevented some scaremongering about an alleged Chinese 'string of pearls' strategy. One American strategic analyst has claimed that:
'Each 'pearl' in the 'String of Pearls' is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a 'pearl.' An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a 'pearl.' A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a 'pearl.' Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a 'pearl,' as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force[d] modernization form the essence of China's 'String of Pearls.' The 'pearls' extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East.'(16)
Yet the same author is compelled to add:
'China's development of these strategic geopolitical 'pearls' has been nonconfrontational, with no evidence of imperial or neocolonial ambition. The development of the 'String of Pearls' may not, in fact, be a strategy explicitly guided by China's central government. Rather, it may be a convenient label applied by some in the United States to describe an element of China's foreign policy.'
The Gwadur deep-sea port is a case in point. The state-owned China Harbour Engineering Company, funded with a $198m Chinese loan, has helped Pakistan complete the first stage of this project for a major Pakistan port near the entrance to the Persian Gulf at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz. It does indeed have a strategic significance as the possible terminus of a land route from western China and central Asia to the Indian Ocean, which would have considerable economic significance.
But there seems little or no evidence that a naval base facility is part of the package, or indeed that China has any current intention or capacity to maintain an Indian Ocean fleet for which Gwadur could be a base. The same applies to the other civil engineering and commercial projects in the region which are quoted as evidence for the 'string of pearls' thesis, from Cambodia to Sri Lanka. Certainly the evidence does not indicate any current Chinese intention to rival India's comparative naval predominance in the region.
However there have been indications that one argument used in Washington to secure ratification of the controversial US-India civil nuclear agreement was the perspective of the US using India as a 'hedge' against China in much the same way as China was played as a card against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.(17)
If this argument were seriously to appeal to policymakers in Washington and Delhi, this could indeed strengthen the hand of military hardliners in Beijing, who are nervous for China's sea lines of communication. However if China's policy were to take a more militarist turn this would show itself first in the Taiwan straits and South China Sea.
On balance this must be seen as unlikely. The diversion of resources needed for China to present a significant naval presence or engage in a real naval arms race in the Indian Ocean as well as in the East Asian theatres would threaten the regime's ability to deliver continued prosperity and growth domestically which is its main continuing source of legitimacy. So the only circumstance in which one can foresee China's policy shifting would be if there was economic downturn at home and a section of the leadership was tempted to play the jingoist card abroad.
Nor is there any immediate sign of Sino-Indian tension developing to the level that would make this a remotely serious proposition.
Short of that the rational Chinese strategy would be to continue to push a multilateral approach to peacekeeping in the region including India and accepting US and Indian predominance so long as China has enough naval and military presence to qualify for a seat at the table.
So there seems little reason to dissent from Jonathan Holslag's conclusion that:
'[F]or the long haul, the geo-economics in question, specifically the vulnerability of its long supply lines, will prevent China from resorting to a kind of gunboat diplomacy that many powers pursued before. Despite changing interests, perceptions and means, China is and will remain to a large extent dependent on the good-will and collaboration of other players to safeguard its economic strongholds in Africa. As long as its social stability relies on the supply of Africa's natural riches, China will thus have to stick to the path of security cooperation. In fact, it will be the main stakeholder in terms of peace, social stability, good governance and equitable development in its African partner countries... Like no other external power, it is in China's interest to turn regional actors into flexible and widely supported organisations, claiming strategic ownership of conflict management by doing so.'(18)
A further motive for encouraging this approach is the emerging concern over security in key global shipping lanes, an issue heightened by recent incidents of piracy around the Horn of Africa. A UN Security Council resolution in June authorised nations to send warships into Somalia's territorial waters to stop piracy and armed robbery at sea. A US-led naval force has been patrolling the area. NATO and the EU have expressed an interest in involvement, and the issue is a major factor in India's regional naval presence.
There is a danger that the need for all would-be players to have a presence in the region, for reasons of prestige as well as security, will be seen to be having a share in protecting key global shipping lanes, and this could lead to a 'leakage' into African waters of great-power naval competition elsewhere.
But there is an alternative:
'Several years ago, as international concern mounted over pirate attacks in and around the Malacca Straits, the governments of countries flanking the waterway Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia pre-empted any possibility of UN or foreign intervention by taking action to reduce piracy and safeguard shipping. They launched coordinated sea patrols in 2004, combined air patrols a year later, and improved intelligence exchange in 2006. Last month, Thailand became the fourth country to join the Malacca Straits patrols, which are backed by an anti-piracy agreement among regional governments and an associated information-sharing centre based in Singapore...the Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce, which runs a piracy reporting network for the shipping industry, acknowledges that the number of pirate attacks in the Malacca Straits has dropped because of increased patrolling by the littoral states.'(19) Alas there is little chance of an equivalent AU-coordinated African response to take control of the issue into African hands.
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