Sam Kebele
26 November 2008
opinion
With the rejection by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Tsvangirai) of the flawed Southern African Development Community (SADC) plan for a government of national unity, there are signs of further economic collapse, increased repression of civil society and opposition and increasing hunger and death for Zimbabweans. As Zimbabwe's crisis worsened, Kofi Annan, Jimmy Carter and Graca Machel were banned from pursuing their humanitarian mission to Zimbabwe. They are members with Nelson Mandela of the Elders, a group of former leaders who try to resolve conflict. The cancellation of their visit came as a deadly cholera epidemic spread, amid reports of 20 prisoners dying daily of disease and malnutrition.
The revived ZANU-PF militarised government under the control of Mugabe and the Joint Operations Command (JOC) - which may well call itself a government of national unity (aka impunity) - is interested only in its own survival and has no solution (or even perhaps desire for one) to the problems facing ordinary Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe has been without a government for six months and things are falling apart. In the words of an academic and activist I interviewed during a recent visit we are seeing again 'the DNA of liberation movements allergic to giving up power to 'civilian' parties'.
On 14 November, an MDC communiqué at the end of a national council meeting criticised SADC, said it would peacefully campaign against any unilateral government appointed by Mugabe, and called for internationally-supervised new elections. It further alleged that since the signing of the power-sharing agreement on 12 September, Mugabe had pursued an "obstructionist approach" and an "entrenched power-retention agenda" including the "crafting of an assassination plot, codenamed Operation Ngatipedzenavo, intended to eliminate the MDC leadership", amid a wider campaign of violence and intimidation aimed at the party "and the people of Zimbabwe".
Thokozani Khupe, deputy leader of the MDC, said that although the MDC remained committed to dialogue, before joining a power-sharing government it wanted a constitutional amendment defining and implementing the terms of the power-sharing deal, especially defining the new post of prime minister, supposedly to be filled by MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Further talks this week in South Africa on a ZANU-PF sponsored draft amendment, are unlikely to provide a breakthrough given the latter was unilaterally-produced.
The power-sharing deal, brokered by SADC-appointed Thabo Mbeki (whom the MDC no longer wish to see as a 'neutral arbitrator'), was meant to divide ministries fairly between ZANU-PF, Tsvangirai's MDC, and a breakaway faction of the MDC led by Arthur Mutambara. Despite losing the election of March 2008, Mugabe was to retain the presidency, Tsvangirai was to become prime minister until new elections in 2012. But no constitutional amendment was passed to create the post of premier, and the deal was quickly overcome by stalemate over posts and powers, including the composition of the new National Security Council. One can also note, as a church activist said, it was contrary to the popular will that voted for Tsvangirai as President and almost got him as the Prime Minister.
Whilst the illegal 'president' Mugabe has yet again outfoxed his opponents, it is at the cost of his 'own' people's lives and livelihoods with a failed currency, hyper-inflation of an independently-estimated 2.7 quintillion % (18 zeroes), lack of access to basic services, including water and the spread of once-tamed killer diseases like cholera with 300 (under-) reported deaths already. Zimbabweans are now 'hunter gathering in a casino economy' where the elite can still make vast amounts of illegal money for personal use.
Although ordinary Zimbabweans voice disappointment over the collapse of the 'Global Political Agreement (GPA) in which SADC only appeared interested in accepting Mugabe's continued rule, despite its rhetoric of increased pressure - many still say no deal is better than a flawed deal. The entire system was designed for ZANU-PF rule and all the key personnel such as permanent secretaries would have remained in place under the agreement.
Many Zimbabweans cannot believe that the region is more concerned with maintaining stability and averting supposed post-Mugabe chaos than following its own principles of democratisation and free and fair elections. SADC appears to fail to see this is a government determined to stay in power, no matter what cost to 'its' people and indeed to the region. Even Botswana and South Africa, which made noises about getting tough with ZANU-PF (as indeed did Kenya), fell in line with Zimbabwe's natural allies the Angolans, Namibians and Congolese in the interests of 'African leadership solidarity', not that many actual leaders were at the summit. This comes amid reports that 3,000 Zimbabwean soldiers (with up to 7,000 more expected), along with Angolans have been sent again into the Democratic Republic of Congo, alongside President Kabila's army against the Rwanda-backed rebels of General Laurent Nkunda. Mugabe was quick to respond to Kabila's invitation, for the rich pickings including diamonds, gold and copper.
The recent interview with South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma alleging the crisis was the fault of the EU and US 'sanctions' rather than one of internal bad governance marked a nadir even from her low standards of unquestioning support for the ZANU PF regime. But the South African cabinet seems unsure of its response; it threatened on 21 November not to release $30 million in agricultural aid until a power-sharing government is formed, linking the cholera crisis to the stalled formation of a government of national unity. SADC is equally unsure as to its response. Even though Zimbabwean human rights lawyer Gabriel Shumba won a challenge in the SADC courts that Zimbabwe had an illegitimate 'government', SADC limply said it would deal with Mugabe's dictatorship as a de facto government. In which case the region, according to activists, is complicit in allowing basically 200-300 people to hold their countrymen and women to ransom. It still remains possible that African heads of state could insist on March 29 being implemented as they did in Kenya, but the likelihood decreases as ZANU-PF reasserts its internal and external control of the situation.
Zimbabwean civil society and mass-based movements and outside supporters will now be re-thinking strategies and it will need to be medium term. The regime is well ahead of them in this. The mass pre-emptive arrests of activists including of health workers protesting against the collapse of the public health delivery system on 18 November suggests that planning for a failed power-sharing agreement, including a dirty tricks campaign, was part of the JOC strategy. The failure to release activists arrested from the end of October onwards suggests backup for the allegations that the MDC, along with the Botswana government, is attempting violent regime change.
The JOC's main focus will be on winning elections - again at any cost such as happened between March and June 2008 - knowing that the region will remain toothless and the international community will be preoccupied with the multiple crises. The youth militia ('Green Bombers') are already being mobilised under the control of the senior military as the shock troops for a ZANU-PF victory. As ZANU-PF has more or less destroyed the education system it now has available and pliable youth at its disposal. There are reports from international NGOs of the hijacking of their meetings by youth militia. Military chiefs are attending all party meetings, although the rank and file dislike of this plus their dissatisfaction over the lack of seeds and fertiliser of this may be highlighted at the ZANU-PF congress in December .
It appears less likely that the MDC was as prepared for SADC's pro-Mugabe ultimatum, although in the past, whenever SADC has been pushed to do anything, it proves to prefer the devil it knows. Up to that point and indeed in refusing to commit political suicide a la Joshua Nkomo in 1987, the MDC handled things well on not signing. And they had good advisers in South African ANC-linked Mac Maharaj and Cyril Ramaphosa Their playing and timing was right in terms of staying in the process whilst ZANU-PF was merely playing for time, counting correctly on SADC to bottle the decision.
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