Barbara Among
3 January 2009
analysis
Kampala — UGANDAN troops entered the Democratic Republic of Congo 20 days ago to flush out the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels, after its leader, Joseph Kony, refused to sign a peace accord.
The joint military attack on the LRA is expected to bring the 22-year-old rebellion in northern Uganda to an end with the prospect of arresting Kony himself or eliminating him.
But the reality is that the operation, backed by the regional forces, the UN and the US, seems to have made northern leaders more wary than ever before, given that the most affected region had experienced peace for the last two years. They fear that the offensive may have fatally undermined any chance of achieving permanent peace.
The Government, however, argues that the operation was successful because it sent Kony scampering and his fighters in disarray. It continues to assure and announce that they will achieve their objective 'sooner'.
The warring parties entered into a peace negotiation in July 2006, mediated by Southern Sudan vice-president Riek Machar in Juba. A final peace agreement was drawn, but Kony refused to sign, demanding that the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued against him and his commanders for crimes against humanity be dropped.
The offensive, also aimed at forcing Kony back to sign the agreements, has taken a new turn with the troops now planning to increase their dominance in the vast Garamba jungle in northeastern Congo.
Sources said more battalions are being ferried into the region, in a bid to boost the ground forces, code-named Operation Lightning Thunder.
Dislodged from their hideout in Garamba National Park in Congo, the rebels are said to be scattered in the jungle and the army is closing in on them. Kony is reportedly heading towards the Central African Republic (CAR).
A Savimbi-like end
The Juba talks attracted a lot of international support and funding from the US, European Union, African Union and United Nations. This is believed to translate into support for the offensive against the LRA, putting more pressure on the rebel group.
Last week the UN Security Council extended their stay in Congo and revised the mandate of the UN mission in Congo (MONUC) to deal with negative forces such as the LRA. MONUC is gathering intelligence information against the LRA and also providing helicopter gunships. The UPDF is also using its strategic base in Dungu as a centre of operation. Growing international interest in the region, especially the American interest in oil-rich South Sudan and DR Congo, Congo Brazzaville and the French in CAR, could trigger a Savimbi-like operation whose end was brought about by a growing international interest both in Angola's oil and politics.
The LRA and Angola's UNITA (National Union for total independence of Angola) have several tactics in common and analysts argue that Uganda could borrow a leaf from the war against the rebel group. Its leader, Jonas Savimbi, after surviving more than a dozen assassination attempts, was killed on February 22, 2002, in a battle with Angolan government troops, who had support from South African mercenaries and Israeli Special Forces.
The army offensive dubbed Kissonde was sustained for six months, with the Angolan government isolating Savimbi by targeting and killing his commanders. LRA, just like UNITA, applies diversionary tactics to draw attention away from its leader. The death of Savimbi's commanders was a serious setback, as it deprived him of diversionary troops who had until then concentrated on attracting attention away from their leader.
Currently, LRA commanders Okot Odhiambo and Bok Abudema are heading to CAR; Okeny Opwa is in Maridi, South Sudan. Kony is shuttling between these places. Killing LRA's notorious commanders could leave Kony bare. It is already reported that Odhiambo and Abudema are in a critical condition, both suffering from gout and probably injured during the December 14 air raids.
Isolation
Savimbi was further weakened when he lost important means of communication by radio. At the moment, the LRA rebel leader and his commanders have abandoned their satellite phones and walkie-talkies for fear of being tracked.
Sources, however, said Kony has acquired a Zain line. Kony's second-in-command, Odhiambo, military intelligence says, has been able to switch his satellite phone on only for a minute every day.
Gulu Resident District Commissioner Walter Ochora believes that with the LRA's communication being cut off, the Government soldiers would succeed in capturing or killing the rebel leader. He argued that the operation has been a success given that the fighters are scattered and could be vulnerable to the UPDF as they are now in small groups. "This operation has disrupted his plan to reorganise," said Ochora
His escape to South Sudan or the CAR could, however, lay him bare. In South Sudan or CAR, the ground troops would also be able to move faster compared to the difficult Garamba terrain.
Kony at a crossroads
During the last attempt to sign the final peace agreement on November 29, Kony seemed more paranoid than times past, reportedly allowing his guards to conduct an embarrassing body search of the Ugandan delegation - a group of elders. When they returned, according to the state minister for defence Ruth Nakabirwa who camped nearby, some could hardly talk about what had happened. The rebel leader also claimed he had been told that his supporters in the diaspora were breaking away from him and starting another insurgency.
Keen LRA watchers argue that the combination of imminent starvation following the air strikes, the razing of large food gardens and the cutting off of supply lines from Caritas and the threat by the UPDF, could have forced the LRA to show eagerness to surrender or sign the peace deal before it is too late.
Regional problem
"The LRA is now a regional problem," said Capt. Chris Magezi, in November 2008, while still the peace talks spokesperson.
One game-changing move is that Kony was reckless enough to provoke a border incident between South Sudan, DR Congo and Uganda. He attacked and killed civilians in DR Congo and South Sudan. On December 5, according to President Yoweri Museveni, he had sent a team to attack northern Uganda via South Sudan.
The Congolese government has turned their attention to Kony after he killed hundreds of civilians in DR Congo over the Christmas period. South Sudan's involvement is, however, expected to grow because the US, South Sudan's patron, has long urged three-way action - by the Ugandans, Congolese, and the South Sudanese against the LRA.
UN backs action
The UN has expressed support for the assault on the LRA. "We cannot condemn this military action because we can see the merit of it," the UN envoy to northern Uganda, Joaquim Chissano, said last month.
"The aim of the attacks now is to force Kony out because he should not be given opportunity to entertain other options than are open to him through the peace process. The negotiations are over... what is remaining is the signing of the final peace agreement."
Under the current agreement, if Kony signed, the government of Uganda would go to the Security Council or the International Criminal Court and request for the suspension of the arrest warrants. Then Kony could move freely into Uganda where justice would be applied according to what is foreseen in the agreement. In May, a special war crimes court was established in Uganda to deal with cases of human rights violations committed during the two-decade insurgency.
Will not capture him
"They cannot capture him (Kony) they will not succeed," said the LRA spokesperson Matsanga, who claims he speaks to Kony often. "Those claiming they hit Kony are lying," he added.
Matsanga's confidence is based on his claims that the group is getting intelligence briefing from a section of soldiers in both SPLA and Battalion 105 of the UPDF. The 105 Battalion, composed of LRA combatants, was only formed in 2004.
The troops made a few blunders at the start of the operation and this could cost the operation a great deal. But these, the President said were 'challenges' that could be corrected. The operation did not begin on time as instructed. President Museveni ordered attack for 7:30am, but was it carried out at 11:30am. And ground troops were also not deployed in time to start the cordon-and search operation. This, they said gave the rebels ample time to carry the dead and move out of the danger zone.
Gulu District chairman Norbert Mao, describes the operation as 'unnecessary' and points that the operation failed right from the start. Mao suggests that the troops be withdrawn and negotiations reopened.
Aswa MP Reagan Okumu, suggests that the troops go back to the drawing board and plan a two military approach based on how to assassinate the LRA leadership, as it is the top commanders who are holding everybody.
Alternatively, the troops should allow the rebels to regroup, and plan a precise rescue mission. "If they continue now, Kony is likely to disappear underneath and the chief culprit will be difficult to get, but if they allow them to regroup, then they can get them."
Those opposed to the operation call it a miscalculated, hurried offensive, with a very broad objective. They suggest that the Government should have designed a rescue mission that would target the leadership, not the entire force.
Since the launch of the attack, allied forces are yet to make contact with the elusive rebel leader and the other five notorious commanders. Kony, Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen and Ceasar Achillam have managed to conceal themselves.
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