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Africa Renewal (United Nations)

Africa: Reforming Security Forces

Ernest Harsch

29 April 2009

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(Page 3 of 3)

Liberia: small and professional

Like the DRC, Liberia suffered through years of devastating war, with numerous armed factions vying against each other. And as in the Congo, multiparty negotiations in 2003 established a transitional government in which most of the main groups were represented.

But there was one crucial difference: the peace agreement did not call for amalgamating the existing groups into a single army, but essentially for fashioning an entirely new armed forces. While the US was asked to "play a lead role" in training the new military, peacekeepers of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) took on the restructuring and reforming of the national police.

The building of a new army did not actually begin until 2006, after democratic elections replaced the coalition transitional administration with a new government headed by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. By that point, more than 100,000 fighters from the old factions had gone through a disarmament and demobilization programme directed by UNMIL. More than 14,000 more were slated for demobilization from the old national army and the Ministry of Defence.

The peace accord had stipulated that the soldiers of the new Armed Forces of Liberia "may be drawn from" the previous armed groups, but as individuals and only if qualified. When recruitment began in January 2006, more than 12,000 Liberians applied - for a force of just 2,000 troops.

The selection criteria were very rigorous. To be accepted, applicants not only had to be physically fit, but needed to have had at least 12 years of schooling. "Vetting" panels assessed each candidate's suitability. This included eliminating anyone involved in past human rights abuses. Recruiters travelled to the candidates' home communities to verify their records and encouraged the public to come forth with information about them. Ultimately, three-quarters of all applicants were rejected. More failed the initial training courses.

The recruitment drive also sought some ethnic and geographic balance, contrary to previous military forces, which often favoured one ethnic group or another. The government hoped that 20 per cent of the recruits would be women, but could not find enough applicants - the proportion is currently around 5 per cent.

For transparency and ownership

While many Liberians applaud the goal of building a professional army that will not prey on civilians, certain aspects of the initiative have stirred controversy. A number of security analysts have questioned the decision to build an army of just 2,000 troops. That may be sufficient in the short term, while UNMIL continues to maintain basic security, but what happens when the peacekeepers leave? Will such a force be able to contain a new insurgency or guard Liberia's borders, in a region that has known numerous wars and conflicts?

According to Thomas Jaye, a senior researcher at the KAIPTC who prepared an assessment for Liberia's Governance Reform Commission, "the decision to train 2,000 soldiers for the army was influenced by the purse and not by any threat assessment." General Coleman of the ASDR, referring to donor-directed security reform initiatives more generally, said: "They want to see it done, but they want to do it only cheap."

The US government's decision to subcontract the training of the new army to two private US security companies has also brought criticism, in part because the details of those contracts are secret. "A lot of money has been spent," President Johnson-Sirleaf told researchers for the International Crisis Group, a non-governmental think tank based in Brussels. "We do not know what on. There's simply not enough transparency and accountability in the way this money is spent."

Some also point to the absence of public consultations to help identify Liberians' views about the types of security structures they would like. The Governance Reform Commission, which advises the government on broad reform initiatives, has expressed concern over "the lack of participation of civil society and the national legislature in the SSR process."

Amos Sawyer, head of the commission and a former interim president, notes that technical training, however proficient, will not by itself create the kind of army Liberia needs. He recalls that "every armed group that plundered Liberia over the past 25 years" had troops that were trained by US experts. The real problem was political. To ensure that the new army and other institutions are under effective political control and serve the interests of the nation, his commission insists on more "local ownership" of security reform efforts.

Widening the debate

That is an issue that extends well beyond Liberia. Proponents of reform generally agree that broad national consultations should help shape SSR programmes and build public support for them. But in the difficult conditions that usually prevail after war, when new governments are struggling to get on their feet and address the many challenges of economic and social recovery, public discussions on military or police reform have been rare.

Security reform advocates argue that government officials and military commanders in Africa should no longer be suspicious of public scrutiny of security arrangements. Similarly, General Coleman of the ASDR urges African civil society groups to become more actively engaged. "Civil society has a critical role to play," he says. But to avoid stirring resentment, he adds, they should proceed with some tact, "without being too hard on the government and without appearing to be the tool of an external [donor] agency."

The UN, which is working to better coordinate its own support for security reform efforts in Africa and other parts of the world, seeks to promote wide consultations. "SSR models are too often imposed by external actors," says Assistant Secretary-General Dmitry Titov, who heads the peacekeeping department's Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions. "Should we not focus on the end recipients of SSR, that is, the population, the societies and governments living in insecurity? Shouldn't it be their ambitions and vision driving SSR efforts?"

Africa itself must take greater initiative, insists Major General Martin Agwai, a Nigerian officer who served as deputy force commander of the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. "African nations must stand up and accept the torch of responsibility for transforming their own security sectors," he argued in 2003. "Africans must kick-start this process themselves, and the assistance of the broader international community will follow."

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