Lagos — Non-compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code has left the Nigerian maritime industry vulnerable to attack and by extension, the Nigerian state.

Recent developments, including the spate of unchallenged pirates attacks on the nation's territorial waters, illegal commercial shipping activities on the waters and the latest attack of the Atlas Cove jetty in Lagos with so much ease by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has raised concerns about the state of security at the nation's seaports.

Daredevil sea robbers recently attacked a petroleum product jetty in Lagos, Ibru jetty, and they successfully siphoned 5,000 tonnes of petroleum products from an indigenous ship, MT Trine Teresa.

The ship, whose captain and crew were held hostage while the operation lasted, was said to have been waiting to discharge her products at the facilities of one of the many tank farms that are located within the expansive jetty.

For about three days from June 26, 2009, sea robbers had laid siege to the Lagos anchorage, attacking and robbing ships at will and in the process, a captain was seriously injured while undisclosed sum of money was allegedly carted away by the robbers.

Any thing can happen on the Nigerian waters despite the presence of security operatives, who often take cover when such operations are going on or aid illegal trading at sea.

The ISPS code is an important international security initiative developed by the International Maritime Organisation, (IMO), and containing security-related requirements for governments, port authorities and shipping companies, together with a series of guidelines on how to meet these necessities.

It is an initiative of the Western maritime world as a direct response to the September 11, 2001 terrorists attack on the United States of America.

Although the enforcement of the ISPS code, which is a mandatory rule for all the world's ports, oil and gas terminals and merchant ships that engage in international trade, commenced July 1 2004, there is no sign that Nigerian ports are about to be compliant. With little exception in the case of Onne, it has been difficult to ensure that only genuine port users are allowed access into the ports.

In June 2004, then managing director of Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), Adebayo Sarumi, announced that access into the ports would be restricted to only authorised persons, who must carry a smart card as the port gates will be manned electronically.

"I want to put the whole nation on notice that today onward, it will be extremely difficult to enter the ports, unless you have business there. We are changing the nature of our gates to be controlled electronically and unless you have a smart card, the gates will not open for you," Sarumi had said on behalf of the then minister of Transport, Abiye Sekibo, at the flag-off ceremony of the access control to the ports in compliance with the ISPS code in Lagos June 2004.

According to him, the measures, among others, were to reduce the porosity of the ports especially the Lagos ports that are in the heart of the metropolis because of the development and increase in the size of the city.

He noted that the issue of illegal entrance into the ports will be solved by the issuance of smart card, adding that the system will be computerised to the extent that only the names of those permitted will enter with the card. He stated that all operations at the ports will be done electronically except inspection and examination of goods by customs.

But the reality on ground five years after the speech shows that the gates are broken down and cannot be said to be electronically manned. Even lighting most times at night is poor.

Most of the people gaining access into the port do not really have business there and merely loiter about in the premises. There is the absence of closed circuit television lack of electronic access control, and inadequate number of personnel of both the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) Security Department and the Ports Authority Police Command (PAPC) for effective security coverage.

Government's attempt to ensure compliance with the ISPS Code was to create another organ - Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS) - which at a time assumed a larger- than -life status in the maritime sector; accountable only to the Presidency.

The body was said to have only succeeded as an avenue to siphon money through different methods.

Going by the assurances that were given at the onset of concessioning in 2006, no one ought to be able to enter Nigerian ports again without electronic card.

While the threat of piracy is as old as maritime travel, the number of attacks by pirates reported around the world has more than tripled during the past 10 years.

Over the years, terrorism has usually targeted land and/or aviation targets. However, many experts believe that this situation will change in the near future, because of the very high vulnerability of maritime transportation, including shipping, port, and coastal facilities and shipping containers.

The appointment of Saud Hamid al-Utaibi as new al-Qaeda commander in Saudi Arabia, largely due to his expertise in marine terror, is said to have caused many security experts to raise the threat level to maritime security.

Hamid al-Utaibi's experience includes an active role in blowing up the USS Cole in October 2000 and in attacking the French Limburg tanker two years later-both rammed by exploding speedboats in Yemeni waters.

Subsequent to the appointment, the United States warned a number of Mediterranean states that maritime attacks involving chemical agents might be imminent.

The feasible modes of operation are far-reaching. To mention a few, terrorists could hijack a vessel, or they could register a ship in a 'flag of convenience' nation, and use it for terrorist activities; or they could purchase and make use of a legitimate shipping company and its vessels to carry out acts of terrorism without coming under suspicion.

These ships could be loaded with explosives and crashed into other vessels, port facilities, critical infrastructure, or population centres on the coast.

Alternatively, oil tankers or vessels carrying hazardous materials could be used as terrorist weapons. The types of vessels mentioned above, major ports, coastal oil depots, power stations, harbours or bridges could be ideal targets for such attacks.

Maritime attacks may also involve the use of small underwater craft, such as small submarines or underwater motor-propelled sleds for divers.[8] Some terrorist groups are known to have experimented with such methods. Intelligence reports point out that radicals from the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a group linked to the al-Qaeda network, have been trained in sea-borne guerrilla tactics, such as suicide diving and ramming, developed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Terrorists could also gain unauthorised access to ships and port facilities to place explosives. At least one al-Qaeda operative is known to have been in the process of obtaining an international seaman's license that would allow him into any port in the world without a visa.

One of the most frightening terrorist threats to maritime security involves terrorists smuggling and/or activating explosives or WMD in general-and dirty bombs in particular-into a sovereign country using cargo containers. Such a scenario became less notional after alert Italian security personnel in Gionia Tauro revealed the 'Container Bob' incident in October 2001.

In that incident, an Egyptian man with Canadian citizenship, nicknamed "Container Bob", was discovered when Port police in the Italian city of Gioia Tauro heard an unusual noise coming from a cargo container.

Upon opening it, they discovered a well-dressed man drilling ventilation holes. He was equipped with a bed, a toilet, water supply, satellite phone, laptop computer, cameras, and maps. He also had security passes to various airports in North America.

A weapon smuggled in such a container could be detonated upon arrival at the port or at any strategic point along the container's route. Targets could include strategic transportation nodes, symbolic landmarks, or large population centres. In addition to death and destruction, any such attack using WMD would undoubtedly have a traumatic effect on the national psyche, not to mention the regional and global economy.

Enhanced physical security of port facilities, increased patrols of waterways, ports and coastal facilities, container security and protection against explosives and the creation of databases to track cargo, ships and seaman are all imperative measures in mitigating the threat. Nevertheless, they will almost all be for naught, if international agreements and cooperation are not upheld.

Manager of Nigerian ports claim that the facilities operate on different levels of compliance.

Going by the dictates of the IMO, security level one requires that there should be minimum, appropriate and protective security measures within the ports.

The second level of security is that there should be appropriate additional protective security measures, which shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident. Security level three is the time when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident.

At this level, there must be further specific protective security measures for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, NIMASA has said it is set to increase the ISPS level in Nigeria to level 2 from the present level 1 within the next two months.

Director general of the agency, Temi Omatseye, who made this declaration while hosting executive members of the Nigerian Chamber of Shipping in Lagos, noted that safety issues are very important to his administration.

According to him, NIMASA is set to create a 24 hour threat response center to boost its safety operations adding that the Agency will carry out an ISPS compliance Audit on all vessels in the country in September 2009.

While saying that non-compliant vessels may be sanctioned, Omatseye declared that his administration will adopt a direct and focused option in regulating the industry