Johannesburg — INTERGENERATIONAL justice is a weird concept. It is one I tried to explain to Wits University philosophy students in a lecture on affirmative action last week. This generated discussion that is worth rehearsing. One of the more serious objections to affirmative action is that it is unjust to expect young white South Africans to bear the brunt of the social and economic cost of affirmative action for a history that was beyond their control. In effect, young white South Africans are being made to pay for the moral sins of their parents.

This notion of intergenerational justice seems like no justice at all. Why should the Mandela generation pay for the actions of others? The expectation that they do is surely unjust. This objection is wholly compatible with recognising that black SA has a claim of justice against the perpetrators of apartheid. The problem is that a lot of those perpetrators are dead or dying. How is it morally acceptable to hold Hendrik Verwoerd's grandchildren responsible? And if it is not fair to do so, then surely the moral foundation for policies such as affirmative action and black economic empowerment collapses?

The government does not understand this moral problem that lies at the heart of affirmative action. This is why it has often shown little empathy for young white South Africans, who are tempted to leave their country of birth. This objection is in fact deeply challenging and must be taken seriously. Merely taking it seriously will itself persuade many young white South Africans that there is not a blind, unreflective racialism driving demands for social justice.

It seems correct to say someone should be held morally and legally accountable only for that which is within their control. But if voluntary control is a necessary condition for the attribution of blame, then presumably no one could be blamed for activities that took place before they were born. It makes no sense to indict someone's future self.

We can apply these ethical intuitions to the affirmative action debate. A 20-year-old white South African could not have prevented apartheid from coming about. Therefore any policy that demands sacrifices from innocent young white South Africans in order for victims of racism to enjoy compensatory justice is itself unjust.

This objection should not be dismissed lightly. Doing so would be intellectually dishonest and politically dangerous. One should acknowledge the coherence, cogency and emotional substance behind the intuitive sense of injustice that someone born in 1990 might be feeling. These feelings are heightened by the knowledge that your friend, Sipho, who has been at a private school with you, might get prioritised over you for a job "simply" because he is black, even though you appear to have indistinguishable life journeys behind you.

Yet, while compelling, this objection is ultimately answerable. The key to understanding social justice demands is to grasp the conceptual distinction between moral sins and moral burdens. No one should be forced to inherit the moral sins of others. That violates natural justice considerations.

However, we can inherit moral burdens. If, for example, I have benefited unjustly from the wealth acquired by my immoral, murderous and racist father, who exerted force over others in acquiring that wealth, then I inherit moral burdens stemming from this fact. The immoral origins of the wealth I have inherited set up the moral burden. This is wholly compatible with recognising that I myself am not morally or legally responsible for the unjust wealth acquisition.

Consider the somewhat remote but illustrative example of Saartjie Baartman's remains. Would it have been morally acceptable for contemporary France to say: "We admit our forefathers did immoral things that resulted in Saartjie eventually dying and being buried here. We are blameless, though, and so have no moral burdens to repatriate her remains." Surely not -- history hands down moral duties unconnected to our immediate lives.

This is the nature of the moral foundation of affirmative action. The average young white South African still has a better shot at living a flourishing adult life than does her black counterpart as a direct result of unjust historical facts whose structural impact lingers. Even your friend Sipho, who seems to speak your language, faces challenges he does not share with you and which stem from our racist history, all of which you have the luxury to be blissfully unaware of. This genesis of contemporary inequalities gives us an overriding moral reason to implement policies aimed at redress. It also constitutes a moral reason why young white South Africans, though blameless, are fair targets of policies aimed at redress.

Whether these policies, such as affirmative action, work adequately in practice is a discussion for another day. What is clear, however, is that these kinds of policies do have a moral justification, albeit a complex one. It would help, of course, if the government was able to appreciate these complexities and show sensitivity by engaging young white South Africans in a caring and non-alienating manner on such potentially divisive topics.

McKaiser (www.safferpolitics.co.za) is a political and social analyst at the Centre for the Study of Democracy.