Kampala — The story of Rwanda is now well known. Fifteen years ago, genocide devastated the country, emptied the banks and decimated human capital. By the time the RPF captured Kigali in July 1994, half the population was either dead or in exile. Just across the border in DR Congo, a Hutu rebel army was training in UN refugee camps, while the international humanitarian community stood idly by.

Today, Rwanda is thriving. The roads are paved and neatly landscaped with palm trees, motor-taxis have uniforms and helmets, hospitals are efficient and the education system is quickly improving. Business reforms are being admired the world over, per capita GDP has tripled, and investment is booming. Anti-corruption billboards adorn the roads and the country is incredibly safe. The population is disciplined, responsible and accountable.

This is not just a façade. Rwanda's measures have increased the standard of living and are pulling many out of hopeless poverty. Unlike most African countries, Rwanda is focusing on long-term projects and on building efficient state structures. Uganda, in comparison, has double the per capita GDP of Rwanda and yet cannot provide a quarter of the same state services at the same price. What other developing country's government focuses on beautification or the prosecution of corruption with such zeal?

This is all the more interesting given that Rwanda's social situation is still, at the very least, a complicated matter. Fifteen years have merely cast a gauze-like veil over the memories, the guilt and the anger of the genocide--those feelings are still very much there. Fifteen years have also made Rwandans realise that they have no other choice but to live together. So what's holding Rwanda together? How can a country--still reeling from its past--be on such an impressive path towards development?

If one compares Uganda and Rwanda on paper and then on the ground, the result is fairly surprising. Uganda has a strong democratic process and a vibrant free press. Its population is far better educated and it has more money and more natural resources. Rwanda, on the other hand, is certainly not a democracy; Kagame is an unabashed autocrat.

The government is very hard on press freedoms, regularly tossing out local and international journalists. Yet, in terms of quality of infrastructure and government programmes and services, Rwanda is now speeding ahead. A visit to Kigali's King Faisal Hospital and then a subsequent visit to Kampala's Mulago Hospital will make clear the immense disparity in healthcare alone.

Of course, there are no straightforward explanations for Rwanda's rise. One cannot simply credit Kagame for imposing such changes upon the country. Kagame and the RPF were forced into decisions based on the conditions before them. It was the genocide and breakdown of order that forced Kagame and RPF to build a viable Rwandan state.

If other African leaders were to implement the same reform programmes today, they would probably be met with failure. Reform is a difficult prospect. The United States, for example, has been trying to reform its healthcare system for decades. Usually, reform has little benefit for entrenched elites who are used to easily gaming the system.

The gains of reform are realised in the long-term while sacrifices are made in the short-term. The groups hurt by reform are typically very successful in organising opposition to it. But in Rwanda, after the genocide, there were neither entrenched elites nor prior state structures to deal with. In fact what made reform so successful was that it wasn't really reform, it was building from scratch.

By the time they took power, the RPF had a failed state on its hands. Even for a year or two after the genocide, it was up against the odds: the Hutu government had the de facto support of the international community (particularly France), who insisted on peace deals and power sharing to sustain the status quo. In order to cope with all of its duties and lack of international aid, the RPF had to quickly diversify.

It had to rebuild the country and supply social services where none existed. There was an intense pressure to regain control of the situation. Another breakdown of order would mean annihilation or exile. It was this pressure to succeed that helps explain Rwanda's path.

The Rwandan President Paul Kagame understood early on that failure was not an option. In order to ensure the survival of his people beyond his political term, Kagame had to break down any ethnic argument against his rule and defuse the Hutu exiles' claim to power.

For Kagame, buying elite support was a short term and expensive solution. Even if tempted, Kagame did not have the money to enact such a campaign. By providing for its citizens, the government could attain popular support; poverty and misery certainly have no ethnic affiliation. It was with this in mind that Kagame worked to design systems and social structures that demand responsibility, accountability and efficiency.

He also continues to constantly appeal to ordinary Rwandans to hold their government accountable, at both the local and national levels. Conditions demanded a state that works. Everything had to be for the good of all Rwandans. This continues to be a strategy meant to keep Rwanda above the ethnic fray. It also explains the highly regulated structures that the government continues to set up.

It is not surprising that the Rwandan leadership is autocratic. Kagame did not have to worry about elections at first: the genocide and war destroyed any political opposition. If Kagame continues to plug any form of dissent (except in private), he will risk delegitimising the same state structures he has worked so hard to create. As his likely end of term in 2017 approaches, he must be mindful to slowly open these channels.

This can be done while continuing to be tough on ethnic partisanship. Kagame should not be afraid to make it his final battle.