Africa's transition from formal colonialism to political independence was marked by a period of semi-subservience called "dominion."

In that dominion, there was a prime minister who was below a local point man called governor-general, who represented the queen.

The governor general approved everything the prime minister did, or passed it on to London for advice.

This structure was dismantled once a former colony attained republican status, but it seems to be returning in a roundabout way.

"Dominions" are back and the ambassadors and high commissioners representing master states are the governors general.

This is particularly the case in Kenya.

Between June 1963 and December 1964, Kenya was a British dominion, had a prime minister and a governor general.

Jomo Kenyatta was the PM and Malcolm McDonald, the former governor of colonial Kenya, was the governor general.

The two men, each looking after his country's interests, worked closely to start dismantling the majimbo structure imposed at Lancaster.

The British, leading the West, stopped demonising Kenyatta and Kenyatta in return told British settlers to stay and teach Kenyans to do certain things.

Among the few things taught was how to look after British or rather Western interests through African political leaders and public servants.

Thereafter, the governor general left Kenya in the safe hands of the president, ministers, and top civil servants.

Subsequently, Kenya became a model country of the West for the rest in Africa to emulate, a country run by Africans largely in the interests of the West.

When compared to its neighbours, it was doing very well politically and economically.

In the south, Tanzania was tinkering with some kind of socialism called Ujamaa and dismissed Kenyan capitalism as 'man eat man' society.

Uganda did not seem to know how to be stable, experienced a series of coups and flooded Kenya with refugees.

Somalia, after failing to maintain internal cohesion by promoting irredentist designs on Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, collapsed as a state with devastating effect on the region.

Despite seemingly being surrounded by hostile neighbours, therefore, Kenya became the regional power centre, and this was for as long as it was subservient to the interests of the West.

Yet subservience was not a guarantee of continued support especially when perceptions of interests changed, as they did in the 1980s.

In the new perception, top leaders became irrelevant because they made the West look bad and had become unpopular with 'the people' in such countries as the Philippines, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Iran.

The solution was to abandon "leaders" and adopt NGOs and Civil Society organs that could be made to appear as if they represented popularity.

As leaders continued to look after the interests of the West, therefore, they found themselves being undermined by the very powers whose interests they thought they were advancing.

Kenyan leaders, failing to notice the shift, found themselves in the predicament of relying on masters who were busy undercutting their "friends".

By discarding "leaders" they considered no longer useful, the master states were simply safeguarding their interests in Kenya.

The governors-general have then taken to instructing Kenya on "reforms" it "must" have, even if they are undemocratic.

Among them is to open the country to foreign rule and to discount the need for people to be ruled with their consent.

For instance, the Draft Constitution plots to disenfranchise Kenyans by imposing an unelected Prime Minister to run the government as Kenya's chief executive while the elected president becomes a virtual rubberstamp.

The "governors-general" then advised "the principals" to ensure implementation of the "draft".

Menene is professor of history and international relations at USIU.