The cessation of armed agitation in the Niger Delta as a result of President Umaru Musa Yar'adua's Amnesty Initiative is an achievement that has not been sufficiently appreciated. Add that to Yar'adua's states-manly gesture of granting ten percent equity in the oil business in Nigeria to the Niger Delta.

In spite of the lingering scepticism in certain quarters, as to whether the ceasefire will hold, the focus now should be the consolidation of what has been achieved. In doing so, Nigeria can draw some lessons from the peace settlement in Northern Ireland where after a ceasefire based on the Good Friday Agreement, peace has held.

Niger Delta grievances predate the discovery of oil in the area in 1956. Long before that, the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region as minority tribes, like several other minorities in the country, had been protesting against the dominance of the major tribes under the colonial administration. Grouped under the provinces of Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers (COR), they cried to the British Government for self-determination, as minorities in the Middle Belt did. Minorities in every part of the country made similar complaints. In response, the Colonial Government set up the Willinks Commission in 1957 to address the fears of the minorities. And so although oil is currently the pivot of the struggle in the Niger Delta, it was not the initial or earliest rallying point.

Following the Willinks report, and further agitations, the Midwest Region was created. It appeased a section of the political elite in the area, but at best what largely prevailed in the narrowly defined Niger Delta of the time was simply uneasy calm. One must note here that Niger Delta is now widely defined to include all the 9 oil mineral producing states.

The Midwest state creation was pursued with dual-purpose. It was a political answer to the fears of the minorities and a weapon wielded by the ruling NPC/NCNC alliance to weaken the opposition Action Group. The process was not driven by any economic programme of action.

The agitation for economic and political emancipation by the minorities continued, sending ripples to corridors of power in Lagos, the then Federal Capital, and in the regional capitals of Kaduna and Enugu. However, at the approach of independence, the colonial administration concentrated on Nigeria's independence process, pushing the creation of more states to accommodate the wishes of the minorities to the background. Thereafter, the military coup of January 1966, and the counter-coup of July 1966, followed.

The creation of 12 states by the Federal Military Government of General Yakubu Gowon, ostensibly done to pre-empt the declaration of an independent Biafra nation by Ojukwu, somehow doused the agitation of the minorities. That explains why Isaac Adaka Boro, who took up arms to fight the cause of the Niger Delta, joined the federal forces in ending the breakaway Republic of Biafra. He died defending the territorial integrity of one Nigeria.

After the collapse of the Boro agitation, the struggle in the Niger Delta region took a less-militaristic path. The tempo of the struggle was intensified by protests against environmental degradation caused by the oil industry. Oil exploitation went on without corresponding development programme. MOSOP's violent protests though strong were still localized and directed largely at an oil company and fellow members of the community who did not join the MOSOP train.

The creation of more states and local governments should have stemmed minority agitation. That optimism soon faded in the face of continuing demands, even to this day.

It would be historically fair to note that widespread armed struggle and wanton destruction of lives and property in the Niger Delta was largely a phenomenon of the Obasanjo era; it was inherited by Yar'adua.

It was during the Obasanjo era that "resource control" became a swan song in the Niger Delta. Prior to 1999, the military's way of running the polity discouraged such radical and divisive calls. In governance, the military posted most officers to states other than their own as governors. Such postings to the Niger Delta had a moderating influence on the region in spite of violence in the Ogoni area.

The departure of the military in 1999 paved way for the emergence of civilian governors. This crop of leaders, for political reasons, threw their weight unreservedly behind their people. Consequently, the agitation, which this time focused almost entirely on 'resource control', assumed a new, and dangerous, dimension. Governing under the new dispensation of freedom of expression after long years of military rule, Obasanjo had a tough time trying to contain the Niger Deltans. He succeeded partially as politicians created further turmoil by sponsoring armed gangs to intimidate opponents, especially during the elections.

Apparently in complicity, the authorities looked the other way while the gangs became strong and entrenched themselves. Abandoned by their sponsors after the elections, some of the gangs committed their energies to the violent struggle for resource control. Many others became plain criminals for purely selfish reasons. So, we can say politicians created the terrorist monster they could not control and the nation paid dearly for it. Even though the activities of armed groups have been brought under control by the current ceasefire, it is unfortunate that, like the incidence of armed robbery which followed the civil war, the Niger Delta struggle has left in its trail the despicable new crime of kidnapping for the nation to contend with.

Because of the widespread misgivings surrounding Yar'adua's 7-point agenda, it is an understatement to say that the cessation of the armed struggle in the Niger Delta took a lot of people by surprise. It was as dramatic as the collapse of the "Republic of Biafra", especially because some militant leaders delayed embracing the amnesty until the last hour.

The rationale for the amnesty and its efficacy will continue to be debated. However, as the saying goes, nothing succeeds like success and success has many fathers while failure is an orphan. Many will want to claim credit for the achievement. Obviously there were those who worked behind the scenes, and so their role cannot be fully appreciated. But among those whose involvement was openly known, credit should rightly go to the president and vice president, both of who patiently and doggedly pursued the goal. Timi Alaibe and Timiebi Koripamo-Agary, styled the militants mother, in whom some of the militants reposed a lot of confidence, deserve commendation for their individual efforts.