Nairobi — In April last year, just two weeks after President Barack Obama appointed him the US Special Envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration arrived in the country for his maiden tour in that capacity.

But Gration was already laying down the broad lines of what would, months later, become Obama's official policy document on Sudan.

The objective of the trip, Gration said, was to look, listen and learn.

"I come here with no illusions, with no preconceived ideas and no solutions," the envoy said after a meeting with Sudan officials.

"And I come here with my hands open; it will be up to the Sudanese government to determine how they want to continue with that relationship; hopefully it will be with a hand of friendship, a hand of co-operation and one that will help us move ahead, because like all my American colleagues, ana ahib Sudan (I love Sudan)."

Later that July, Gration told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "To achieve our goals, we must also engage Sudan's neighbours and the international community."

He said it was the reason he had travelled to Chad, China, Egypt, France, Libya, Norway, Qatar and the United Kingdom to meet leaders who shared that concern and were ready to work together towards shared objectives.

"We are working with Libya and Egypt to end the long-standing proxy war between Chad and Sudan, that has fired up further conflict," said Gration.

In mid February this year, Gration returned to Sudan and had something to take home: A peace agreement between President Omar al Bashir and his Chadian counterpart Idriss Deby.

And days later, Darfur's rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signed a ceasefire deal with Khartoum.

Chad, apparently, played a significant role in the Darfur rebels-Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) deal.

In a statement, Philip Crowley, the assistant secretary of the US Bureau of Public Affairs said: "The US acknowledged the substantial efforts made by Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno and his government in facilitating this accord."

But according to insiders within the rebel movements, the deal was done in spite of Gration.

"The deal was initiated by Chad," Abdullahi el-Tomi, a JEM official said. "The US has no role in it and in some ways is antagonistic to it. Gration is not happy that his own group (Road Map Group) was not included."

There are from 15 to 30 rebel groups in Sudan.

In early February, the Darfur armed factions that were holding talks split into three.

The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) did not want to integrate with other groups while the Road Map Group said they would talk only when all armed factions and local administrators were united.

The JEM proceeded with the talks and signed a tentative deal that would improve conditions for substantial talks.

According to el-Tomi, Gration was later able to secure the Road Map Group a front-row seat at the signing ceremony.

"Gration was in the same hotel where the ceremony was being held but he did not attend; there was a strong message to the mediators in that," said el-Tomi.

Yet, in many respects, despite not turning out to America's liking, that Deby and Bashir are publicly talking peace says a lot about the environment, and, therefore, about the efforts of one man: Scott Gration.

The road to Darfur's peace was always going to go hand in hand with the road to Deby-Bashir peace.

The proxy war made it impossible to consider a peaceful settlement in Darfur. Peace effort after peace effort had faltered.

Faltering peace efforts

In early 2006, for instance, Salva Kiir, the chairman of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, named a Darfur Task Force.

But the relations between the rebel groups that Deby backed, and the Khartoum regime were so bad that the Task Force dragged on without any outcome to show for its efforts.

It did not matter that then South African president Thabo Mbeki and Eritrean President Isaias Aferwerki were engaged at various points.

In 2007, Abdul Wahid al Nur, the leader of the then major rebel faction in the war ravaged region, refused to meet Kiir's deputy Riek Machar when he went to visit him in Paris.

Al-Nur said he didn't think peace talks were possible before all Bashir's forces had left Darfur, and displaced persons had returned to their areas.

But that was an inconceivable demand since it would be impossible to imagine the Sudan Armed Forces leaving the region to the rebels.

So when Kiir's task force finally brought together disparate Darfur rebel groups, only the small ones turned out and the peace treaty crumbled as soon as it had been signed.

Perhaps a peace deal could have been brokered earlier if SPLM had the trust of their godfathers -- the Chadian and the Sudan rebels.

Instead, it later transpired, the two major foes, Deby and Bashir, never really trusted Kiir to broker peace.

In November 2008, a frustrated Kiir finally went public, telling visiting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that the two leaders had rejected his overtures.

It seemed, Kiir said, Sudan did not trust him, as First Vice President, to fulfil this role.

"We cannot conspire against the same government that we are in," Kiir said.

Then in early 2008, Chadian rebels nearly swept Deby out of power.

According to all accounts, it was the French military that kept Deby in power.

In return, the JEM, made a daring attack on Khartoum that left the leadership shaken.

Chad and Sudan have had four other peace ventures previously, including one in Qatar last year, and another in Senegal in 2008, all of which crumbled.