Members of the United Southern Sudan Youth for Referendum during a peaceful demonstration at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park early this month. (Photo Courtesy Peterson Githaiga/Nation)

When former Sudanese First Vice President and rebel leader John Garang died in a helicopter crash only months after the signing of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between north and south Sudan, many feared that the peace process could collapse.

But such fears were allayed by his predecessor, Salva Kiir's reassurance that he and colleagues in the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) would strive to maintain the peace deal Garang had helped to create to end Africa's longest civil war. Even President Omar al-Bashir, a bitter adversary of Garang during the brutal 21-year war, vowed he would "faithfully" implement the CPA.

But skeptics still maintained that, despite such reassurances, the peace agreement was destined to remain "fragile" and that the political landscape of Sudan would not be the same after Garang. This skepticism was immediately reinforced in some way by the bloody violence that swept Khartoum and Juba - the capital of southern Sudan - in the wake of Garang's death.

The violence was a reflection of not only Garang's great emotional appeal for his people, but also the historical animosity between the black (mainly Christian) Sudanese of the south and the Arab (predominantly Islamist) Sudanese of the north.

Southerners have always been suspicious of their northern (racist) brethren whose monopoly on power in Khartoum as well as their decades-long hegemony and marginalisation of the former, were the SPLM's raison detre. It is this suspicion which raised the spectre of the "possible" collapse of the CPA. Although, to the chagrin of the skeptics, the peace deal has not collapsed, it has neither helped to end the deep mistrust between the former foes in the shaky national unity government nor brought about the desired democratic transformation in Sudan.

The Sudanese State is still the same old dictatorship under Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) which allows only marginal freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press (just to appease the West) and is contemptuous of the non-Arab Sudanese.

The April elections, the first in 24 years, were held against this background. We heard of the alleged wide-spread fraud and vote-rigging that enabled Bashir to remain in power. Because of the instability as a result of the Darfur conflict and due to the absence of democratic guarantees for free, fair and transparent polls, credible international election monitors like the Carter Centre (the long-term international observer mission in Sudan) had suggested that elections be delayed

Few were surprised at the insistence of President Bashir that the poll should take place as planned, regardless of the prevailing adverse conditions in the country. With an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court (ICC) hanging over his head, he saw the elections as a "do-or-die" affair.

Indeed, he knew that only victory (at any cost) would guarantee him security against such arrest. (The Hague court wants Bashir to answer charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed under his watch in Darfur").

One of the arguments advanced by the African Union, which is strongly opposed to the ICC move, was that indicting Bashir while he was still in office would be "an affront to the sovereignty of Sudan". The other, of course, was that the indictment could undermine peace efforts (as if there were really such efforts) in the Darfur conflict and further destabilize the country. This has encouraged him to continue his onslaught on the people of Darfur. (Critics of the AU in this issue say that position was hardly surprising since many of the African regimes which were strongly opposed to the indictment of Bashir have skeletons in their own closets and were afraid of the legal precedent of the ICC).

Although under the CPA southern Sudan is supposed to choose between unity and secession through a referendum (a key component of the peace deal), there is a provision in the agreement that requires the relevant parties to make concerted efforts to persuade southerners of the great benefits of unity.

Unfortunately, there has been no initiative either from Khartoum or from the leadership in the south towards that goal! Consequently, the people of southern endemic Sudan have been left with the option of separation which might further complicate Sudan's troubles. Southerners are waiting anxiously for the referendum, which is due next January, to vote overwhelmingly for independence!

But looking seriously at Sudan's political landscape, one does not feel comfortable at all about the prospect of Africa's largest country breaking up. Such scenario raises the spectre of heightened tensions and instability not only in the whole of Sudan, but also beyond the country's borders. The greatest fear is that the country could slide back to war.