Accra — In recent times, the Supreme Court of Ghana has issued broad rulings on individual rights, some of which have required the government to take positive actions on behalf of minority interests.

One of such important areas is the recent judicial ruling that Ghanaian prisoners must be accorded electoral (voting) rights.

The Supreme Court's ruling instructed the Ghana Electoral Commission to provide the necessary framework and to begin to build capacity for prisoners, incarcerated for various crimes against humanity to be able to exercise their constitutional rights.

Such judicial action has raised important questions such as: Has the judiciary exceeded its intended authority under the Ghanaian Constitutional system?

Has it robbed lawmaking majorities of decisions that are rightfully theirs to make?

As Ghana's Supreme Court crosses the thin line into areas traditionally reserved for law-making majorities, the legitimacy of its policies has to be questioned.

I argue that a justices' role is to discover the application of legislation and precedent to specific cases, rather than search for new principles that essentially changes the meaning of the law.

There are two general schools of thought on these issues: Those of judicial restraint and judicial activism.

Although these terms are somewhat imprecise and often misused, they are helpful in efforts to clarify the recent Supreme Court's proper role.

Advocates of judicial restraint claim that the justices' personal values are inadequate justification for exceeding their proper judicial role.

They argue that the constitution entrusts broad issues of the public good to elective institutions such as the Ghanaian parliament and that judicial activism ultimately undermines public respect for the judiciary.

Judicial activism counter that the courts were established as an independent branch of government and should not hesitate to promote new principles when they see a need, even if this action puts them into conflict with elected officials.

The dispute between advocates of judicial activism and advocates of judicial restraint is a philosophical one that involves opposing values like that of 'the right of prisoners in Ghana today.

The debate is important because it addresses the normative question of what role the judiciary ought to play in Ghanaian democracy.

Should unelected judges and justices involve themselves deeply in policy by adopting broad conceptions of their power, or should they give wide discretion to elective institutions?

Should judges or justices defer to precedent, or should they be willing to change course, even at the risk of sending the law down uncharted paths in Ghana's judicial history?

These questions cannot be answered simply on the basis of whether one personally agrees or disagrees with the recent judicial decision on prisoners' rights.

The answer necessarily depends on what value Ghanaians place on judgements about the role of the judiciary in a governing system based on the often-conflicting concepts of majority rule and individual rights.

As a supporter of judicial restraint, the Supreme Court's position on prisoners' rights is skewed and amounts to the 'shifting of the goal posts' during a football match.

Why would prisoners, many of who took it upon themselves to commit criminal acts and atrocities, be handed the right to vote in elections like faithful and obedient citizens of Ghana.