The campaign fronted by ANC Youth League President Julius Malema to oust South African President Jacob Zuma will in time be recalled as an interesting sidelight to the broader sweep of South African politics – part of the third phase of ANC rule.
While his abrasive populism – operating to silence rather than incorporate dissent – has damaged the ANC’s drive to re-invigorate itself post-Thabo Mbeki, the politics of government has been only slightly disturbed.
Malema’s attempt to steamroller through a programme to nationalise South Africa’s mining sector marked the start of a new phase of the Malema phenomenon: a bid to direct national, rather than ANC, politics. From that point, with the release of the youth league’s draft proposals, Southern Africa Report began to track and analyse Malema’s trajectory.
31 March 2011
Malema began his drive to impose nationalisation as ANC policy during the party’s national general council in mid-2010 – complete with a youth league attempt to storm the podium.
The initiative also marked the start of his tactical decision to integrate his supposedly radical nationalist policy drive with his attempt to construct an alliance to oust Zuma at the ANC’s centenary conference in December 2012 – a linkage Southern Africa Report later noted “could end not only his anti-Zuma campaign, but his career in politics”.
Unpacking both the youth league proposals and the ANC policy framework first outlined at Polokwane in 2007 – within a broader policy shift towards greater state involvement in the economy – made it clear that Malema had little prospect of success. His proposals were little more than sound and fury – thus signifying nothing – intended to mobilise support for an anti-Zuma platform rather than revolutionise the R2-trillion (R259-billion) mining sector.
Southern Africa Report noted that the youth league’s proposals would “resonate with the ANC’s black business elite (and aspirant black business elite), over-represented on the ANC National Executive Committee”.
In response to growing alarm among domestic and foreign mining houses and investors, Southern Africa Report concluded its analysis of the Malema proposals: “It would be dangerous to hold your breath as you wait for the arrival of nationalisation”, but indicated that significant changes to the minerals regulatory regime were imminent.
But the link between the nationalisation rhetoric and challenge to Zuma carried significant dangers: “For the moment there is no real potential challenger for Zuma’s ANC presidency – and thus for election as South Africa’s fifth president. The only real unknown is whether the local government election results and other factors could weaken Zuma’s standing sufficiently to force him to compromise with the nationalisation lobbyists to navigate his way through the conference. This is unlikely, but is at the heart of mining houses’ concern over certainty.”
13 April, 2011
ANC leadership race- through a glass darkly
Within weeks, Malema’s anti-Zuma programme was contributing to low-level tensions triggered immediately by nationwide municipal elections due in May 2011, as the thoughts of those in the ANC with ambitions for higher office turned to the 2012 leadership contest. A poor showing at the polls would open the way for a serious challenge, and anyone wanting to be on the winning ticket needed to be ready – and have the support of the youth league, then still able to sell itself to the media as the ANC’s king-maker.
Southern Africa Report’s assessment was: “Zuma is currently confidently in control of the ANC. But the contest for leadership has not yet begun in earnest: current manoeuvring is more in the nature of feeling out others’ strengths and weaknesses – measuring each other’s arsenals.
25 May, 2011
Back to the real fight – the ANC presidency
In the wake of municipal elections – the ANC maintained most of its popular vote, with opposition Democratic Alliance gains mainly resulting from increased polls – the ANC National Executive Committee met to review performance (27 May 2011). This was the first test of Zuma’s vulnerability. Southern Africa Report argued: “The youth league’s brazen willingness to take on Zuma anywhere, anytime and on any issue is clear evidence of this gradual weakening of the party’s presidency … the youth league under Malema has regrouped … in recent weeks doing significant collateral damage to the ANC’s election campaign”.
The election campaign demonstrated that Malema had succeeded in foregrounding the succession battle: Zuma’s detractors repeatedly tried to upstage him on the campaign trail, which he joined late as a result of government commitments, often by openly attacking his leadership. Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi, warming to the Malema campaign as his relationship with the presidency cooled, hyperbolically warned of the prospects of “president Zille”.
Zuma survived with only mild political bruising, but his failure to respond forcefully to the youth league encouraged Malema.
A Southern Africa Report editor’s letter by Vukani Mde previewed the youth league’s 16 June 2011 elective conference: “Oh, and there will be an election of indeterminate fairness, during which Julius Malema will be returned as league president.”
9 June, 2011
Gordhan’s clean-up drive – with benefits
Malema consolidated his control over the youth league machine, but only, Southern Africa Report noted, “by the slimmest of margins” and only because of the league’s winner-takes-all electoral system. The fault-lines that would explode into yawning fissures by January 2012 were visible.
At the same time, Zuma made his first – and typically indirect – move: Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan announced, in an unheralded briefing to a parliamentary committee, a comprehensive programme to combat political patronage and public sector corruption.
The assumption by Gordhan’s National Treasury of control over all tenders above R500 000 was almost unnoticed, but its implications were significant for Malema and other beneficiaries of lucrative provincial and municipal contracts. Within days, Treasury banned 120 businesses and “tendrepeneurs” from doing business with any tier of government.
9 June, 2011
Youth league prepares for assault on Zuma
While the youth league emerged from its elective conference cloaked in a façade of absolute unity behind Malema, analysis of the conference and run-up provincial preparations exposed an increasingly coercive approach to politics, and a wave of allegations of vote-rigging to secure Malema and his hand-picked officials an effortless ride through the conference.
“Since early 2010 his supporters have driven a relentless campaign in the provinces to force out all opposition to his candidacy ahead of the conference. The breakdown of internal democracy is not new. Delegates to the 2008 conference at which Malema was first elected to the league presidency were bullied and brow-beaten into supporting (him) … ”, Southern Africa Report noted.
But it recognised that Malema’s lengthy, unchallenged run was coming to an end: “the stakes here are high for Malema. He and his business entourage are now in Zuma’s and Gordhan’s sights …”
23 June, 2011
The reality behind Malema’s ‘radicalism’ – and the cost of failure
Probably Southern Africa Report’s most comprehensive – and prescient – analysis of Malema’s plans came in a review of the youth league conference. It noted Malema’s most serious tactical error – “conflating the ‘radical’ policy platform with political push to topple Zuma” – and that, combined with Gordhan’s new anti-corruption powers, this “could end not only his anti-Zuma campaign, but his career in politics.”
At the same time, resistance to Malema and the youth league was gaining coherence. Under the headline ANC allies gather to counter the youth league, Southern Africa Report predicted that Cosatu’s mid-term central committee meeting in late June “will close ranks behind Zuma – sending a powerful signal in the leadership struggle of its intentions ahead of the ANC’s elective conference in 2012”. It did, despite strong resistance from general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi. This division had the potential to trigger “an ugly succession battle” within the union federation, but the central committee meeting was “the first opportunity to avoid it”.
7 July, 2011
The Mac Factor – Zuma launches his counter-strike
Zuma’s appointment of former transport minister and anti-apartheid struggle veteran Mac Maharaj to replace Zizi Kodwa as presidential spokesperson is the first clear signal that Zuma is making his move.
The next two weeks will see rapid action to consolidate his own position and weaken the grouping hoping to challenge his leadership of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) next year. This is expected to include a Cabinet reshuffle – the second of Zuma’s presidency.
Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa has doubled up in Siceli Sicheka’s post for most of this year. Mthethwa is a strong possibility to take over the challenging local government portfolio. Politically, Zuma sees him as solid: he has been the cutting edge of several internal ANC initiatives to blunt attacks on Zuma and the ANC leadership by Malema’s youth league. Last month he forced a powerful rebuttal of the youth league’s conference statements through the ANC’s National Working Committee – where anti-Zuma voices, Mathews Phosa, Tony Yengeni and Fikile Mbalula, dominate.
18 August, 2011
By mid-August 2010, Malema was living on borrowed time. Encouraged by his backers, who continued to eye the ANC presidency, Malema was continuing to challenge the Zuma administration – most immediately through a statement that the league intended to intervene with Botswana’s opposition parties to precipitate regime-change.
The ANC leadership responded by cancelling a scheduled weekend meeting with youth league officials – in turn provoking an invasion by the league officials of a meeting of the ANC’s top six officials.
The invasion was the last straw.
Zuma demanded that the top six initiate disciplinary action against Malema. By the end of the month, charges against Malema and five other officials had been filed. Reporting once the charges had been laid, Southern Africa Report noted: “The move by Zuma and a majority of the ANC’s top six officials was a long time coming … the reasoning behind their procrastination is now clear. Conventional wisdom has seen the youth league’s campaign against Zuma as a battle for control of the ANC and to block a second Zuma term at next year’s centenary elective conference in Mangaung. By waiting, Zuma has allowed Malema’s actions to make his case: that the youth league behaviour has wider implications than Zuma’s own second-term ambitions. He has convinced elected ANC office-bearers at all levels – national, provincial, regional and even local – that their security of tenure could be a thing of the past if Malema and his supporters succeed in rendering the ANC president a lame duck ahead of the conference next December … He needed to build this consensus before acting. Reaction to the disciplinary action indicates that he has done so.”
The Malema endgame had begun.
27 October, 2011
Malema gambles. And loses - heavily
The ANC disciplinary process’s inexorable progress towards expulsion, and with the youth league immobilised behind him, left Malema with no choice but to make good his threat to call on his supposed mass support among South Africa’s poor and unemployed youth.
In October he led a march, intended to mimic the historic ANC-led Women’s March to Pretoria in 1956, with the goal of embarrassing Zuma and demonstrating the extent of Malema’s support. It attracted just 3 000 people all told – fewer, it was noted, than a gay pride march five days earlier, and slightly more than those who attended the free post-march concert. Malema had shot his last bolt. The anti-climax of his actual expulsion would be simply a box to tick.
The fall
Following Malema’s failed march, Southern Africa Report stories and analysis reflect an inevitable implosion of Malema’s control of the youth league, of his legal strategy in the disciplinary hearing, and of his business network in Limpopo:
Malema: Losing friends and influence…
Malema: Hawks circle Limpopo
Malema: The Stalingrad strategy
No out-of-court deal for Malema
Malema gambles. And loses - heavily
Out of the ANC, out of a job & out of his League
Malema's league base crumbling
Motlanthe opts off league slate
Malema’s silver bullet ricochets
The axe finally falls
Fixing Limpopo
Malema’s other problems
Malema: Dead man walking
Youth league: Behind the veil of unity
Malema’s last kicks
Malema’s crumbling defences
Wrapping up Mangaung
Comments Post a comment