Justice Emmanuel Nkea of the Special Criminal Court of the High Court in Banjul, yesterday granted bail to Sheikh Tijan Sosseh, former Project Coordinator of the Gambia Emergency Agricultural Production Project {GEAPP} who is accused of economic crimes and neglect of official duties contrary to the laws of The Gambia. The accused person was granted bail in the sum of twenty million dalasi with four Gambian sureties who must individually or jointly deposit leasehold property of that value and such property must be situated within the Greater Banjul Area. Below is the full text of the ruling: RULING Upon an Application dated and filed 23' July 2013, the Applicant through his counsel, L.S Camara is praying this court for an order releasing the Accused/Applicant on bail pending the hearing and determination of any charges against him.

The application is brought pursuant to section 8 (1) of the Economic Crimes (Specified Offences) Act, sections 19 (5), and 24 (3), of the 1997 Constitution, and section 99 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As a preliminary issue; both sides have argued in terms of section 89, 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, attacking the respective affidavits for non disclosure of the sources of the respective affidavit evidence. Now; the provisions of sections 89, 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act are quite clear .

They require an affidavit to contain only facts that arise from the personal knowledge of the deponent or from information which he believes to be true and that when the information is derived from any source other than his personal knowledge he shall set forth explicitly the facts and circumstances forming the ground of his belief. When that belief is derived from an informant, he shall be named and reasonable particulars given.

Therefore, disclosing the source of information of facts deposed to on information, and giving ground of belief where facts are deposed to on belief and distinguishing between those facts which are deposed to on information, belief and knowledge of the deponent are the fundamental requirements of a good affidavit.

The law in sections 89, 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, is that affidavit based on information must disclose the source of information and nothing more. Nothing in the foregoing sections of the Evidence Act requires that the source of information of the informant whose own information is believed should be given. In paragraph 3 of the supporting affidavit, it is clear that the deponent relies on information derived from his personal knowledge as Legal Clerk in Dandimayo Chambers, and in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 he relies on information from a source other than his personal knowledge.

And the informant was named therein as L.S Camara of counsel, and I take notice that L.S Camara is counsel having the conduct of this case. And in paragraph 1 of the opposing affidavit, it is also clear that the deponent relies on hot information derive from his personal knowledge as litigation clerk, information from people he has interacted with during the course of duty.

But when I read the said affidavit, it seems to me that the deponent relied only on information derived from his personal knowledge. I therefore fail to see how the respective affidavits are incompetent for non compliance with sections 89, 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. These submissions are misconceived in my view. I discard them. I now return to the aplication proper.

In support of the Application is a 22 paragraph affidavit sworn to by one KEBBAH SANNEH; a Legal Clerk at Dandimayo Chambers. And attached thereto as "KSl"; is a three (03) Count charge sheet, brought in terms of sections 5 (b) and (f) of the Economic Crimes Specified Offences Act, and section 113 of the Criminal Code. And there was an opposing affidavit of six (06) paragraphs sworn to by one ABDUL KADRI TOURAY; a Litigation Clerk at the Attorney General's Chambers. In adopting the respective affidavits, both sides made oral arguments in support and against the grant of the prayers sought.

And the thrust of the Applicant's case is detailed out in paragraphs 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, and 17 of the supporting affidavit while the crux of the Respondent State's case is contained in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of the opposing affidavit. And it is common cause that the applicant has been in custody since his arrest on the 10th of June, 2013 and that investigation into this matter has been concluded.

And these I shall hold as a fact. The Applicant has averred that he has wiling and competent sureties to get him on bail and that he will not jump bail if admitted to bail by this Court. These pieces of affidavit evidence were never sufficiently challenged. Apart from merely denying these averments, there was no evidence to show that the Applicant has not got such sureties or that, he will jump bail.

And it is untenable to suggest that the Applicant will jump bail because one Mr. Benedict Jammeh who was granted bail by the High Court has, since jumped bail.

I take judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Benedict Jammeh was jointly charged with others and that even though he jumped bail the co-accused persons who stood trial with him were allowed to continue on their bail. And there is no evidence that the Applicant will interfere with the witnesses in this matter. And there was no bank statement or any other proof to support the averment that the Applicant is financially sound and would merely give his sureties a part of the wealth to settle the bail bonds.

These contentions are therefore speculative and idle. It has also been contended by the Respondent State that on information from the National Intelligence Agency; where the Applicant was kept pending trial, Kebba Sanneh who deposed to the affidavit in support had never had access to the Applicant and so could not have had the Applicant's instructions to depose to the affidavit as alleged.

Since this Court must take judicial notice of its own orders and directions; it is perhaps important the 18th July, 2013, there was an order directing the applicant be kept for some time at the police Headquarters to allow him access to his family and counsel.

I have not been informed that those orders were not complied, with. And even if it were so, which has not been established; i have not been given any reasons for such non compliance. This piece of affidavit evidence is therefore inherently self contradictory.

Now, the lone issue for determination is whether the Accused/Applicant should be admitted to bail pending the determination of the charges against him. And in my view, where the offences are bailable offences as in this case, the grant of bail should not be unjustifiably denied.

The denial of bail would be justifiable where the State has led concrete evidence that the Applicant is likely to jump bail as was the case in The State v. Aihagie lobe (crime. CASE No: H/227/13/CR/O76/AO unreported) or that he is likely to interfere with the witnesses. And these facts have not been established in the instant case. Now the issue of bail in this case is within the discretion of the Court.

And I have reminded myself that in the exercise of any judicial discretion, the Court must do so judiciously and judicially. And it is judicious when all the surrounding circumstances of the case are taken into account and judicial if supported by law. And the law in section 19 of the Constitution, section 99 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 8(1) of the Economic crimes (Specified Offences) Act, being the relevant laws.

In view of the foregoing, I shall admit the Accused, Applicant SHEIHK TITAN SOSSEH to bail in the sum of D20 Million Dalasi and Four (4) Gambian sureties who must individually or jointly deposit leasehold property of that value.