From July to December 2013, Tunisia experienced a political crisis that had two possible outcomes: violence or consensus.
The January 2014 adoption of a new constitution confirmed that compromise had prevailed. With the nomination of an independent technocratic government to replace the An-Nahda-led Troika, the country's transition entered a new phase - less troubled than the preceding one but with an outcome just as uncertain.
The challenge is to prolong the consensus that emerged from the national dialogue and prevent the return of political polarisation, even through potentially divisive elections.
Rather than focusing only on power-sharing - which will work only in the event of reasonable balance between Islamists and secularists at the ballot box - stakeholders should prepare too for other results, particularly by limiting the power of electoral winners and offering assurances to losers.
The legislative and presidential elections scheduled to take place by the end of 2014 under the transitional provisions of the new constitution could cause new spoilers to emerge and produce a majority sufficient for either Islamists or secularists to form a coalition that excludes the other.
With such high stakes, losers may be tempted question the vote's credibility and resuscitate the polarisation of last year, despite the consensual and democratic character of the new constitution.
The leaders of the major parties, for the time being, are seeking to reduce the uncertainty of the next elections by agreeing to share power. But much of their rank-and-file hopes to win outright.
Many Islamists believe they will return to power at the head of a new governmental coalition; some secular fringes count on the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Jom'a to "de-Islamise" the civil service before the elections occur, at least sufficiently for them to deem the elections fair.
The political scene is shifting fast. The alliance contemplated by the two largest political forces - An-Nahda and the secular party Nida Tounes - could marginalise a number of smaller parties and political personalities.
The scenario of a wider parliamentary coalition, integrating all the most important political forces, assumes an electoral equilibrium between Islamists and secularists that remains hypothetical.
Several obstacles could prevent the projected coalitions forming or results that are balanced. These include the readoption of the 2011 electoral law, which in the case of the 2011 elections encouraged the proliferation of electoral lists and benefited a more united Islamist camp; and the fragile economic, social and security context.
Growing public disillusionment and low voter turnout, together with the diminishing influence of political parties and the trade union, make results even less predictable.
Tunisia's major political forces would benefit from preserving the spirit of compromise that helped resolve its last crisis, even in the midst of their campaigns.
Beyond electoral transparency, they should reach an accord, in advance of the vote, on minimum guarantees against the next government adopting a "winner-takes-all" approach and agree beforehand to its main objectives, notably with regard to economic and security policy.
Deliberating on the basic rules of governance, regardless of the outcome of the upcoming vote, would reassure all sides and anchor political stability in a broader process of democratisation, rather than a narrow power-sharing deal.
Tunis/Brussels, 5 June 2014