On May 17, Brig Gen El Hadji Babacar Faye, a retired Senegalese army officer who was in Rwanda during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, gave a lecture to students of political science and international law at l'Institut Supérieur de Management (ISM), in Senegal's capital, Dakar.
The 61-year-old gave the students a firsthand account of the horrors Rwanda experienced, dismissed genocide deniers' narratives and also explained the complexity of international community systems. The next day, he accorded The New Times' James Karuhanga an interview in which he shed light on, among other things, how the Senegalese contingent's daring missions rescued around 600 Tutsi against all odds.
Excerpts:
Please tell us about your first days in Rwanda; when did you arrive and, what was the situation?
I am a former member of the military contingent deployed in Rwanda from 1993 to 1994, as military observers. In fact, when I was coming to Rwanda it was under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
We arrived in Rwanda as a contingent of 30 military observers coming from Senegal. The first 20 arrived on the 27th of July, and I was part of the second group which was 10. We arrived on the 4th of August, the day the Arusha agreement was signed.
Before you arrived, what did you expect?
When I was told that I may be part of the military contingent that was to be deployed in Rwanda; from the geography I knew Rwanda and Burundi as small countries with a large population. From there, I went to the information [desk] to gather more about where I was to deploy.
Looking at the population, I realised there was a conflict between two ethnic groups that live in harsh conditions. Then I tried to check on the sociology and tried to figure out the roots of the conflict but there was really not much. I really came to Rwanda to discover what is going on. We arrived by night, at around 1900 hours, got out of the plane and we were led to the buses and driven to Busogo.
We arrived at Busogo at around midnight and we didn't see much because we travelled at night. I just noticed that the road was hilly and we were going up and down. The following day, at breakfast, we started observing what has happening around us. By afternoon we tried to go out around the camp and we started seeing a lot of people walking on the road with some bananas and it was the first time I saw big banana plantains because we don't have them here.
Two or three weeks later, you surely understood what was going on in the country, then?
No. In fact, after we arrived, we got the first briefing the following day: This is the situation on the field. There is some fighting going on from time to time. We have a buffer zone around Byumba and, this is the red zone. Beyond the line of the buffer zone, this is where the warring parties are.
I arrived the day when the [peace] agreement was signed. I arrived when it was raining. So, I said, 'what a good sign! Maybe we could experience peace.' And then, some days later, we decide to move. The nearest town was Gisenyi. We drove to Gisenyi and on the road I saw people walking on the road and when we arrived at Gisenyi, you see the people very cautious or very prudent and then we could see the level of confidence.
The retired Senegalese general who served in Rwanda during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, Brig. Gen. El Hadji Babacar poses for a group photo with students and officials after giving a lesson.
In our group, there were some people from the Fulani ethnic group who really looked like the Tutsi. When it comes to these people, we realised that those [locals] who looked at them hated them immediately. We noted the level of hatred [of the Tutsi] that existed there. It is when we started understanding that any isolated Tutsi, wherever he or she is, may be in danger. The way they [locals] were speaking to us, looking at us, even refusing to sell you something at any market was telling.
How did you feel after observing all that?
We started feeling how the situation is serious. It was in our mind that we came for peace but when we saw that, we started understanding how tough our mission could be. We then stayed for one week and started being deployed. Some of us were sent to Kigali, and then we said we have to implement the Arusha peace accord.
Therefore, we need to establish our headquarters in the buffer zone where we can hold meetings to implement what needs to be done. We were asked to deploy to Kigali and be ready to be redeployed. And I was part of the team that was later deployed in Kinihira where you have fields of tea and everything. From Kinihira we got a place where we were holding all meetings between the [government] ministers and the RPF and then we got the airport and we could bring people from CND [Conseil national de développement] and we could do this and that.
We had a lot of meetings but any time we almost got an agreement with the government that is not in line with the government, it was systematically violated.
Any examples of the agreements violated?
For example, when we said we bring the RPF to CND, we had a calendar. We met and said this, and then the agreement was that we go, escort them and bring them to CND. But even for our escort to go there they were blocked. They had to delay for some days and come back. At some point, the people we were escorting were in jeopardy. We had to be very strong and determined to succeed.
Finally, we said, it was too dangerous to deal with because if they [interahamwe and government forces] come they were strong enough to be able to kill the people we were supposed to protect. While we were working on this, a decision was ongoing for the UN to take over the mission.
So, we worked like this until the UN took over on the 1st of December 1993. We went to Kinihira and changed our white hats to the blue hats and it was the first mission of UNAMIR [United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda].
From you observations, do you think the Genocide could have been avoided? Did you see any warning signs of what was about to happen?
When we were with the AU, there was really no force. We were in fact just a group of military observers but even during this time, there had been concerning signs that something is happening. There were signs because almost one week after we came to Kigali, I had been to three missions where there had seen ceasefire violations.
I went to do the inquiry on who violated the ceasefire in the region of Byumba. The second one, we had another team which went to inquire about a killing in a village around Rwamagana. Almost the whole village had been killed and people dispersed in the countryside; those who were able to hide. This was the very first sad experience, knowing that if these people are able to do this, not only is it scaring but it is concerning.
And then we went, under the blue hat, we reported this incident. At this time we had a strong force comprising very equipped Belgians, and the Ghanaians, and a company from Tunisia that could guard places like Amahoro stadium, Hôtel des Mille Collines, some other key places and the headquarters.
The Ghanaian battalion deployed on the buffer zone was able to control the traffic and people. The Belgian battalion was deployed in Kigali as a reserve force, ever ready to make the difference on the field. I don't know if we could stop [genocide] but the signs that we were experiencing if it could have made pressure to the government to say that I think we could avoid something.
But there is something that you should understand; the leadership of the Interahamwe was stronger than the governance of the state. It means that at the diplomatic level, the state could decide something and then the interahamwe chief say the opposite and it is what he said that would be done.
We lost time before we understood that. We made many mistakes in the management of the genocide because if we wanted to stop the genocide we could have talked to the Interahamwe leaders. It is where we would have put enough pressure; identify who is the leader and put enough pressure instead of discussing with the government which cannot give orders to the Interahamwe.
Did you ever personally interact with some of the interahamwe? How did that happen?
The Senegalese contingent was deployed in very key positions. We had one intelligence officer and the chief intelligence officer was Senegalese. He had been able, from time to time, to get in touch with the Interahamwe until he understood their structure.
One day, my friend who was in [Hôtel des] Mille Collines, Capt. Mbaye Diagne, planned to take all the Tutsi in Mille Collines to Amahoro stadium where we were going to hand them over to RPF, and then take all the dignitaries of the Hutu who were in Amahoro stadium to Mille Collines, the government side. We got an agreement on that and then we loaded the trucks from Mille Collines with everyone and then stopped at the gas station down the hill before you turn to go to the road to CND (currently commonly known as Sopetrad), the road where Mbaye Diagne was, later, killed.
They were blocked by the Interahamwe who unloaded the trucks and grouped people in different locations around, ready to kill them. I was in Meridien hotel where I had taken the laundry for the General [Roméo Dallaire, Canadian army officer who led the ill-fated UN peacekeeping mission (1993-94) in Rwanda].
I was his ADC. And I heard Mbaye Diagne calling [on satellite phone] and say, 'we are surrounded by the Interahamwe and they want to kill the people we are transporting.' I said to my friend, let's go. We drove from Meridien (Hotel). I saw a group of Interahamwe on the road and, they blocked us and asked, 'what are you going to do there?' and I said our friend called us and said he is blocked by Interahamwe.
They [taunted me and] said, 'what can you do?' I said, 'you know what, instead of killing one Senegalese, I want to give you the opportunity to have three Senegalese that you can kill.' They said, 'ah, it is what you want? So, go ahead'. I said yes, please, let us go ahead. When I arrived I found two Interahamwe surrounding Mbaye Diagne, putting a gun on his neck. And he was telling them, 'vous êtes des lâches, vous ne jamais tirer' [you are cowards, you never shoot]. I just pushed them all. I said, Mbaye Diagne, they are going to kill you! They are going to shoot you because they are drunk and don't know what they are doing.
From the previous interaction one of our officers had with the Interahamwe, he had been able to reach the chief of the Interahamwe immediately. I told him 'you have to come because this [the transfer of people to CND] was by an agreement with the UN. I said we must get the escort which is the three APCs with a machine gun.
The préfet also came, on the site, because we called him along with the member of the government. At the time, our whole team was led by a Colonel from logistics and not a Colonel from combat. My specialty was in cavalry. I am a tanker. I told him, 'Sir, give me permission for manning our three tanks otherwise we are all going to be killed.' I was a Captain. He looked at me and said, 'please.'
He gave me permission. I communicated on radio to the three tankers, and told them I am in charge. I said 'move!' [gestures showing how he positioned the tankers to a defensive position]. I said, 'if these people [Interahamwe] kill one person, kill every one of them! If we are going to lose the prisoners, we are going to lose the prisoners and those detaining the prisoners.' They were very happy for the order.
They pulled down [gestures showing how the soldiers in each tank readied for battle] in their tanks, locked the guns and aimed at the Interahamwe. I said, to the Colonel, we are ready! If they shoot, we are all going to die, so let's get ready! There is no chance that we get out of here. And then we called our colleagues.
And finally we discussed and decided to cancel the operation and resume another day. Everybody was brought back to the hotel safely. But some of the people had already been beaten and were bleeding; all to show you the determination the Interahamwe had. They would have killed these people. And this is when we really started understanding the strength of the Interahamwe.
After what you went through, at some point an order was given for the UN force to pull out. How did you feel?
In fact, what I was saying; that incident was after those events. It is why we were not many [peacekeepers] there. On the 7th [of April 1994] there were a lot of signs; weapons were circulating. We could not think about Genocide. We were thinking about a mass killing but not at the level we experienced.
And then, on the 7th they killed the Prime Minister Agathe [Uwilingiyimana]. On the same day they killed 10 Belgian soldiers. Their commander could not bear this and faced the public opinion of Belgium.
They put pressure on the UN and then they were pulling out. Belgium was supposed to protect everyone, all the UN agencies in Rwanda, because the protection force's mission is to protect UN property and personnel. When they said that they are pulling out, the UN department of security made an assessment and said, 'no, we can no longer stay because the protection force is not here and everyone who is staying here is under a threat and can be killed. So, from that perspective, everybody should pull out. We are going to have an agreement with the government and we will maintain only the necessary people.'
Necessary people to do what?
Just to monitor and report what is happening.
Meaning you become observers again?
We become observers but at least we could be able to escort the journalists and some stakeholders from around the world to show them what is happening. And to get the necessary pressure at international level to see what they can do. And then, in the meantime, when they said we pull out, we decreased from 2,500 to 250 [peacekeepers].
So, how did you feel about this order to pull out?
When they said they are pulling out, I felt really very uncomfortable that they are abandoning people in danger. I could not bear the betrayal. I really felt that we were betraying the people that felt confident when we arrived, felt confident when we started deploying, felt confident when we were patrolling and that felt confident when we investigated about some killings.
They felt that at least justice will be served. That's where we were, and then they [UN bosses] said that those who want to stay, it will be on a voluntary initiative because 'the UN can no longer protect you. You can be under UN as long as you are here but if something happens to you, it won't be the fault of the UN. You can be compensated and given everything but the UN wont bear the responsibility for maintaining you in an environment where it cannot protect you.'
Then the Senegalese contingent lost one member by accident during the move from Busogo to Kinihira and we were 29. Out of these 29, 25 stayed. This is why, when you look at what happened, in all the escort missions and everything, almost all Senegalese were there; the only contingent present in Rwanda during this period.
And then after that, when we resolved to stay, other Africans also stayed; the Togolese stayed, the Congolese from Brazzaville stayed, and the Ghanaian contingent was there also but they pulled back to Kigali to protect Amahoro stadium and also to be able to reinforce the Tunisians who were guarding Meridien and Mille Collines hotels. This is what happened. And it is why the Senegalese contingent saw a lot.
How many of your Senegalese colleagues are still alive today?
We lost many. In the meantime we are at least 15. During the last commemoration, two of them were present [in Kigali] and they are still following what is happening. Another one contacted me recently to say that if there is any movement to Kigali 'I would like to go there.'
We still have strong ties with the Rwandan people because we also have a lot of friends. We have this closeness, and even when I was working there [in Rwanda] I was almost killed because they [Interahamwe] thought that I was Tutsi.
How did it happen?
I had escorted one sister, a nun, to a house of nuns. I was parking the car at the gate of the sisters in Kacyiru. When I was disembarking, there were three people standing at the gate. One held a stick and one had a machete. When I was disembarking with the sister I heard them yell, 'inyenzi!' [Kinyarwanda for cockroach. The term was used to dehumanise members of the Tutsi ethnicity].
I did not say anything. Suddenly the group grew to eight. There was one with a gun, one with a pistol, three with a machete, three with sticks. Instead of going to my car, I went to them. I said I am not inyenzi. I am a Senegalese. You can notice that I am a Senegalese. Maybe you are about to make a big mistake.
I don't know what is your plan or what you intend to do but it should be clear! They said, 'but we know that RPF infiltrated all of you ... they are among you and they can wear the blue hats ... but at least now we can see you now that you are speaking.' I said, 'now that I am speaking and you know can I go?' They said I can go, and I said, 'thank you very much'.
What do you make of one of the biggest challenges Rwanda faces today; genocide denial and genocide ideology?
A lot of things happened. There is a narrative but as a military man I talk by facts. When I was in Rwanda, all those that I saw that were killed, and they are very many, had all one identity. They were Tutsi. At the beginning I could not talk about genocide but when we went up to the definition of it, we experienced genocide.
At some point we were in Kigali and we requested the municipality to remove all the dead bodies lying on the street during days and months, because they had killed so many people that they couldn't remove the bodies. At one road, we got them to remove dead bodies with huge dump trucks and then we got the municipality to open a mass grave on the road to Gitarama, from Kigali.
Every day, many trucks offloaded dead bodies. It happened for more than one week. This, I saw myself. And there is no way you can tell me no genocide was going on. And then also seeing people on these trucks sitting on the dead bodies and drinking beer while they are transporting dead bodies, I get very depressed to say these kinds of things because it was very sad to see this image. You cannot say this did not happen. I was the ADC of Gen [Roméo] Dallaire.
We went across the country. At some village, we saw cows and goats and nobody. I said, no, it was not possible how people cannot be here. And then we stopped, for curiosity, to look around. And then we saw one building which looked like a church. The church was full of bodies. They exterminated all [the people in] the village and put them in the church. Nothing to compare with happened in Gitarama or Gitega but the same scene, all in one church in a remote village.
Remember where that village is located?
Coming from Mulindi, it was really not far from Kigali. And the Senegalese contingent was [there] up to the 18th of June when France launched [Operation] Turquoise and we were forced to pull out and go back because Senegal was part of Turquoise just as Congo, Togo, and others.
So, we had to pull out because we could not be part of Turquoise and also be part of UNAMIR. When the killings started, Gen. Dallaire had hoped that maybe with a strong contingent [after the Belgians left] we could stop the killings. He approached Senegal for it to designate a battalion. I told Dallaire it was possible we can have a battalion here and they can stop this thing. And then we contacted the United States which was ready to provide equipment.
The battalion was to be equipped with the M113, an armored personnel carrier armed with a very heavy machine gun. I said, with this battalion, we can stop this. I told Dallaire I am ready to go as squadron commander with this battalion. But when we came to this decision we were already in mid-May. We started working on this and, really, I think it was advancing but sometimes we discussed with people who had another plan. France was planning to have Turquoise with Senegal, with Togo and others...
France wanted Senegal to be part of Turquoise? How would that fit in your plan?
Yes! Turquoise was launched by France! But they did not want to go alone. They took African countries like Senegal, Togo, and Guinea Bissau, to go with them. But how could Senegal send a battalion to stop the genocide while it is part of Turquoise? France was very strong in Africa and they had been able to reverse the decision. So, there was no way for us to succeed. Our plan was killed. And then we left on the 18th of June. And then Kigali was liberated on the 4th of July almost.
What do you think about the Hotel Rwanda film? Do you know what exactly happened at the hotel in 1994?
For the film, there are two untruths that I note; One; the evacuation of Mille Collines took place in May whereas the Belgians had left on April 14. It was made with the support of the Ghanaian battalion. Two; when the UN asked for the evacuation of the mission all who were mzungus had left except the staff of General Dallaire and the people who were not Europeans like the Bangladeshis and the Uruguayans, but especially the Africans: Senegal, Togo, Congo, Ghana and Tunisia.
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The movie has some scenes that are true. And the killings were almost organized that way. The problem is: who was, in this period, the savior and who was the saved? At one moment, all those who were mzungu were supposed to leave and it was very dangerous for them to stay.
And all mzungu was considered as Belgian because Belgium was considered to be behind the shooting of the plane. So, when we came to Mille Collines we had some agreement just as we did with Meridien, and Stade Amahoro, to raise the flag of the UN and make it a safe place for everyone.
Those we had been able to bring to safety were saved individually either by Capt Mbaye Diagne or saved by an accord we got by some friends to bring them in clandestinely or had been wise to run and get there.
The situation was so tense that if you left your house you could be killed because there was exchange of fire at any moment. In this situation, you cannot say somebody was heroic and able to go and save people without any cover. The one who got good cover was Capt Diagne because he was a member of the UN mission. He could move around with the UN car but even then, to take people and hide them at Hôtel des Mille Collines, he had to act wise.
It had to be a concealment operation because if it was discovered, these people would be killed. I was at headquarters with the Force Commander and I had the only working satellite telephone because I was his ADC.
AS liaison officer, Capt Diagne had a good sense of understanding and trust with many in the government because of the way he was behaving. He also had a good rapport with the Interahamwe because he understood that they were holding the power. So, he was driving in peace time and come and greets them at the check points and between two check points he would be asking 'where is the chief?' And sometimes he was interacting with the chief. What Mbaye did was load beer on his car, sometimes whisky, cigarettes, and sometimes, to some boys, he gave money. They got used to him.
Then they bacame less suspicious when he was driving around. But when he would drive [around], he was going for reconnaissance most of the time and it was where he was able to get people, from time to time, to say 'hello, how are you? Don't worry; I am coming this day, this time, to pick you'. And when they saw him driving around again, at night also, they [interahamwe and government troops] did not check his car. He was putting people on the car's floor and taking them to safety. It was the way he was operating until he was able to save around 600 people.
And, all his colleagues knew what he was doing. Right?
I was at headquarters. Every time he succeeded with an operation he told me. 'The target is safe'. Until one day he said 'target is dead.' And he was crying. What happened was that there was a lady and her daughter, and he was signaled that they are somewhere in Nyamirambo. They had been in hiding for a long time.
Mbaye managed to get through to them and assured them he would come back for them. Unfortunately, that day, he was followed by an interahamwe and when he left, they went back and decapitated the lady. When he came back he found the body in blood. And that night it was very hard to console him.
Another thing is, remember we had Senegalese at the intelligence liaison office for air regulation. The one who knew about planes coming in and going out was Senegalese. So, any time we had a group, or sensitive target, we coordinated with him. He could say 'I have a plane coming this time tomorrow' and Mbaye would drive 'the target' to the airport to make sure he can fly the target out of the country to Nairobi. This is how we operated most times.
Have you ever got in touch with some of the people you rescued?
No. I didn't until I got this testimony from a lady called Leatitita. I think it is Leatitia Murekatete. I got her testimony two weeks before the commemoration on April 7 and I was so surprised that she made this testimony because since 1994 I did not get in touch with her. She is part of the 49 people we saved the day of 7th April 1994. Leatitia was my neighbour. Her son would always come to my house through the metal fence in our wall partition and he was always crying.
We used to let the boy come by holding him over the fence but one day I said let's make a door for him in the fence so he doesn't need to go over the fence. This is how the idea of a 'door' in the fence started. When we came in January 1994, there was the African Cup of Nations and we were passionate football fans.
Her husband was a very good person and he had a parabolic antenna and then we could catch canal. They opened their living room and told neighbours to come watch the matches. And then, I said, instead of going out, I will cut a fence for us at the back of the house and from there we are going see the match and return home.
And I said to the lady that I think this back door will be good for us, you never know. Three months later, when Interahamwe came to kill them, we opened the door in the fence and got all of the family in our house.
