AFRICAN UNION

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE
AND
THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

(PART II – ANNEXES)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART II: ANNEXES

A.	Recommendations of Second ACDS Meeting	A-1 - A-10
B.	A History of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Existing Capacities ...	B-1 – B-7
C.	Strategic Level Management Structures	C-1 - C4
D.	Mission Level Structures	D-1 - D-4
E.	Models of Standby Arrangements	E-1 - E8
F.	UN Financial and Logistics Guidelines	F-1 - F-6
	Appx 1 - 2003 Standard Costs Manual Extract	1F-1
	Appx 2 - 2003 Standard Ratios Manual Extract	2F-1 – 2F-2
	Appx 3 - 2002 COE Manual Extract	3F-1
	Appx 4 - Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) Overview ...	4F-1 – 4F-2
G.	Sample Deployment Timelines	G-1 - G-3
	Appx 1 - Mission Deployment: DRAFT Milestones and Major Activities - UN HQ	1G-1 – 1G-3
	Appx 2 - Mission Deployment: DRAFT Timeline with Milestones and Major Activities – MISSION ...	2G-1 – 2G-2
H.	SHIRBRIG	H-1 - H-6
I.	Acronyms	I-1

PART II: ANNEXES TO POLICY FRAMEWORK PAPER

ANNEX A

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE ACDS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE CENTRAL ORGAN

15. THE CONCEPT OF AFRICAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

15.1 All Peace Support Operations in Africa should be conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration. This will enable the OAU to mobilize for action and to acquire UN support for the initiative.

15.2 The OAU should evolve a glossary of OAU peace operations terminologies to ensure common understanding.

15.3 Participation in OAU operations should be open to all OAU Member States.

15.4 The conflict situation should guide the level at which the OAU considers involvement. In an emergency situation, the OAU should undertake preliminary preventive action while preparing for more comprehensive action which may include the UN involvement. The emphasis here is for speed of action and deployment. As a principle, the OAU should take the first initiative in approaching UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an emergency in the continent. If the UN is unresponsive, the OAU must take preliminary action whilst continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from the world body.

15.5 The OAU concept for Peace Support Operations should be firmly linked to the operationalization of its Early Warning System including a network linking each of the Early Warning cells of the various sub-regional organizations in Africa.

15.6 All Peace Support Operations conducted by sub-regional organizations in Africa should be endorsed by the OAU. It must be noted that not all sub-regional organizations are in position to conduct Peace Support Operations.

15.7 Where the OAU deploys a peace operation, this should be an all-African force. In the event of a UN operation in Africa, the UN principle of universality should be respected. Where Africa provides the majority of troops, the Force Commander must be an African.

15.8 The UN should consult the OAU on the formulation of mandates, mission leadership and force composition when it deploys peace support operations in Africa.

15.9 While the recent trend has been to focus on the problems of intra-state conflict, OAU capacity must also be utilized in the event of a need to engage in Peace Support Operations to prevent or resolve inter-state conflicts.

16. PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

16.1 The selection of national contingents for participation in OAU Peace Support Operations should not pose a threat to mission success because of the real or perceived lack of impartiality of countries with a direct interest in the conflict.

16.2 Operational procedures for the planning and conduct of Peace Support Operations exist and are well documented at the level of the UN. The OAU should use these references and adapt them to unique continental and organizational factors.

16.3 While the OAU should adopt standard UN staff procedures for training and operations, it must also develop its own Standard Operating Procedures, as the structure of the two organizations is obviously not identical. These must be disseminated to Member States for use in training and preparation for peace operations.

16.4 OAU Member States, individually or as part of sub-regional organizations should supply the Conflict Management Division with the same data on strengths, tables of equipment, etc. as that which they provide to UN DPKO.

16.5 The OAU could earmark a brigade-sized contribution to standby arrangements from each of the five African sub-regions as a starting point, which could then be adjusted upwards or downwards

according to evolving circumstances. If the prevailing situation in a given sub-region does not allow for this, bilateral agreements should be reached with the countries of the region individually.

16.6 The OAU should identify about 500 trained military and civilian observers (100 from each sub-region) as an appropriate starting point for standby capacity.

16.7 The OAU should devise a standard structure for battalions, brigades, and perhaps even a division for future OAU deployments.

17. TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

17.1 Training should be conducted according to UN doctrine and standards, and should draw on the available training materials, training aids and courses available through the UN system. UN training manuals should be complemented by Africa specificity.

17.2 Member States should be encouraged to include basic training in the concept and conduct of Peace Support Operations as part of the training curriculum for all troops, individuals, units, and officers in staff colleges, as well as various civilian role players and the police. Such training should include International Humanitarian Law. Member States should be encouraged to use the expertise of international humanitarian organizations and agencies.

17.3 Centers of expertise for Peace Support Operations training should be established, which are capable of conducting research into training; formulating guidelines for training; producing common training syllabi; and conducting control and evaluation functions.

17.4 African training for Peace Support Operations should not be held hostage to the availability of foreign donated equipment. Africans should train with what they have available on inventory in their armed forces and adapt their concepts for the conduct of Peace Support Operations accordingly.

17.5 The OAU should conduct simulation exercises at the organizational level involving the humanitarian, military and political actors – once the Secretariat has been restructured.

17.6 Joint exercises should be organized under the auspices of the OAU at the sub-regional level, across the sub-regions and at the continental level.

17.7 The OAU should be involved in the planning of all exercises conducted at the sub-regional level.

17.8 An African (OAU) peacekeeping identity must be established through, for example, the use of OAU insignia, accouterments, etc. and the drafting of an OAU code of conduct for African peacekeepers. This would emphasize the importance of African unity over national identity.

17.9 Countries with military academies, war colleges and other military institutions of higher learning should be encouraged by the OAU to establish a chair of operations. This would not only develop the intellectual and conceptual capacity to deal with the complexity of modern Peace Support Operations, but would ensure a future supply of senior African officers with a thorough knowledge of the subject.

17.10 To enhance communication in Peace Support Operations, OAU Member States should be encouraged to introduce the teaching of one or other of the official languages of the OAU for officers.

17.11 While bilateral foreign training assistance cannot be prevented, all foreign training assistance for Peace Support Operations should be within the parameters and concepts of the UN and OAU and should be of general benefit to the entire region or sub-region.

18. **STRUCTURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

18.1 Taking cognizance of the process currently underway to restructure the OAU Secretariat, it is recommended that the proposed organizational framework should, within financial limitations, be capable of performing the following functions:

18.1.1 serving as the operational arm of the Secretary-General for all OAU field operations;

18.1.2 co-ordination of all African activities in the realm of Peace Support Operations with the UN system on the one hand, and with African sub-regional organizations on the other;

18.1.3 formulating policies and procedures, based on Central Organ decisions, for the establishment of new Peace Support Operations, and the effective functioning of ongoing operations;

18.1.4 securing, through negotiations with Member States, military units and equipment as well as other military, police and civilian personnel for participation in Peace Support Operations;

18.1.5 developing operational plans, methodologies and guidelines for multi-functional operations, including election-monitoring and humanitarian assistance;

18.1.6 undertaking contingency planning for possible new Peace Support Operations and related activities;

18.1.7 determining resource requirements for such operations;

18.1.8 providing logistic and administrative support for the operations in the field; and preparing guidelines, assistance, and co-ordination for Member States to train both civilian and military personnel for participation in Peace Support Operations.

18.2 In order to fulfill the above functions, it is further recommended that key elements of the structure of the OAU Conflict Management Division should include:

18.2.1 an information and early warning unit as well as an operations and training unit;

18.2.2 within the information and early warning unit, a 24-hour situation room and a policy analysis capacity which is linked to both the UN system and international organizations on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to all the regions of the continent through sub-regional organizations, research institutes, and other scholars and experts in civil society;

18.2.3 Within the operations and training section, a planning and operations capacity distinct from a conflict prevention and peace-building capacity;

18.2.4 Within the planning and operations section a distinct operations capacity and logistics;

18.2.5 Within the conflict prevention peace-building section, a distinct capacity for research and training, international law, and preventive diplomacy.

19. **COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS**

Based on the detailed deliberations, the Chiefs of Defense Staff recommend:

19.1 that, taking into consideration the Charter and the 1993 Cairo Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the OAU could undertake peace support operations excluding peace enforcement with a mandate from the Central Organ and/or within the framework of joint operations with the UN and Sub-Regional Organizations,

19.2 the adoption of the Command and Control functions for the Central Organ, the Secretary-General and the Force Commander as shown in the report,

19.3 that the Secretary-General should work out ROE and SOFA, for each specific Mission, whenever the OAU was to commit forces for peace support operations,

19.4 the adoption of the Field Operations Unit of the Secretariat as included in the report. This would, however, take into consideration the need to operate in peace time with limited personnel who may be beefed up in times of crisis through the secondment of personnel from Member States. Such secondment was also to cater for fair representation based on regional and linguistic consideration. Such secondment should be at the country's expense,

19.5 the staffing of the H.Q. Field Operations Unit should also include the use of voluntary staff or consultants on a short-term contract,

19.6 that troop contributing nations should only withdraw their forces from OAU Peace Support Operations through the OAU channel of communication. Such withdrawal must be made in a manner not to jeopardize operations,

19.7 the establishment of a communication capacity at the OAU Secretariat to provide communication links with Mission Areas and the early warning networks/sub-regional bodies,

19.8 the provision of simple communication structures and procedures to ensure inter-operability. This would include the provision of communication equipment by the OAU to link the Secretariat with Mission Headquarters, provision of communication equipment by a designated Member Country to link the Mission Headquarters with the contingent Headquarters, while the various contingents were to be responsible for their own communications,

19.9 that, strategic and operational planning for all OAU peace support operations be undertaken by the Secretary-General assisted by his Special Representative and the Force Commander respectively,

19.10 that the Secretariat be tasked to establish a stand-by system to be based on Member States' indication of peace support capabilities. These would include information on size and types of forces on stand-by and their general standards of training, equipment and state of readiness,

19.11 that, all external assistance aimed at reinforcing OAU Operations, or operations carried out on behalf of the OAU, should be effected through the OAU.

20. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

20.1 The responsibility for establishing a limited pre-deployment support capability should remain at the national level of Member States and be coordinated at the OAU level. In this regard, Member States would be required to periodically furnish the Secretariat of the OAU with information on the status of their preparedness and capacity to contribute towards OAU PSOs.

20.2 In its attempts to enhance and develop an integrated logistics system the OAU should harness its Member States available military, civil, political and diplomatic resources, as a holding measure while awaiting and

anticipating any other outside assistance, including that of the United Nations.

20.3 To ensure sustained logistical support throughout the duration of a given PSO, the Committee recommended the following:

20.3.1 the contingents should be self-sufficient for a limited and reasonable period, to be agreed before initial deployment which expenses should be refunded to allow the OAU to marshal the requisite resources for sustained operations;

20.3.2 The OAU should take cognizance of and make maximum use of locally available resources in all its PSOs;

20.3.3 In order to sustain its operations the OAU should engender the principles of economy of effort, cooperation, flexibility, foresight, simplicity and the ability to tailor its effort to the prevailing conditions peculiar to every given situation;

20.3.4 The Committee observed that compatibility and inter-operability are severely handicapped in OAU PSOs owing to lack of standardization of equipment, concepts and training. It therefore recommends that regular joint training and exchange programs be pursued vigorously at national, sub-regional, and regional and international levels, with the attendant political will;

20.3.5 That in the ongoing restructuring process of the OAU Secretariat, consideration be given to expanding the Military Unit to be headed by a sufficiently senior military officer;

20.3.6 In the OAU's negotiations on logistics and funding for African PSOs with the UN and other external Organizations, a team of military experts should be seconded and duly accredited, when necessary, to attend and represent the OAU position.

20.4 The Committee observed that in order for the OAU to be able to mobilize both internal and external resources from the UN and other donors in the right quantity and quality, at the right place, and at the right time, it should prioritize its requirements, and assert its position as the final arbiter regarding those requirements.

20.5 The Committee recommended that the OAU should establish uniform and commensurate compensation scales for loss of life, injury, equipment loss

and damage, and depreciation, based on the principle of equality for all forces.

21. **FUNDING**

21.1 Member States should be urged to make their contributions to the annual budget of the OAU in full and on time.

21.2 In addition, more efforts should be made to encourage member States to make direct voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund either in cash or in kind.

21.3 In order to enhance sub-regional and continental logistical capacity, Member States are urged to, even where such voluntary assistance is sourced through national bilateral means, optimize such assistance to enhance, the logistical capacity of the sub-region and the Continent.

21.4 To ensure the confidence of the UN and members of the international community, African PSOs mounted at the regional and sub-regional levels should demonstrate a high level of professionalism. This would include transparency, strict codes of conduct, accountability and efficient use of resources. Furthermore, there is need for an aggressive public relations and public awareness campaign aimed at informing all interested parties of the value, merits and peace dividend of PSOs undertaken by the OAU.

21.5 In that regard, it is highly recommended that the OAU launches an annual fund-raising week to be commemorated in all countries. Contributions can also be sought from the UN and other international organizations as well as multi-national companies, NGOs and corporate bodies. The policy organs of the OAU and Governments of Member States should be encouraged to consider the following as possible alternative sources of funding:

21.5.1 Exploring the possibility at the political level of increasing the contributions of Member States to the OAU's regular budget, or, alternatively, consider increasing the percentage of the budget that is dedicated to the Peace Fund;

21.5.2 Soliciting for individual donations in cash and in kind and involving business corporations;

21.5.3 Exploring the possibility of undertaking fund-raising activities for OAU peace support operations including the issuance of Commemorative Stamps by OAU Member States and other options such as the organization of soccer matches.

ANNEX B

A HISTORY OF THE OAU MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION (1993) AND EXISTING OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

1. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 25 May 1963, with the view to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2. To these ends, the Member States expressed their intent to co-ordinate and harmonise their general policies, especially co-operation in the fields of political and diplomatic; economic, including transport and communications; educational and cultural; health, sanitation and nutritional; scientific and technical; and last but not least defence and security.

3. Following the under-implementation of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, to settle all disputes among Member States by peaceful means, the Heads of State relied heavily on *ad hoc* committees in resolving African conflicts. As a matter of fact, the evolution of OAU peace support operations (PSO) started with its inception in 1963, when the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (OCCLA) was established, being responsible for organising and channelling diplomatic, financial, military and logistical support to African liberation movements, which were instrumental in securing independence from colonial rule, as well as from apartheid in South Africa.

4. In practice, though, the OAU's first generation peace and security agenda largely involved pacific interventions on the one hand, and peacekeeping operations on the other. Aiming at containing conflicts and preventing their escalation, pacific interventions, including ad hoc commissions, dealt with a wide range of issues, such as border and territorial claims, as well as intrastate conflicts. On balance, however, these interventions were hardly ever able to find lasting definitive solutions to the respective disputes.

5. Failing agreement on the structure of an inter-African force for the military aspects of conflict management, including ceasefire observation, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, the OAU occasionally undertook or

endorsed less complex ceasefire monitoring missions such as the Bamako Ceasefire Commission (1963), and one peacekeeping operation. Besides a few bilateral peacekeeping interventions in some Member States, the Pan-African peacekeeping force that operated in the Shaba Province of Congo (Kinshasa) in 1978-79 was truly the first OAU "first generation" peace support undertaking; followed by the Chadian operation (1979-82), which was also the only truly OAU peacekeeping venture of a complex nature.

6. The rather unsatisfactory record of the *ad hoc* mechanisms for intervention called for a reappraisal of OAU's first generation peace and security agenda, especially following the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, accompanied by global economic changes. These developments had the potential to marginalise the Continent, while the process of democratisation that was compelled by the new realities led to fratricidal intrastate conflicts, in which the UN (Security Council) showed less interest, responsibility and commitment towards their resolution. Against this background, SROs, particularly ECOWAS and SADC, increasingly adopted a tendency towards sub-regional intervention.

7. It was the combination of these realities that compelled the Organisation's Summit in 1990 to re-examine the OAU's security and peace agenda. It recognised the prevalence of destabilising conflicts that would seriously impede their collective and individual efforts to realise the Continent's political and socio-economic objectives, and pledged to work together to reduce the scourge of conflicts in Africa. The outcome of that Summit was the *"Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World"* by which they agreed to work together towards the peaceful and rapid resolution of all conflicts on the Continent. To this end, they adopted the Cairo Declaration of 1993 establishing the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, marking the beginning of the Organisation's second generation peace and security agenda, and reflecting its slow but relentless efforts at finding a dynamic and relevant role to deal with the prevailing situation of conflicts.

8. As part of its second generation peace efforts, the OAU Mechanism was instrumental in enabling the Organisation, through the Central Organ, the Secretary General and the Conflict Management Centre (CMC), to react more promptly and effectively to the numerous existing and new conflicts. It facilitated the active and prompt intervention of the OAU in a number of conflicts (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Liberia, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone; as well as the

Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute and conflict). In the field of peacekeeping, the Mechanism endowed the OAU with the capacity, though limited, to mount peacekeeping missions and operations in five countries, namely Rwanda (NMOG); Burundi (OMIB); Comoros (OMIC); DRC (JMC) and Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE).[1]

9. As a demonstration of its readiness to take risks and responsibility for increasing peace and security in Africa, the OAU was transformed into the African Union (AU) in Durban in 2002. Pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU), the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established, as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa, replaced the OAU Mechanism. Within the framework of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, the AU Commission is seized of the matter of establishing the African Standby Force (ASF), in accordance with the relevant provisions of the CAAU.

EXISTING OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

General

10. In general, African Member States have increasingly participated in UN peace operations and other Multinational Force (MNF) operations authorised by the UN. As of about 1999, 29 Member States were estimated to have supplied troops for more than one UN mission, in contrast with the limited participation previously.[2] In practice, it is fair to say that such participation has provided exposure and helped to build practical peacekeeping experience and expertise in national defence forces. However, such national experience has not necessarily provided Member States with the capability to undertake or participate in peacekeeping missions as single states or as sub-regional organisations, in spite of a clear political will on the part of Member States to do so.

AU Capability

11. As indicated earlier in the Introduction, within the framework of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993), the Organisation has undertaken eight limited observer missions in five countries, some on more than one occasion. The missions are:

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1 See Part IV.

2 Berman, Eric G., Sams, Katie E., *Peacekeeping Capacities of African Regional Organisations*, Conflict Security and Development, January 2002, p. 32. According to the Authors, African states have participated in all but 10 of the 54 UN PKOs that have been launched since 1948.

a. Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I, Rwanda, 1991-Jul 93, 57 MLOs, budget not known).

b. Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II, Rwanda, Aug-Oct 93, 70 MLOs, budget not known).

c. OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB, Dec 93-Jul 96, 47 MLOs, estimated budget of $1,136,345).

d. OAU Mission in Comoros I (OMIC I, Oct 97-May 98, 20 MLOs, estimated budget of $1,414,253, excluding repatriation bill of $40,700).

e. OAU Mission in Comoros II (OMIC II, Dec 01-Feb 02, 14 MLOs, estimated budget of $105,000).

f. OAU Mission in Comoros III (OMIC III, Mar-May 02, 30 MLOs and 9 technicians, estimated budget of $305,000).

g. Joint Monitoring Commission (DRC, Nov 99-Nov 00, 33 Neutral Investigators, and 10 JMC members, estimated budget of $3 million for first year, excluding $7.7 million for Facilitator).

h. OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE, Aug 00 to date, 13 MLOs and military staff and 21 civilian staff, estimated budget of about $3 million as of December 2002).

Sub-Regional Capabilities

12. Additionally, African SROs have undertaken operations and/or established security mechanisms to various degrees.[3] The major ones are:

a. **ECOWAS**. ECOWAS is the leading SRO in this respect and has undertaken 4 operations in Liberia (1991-98), Sierra Leone (1995-2000), and Guinea Bissau (1998-99) and currently in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-); an authorised deployment to the Guinea-Liberia border (2000) failed to operationalise. Further to its Protocols on Non Aggression (1978) and Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters (1981), ECOWAS revised its Treaty in 1993, and in 1999, established a formal Protocol on its conflict Mechanism, which is currently in various stages of implementation.

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[3] Berman and Sams, op. cit., p. 32. SROs have undertaken 17 (18 including Côte d'Ivoire) of the estimated 23 African-led missions to date.

b. **ANAD**. The Treaty of Non Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence has undertaken 2 operations in Burkina Faso and Mali; ANAD was integrated with ECOWAS in 2001.[4]

c. **SADC**. Coalitions of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Member States have undertaken 2 operations in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998. The Organisation had since 1996 created the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

d. **Other SROs**. Other SROs with no previous peacekeeping experience are in various stages of developing security structures:

(1) **ECCAS**. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) established its Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) in 1999. Further to this, on 17 June 2002, at Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the Organisation adopted the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Defence and Security of the Early Warning Mechanism of the region and of the Central African Multinational Force 2000.

(2) **EAC**. The East African Community (EAC) signed its MOU on Co-operation on Defence in 2001.

(3) **IGAD**. The Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) adopted the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in 2002. In addition, the Organisation has created a Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) purposely for the Sudan peace process, while the Somalia Monitoring Committee, established since October 2002, is to be expanded to include joint operations with the AU.

(4) **COMESA**. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA) has since 1999, developed a programme on Peace and Security, focussing on conflict prevention through diplomacy, as well as building the capacity of civil society, NGOs, the private sector and parliaments.

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[4] The *Accord de non-aggression et d'assistance en matière de defense*. It is unclear whether ANAD staff have yet been absorbed into ECOWAS Secretariat.

(5) **UMA**. Since the establishment of its Council of Common Defence, the Arab-Maghreb Union has never convened, but does undertake *ad hoc* humanitarian operations.

Summary of Critical Limitations

13. To date, it is assessed that AU peace support efforts have been affected critically by lack of funding to fully establish, equip and staff the relevant structures for mission planning and support, as well as to equip, deploy and sustain missions (see Chapter 5). While the six percent appropriations from the regular budget of the AU (about $1.8m)[5] was insufficient for the task in hand, external funding, which formed a larger portion of contributions, came in slowly and with conditions.

14. To some extent also, lack of co-ordination and harmonisation between the OAU Mechanism (1993) and other sub-regional security mechanisms did not help to synergise efforts. The limited peacekeeping scope[6] of the Mechanism, focussing primarily on the deployment of civilian and military observer and monitoring missions of limited scope and duration, was itself a limiting factor quite unrelated to the nature of African conflicts. The PSC Protocol has redressed this issue. Additionally, the UN's response was also at times limited.

15. In addition to funding and equipment issues, there are clear limitations in the level of expertise in multinational command and control functions at the brigade level and higher.

16 As in the case of the AU, SRO peace and security efforts are also critically affected by a deficit of financial, equipment and logistical resources, in addition to inadequate staffing of appropriate branches of staff at the Secretariats. The efforts have also been affected to some extent by lack of regional cohesion involving linguistic divide, lead nation crisis, duplication of effort, as well as by political inertia to substantially, if not fully, empower some

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[5] The regular budget is estimated at about $32m annually. The 6 percent is transferred into the Peace Fund irrespective of arrears of contributions by Member States.

[6] The primary objective of the Mechanism was 2-fold, namely: (1) *the anticipation and prevention of conflicts;* (2) and where conflicts have occurred, the undertaking of peacemaking and peace-building functions in order to facilitate their resolution. The scope of the Mechanism focused first on long-term peace-building, anticipatory actions and preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, failing which it was to be concerned with the mounting and deployment of civilian and military observer and monitoring missions of limited scope and duration, with the proviso that the UN Security Council had fundamental responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and stability.

of the structures. To a much larger extent, lack of regional cohesion has affected the efforts of SROs at establishing substantive security mechanisms.

17. AU/SRO capabilities are yet to meet the standards set by the Report and Recommendations of the Brahimi Panel. This raises challenges that may be addressed through AU/SRO collaborative and consultative arrangements, as well as with the UN and the international community.

18. While there is clear support for African goals, the international community must have confidence that support provided is used in the most effective and efficient manner. On its part, therefore, the AU should demonstrate convincing commitment to collaborative regional security mechanisms, including the establishment of viable structures for the strategic level management of peace operations.

ANNEX C

STRATEGIC LEVEL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

Scenarios 1 & 2 Political and Very Small Observer Mission



Notes:
1. This structure and staffing was provided by PSC staff and is not negotiable. The structure and staffing were not analyzed by the consultancy team.
2. To assist in mission establishment, UN would provide small Planning Coordination and Advisory Team for up to 3 months.
3. Conflict Management Division is responsible for the continuum from Prevention to Post Conflict Peace Building.

Scenario 3 Observer Mission



Notes:
1. Assumes MOU for UN staff reinforcement for up to 3 months while AU calls out roster and recruits.
2. Conflict Management Division is responsible for the continuum from Prevention to Post Conflict Peace Building.
3. Figures based on one observer mission.
4. Logistics Sect includes staff for Logistics depot, current log ops, log plans, contract management, transport (air & surface), supply, medical and engineering.

Scenario 4 Brigade Group Size Traditional Peacekeeping Mission (includes Standby Brigade Group)



Notes:

1. Conflict Management Division is responsible for the continuum from Prevention to Post Conflict Peace Building.
2. Figures based on one mission using a brigade size force and including observers. This could be a traditional mission or a complex mission where only a military component was initially required or feasible, e.g. where the security situation or the AU plan did not foresee large civilian components. This might be the case where the ASF was stabilizing the situation to facilitate deployment of a UN mission.
3. Logistics Sect includes staff for current log ops, log plans, contract management, transport (air & surface), supply, medical & engineering.
4. Standby High Readiness Brigade Group HQ Coy/Support Unit will also assist Training and Logistics Base.
5. Training and Logistics base would include staff on standby that would help to certify units as being operationally deployable.
6. Based on structure provided by AU. Could be amended to suit Sub-Regions by reducing the Conflict Management Division.

Scenario 5 Independent Multidimensional Mission



Notes:
1. Conflict Management Division is responsible for the continuum from Prevention to Post Conflict Peace Building.
2. Figures based on one complex mission and one observer mission.
3. Logistics Sect includes staff for current log ops, log plans, contract management, transport (air & surface), supply, medical & engineering.
4. Includes provision for a police component.

ANNEX D

MISSION LEVEL STRUCTURES

Mission Structures - Scenario 2 Small AU Observer Mission



Mission Structure - Scenario 3 Standalone Observer Mission



Mission Structure - Scenario 4 Brigade Level Traditional Mission



Note: Does not include locally employed staff.

Mission Structure - Scenario 5 Complex Multidimensional Mission



Note: Does not include locally employed staff.

ANNEX E

MODELS OF STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS

1. The Panel considers that there are numerous examples of standby arrangement systems both within and external to the UN System that could inform AU efforts at operationalization of the ASF. This Part therefore provides an overview of the existing systems, in order to facilitate an understanding of key aspects and modifications that could be adopted by the AU System.

UN Standby Arrangements System

2. The UN operates on a target of establishing a "traditional" peacekeeping mission within 30 days and a "complex" mission in 90 days. A traditional mission is one that is largely military in nature and typically involves deployment in response to inter-state conflict, where the belligerents are Member States who have signed a ceasefire or a peace agreement. A complex mission is often characterised by conflict that is intra-state in nature and demands a multidimensional field response by the UN. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) uses two standby systems:

a. The UNSAS caters for military and civilian police capability that is provided by Member States. Military and civilian police aspects are managed by the Military Division and Civilian Police Divisions respectively.

b. The Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) concept is used by DPKO's Office of Mission Support (OMS) to rapidly establish civilian elements of a new mission headquarters. This uses current UN staff at UN New York and in DPKO field missions who would deploy at 14 days notice and remain in the mission area for up to six months. DPKO also maintains a roster of individual civilians with qualifications that may be recruited at relatively short notice for longer-term service in field missions. These would replace individuals deployed as part of the RDT as soon as is possible.

3. The UN also has a mechanism to obtain significant funds (up to $50 million), prior to a Security Council Mandate. This significantly improves the Organisation's ability to deploy rapidly, as contracts can be established and procurement can commence well before a mission needs to deploy.

4. In addition, the UN maintains significant amounts of materiel to the value of $140 million as part of its Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) in its Logistics

Base (UNLB) at Brindisi, Italy. By end June 2003 the base will have the capacity to deploy stocks to support up to one complex mission within the 90-day time frame. The UN has confirmed that these are only available for UN commanded missions. Further details on SDS are at Appendix 4 to Annex G.

Military Aspects of UNSAS

5. **UNSAS**. Details of military aspects of UNSAS are contained in the UNSAS Military Handbook, of which a brief explanation is contained in this F. A copy of the Handbook has been handed over to the PSD. In brief the system comprises three components:

a. Standby Arrangements for Formed Units.
b. An On-Call list.
c. Equipment.

6. **Standby Arrangements for Formed Units**. This comprises varying levels of increasing participation in the system that may be made available by a Member State to UN PSO. Levels 1-3 provide broad information regarding what may be made available. At Level 3 an MOU is signed, but it does not define capability in a level of detail that would be necessary to deploy a unit. In addition, information is not verifiable. The level with the most utility is the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL), which seeks to speed deployment times by obtaining detailed information from a Member State about a unit that may be made available at short notice, and by providing information to the Member State as to exactly what is required and the amount of reimbursement that can be expected. At this Level, the UN and the Member State exchange information to the degree that a detailed MOU for the capability that may be deployed is drafted (but not signed). The MOU details personnel, Contingent Owned Equipment (COE), and self-sustainment capacity. This Level may involve visits to a Member State by a DPKO staff assistance team in order to verify the equipment pledged, the training of personnel, and the level of self-sustainment. The Copenhagen-based Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG – detailed later) has been pledged to UNSAS, and parts of the Brigade are negotiating membership of the RDL.

7. **An On Call List**. This involves 154 posts in a model Force HQ on which Member States can bid to establish the HQ of a new mission. Member States were reluctant to provide names of individuals, while they were initially sought by the UN; they are now not required. The List involves three groups:

a. **Group 1**. Group 1 involves bids against nine posts on seven days notice to move. It can either deploy to UN HQ to assist in planning prior to deployment, or deploy directly to a concentration area, or to a mission.

b. **Group 2**. Group 2 involves bids against the remaining 145 Force HQ posts on 14 days notice to move to a concentration area or directly to a mission.

c. **Group 3**. Group 3 involves individuals that can be used as UN Military Observers (UNMO), Staff Officers and Military Experts on mission, already pledged by Member States in UNSAS. Staff officers at this level will be used as replacements in an existing mission HQ.

The entire staff of the HQ of SHIRBRIG is pledged to Groups 1 and 2 of the On Call List.

8. **Equipment**. UNSAS can be used to link equipment from one Member State or organisation with personnel or units from another. Until recently, this has been a little used mechanism. However, DPKO currently has a project to link Level 2 hospitals donated by Sweden with various regional organisations. Details are contained in the UNSAS Handbook.

9. **Analysis and Comment**.

a. The primary purpose of UNSAS is to ascertain potential availability of capability by Member State, and to support rapid deployment. DPKO staff advise that, even in their situation with advance funding and strategic stocks available, the two factors that slow deployment of the bulk of their missions, i.e. the military component, are: (1) gaining Member State decision to deploy, and (2) obtaining sufficient detail of the capability to be moved to allow an MOU to be signed and movement planners to complete their tasks. Obtaining strategic lift, particularly aircraft, is not a significant factor in delay, as the UN uses civilian contract. The UN is considering abolishing Levels 1-3 of the System as far as formed units are concerned. Even if they are retained, minimal staff effort will be devoted to support them, the underlying reason being that they do not actually support rapid deployment. In some cases, DPKO has the impression that Member States are merely making a political statement in joining the System at these Levels. In addition the UN is unable to verify that the capability pledged actually exists or, if it exists, whether it meets UN standards. DPKO intends to focus effort on the RDL because it has the potential to overcome some of the technical (but not political decision) impediments to rapid deployment.

b. In addition to its utility in supporting rapid deployment, the RDL concept may be particularly useful in the context of the ASF, as it enables those managing the standby system to determine shortfalls. These can then be linked to external support. For non-UN missions this can include donor support. For UN missions, in some cases the shortfall can be linked to the possibility of using SDS held in Brindisi. For this reason, as well as to meet the stated goal of being compatible with the UN, if an RDL type mechanism is used by the ASF, it should be linked to UNSAS. To be effective Member States joining this type of system must be transparent regarding their capability, in particular, their shortfalls.

c. A major problem with the On Call List concept, particularly when it seeks to deploy coherent HQ capacity in a timely manner, is the lack of names. Because of this, guaranteed training is problematic. It is also unlikely individuals will have met one another, let alone worked together, prior to call out. This means that valuable time will be spent at the critical early stages of start up of a mission in establishing this coherence and educating individuals on the UN and the specific mission circumstances. Lack of names also precludes simple, but important, administrative preparation, such as vaccinations. While the List can provide reinforcement to DPKO planning capacity, this is limited in time and quantity, as the primary focus of the List is establishment of a mission HQ. It is conceivable that individuals on Group 3 of the list could be used to reinforce DPKO, but names and curriculum vitae would be required to ensure that they possessed the proper qualifications and experience.

d. A version of the On Call List concept may be useful in an African context in two areas. It could be used to reinforce the limited number of military staff in African regional and sub-regional organisations. It could also be used in the same manner as the UN system—to establish the military element of the HQ of a new mission. Its use would only really be optimised, however, if names and curriculum vitae were available. This would allow selection against qualifications and experience, as well as some training to take place (if funding were available).

e. The mechanism to link equipment from one nation with potential troop contributors from another may be of some utility to the ASF. It would be most useful if linked to an RDL concept, particularly as it would involve identification of shortfalls.

10. **UN Deployment Timelines**. UN deployment timelines may be a useful guideline when considering the time required by the ASF to deploy to a

mission. A sample timeline is shown at Annex H. A key point is that substantial activity occurs well before a UN Security Council Resolution providing a Mandate.

The SHIRBRIG Model

11. Details concerning the Copenhagen based SHIRBRIG are at Annex I. In short, while not a UN funded entity, it is a grouping of Member States that have pledged capability to a standby brigade structure for use by the UN in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The entity is the sole "coherent brigade group", as mentioned in the Brahimi Report, to be made available to the UN. The key components of the concept are:

a. A small permanent Planning Element (PLANELM) of 15 staff officers provided on a gratis basis by SHIRBRIG members. This PLANELM is based at Høvelte barracks near Copenhagen. Administrative support, including 10 staff assistance, is provided by Denmark. SHIRBRIG has an operating annual operating budget of approximately $440,000, allocated on an equal basis against those providing staff to the PLANELM. The entire PLANELM is nominated as part of Group 1 of the UNSAS On Call List.

b. Named individuals on call in Member States to provide the remaining brigade HQ staff. These are termed the Non-Permanent Staff, and are called together with the planning element at least twice per year for staff training and command post exercises. Travel for these activities is a Member State responsibility.

c. Identified units on standby in Member States, which are referred to as the Force Pool. Units must meet UN standards as regards equipment and self-sustainment. Individuals from the units attend conferences and command post exercises in Copenhagen and other locations. Travel for these activities is a Member State responsibility.

12. Direction to the arrangement is provided by a SHIRBRIG Steering Committee, involving representatives from Capitals that meet at least three times per annum. The Chair of the Steering Committee rotates annually, and is currently held by Canada.

13. A SHIRBRIG Contact Group comprising Permanent Representatives to the UN in New York, or their staff, also provides additional guidance to the body. The Chair of the Contact Group is held by the same Member State as the Chair of the Steering Committee.

14. Membership in SHIRBRIG is regulated through a series of MOUs. The group accepts Member States as observers, Senegal being the sole African observer. SHIRBRIG has also announced that it will accept visits and provide on the job experience for staff officers from other Member States or entities considering establishing similar arrangements. The UN is examining sources of funding for this, particularly for African Member States

15. **Analysis and Comment**.

a. The key characteristic of the SHIRBRIG concept that makes it of utility to the UN is that it is a coherent body with officers that are familiar with the UN System and with key DPKO staff. The PLANELM is viewed as being of particular utility as it is a full time staff with no other function than to prepare for UN missions. The UN has started using it to assist in mission level planning. Recently, officers from the PLANELM have also assisted ECOWAS in planning for operations in Côte d'Ivoire; this support was brokered by DPKO.

b. The SHIRBRIG concept acts as a very good model for the sub-regional standby brigade groups recommended by the ACDS and endorsed by African Member States. In this respect, the indicative organisational structures and scheme of management of the SHIRBRIG, including its legal framework and training, could well influence and guide the operationalization of the ASF and other SROs. The arrangement would need to be modified, however, to take into account the realities of the African situation, particularly as regards equipment and sustainment. It could also be linked to the RDL concept outlined earlier and to an On Call List to reinforce the military staff in the HQ of AU and SROs. In this context a permanent Planning Element staff could assist in strategic level planning in the AU/SRO prior to deployment of a brigade and while the On Call list was being activated.

ECOWAS

16. ECOWAS is the only African SRO that has, to any significant extent, developed military standby arrangements, though primarily for formed units and using a model similar to Levels 1-3 of UNSAS. HQ capacity for the ECOWAS Secretariat and for a field HQ do not exist but are being developed.

17. **Analysis and Comment**. The ECOWAS mechanism suffers from the same problem as Levels 1 to 3 of UNSAS. There is no verification that a capability exists or, if it does exist, its level of equipment, training or

sustainability. ECOWAS is advised that in time, a skeleton ECOMOG HQ, on behalf of the ECOWAS Secretariat would, as standard practice, periodically review the preparedness of each potential troop contributor, including composite elements, to meet the provisions of the relevant MOU on training and equipment requirements; those that do not meet requirements may not deploy. Clearly, this underlines the need for Member States' co-operation and transparency mentioned elsewhere in the Report.

European and NATO Standby Systems

18. Large regional organisations and military alliances such as the European Union (EU) and NATO also possess standby systems. A key aspect of both of these Organisations is that they do not rely on external support and possess sophisticated equipment and capabilities, some of which is designed for war-fighting. To varying degrees, they possess large standing military staffs at the strategic and operational levels; for example, the EU Military Staff comprises over 150 individuals.

19. To a degree, NATO and EU standby systems are in competition for resources with the UNSAS. In addition, the organisations do not share standby information with the UN.

20. **Analysis and Comment**. For various reasons, not the least of which is finance, similar systems are not realistic in the existing African context. Given the stated African goals, the problem of resource competition with the UN in standby arrangements, should not be repeated in the operationalization of the ASF.

Lead Nation Partnerships for Composite Units and Formations

21. Realistically, ECOMOG's experiences and, indeed, other sub-regional experiences, particularly in Central and Southern Africa, point to the indispensability of lead nations in certain scenarios. Lead nations in these contexts provided the economic and political locomotive power to propel and sustain costly interventions.[7] Such a concept of partnerships was recommended by the Brahimi Panel. Indeed, it was exemplified by the composite Canada-Netherlands contingent that featured in UNMEE. In principle, by pooling resources, less resourced and endowed countries, or those with considerable

[7] With or without regional consensus, Nigeria bore over 70% of the collective manpower, logistical and financial burden of ECOWAS's interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the process, the cohesion of ECOWAS was ruptured owing to apprehensions of Nigerian hegemony in the region. Similarly, the lack of consensus on SADC intervention in Lesotho (1998) and DRC in the same year also spelled further strategic conflicts in the SADC and IGAD regions.

commitments internally and elsewhere, could still provide self-sustaining contingents.

22. It is also pertinent to point out that some of the indiscriminate and uncoordinated efforts of lead nations engendered regional polarisation and disharmony that undermined regional cohesion and synergy and, to a large extent, compromised effective regional efforts. A syndrome of "coalitions of the willing and able" *[cowiables]* goes contrary to the spirit and letter of collective burden sharing and simply defeats the view that collective security arrangements should be supported by collective burden-sharing, which is less burdensome. Nonetheless, *cowiable* partnerships within and without SROs, recommend itself to sub-regions in which progress towards their own security protocols and mechanisms face daunting challenges and may take a considerable time to realise. In such sub-regions, lead nations may indeed provide the magnet to pull together a number of regional and other countries eventually as a nucleus for SRO standby brigades.

Single Nation Participation

23. In addition to the slow progress towards the establishment of security mechanisms in some SROs, there may be circumstances, political or otherwise, when some Member States may wish to contribute troops directly to an ASF operation. Even though such participation will be outside of the proposed SRO standby brigade arrangement, it would not necessarily undermine the integrity of the PSC and the activities of the ASF. Indeed, it may well be that such Member States may be seen to be politically neutral to the conflict, while the contingents they contribute may hold the balance of peace in a polarised mission. As long as such contingents meet the relevant indicative criteria and standards for participation in ASF operations, they should be included in the overall framework of the arrangement.

24. **Comment**. On the whole, Member States, especially in sub-regions lagging behind in efforts towards the establishment and/or operationalization of security protocols and mechanisms, should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the ASF and the UNSAS. They should form coherent coalitions of brigade-size forces, ready for effective deployment within appropriate states of readiness for ASF missions and operations. Additionally, Member States that wish to participate directly in the ASF, for political and other technical reasons, should be supported.

ANNEX F

UN FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICS GUIDELINES

1. GENERAL.

a. There is a direct link between logistics factors and the budgetary / financial requirements to support peace operations. The linkage between these aspects is such that this process must result in a consultative process as both areas impact on the other. To reach the final level of acceptable logistics support available within realistic financial support arrangements requires a series of exchanges of information between the staff within these respective parts of the organization. Only once these respective levels have been firmly identified can the actual decision be made on whether the proposed peace operation is realistic because it is supportable. If the proposed mission cannot be supported logistically and financially then the deployment should not go forward.

b. The logistics requirements to support a peace operation will vary as each member state may have its own standards for what is considered "acceptable" as a consumption rate or a stock level of supplies that will be maintained or the requirements for acceptable living conditions for the participants in the area of operations (whether military or civilian).

c. The financial processes used to support peace operations will ultimately be based on the specific financial rules and related standards of the central organization (the AU) and the member states. A key role in this process will be the determination of standard costs, rates of reimbursement and the ratios being used in the computation of the acceptable rates to be used in this process. This allows both planners and operators to work from a standard baseline. The UN has developed a number of reference documents, which may be of great value for any organization setting up similar operations as those that have been previously conducted by the UN. These documents are the result of extensive research and analysis of the data created over the years of UN peacekeeping operations. While any organization may determine the rates or percentages used by the UN are not in line with what the specific organization may wish to use, they provide a very thorough base line with the key areas already identified for which a determination of applicability can be made. Three of the key documents are discussed below and samples of the information contained in some of them are attached at the separate appendices to this Annex. These documents have been especially useful in the UN budgeting process as they are based on data accepted by the member states for use by the Organization.

d. In order to standardize the process it is recommended that the AU adopt these documents in principle as a baseline and change the specific rates to better fit the needs of the AU and its members. These "AU Documents" then accepted by its member states as the baseline for logistics planning, budgetary purposes, and computation for reimbursement.

2. UN STANDARD COSTS MANUAL

a. The complexity of demands placed upon the United Nations, in a rapidly evolving global context, has resulted in the need for a more cohesive and integrated approach to the planning and implementation of UN peace operations. With the objective of re-engineering the United Nations approach to budget preparation; there exists a need for a strategic data model which will serve as a planning document for start-up operations and existing missions. The data model will concentrate on the analysis of substantive needs in order to be able to budget estimated financial requirements. It will seek to justify, rather than explain, the translation of data into operational requirements and will therefore form the basis of the resource requirement submission used by technical survey teams and Chief Administrative Officers for justification of needs.

b. The Standard Cost Manual has been in use since January 1994 and is being made available to Member States in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 49/233 dated 23 December 1994. This manual represents one of the primary tools in the budget process through the application of standard cost rates. The Standard Cost Manual identifies a uniform basis for budgeting and financial management that will promote the consistency, credibility, and transparency of the budgeting process. Items are divided into functional categories, and identified by both their technical specifications and unit price. A detailed description of major items of equipment, including specification of size, capacity, range and utility, is provided in the Annexes. Revisions to the rates are planned every twelve months, the period corresponding to that of the mid-year budget cycle. A sample of the data in the Standard Cost Manual is found attached at Appendix 1.

c. Standard costs have been derived from the following sources:

(1) Reimbursement of pay and allowances to troop-contributing countries is based on the following: General Assembly document: A/C.5/55/47 dated 26 July 2001, GA resolution 55/274 of 14 June 2001, GA resolution 45/258 dated 3 May 1991, Secretary-General's Report A/45/582 (para. 3 & 6), dated 10 October 1990, GA resolutions 42/224 dated 21 December 1987, 35/44 dated 1

December 1980, 32/416 dated 2 December 1977 and the Report of the Fifth Committee A/9825/Add.1 dated 29 November 1974.

(2) Reimbursement for the use of contingent-owned equipment is based on the following General Assembly documents: GA resolution 55/274 dated 14 June 2001, GA resolution 50/222 dated 10 May 1996, A/50/887 dated 6 March 1996, A/50/807 dated 8 December 1995, A/C.5/49/70 dated 20 July 1995, and A/C.5/49/66 dated 2 May 1995. The new rates came into effect on 1 July 2001 and apply to all new missions starting on or after that date. For missions that were activated prior to 1 July 1996, troop-contributing-countries have the option to adopt these new rates or to be reimbursed under the previous scheme.

(3) Reimbursement for death and disability in respect of contingent personnel is made in accordance with GA resolution 52/177 of 18 December 1997.

(4) Costs in respect of international civilian personnel (salaries, common staff costs and staff assessment) are based on the Standard Salary Costs prepared by the Office of Program Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA) and updated on a yearly basis. Local salary and related costs are based on local surveys carried out by local UNDP offices.

(5) Travel Costs are based on figures supplied by the United Nations Travel Unit.

(6) Vehicles - the rates for vehicles are based on purchase orders obtained from the Procurement Division (PD).

(7) Air Operations - the figures are based on the last twelve month’s record of contracts entered into by PD.

(8) Naval Operations - rates are based on purchase orders from PD.

(9) Communications - The figures are based on an average of the last 12 months purchase orders. Satellite communication costs per minute usage vary depending on the location of the mission and availability of satellite coverage and are based on scale rates invoiced by satellite companies.

(10) Accommodation Equipment - rates are based on contracts awarded during the last 12 to 24 months.

(11) Other Equipment - rates are based on catalogue prices and latest purchase orders.

(12) Data Processing Equipment - Prices are based on the previous 12 months purchase orders. It should be noted that in this area variations from the standard can occur since the technology and prices change rapidly, additionally costs also depend on where the procurement takes place.

3. UN 2003 STANDARD RATIOS MANUAL. This document should be used in conjugation with the other manuals listed in the Annex. The value of this document is to help establish the resource requirements once the basic composition of the mission is identified.

4. UN 2002 CONTINGENT OWNED EQUIPMENT (COE) MANUAL. The COE manual is discussed else where in the document and is now readily available to member states. The basic principles of this system are simplicity, accountability, financial and management control. This manual and the system it is based on provide a guide for organization and determining the responsibilities of the central organization (in this case the AU) and those of the TCC as well as providing a mechanism for determining rates of reimbursement. A key aspect of this system is a clear MOU between the organization and the TCC including a process to verify the agreements contained in the MOU have in fact been met by all parties. While the rates of reimbursement, consumption or overall requirements reflected in the UN COE manual may not be within the thresholds considered acceptable for AU peacekeeping operations the COE manual certainly provides another example of a base document which contains valuable information based on many peacekeeping missions conducted by the UN and built on those lessons learned which can be used by another organization to assist in the establishment of acceptable standards.

5. UN CLAIMS AND DISABILITY.

a. The General Assembly, in its resolution 51/218E of 17 June 1997, established uniform and standardized rates of payment as well as a maximum reimbursable amount of US$50,000 for death and disability sustained by troops in the service of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Report of the Secretary-General (A/52/369 of 17 September 1997) outlined the implementation arrangements and procedures including the documents required for submission of death and disability claims for military contingents

in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in respect of death or disability incidents occurring on or after 1 July 1997. The General Assembly, in its resolution 52/177 of 18 December 1997, authorized the Secretary-General to implement the administrative and payment arrangements and procedures contained in that Report. The guidelines published by the UN offer more detailed submission requirements for these claims. A determination by the AU should be made on the same issue.

b. The issue of claims and disability requires careful consideration, as this can be an issue in areas other then that of personal injury and death of individuals. In those instances where equipment is supplied by one country and used by a different contingent, in the event of an accident which would result in possible claims for injury or death it should be reviewed in light of the trend to have this type of situation (equipment of one country used by another) existing in the field in more frequency than in the past.

6. **UN STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT STOCKS (SDS).** The lack of a rapid deployment capability has been repeatedly identified as a major weakness in United Nations peacekeeping operations. As a result, the Organization has often missed opportunities to provide effective support in the critical initial phase of such operations. In its report (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations addressed this weakness and recommended the development of a capability for the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions within 30 or 90 days (30 days for a traditional mission and 90 days for a complex mission). The concept was further expanded into a practical framework as presented in the Report of the Secretary General: The Concept of Strategic Deployment Stocks and Its Implementation. (A/56/870 dated 14 March 2002). A brief description of the Strategic Deployment Stock Concept, which is now a cornerstone for the UN's Rapid Deployment Strategy, is contained at Appendix 4. The establishment and management of this SDS at the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy, may provide valuable lessons learned which could be applied to the establishment of MLDs to support the ASF, if this concept is adopted.

7. **DOCUMENT COPIES**. Complete electronic copies of the documents in the appendices 1 – 3 listed below have been handed over to the AU with this report. The complete manuals are also available from UN Headquarters in New York.

APPENDICES:

1. 2003 Standard Costs Manual Extract.
2. 2003 Standard Ratios Manual Extract.
3. 2002 COE Manual Extract.
4. Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) Overview.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F

2003 STANDARD COSTS MANUAL EXTRACT

Objective of Expenditure	Effective Date	Usage	Standard Cost	Remarks
Premises/Accommodation 4.00 Prefabricated Hard-Wall Accommodation Ablution Unit, Container, 20 ft				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	01/07/2000	Item	10,000.00	Up to 30 persons
Attached Ablutions (knocked down) for 26 sq.m. prefab buildings				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	08/08/2002	Item	1,200.00	
Containerized Kitchen/Dining Unit for 100 man				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	01/07/2000	Item	150,000.00	Without power supply, with 6 month supply of chemicals and detergents
Containerized Kitchen/Dining Unit for 250 man				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	08/08/2002	Item	195,000.00	With 6 month supply of chemicals and detergents
Containerized Kitchen/Dining Unit for 50 man				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	01/07/2001	Item	65,000.00	With 6 month supply of chemicals and detergents
Containerized Kitchen/Dining Unit for 500 man				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	01/07/2001	Item	285,000.00	With 6 month supply of chemicals and detergents
High Security Cashier's Container 20 ft container size (size A)				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	08/08/2002	Item	25,000.00	Optional safe $4,600
High Security Cashier's Container half 20 ft container size (size B)				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	08/08/2002	Item	20,000.00	Optional safe $4,600
Office/Living 21 sq.m. "Knocked down" configuration – Prefab				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	08/08/2002	Item	4,600.00	With one A/C and sea container for packing
Office/Living 26 sq.m. "Knocked down" with double glazed windows based on houses of 3 modules				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	08/08/2002	Item	3,700.00	With one A/C (not split A/C) and Container for packing
Office/Living 26 sq.m. "Knocked down" with double glazed windows based on houses of 6 modules				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	08/08/2002	Item	3,650.00	With one A/C (not split A/C) and container for packing
Office/Living "flat-packed containers, 20ft				
4208 Premises/Accommodation	08/08/2002	Item	3,820.00	With one furniture package and one A/C unit

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX F

2003 STANDARD RATIOS MANUAL EXTRACT

Object of Expenditure	Mission Specific	Standard Ratio or %	Standard Dollar Rate	Technical specifications & comments
Other EDP requirements				
- File server	-	**4:100**	**350**	- servers/persons
LAN networking components				- per workstation
UPS, 600 VA		**1:1**		- per workstation
UPS, 2000 VA		**1:1**		- per server
ID card system		**1:250**		- unit/persons
Administrative systems		**1:1**		- per mission
Computer software license		**1:1**		- 100% of computers
Lotus Notes		**1:1**		- 100% of desktop computers
PC Workshop	**x**			
Generators	**x**	**1:1.5**		- KVA per person
Generators spare parts				- 12.5 % of acquisitin cost, for new generators
Generators spare parts				- 20% of acquisition cost, for used generators
Observation equipment	**x**	**1:1**		- to be determined by outpost
Petrol tanks plus metering equipment	**x**			- to be determined by outpost
Water and septic tanks	**x**			
Medical and dental equipment	**x**			
Accommodation equipment		**1:1**		- $1,000 per person in Un provided accommodation
Airconditioning	**x**	**1:1**		- $500 per person in Un provided accommodation
Miscellanerous equipment	**x**			- incl. Cameras, scales, fans, lamps, etc.
Field defense equipment	**x**			- to be determined (type, quantity required for outposts
Security equipment	**x**			- incl. X-ray machines (walk-in, luggage, surveillance equipment, metal detectors
Water purification equipment	**x**			
Refrigeration equipment		**1:1**		- $500 per person for staff in offices and UN provided accommodation
Spare parts repairs and maintenance				- 10% annum of acquisitiion cost of all equipment, old equipment/s of other missions 15-18%
Freight				- 15 of total cost of purchased other equipment
10. Supplies and Services				
a) Miscellenaeous services				
Exernal audit	**x**		**17**	- cost for biennium provided by Secretary of Board of Auditors
Conractual services	**x**		**190**	- haircut, laundry for contingents at $12 +$5 postage per person/month; logistics support contract is mission specific

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Object of Expenditure	Mission Specific	Standard		Technical specifications & comments
		Ratio or %	Dollar Rate	
Data processing services	**x**		**80**	- PC annual maintenance
				- network annual maintenance
Security services	**x**		**1**	
Medical treatment and services	**x**		**14-50**	- person/month ration, treatment in civilian hospital
			1	- person/month ration, treatment in military/civilian hospital
Claims and adjustments				- person/month

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F

2002 COE MANUAL EXTRACT

Category of Equipment	Generic Fair Market Value ($US)	Estimated Useful life (years)	Maint. Rate ($US)	Monthly Dry lease ($US)	Monthly Wet lease ($US)	No-fault incident factor %	Monthly Non-UN POL ($US)
TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT							
Telephone exchange large, 1-1100 lines	$408,680	15	$100	$2,339	$2,439	0.2%	
Telephone exchange PABX 1-100 lines	$66,411	15	$49	$472	$521	0.2%	
Cryptofax	$3,269	7	$4	$39	$43	0.2%	
Cyphering equipment	SPECIAL CASE						
AIRFIELD SUPPORT EQUIPMENT							
All radars	SPECIAL CASE						
Approach systems/slighting	SPECIAL CASE						
Control tower	$4,353,300	20	$12,574	$18,864	$31,438	0.2%	
Navigation systems	$1,937,219	10	$5,712	$16,466	$22,178	0.2%	
MISCELLANEOUS - COMMUNICATIONS							
Underwater communication systems	SPECIAL CASE						
Antenna towers	$5,180	20	$11	$22	$33	0.2%	
UPS 10KVA and up	$8,288	10	$85	$70	$155	0.2%	
ELECTRICAL							
GENERATORS - STATIONARY AND MOBILE							
20KVA to 30KVA	$38,020	8	$133	$412	$545	0.5%	309
31KVA to 40KVA	$41,780	12	$135	$308	$443	0.5%	432
41KVA to 50KVA	$56,403	12	$173	$415	$588	0.5%	555
51KVA to 75KVA	$66,848	12	$187	$492	$679	0.5%	771
76KVA to 100KVA	$75,204	12	$209	$554	$763	0.5%	1080
101KVA to 150KVA	$83,560	15	$282	$478	$760	0.2%	1543
151KVA to 200KVA	$104,450	15	$395	$598	$993	0.2%	2160
201KVA to 500KVA	$158,764	15	$527	$908	$1,435	0.2%	3086
Greater than 500KVA	SPECIAL CASE						

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT STOCK (SDS) OVERVIEW

1. The lack of a rapid deployment capability has been repeatedly identified as a major weakness in United Nations peacekeeping operations. As a result, the Organization has often missed opportunities to provide effective support in the critical initial phase of such operations. In its report (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations addressed this weakness and recommended the development of a capability for the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions within 30 or 90 days (30 days for a traditional mission and 90 days for a complex mission). The concept was further expanded into a practical framework as presented in the Report of the Secretary General: The Concept of Strategic Deployment Stocks and Its Implementation. (A/56/870 dated 14 March 2002).

2. In response, the Secretary-General proposed the concept of a strategic reserve in his report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/977). Subsequently, the Special Committee urged the Secretariat to work towards the goal of rapid deployment within a 30/90-day time frame and endorsed the concept of a strategic reserve, including a material reserve; the medium-sized reserve was considered the most appropriate and practical (see A/55/1024, para. 66).

3. The result of this work has been the procurement of equipment and its stockage at the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) at Brindisi, Italy as the strategic reserve. The concept is that this equipment will be used primarily for the start up of new missions where the normal procurement lead-time is such that in order to meet the 30/90 deployment time lines the normal system is too slow. Having the equipment readily available greatly enhances the speed with which the UN can react to a decision to deploy a peacekeeping mission. The replacement of those items removed from the UNLB stock, which are deployed to support a mission, are then purchased from the new mission's budget allowing the stocks at UNLB to be maintained at operational levels.

4. The management of this stock includes a process of rotating the stock by using it as a key source for the purchase of new or the replacement of equipment in current peacekeeping missions. Where applicable (and cost effective), these items are purchased from the existing stock at UNLB to meet existing missions needs and then the replacements go into the stock at UNLB. This maintains the

stock at acceptable, operational levels and insures the equipment is both up-to-date and that shelf-life limitations are not exceeded.

5. These equipment levels were based on supporting what is considered a "complex mission" start-up with approximately: 10,000 Troops; 375 International Staff; 500 Military Observers; 500 UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL): and 575 Local Staff. The equipment includes the following types of equipment: light vehicles and some specialized vehicles; communications and information technology (to include rapidly deployable satellite communications; phone switching capability; and computer systems); office equipment (including furniture); accommodation, kitchen and ablution units; generators; and various spare parts and consumables.

SAMPLE UN DEPLOYMENT TIMELINES

1. The following information is extracted from the Report of the Secretary General: The Concept of Strategic Deployment Stocks and Its Implementation. (A/56/870, dated 14 March 2002). It is recommended that a similar process is adopted by the AU for the purpose of mission planning and execution taking into account the particular aspects of the organizational processes which will be used by the AU for these activities. The analysis of this process has clearly shown that in order to achieve the timely deployment of a peacekeeping mission, extensive actions must take place in the weeks before the issuance of a mandate. This allows transportation and other key contracts to be negotiated in a timely manner.

2. The lack of a rapid deployment capability has been repeatedly identified as a major weakness in United Nations peacekeeping operations. As a result, the Organization has often missed opportunities to provide effective support in the critical initial phase of such operations. In its report (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations addressed this weakness and recommended the development of a capability for the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions within 30 or 90 days (30 days for a traditional mission and 90 days for a complex mission).

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4. Experience of the past 10 years indicates that new peacekeeping operations can often be anticipated prior to the adoption of a full mandate, which often hinges on late-developing political action in the host country. For planning purposes, "M-day" is designated as the estimated date of adoption of a new Security Council resolution. Planning for rapid deployment will normally commence about 60 days before M-day, or M – 60 days.

5. To initiate rapid deployment planning, the Secretary-General will be engaged in extensive consultation with the Security Council. Following these consultations, the Secretary-General will inform the President of the Security Council in writing of his intention to plan and prepare for a new mission, in keeping with Security Council resolution 1327 (2000). Once the Secretary-General has received from the President of the Security Council a letter expressing concurrence with his intention, the following steps will be taken (see figure 2) to initiate rapid deployment:

(a) M – 60 days: a planning team will be established. A warning order will be issued to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations regarding anticipated preparatory steps for a new mission. Military Division will place the HQ Company from the RDL on 7 days notice.

(b) M – 50 days: the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions will be sought for pre-mandate commitment authority of up to $50 million to meet the costs of the advance team, the procurement of supplies and service with long lead times and the recruitment of personnel for the establishment of the mission headquarters.

(c) M – 49 days Military Division DPKO call out HQ Company to concentration area and Level 1 of military On Call List. Level 2 of military On Call List placed on 7 days notice.

(d) M – 30 days: contract arrangements will be made for strategic sealift and/or airlift and other services. Procurement action will be initiated for delivery of goods and provision of services as from M + 60. Standby arrangements for personnel and material will be activated.

(e) M - 28 days. Military Division DPKO call out Level 2 of military On Call List to concentration area.

(f) M – 21 days. Level 2 military on Call List personnel arrive concentration area and commence individual and collective training and administration.

(g) M – 15 days: shipment of items from strategic deployment stocks will be prepared.

(h) M-day (Security Council mandate): the concept of operations will be finalized.

(i) M + 30/90 days: deployment will take place to provide an initial minimum operational capability. An initial budget for the first six-month period

will be submitted to the General Assembly within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution.

6. Based on the planning timelines shown above the DPKO has continued to refine these into planning templates which can be used to assist the planning process. Working drafts of these documents are shown at the attached appendices and can be used as samples to develop a similar planning process for the AU.

APPENDICES**:**

1. Mission Deployment: DRAFT Milestones and Major Activities - UN HQ.

2. Mission Deployment: DRAFT Timeline with Milestones and Major Activities – MISSION.

Mission Deployment: DRAFT Timeline with Milestones and Major Activities – UN HEADQUARTERS



- *Country study*
- *Information available with other UN or non-UN Agencies*
- *Assessment of situation*
- *Ascertain likelihood of UN involvement*
- *Feasibility of a UN Operation or otherwise*
- *Integrated Mission Task Forced (IMTF)*

- *Peace Accord*
- *Viability of the peace accord*
- *Agreement to role of UN*
- *Exchange of Letters*

- *Identify gaps in the information*
- *Team*
- *Plan*
- *Funding*
- *Survey*
- *Report*
- *Military call Out HQ Coy and Level 1 On Call List*

- *Likely Mandate*
- *Likely tasks & analysis*
- *Defining end state of the mission*
- *Available Options*
- *Analysis of Options*
- *Most viable option*
- *Assessment of requirement of troops/Civpol/ UNMOs*
- *Any QIPs*
- *Initial concept*
- *Initial mission support Plan*

- *Troops to task*
- *Consult and earmark TCNs*
- *Review status of RDT*
- *Initial mission staffing table*
- *Determine mission structure during sustainment phase*
- *Review SDS & identify shortfalls*
- *Determine support requirements*
- *Determine requirement for Commitment Authority*
- *Identify requirement of technical survey*

- *Nomination of personnel*
- *Survey Plan*
- *Request for funding*
- *Travel Arrangements*
- *Coordination with HN PM*
- *Coordination with other UN missions, UN and non-UN Agencies*
- *Conduct*
- *Stay behind personnel*
- *Report*
- *Military Call Out Level 2 On Call List*

Mission Deployment: DRAFT Timeline with Milestones and Major Activities– UN HEADQUARTERS

Finalize Mission Plan	*SG Report to Security Council*	*Draft MOUs with TCNs*	*SRSG briefs DOA/CAO*	*Publish Mission Support Plan*	*Mobilize Advance T of RDT*

- *Finalize troop requirements*
- *Finalize civilian staffing table, job descriptions and Vacancy Announcements*
- *Place RDT on 14 day notice*
- *Finalize Mission Support Plan*
- *Seek approval for commitment authority*
- *Finalize Rapid Deployment Teams (RDT)*
- *Prepare request for delegations*
- *Finalize Relocation Plan*

- *Provide contribution to SG Report to Security Council*

- *Finalize TCNs*
- *Finalize troops to task*
- *Negotiate draft MOUs*

- *Mobilize RDT*
- *Release SDS*
- *Arrange transportation for induction*
- *Issue instructions for inter mission transfers*
- *Mobilize systems contracts*

- *Concentrate UNLB*
- *Briefings*
- *Merrying up of men and materials*
- *Check initial loads*

- *SRSG's Vision and goals*
- *Relationships to with HN(s), Regional States and UN and non-UN entities*
- *Administrative and logistic support to be provided or expected*
- *Coordination with:*
  - *humanitarian entities*
  - *NGO's*
  - *UN Agencies*
  - *Military support and available assistance*
  - *Host Nation)*
  - *DDR programmes*
- *Mission end state*
- *Mission footprint by time, phase and location*
- *Status of 'Exchange of Letters'*
- *Serious crimes and code of conduct issues*
- *Integration of the DOA / COA in the management team of the mission*
- *Any constraints / freedoms in regards to time, resources and movements including acceptable administrative / logistic risk to be allowed*

- *any specific staffing issues or priorities ie gender, medical, R&R*
- *any specific tasks in priority order by time and phase*
- *Expected environmental impact*
- *Integrated operations i.e QIP etc*
- *Command and control relationships*
- *Policy on contact with media and public information*

Mission Deployment: DRAFT Timeline with Milestones and Major Activities– UN HEADQUARTERS



- *Mobilize Expansion of Rapid Deployment Teams*
- *Publish Staff Vacancies*
- *Mobilize transportation arrangements for induction*
- *Commence recruitment of local staff*
- *Negotiate Short Term Contracts*
- *Invitation To Bid (ITB) for Long Term contracts*
- *Lease premises*
- *Lease communication lines as required*
- *Lease vehicles*

- *Induct Advance T*
- *Establish Communications*

- *Premises for SRSG*
- *Secure lines of communications*
- *Crypto center*
- *Security arrangements*
- *Medical arrangements*
- *MOSS*

- *Reception of expansion T and surge*
- *Coordinate customs and immigration*
- *Crypto center*
- *Security arrangements*
- *Medical*

- *Prepare Mission Budget*
- *Expansion to regions/establish external offices*
- *Be prepared to receive contingents*
- *Establish warden system*
- *Establish common service agreements*
- *Conduct induction training*
- *Set up ITS Services, LAN*
- *Establish major IT systems i.e. finance, property management, etc.*
- *Establish payroll*
- *Arrange for Local 3rd party insurance*
- *Activate helipads and Airports*
- *Support implementation of Mission-Pre Accident plan*
- *Establish MOVCON facilities for cargo and passenger processing and handling (air, sea)*
- *Establish mail and pouch system*
- *Establish system of travel and traffic*
- *Establish registry and archives*
- *Coordinate evacuation procedures*
- *Establish basic medical clinics*
- *Establish back-up power facilities*
- *Condition reports on proposed premises/land use*
- *Establish transit accommodation*

Mission Deployment: DRAFT Timeline with Milestones and Major Activities - MISSION



- *SRSG's Vision and goals*
- *Relationships to with HN(s), Regional States and UN and non-UN entities*
- *Administrative and logistic support to be provided or expected*
- *Coordination with:*
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  - *NGO's*
  - *UN Agencies*
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- *Any constraints / freedoms in regards to time, resources and movements including acceptable administrative / logistic risk to be allowed*
- *Any specific staffing issues or priorities ie gender, medical, R&R*
- *Any specific tasks in priority order by time and phase*
- *Expected environmental impact*
- *Integrated operations i.e QIP etc*
- *Command and control relationships*
- *Policy on contact with media and public information*

Mission Deployment: DRAFT Timeline with Milestones and Major Activities - MISSION



- *Premises for SRSG*
- *Secure lines of communications for SRSG*
- *Crypto center*
- *Security arrangements for SRSG*

- *Reception of expansion T and surge*
- *Coordinate customs and immigration*
- *Crypto center*
- *Security arrangements*
- *Medical*

- *Prepare Mission Budget presentation to ACABQ*
- *Establish UNMO team sites or as directed*
- *Be prepared to receive contingents*
- *Establish warden system*
- *Establish common service agreements*
- *Conduct induction training*
- *Set up ITS Services, LAN*
- *Establish major systems i.e SUN, Mercury, Progen, IMIS, FACS*
- *Establish payroll*
- *Arrange for Local 3rd party insurance*
- *Activate helipads and Airports*
- *Support implementation of Mission-Pre Accident plan*
- *Establish MOVCON facilities for cargo and passenger processing and handling (air, sea)*
- *Establish mail and pouch system*
- *Establish system of travel and traffic*
- *Establish registry and archives*
- *Coordinate medial/casualty evacuation*
- *Establish basic medical clinics*
- *Establish back-up power facilities*
- *Condition reports on proposed premises/land use*
- *Establish transit accommodation*

- *Receive and unload UNLB Ship*
- *Establish integrated Warehouse*
- *Commence refurbishment of the mission premises*
- *Establish full power facilities*
- *Establish Sever Rooms*
- *Achieve full connectivity through establishment of exchanges and satellite communications*
- *Establish VHF or microwave communications*
- *Commence expansion to the Regional offices/ liaison offices*
- *Establish cashier facilities*
- *Establish reception and transportation arrangements for the incoming military contingents*
- *Mobilize rations and bottled water contracts before the military contingents begin arriving*

ANNEX H

SHIRBRIG

SHIRBRIG (the Multinational Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade for UN operations) is a multinational initiative to improve the UN's rapid deployment capability within the framework of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System, otherwise known as UNSAS.

15 nations have signed one or more SHIRBRIG documents, with 6 more nations (Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Senegal and Chile) participating as observers. Although the increasing support for the brigade is a very good sign, the SHIRBRIG nations strongly believe that, to make SHIRBRIG viable, the brigade needs further international participation. The number of nations supporting this initiative is therefore gradually expanding.

The SHIRBRIG concept is to provide the UN with a multinational brigade at high readiness based on the UN Stand-by Arrangement System. This concept would thus provide the UN with a well-prepared, rapid deployment capability for peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN Security Council.

The background to SHIRBRIG originates from the early 1990´s, when the UN operations in Rwanda and Srebrenica showed that the UN did not have the capability to react fast and strong enough. Hence, a number of like minded nations committed to UN peacekeeping, decided to form a rapid deployment brigade by pooling some or all of their UNSAS force contributions, and by providing for effective and continuous pre-deployment planning, training and preparation.

By co-operating in SHIRBRIG, the participating countries from all over the world can improve their contributions to the UN Stand-by Arrangement System, as well as promote their interoperability, for example, through the creation of a small permanent planning element north of Copenhagen in Høvelte.

The concept can be summarised as follows:

- SHIRBRIG will only be deployed on a case-by-case basis in peacekeeping operations mandated by the United Nations Security Council. This would include missions such as preventive deployments, cease-fire monitoring, supervising the separation of forces, as well as support for humanitarian aid operations.

- After a maximum duration of 6 months the mission will either be terminated or the brigade will be replaced by other than SHIRBRIG forces.

- The reaction time will be 15 to 30 days following the decision of the participating nations to make them available for deployment upon request by the United Nations.

- The units must have the inherent capability of extended self-defence, and should the occasion arise, to extricate its elements from untenable situations.

- The units will be self-sufficient concerning logistics for 60 days.

- The participating countries will decide on a case-by-case basis whether they will participate in any given mission. Their national decision making procedures (and thereby their national sovereignty) is in no way affected by participation in SHIRBRIG. This is the reason that SHIRBRIG maintains a brigade pool of units.

- Of particular note, SHIRBRIG can deploy in different configurations involving the Commander, HQ and certain units.

- SHIRBRIG is unlikely to deploy as one entity, it is rather foreseen that deployment will always be together with units from other countries as well.

- Once SHIRBRIG units deploy in a UN mission, the units will usually be organised and referred to by the UN as a Force or as a Sector, depending on the mission's order of battle and strength.



When fully deployed, a SHIRBRIG task force could consist of about 4000 to 5000 troops comprising a headquarters unit with communication facilities, infantry battalions, reconnaissance units, medical, engineering and logistic support as well as helicopters and military police as shown on this slide.

National authorities are responsible for the logistic support for their respective units in SHIRBRIG, which is coordinated by the Brigade Logistic Operations Centre (BLOC). Furthermore UN support is used according to UN procedures.

The BLOC is a concept based on the co-ordination of specific logistical assets provided by the various National Support Elements (NSE) in the mission area. Some NSEs are expected to take responsibility as role specialists for transportation and movement control.

A brigade pool comprising a number of similar units exceeding the force requirement will normally ensure the deployment of the brigade, even if a participant decides to abstain from providing troops for a specific mission.

The framework for the creation of SHIRBRIG is composed of four documents: the Letter of Intent and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Steering Committee, the Planning Element and the Brigade.

The signing of all four documents commits a country to assign troops to the brigade, to be represented in the so-called Planning Element and be a participant in the meeting of the Steering Committee.

First, the Letter of Intent or LOI:

When a nation signs this document, it will then become an "Observer Nation" in the Steering Committee. However, some nations are also designated "Observer Nations" without having signed the LOI simply because they are interested in the SHIRBRIG project and foresee potentially the signing of one or more SHIRBRIG documents in the future.

Second, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Steering Committee – MOU/SC:

The signing of this document allows a nation to participate in the Steering Committee concerning the development of policies and guidance for SHIRBRIG. However by signing this document only, the nation has no influence on the budget and other specific issues directly relating to the Planning Element.

Third, the Memorandum of Understanding on SHIRBRIG – MOU/SB:

With the signing of this document, the nation commits troops to the Brigade Pool. However, it does not station personnel permanently in the Planning Element in Denmark.

Finally, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Planning Element:

With the signing of this document the nation has 1-2 staff officers stationed in the Planning Element.

The Key bodies of SHIRBRIG.

The Steering Committee is the executive body for SHIRBRIG. It is a political-military body responsible for supervision of the Planning Element and for other matters pertaining to the establishment of the Brigade, such as enlargement of the Brigade. The Steering Committee takes decisions by consensus. Meetings in the SC take place approximately 3-4 times annually in order to direct and supervise the establishment and operation of SHIRBRIG in general and with special attention to Planning Element.

The Chairman is a rotational position, and each nation holds the position for a period of one year. Canada currently chairs the Steering Committee.

The Planning Element also known as PLANELM, is the small permanent multinational staff of the Brigade (the core staff), which started its activities in June 1997 and was officially inaugurated by the UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan on the 2nd of September 1997.

The Secretary General is a firm supporter of the SHIRBRIG, and views it as a "logical and necessary extension of the UN Stand-by Arrangement System". A total of 13 officers and 10 support staff from participating countries are currently seconded to the PLANELM from 10 Nations.

During operations the Planning Element will serve as the nucleus of a regular brigade staff. In the pre-deployment stage its responsibility is to develop standard operating procedures, to work on concepts of operations and to organise limited joint exercises. The activities of the Planning Element will improve the co-operation amongst the military units of SHIRBRIG nations, thereby promoting their rapid deployment.

All officers in the PLANELM are assigned for a period of 2-3 years and rotation will take place in such a way that the PLANELM will keep a high degree of

continuity. The Commander and the Chief of Staff positions rotate by Nation every two years.

During deployment, the whole staff consists of more than 90 officers and NCO's from all the participating nations, supported by a fully equipped HQ company counting 150 troops.

Some financial aspects.

SHIRBRIG is established at low additional costs to participating countries. Denmark is the host nation of the Planning Element.

All expenses for the SHIRBRIG units with regard to training and preparation for deployment are paid for by participating countries. During deployment the UN reimburses expenses for SHIRBRIG according to the existing UN rules.

The additional costs resulting from a national participation in SHIRBRIG are related to the shared costs for running the Planning Element, the possible placement of officers in the Planning Element, participation in CPX, branch conferences and training and for attendance of staff officers at the Steering Committee meetings.

Budget 2003 for the Planning Element is stipulated to be US $ 440,000 to be shared only by the member nations participating in the PLANELM. Currently 10 nations share this cost.

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

The strength of SHIRBRIG lies in the permanent PLANELM and the high readiness of its units. All units should be ready for deployment from the Port of Embarkation within 21 to 30 days of a national decision, with the advance parties deploying within 14 days. As a result, SOPs are focused on the preparations before deployment and the deployment itself.

The SHIRBRIG Concept of Operations is conducted in five phases:

PHASE 1. PRE-DEPLOYMENT

In the first phase, Pre-Deployment, basic peacekeeping training and mission oriented training is emphasised. Furthermore some generic planning as well as some open source fact-finding of potential mission areas are being done. Units and individuals are trained under national and SHIRBRIG responsibility in accordance with the SHIRBRIG training standards. If assigned to a mission,

SHIRBRIG sends an advance party and or fact finding team into the mission area.

PHASE 2. DEPLOYMENT

In the second phase, Deployment, the deployment of the advance parties under national responsibility takes place. This if followed by the deployment of the main bodies. The SHIRBRIG reserve is formed when operational. The transfer of authority will take place during this phase.

PHASE 3. EMPLOYMENT

In the third phase, Execution and Employment, the peacekeeping operation is conducted in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution and mandate. In theatre training is conducted by the various SHIRBRIG contingents as laid down in the SHIRBRIG training standards and as co-ordinated by SHIRBRIG.

PHASE 4. RE-DEPLOYMENT

Fourth, Re-Deployment. The re-deployment of SHIRBRIG units at the end of the mission is a national responsibility. SHIRBRIG will develop contingency plans and co-ordinate any emergency evacuation. Transfer of authority from SHIRBRIG to the respective national commands will take place in this phase.

PHASE 5. RECONSTITUTION

Phase five – Reconstitution. In this phase, the re-establishment of SHIRBRIG HQ takes place. The reconstitution of units remains a national responsibility. SHIRBRIG should be ready for a new mission after a reconstitution period of up to 12 months. Lessons learned are developed during this phase.

Training is a vital component in ensuring the readiness of SHIRBRIG HQ and the various units. The training in SHIRBRIG is divided into three main activities: training of the commanders and branch-heads from the units, training of the staff and finally a CPX with participation of the staff, the units and the HQCOY. There is also a small individual training component for the officers in

Deleted: the Planning Element.¶

ANNEX I

ACRONYMS

ACDS	-	African Chiefs of Defence Staff
ACOTA	-	African Crisis Operations and Training Assistance
ACRI	-	African Crisis Response Initiative
AMLD	-	AU Military Logistics Depot
ASF	-	African Standby Force
AU	-	African Union
BPST	-	British Peace Support Team (formerly BMATT - British Military Assistance Training Team)
CAAU	-	Constitutive Act of the African Union
CEN-SAD	-	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
COE	-	Contingent-Owned Equipment
COMESA	-	Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States
DPKO	-	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECCAS	-	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	-	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
IGAD	-	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
MLD	-	Military Logistic Depot
MNF	-	Multinational Force
MSC	-	Military Staff Committee
MOU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
OAU	-	Organisation of African Union
OMS	-	Office of Mission Support
PKF	-	Peacekeeping Force
PLANELM	-	Planning Element
PSC	-	Peace and Security Council
PSD	-	Peace and Security Directorate
PSO	-	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	-	Peace Support Operations Department
RDL	-	Rapid Deployment Level
RDT	-	Rapid Deployment Team
REC	-	Regional Economic Community
RECAMP	-	Reinforcing African Peacekeeping Capacities (French acronym for *Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix*)
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
SDS	-	Strategic Deployment Stocks
SHIRBRIG	-	Standby High Readiness Brigade (UN)
SRO	-	Sub-Regional Organisation
TOR	-	Terms of Reference
UMA	-	Arab-Maghreb Union (French acronym)
UNSAS	-	UN Standby Arrangements System

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