

Executive Summary

General

1. For some time now, in particular over the last decade, commencing with the Cairo Declaration of 1993, African Member States and Sub-Regional Organizations have increasingly addressed peace and security on the Continent, and developed the capacity to participate in peace operations at the continental and sub regional level. In particular, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) made a number of substantive recommendations in their Second Meeting, held in Harare, in 1997.
2. The most recent stage of this development has been the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU). In establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC), AU Member States have clearly indicated that they are willing to take additional concrete steps for peace and security in Africa. In particular, they have signaled their intention to expand their willingness to take risks for peace, and again indicated they are ready to accept their share of responsibility for ensuring durable development of the Continent, particularly in the area of peace and security.
3. The protocol establishing the PSC sought to create a number of structures, including the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC). To advance consideration of these issues the AU decided to engage a Panel of Consultants to prepare this Concept Paper which was revised following consultation with the AU Regional Economic Communities and other African and External Partners at Addis Ababa on 14-15 April 2003.
4. The Paper examines the requirements, issues and options for the conceptual framework of the ASF and MSC, noting the previous recommendations of the ACDS, the experiences gained in peacekeeping in Africa, the existing guidance and doctrine available, particularly the considerable work undertaken recently within the United Nations, and the interrelationships between the AU, Sub Regional Organizations (SROs) and external partners. A number of Annexes are included with the Paper to inform further discussion.
5. The Paper examines options for the ASF against a number of typical conflict scenarios. These highlight the options for AU and Sub Regional capabilities, including the requirements for a multidimensional Strategic Management capability, a multidimensional and multinational Mission Headquarters capability, military standby brigades and observers, plus police and civilian administrative and expert capabilities. The Paper notes the

requirement for the AU and SROs to address doctrine, command and control, logistics, funding and reimbursement issues.

The ASF

6. The creation of an ASF will be a significant enhancement in African capacity. It will take time to come to fruition. For this reason the Paper suggests the system be established in two phases, with Phase 1 to 30 June 2005, and Phase 2 to 30 June 2010.

7. Taking into account financial reality, previous ACDS guidance and experiences, in broad outline the Panel recommends that the ASF be developed in these phases to provide:

a. A reasonable level of staffing to develop a strategic level HQ (PSOD) capacity, managing an on-call individual reinforcement system to gain mission level (ASF) HQ capacity, and specialist mission level civilian components, such as those dealing with human rights.

b. Where sub-regions have the will and capacity, a system of sub-regionally managed standby brigade groups, eventually capable of deployment in 30 days, that maintains a small full time core planning staff (15) with individual on-call reinforcement of other brigade HQ staff positions, and a pool of units on standby in Member States that are supported by appropriate administrative, logistics and training infrastructures.

c. An AU managed high readiness brigade capable of deployment in 30 days comprising a HQ, including a full time planning staff of 15 with individual on-call reinforcement of other brigade HQ staff positions, plus a pool of units able to be committed by Member States from all sub-regions, supported by appropriate administrative, logistics and training infrastructures.

d. An AU-managed standby system of military observers and police capacity, preferably consisting of individuals nominated to on-call lists. Alternatively, if it is impracticable to provide names, Member States could also advise the numbers of appropriately trained and prepared military observers and police that they could provide.

8. The entire standby system would use as its basis for doctrine and training, concepts and material developed by the UN and SHIRBRIG and other organisations. It should also be linked into the UN Standby Arrangements System.

The MSC

9. Part of the system will be an MSC that constructively contributes to strategic level management as a standing advisory committee to the PSC. The Paper makes suggestions on the composition, chairmanship and conduct of the MSC. It suggests the MSC should meet monthly under a Chairman appointed by the AU for 12 months that rotates through the sub regions. It notes that the MSC will advise and assist the PSC, the ACDS, and the PSOD. It should have no executive powers of its own except as and when assigned by the PSC.

Implications

10. The Paper discusses a number of proposals and recommendations concerning the creation of an ASF and MSC that will have long-term implications for the AU and SROs, and which need to be carefully considered, initially by the ACDS. The Paper presents various options facing the AU as it deals with challenge of establishing an ASF. The number and location of standby brigades to be developed, along with their supporting military logistic depots, must be rigorously analysed against required readiness levels, available resources and other priorities. A cost benefit analysis will be needed to support final recommendations. Key decisions are necessary on reimbursement principles and standards to be met that will influence the cost analysis, and the effectiveness of any implementation plan.

11. Nevertheless, it is considered that the African Goals set out in this Paper are achievable, using the phased approach suggested, and harnessing the experience of the UN and other regional entities and partners as applicable to the AU.

**PART I: THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE
AND MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE**

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 African Member States, in transforming the OAU to the African Union (AU), have created a Protocol to enhance peace and security on the Continent. Central to this is the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

1.2 In establishing the PSC, AU Member States have clearly indicated that they are willing to take additional concrete steps for peace and security in Africa. In particular, they have signaled their intention to expand their willingness to take risks for peace, and again indicated they are ready to accept their share of responsibility for ensuring durable development of the Continent, particularly in the area of peace and security.

1.3 The protocol establishing the PSC sought to create a number of structures, including the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC). To advance consideration of these issues the AU decided to engage a Panel of Consultants to prepare a Concept Paper in accordance with the Terms of Reference (TOR) at Annex A. The Draft Concept Paper was considered by the AU Regional Economic Communities and other African and External Partners at Addis Ababa on 14-15 April 2003, and has now been revised to incorporate this consultation.

ACDS Recommendations

1.4 The Panel noted that the African Chiefs of Defence Staff made a number of substantive recommendations in their Second Meeting, held in Harare, in 1997 (See Annex B). In particular, these included the following important recommendations relevant to this Concept Paper:

- a. All Peace Support Operations in Africa should be conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration. This will enable the OAU to mobilize for action and to acquire UN support for the initiative.
- b. The conflict situation should guide the level at which the OAU considers involvement. In an emergency situation, the OAU should undertake preliminary preventive action while preparing for more

comprehensive action which may include the UN involvement. The emphasis here is for speed of action and deployment. As a principle, the OAU should take the first initiative in approaching the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an emergency in the continent. If the UN is unresponsive, the OAU must take preliminary action whilst continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from the world body.

c. Where the OAU deploys a peace operation, this should be an all-African force.

d. Operational procedures for the planning and conduct of Peace Support Operations exist and are well documented at the level of the UN. The OAU should use these references and adapt them to unique continental and organizational factors.

e. The OAU could earmark a brigade-sized contribution to standby arrangements from each of the five African sub-regions as a starting point, which could then be adjusted upwards or downwards according to evolving circumstances.

f. The OAU should identify about 500 trained military and civilian observers (100 from each sub-region) as an appropriate starting point for standby capacity.

g. The OAU should devise a standard structure for battalions, brigades, and perhaps even a division for future OAU deployments.

h. Training should be conducted according to UN doctrine and standards, and should draw on the available training materials, training aids and courses available through the UN system. UN training manuals should be complemented by Africa specificity.

i. Centers of expertise for Peace Support Operations training should be established, which are capable of conducting research into training; formulating guidelines for training; producing common training syllabi; and conducting control and evaluation functions.

j. The Secretariat be tasked to establish a stand-by system to be based on Member States' indication of peace support capabilities. These would include information on size and types of forces on stand-by and their general standards of training, equipment and state of readiness.

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Development of African Peace and Security Initiatives

1.5 The ACDS recommendations should be taken in the wider context of overall developments in African peace and security. The Panel also noted that for some time now, in particular over the last decade, commencing with the Cairo Declaration of 1993, African Member States and Sub-Regional Organizations have increasingly addressed peace and security on the Continent, and developed the capacity to participate in peace operations at the continental and sub regional level. An outline of the history of this development, the existing operational capability, and a number of critical limitations to the conduct of peace operations are at Annex C.

Conflict and Mission Scenarios

1.6 A number of typical conflict scenarios, described in the TORs for the Consultants, outlined below were used to develop the proposals in this Paper:

- a. **Scenario 1.** AU/SRO Military advice to a Political mission.
- b. **Scenario 2.** AU/SRO observer mission co-deployed with UN mission.
- c. **Scenario 3.** Standalone AU/SRO observer mission.
- d. **Scenario 4.** AU/SRO peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions.
- e. **Scenario 5.** AU PKF for complex multidimensional PK mission—low level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts).
- f. **Scenario 6.** AU intervention – e.g. genocide situations where international community does not act promptly.

CHAPTER 2: REQUIREMENTS, ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ASF

Generic Components of a Peace Operations Capability

2.1 The generic components of a valid multidimensional peace support operations capability comprise the following:

- a. A legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter.
- b. A multidimensional strategic level management capability.
- c. A mission HQ level multidimensional management capability.
- d. Mission components for multidimensional peace operations.

Mandating Authority

2.2 As noted in the Chapter 3 of this Report dealing with African Goals, and particularly with regard to the provisions of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the AU PSC is a legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This view is consistent with the endorsed recommendations of the Second African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) (of the Central Organ) Meeting, Harare 1997.¹ However, due regard needs to be taken of the provisions of the UN Charter (Chapter VII Article 51) on the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, subject to such measures being reported to the UN Security Council, as well as the provisions of Chapter VIII on enforcement action by Regional Arrangements, in particular subject to authorisation by the Security Council, which shall also be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies (Articles 53-54). In this context, it is to be expected that while the AU will seek UN Security Council authorisation of its enforcements actions, SROs similarly will seek AU authorisation of their interventions.

Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability

¹ In 1995, the ACDS proposed that each Member State earmarked peacekeeping-trained standby forces. Subsequently in 1996 (Addis Ababa) and 1997 (Harare), they made further substantive proposals for the establishment of an OAU observer force of 500 standby personnel, with 100 drawn from each of the 5 sub-regions, within the framework of the UNSAS. In addition, the ACDS recommended the formation of sub-regional standby brigades consisting of bilateral or multilateral national contingents.

2.3 The Panel endorses the broad capability requirements shown in the Scenarios at Annex A. Based on UN advice, instructive experiences of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, and the structure contained in the Panel's TOR as the base level of AU Peace and Security Directorate, the Panel has developed a series of strategic level HQ structures for the AU needed to manage operations for each of the Scenarios contained in the TOR. These are provided at Annex D to this Report. These structures could be adapted by an SRO, if it were authorised to manage an operation.

Mission HQ Level Multidimensional Management Capability

2.4 Given the goal contained in the Protocol establishing the PSC to involve the UN in the conduct of missions in Africa, any mission HQ level structure should be able to be handed over to, or incorporated into, a UN PSO with relative ease. UN structures are subject to rigorous consideration within the Secretariat and in various UN legislative and budgetary bodies. For this reason the Panel has based its advice on structures used in UN Missions. This approach is consistent with the endorsed recommendations of the Second ACDS Meeting. With the exception of Scenario 6 (intervention) the structures are shown at Annex E.

2.5 Based on the level of coherence required at the field HQ level for an intervention mission, particularly those involving an opposed early deployment, such operations are best conducted by a coalition under a lead nation. The initial entry may best be undertaken by the lead nation with rapid follow-up by the other nations in the coalition. This would mean that the lead nation HQ would need to deploy "as is", with limited change to its existing structure to cater for multinational representation. For this reason a proposed structure for a mission HQ for Scenario 6 (intervention) is not shown. As a long term goal, the ASF should be capable of conducting such interventions without reliance on lead nations. This would require a standing AU multinational military HQ at above brigade level, plus the capability to assemble and deploy rapidly well prepared and capable military contingents.

Mission Components

2.6 **Military.** The Panel endorses the recognition, contained in the recommendations of the Second ACDS Meeting, of the importance of the brigade level as the basis for a viable peace operations capability. The brigade is the first level of military command where multiple arms and services are grouped under one HQ. It is also the first level that is genuinely self-contained

and capable of sustained independent operations. In addition, the number of manoeuvre units can be easily adjusted depending on the situation. It is a sound building block for the military component of Scenarios 4 and 5 [traditional and complex AU/SRO peacekeeping forces (PKFs)]. A reduced version of a brigade HQ can also provide the HQ for Scenarios 2 and 3 (co-deployed and standalone observer missions). Structures for the military component for each Scenario are shown at Annex E together with indicative strengths. The military component of Scenario 4 (AU/SRO PKF) is a model structure for a brigade deployed in the field.

2.7 **Other Components.** Scenario 5 (complex PKF) involves components other than the military. The UN is the most experienced Organisation in these types of activities. Examples of typical UN mission structures for police, human rights, governance, DDR, and reconstruction components are shown at Annex E.

Goals, Priorities and Deployment Timelines

2.8 The speed with which forces will be required to deploy has particular implications for standby force structures and arrangements. Linked to this is the type of conflict into which they will deploy. Given the fluid and uncertain nature of conflict, particularly in Africa, coherence on deployment will be critical. This demands that units and HQ staff will have trained together prior to deployment. Significant implications of varying readiness levels are:

- a. At 14 days readiness collective training involving field exercises with all units is essential prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for at a standing fully staffed brigade HQ and HQ support. There is also a requirement for an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. Apart from large military alliances such as NATO, individual Member States may be best placed to provide this capability.
- b. At 30 days readiness collective training at least involving HQ command post exercises must occur prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for at least a standing nucleus of a brigade HQ with its attendant HQ support as well as an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. SHIRBRIG provides a good example of the HQ structure. In its system, contingents deploy fully self sustained for 60 days. This is not normally the case with African

contingents. In the African context ASF owned logistics bases will be required.

- c. At 90 days readiness there may be time available to conduct collective training to develop a level of coherence prior to deployment. There is also time to establish a HQ and logistics stocks. A requirement does exist, however, for a small full time staff to manage the standby system, and to standardise procedures and doctrine.

2.9 Bearing this in mind, the Panel recommends the following long term deployment targets for the ASF (all timings are from an AU mandate resolution):

- a. Scenario 1-4 should be able to deploy in 30 days (possible only if pre-mandate actions have been taken).
- b. Scenario 5 should complete deployment in 90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days (possible only if pre-mandate actions have been undertaken; and
- c. Due to the nature of situations demanding intervention operations, Scenario 6, it will be important the AU can deploy a robust military force in 14 days.

2.10 The AU possesses a limited capability of deploying in Scenarios 1 and 2. The UN would normally be able to deploy in Scenarios 3 and 4 and Scenario 6 requires a strong lead nation. Given this, development of the ASF should concentrate on Scenario 5, in particular the military component of this Scenario. The building block of this capability is robust coherence at brigade group level.

Doctrine

2.11 To be effective, a multinational peace operations capability requires standardised doctrine. As in other areas of African capability, the Panel endorses the recommendation of the Second ACDS Meeting that peacekeeping doctrine used by the ASF should be consistent with doctrine produced and used by the UN, and complemented by African specificity. In this respect, the Panel notes that the UN has almost completed a Multidimensional Peacekeeping Handbook, with publication slated for August 2003 at the latest, which will serve as the base document for all UN peacekeeping doctrine. The Panel is therefore of the view that doctrine for the ASF should be based on this UN document when it enters into circulation and use. The Panel also notes that

peace operations SOPs have already been drafted by the AU, as well as by ECOWAS. In this sense, the two Organisations are ahead of the UN. The UN has indicated that it will comment on the AU SOPs and the outcome of this Report will affect the scope and content of the draft SOP. It is logical to suggest that draft SRO SOPs will have to be harmonised with that of the AU.

2.12 In the UN context, production of detailed doctrine for how units will complete normal military tasks, e.g. conduct of a reconnaissance patrol, is a national responsibility. The UN has produced policy for subjects that are common in a multinational peacekeeping environment, such as civil-military co-ordination. These should be adopted by the AU. Doctrine for what could be termed multinational war fighting tasks is not available from the UN. Production of this type of publication is a major task for military alliances such as NATO, where there is a significant standardisation structure in NATO HQ. In the case of intervention, the AU may wish to seek NATO and European advice.

Training

2.13 Training for peace operations has a number of elements, both military and civilian. As far as peace operations are concerned, a basis for the military component is sound capability in the full range of normal military tasks. While this cannot be over stressed, training in these tasks is a national responsibility. Even in large military alliances, there is limited standardisation of this type of training, as a result of differing national doctrines, tactics, techniques and procedures. For these reasons the Panel is of the view that it may be impractical to try to develop standardised training at this level in the African context.

2.14 On the other hand, there is some degree of standardisation on issues specific to peace operations. The Panel therefore endorses the recommendation of the ACDS that in addition to doctrine, Africa should use UN training standards and material, modified as necessary, for Africa. The UN has made significant effort in recent months in this direction, particularly as part of its Standardised Generic Training Modules Project.² Because African Member States have been, and will continue to be involved, this Project will be useful and should inform African peace operations training.

2.15 The relevant AU and regional training framework should provide for some amount of co-ordination of AU, SRO and national training, as well as for

² The Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) Project is being conducted by DPKO, in close collaboration with Member States, to produce recommended training modules and content. Sixteen SGTMs have been distributed covering a range of peacekeeping training.

the establishment and designation of centres of excellence for peacekeeping training at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. An example of this is that, within ECOWAS, broad thinking is to designate the Zambakro PKTC (Côte d'Ivoire) as a tactical institution; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) as an operational level centre; the National War College (Nigeria) as the strategic level institution. The AU and other SROs could develop a similar hierarchy of training institutions.

2.16 While this arrangement does not seek to micro-manage issues of standardisation of doctrine and training, it provides a practical framework for standardisation based on UN doctrine and training standards, and the promotion of cohesion.

2.17 It is also to be recalled that national military training frameworks provide for training cycles normally incorporating progressive training activities. AU and sub-regional training should therefore be designed on the basis of a cycle that dovetails into these national arrangements. In this respect, there will be the need for some degree of harmonisation among Member States signing up to the standby arrangements. Such harmonised training cycles, if synchronised with UN and other external initiatives such as ACRI (as well as Operation Focus Relief and African Crisis Operations and Training Assistance - ACOTA), RECAMP, BPST, etc., will help to harness support for AU training for PSO by channelling external assistance towards quality support at the centres of excellence. This will enhance African peacekeeping capacities, as well as provide a framework for joint tactical and operational field training exercises (FTX), command post exercises (CPX) and telephone battles to practice common doctrine and techniques and test readiness. It will be particularly useful if training is focused towards structures established as part of the ASF.

Brahimi Issues

2.18 The recommendations of the Brahimi Panel³ have made collaboration with the UN System even more fundamental. It is instructive to call to attention the Brahimi Panel's view:

³ The Brahimi Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was convened by the United Nations Secretary General in March 2000 to ***“assess the shortcomings of the existing [UN] system and make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change”*** The Report of the Panel which was submitted on 21 August 2000 (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809). The panel was led by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister.

“There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.”

2.19 The Brahimi Panel’s Report and Recommendations raise serious challenges that have far-reaching implications for AU/SRO peace support efforts, especially in the areas of organisation, equipment, training, operational doctrine, and capacities for mandate accomplishment, including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), as well as for Quick Impact Projects (QIP). In operationalizing the ASF, the AU should borrow extensively from the relevant lessons drawn in the Brahimi Report and give serious consideration to those issues relating to mission-capable forces within the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) for regional training, standardisation and organic logistical support. The rationale for this view is that the relevant recommendations impose a higher premium on standards and capacities that, if met, will facilitate the full participation of African countries in UN peace operations.

Issue of AU/SRO Consultations and Co-ordination

2.20 The need for consultations, harmonisation and co-ordination of the security mechanisms of the AU and SROs is predicated on the framework of the CAAU and relevant decisions of the Durban Summit (July 2002). Within the framework of the PSC Protocol, SRO security mechanisms should be envisioned as a crucial part of the regional security architecture.

2.21 Another pertinent reason for closer AU-SRO collaboration stems from the fact that there is a limit to the burden that sub-regions can bear for their own security, and the lack of sub-regional capacity may tend to prolong conflicts. The AU has provided diplomatic support for sub-regional interventions, but its financial and logistical contributions to such SRO efforts⁴ has been limited.

⁴ It is estimated that the total AU funding for ECOWAS peace support efforts, as of October 2001, stands at about \$750,000 as follows: 1) \$300,000 from General peace Fund towards projected ECOWAS deployment on the Guinea-Liberia border -- it was in lieu of a specific ECOWAS request for logistical support and equipment for that purpose; 2) \$200,000 in December 1995; and 3) \$250,000 in August 2000 for disbursement to the Government of Sierra Leone for the DDR program (\$100,000), another \$100,000 to alleviate the plight of amputees, and \$50,000 to ECOWAS for the operationalization of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace in Sierra Leone within the framework of the Lomé Agreement (1999).

2.22 The lack of fully co-ordinated and harmonised regional security mechanisms and intervention efforts has also created competition among and between African regional organisations for external assistance, to the detriment of concerted efforts at building African and regional capabilities.

2.23 In reality, the more ambitious objectives of the PSC Protocol and the ACDS recommendations which envisage sub-regional components of the ASF demand the full participation of SROs. Their respective security mechanisms need to be harmonised with that of the AU, in order to synergise African security efforts.

2.24 To achieve effective consultations between the AU and SROs on these subjects, as well as with external Partners, there is the need for clearly designated focal points at all levels.

Issue of Collaboration with the International Community

2.25 AU co-operation with the international community occurs in the areas of diplomatic, political and economic activities, in addition to resource (financial and material) mobilisation in support of its peace agenda. In the context of building African capacity for peacekeeping, the AU is expected to continue to be the recipient and beneficiary of external support programmes, such as support for the establishment of the Conflict Management Centre (CMC), and financial support for the establishment and sustainment of peace operations. In addition, the Union and SROs have benefited from other financial and material assistance programmes such as the ACRI (US), RECAMP (France), as well as support from the British (BPST), Canadian, Danish and other Nordic countries. These have helped to enhance skills, further doctrinal standardisation, and improve the logistics capacity for African peacekeeping.

2.26 Nevertheless, while external initiatives have helped to improve some African peace support capacities, the level of external assistance has been lower than expected, and has not always focused on key African concerns. In particular, the OAU/AU has not been fully involved in determining the nature and scope of the initiatives.

Sustainability and Logistical Support Requirements

2.27 In order to develop advice regarding sustainability, logistic support and funding, the Panel has needed to adopt assumptions regarding rapid deployment, periods of self sustainability and methods of providing logistic support. These are that:

- a. Scenarios 1 to 3 will deploy with self sustainability for 30 days.
- b. Scenarios 4 to 6 will involve contingents deploying with self sustainability for 90 days.

2.28 The identification of broad sustainability, logistical support, and funding requirements are key components for the deployment of any peace operations. The UN has developed a number of documents which are used to establish these requirements. Examples are shown at Annex G. Past experience has indicated that the rates used by the UN may be too high for adoption by the AU. It is therefore recommended that the AU use the information in these documents as a guide and build on this information, making changes as appropriate in the scales of reimbursement, the consumption rates, etc., to fit the African environment. The resulting documents, formatted to fit AU parameters, will provide valuable planning tools to determine the sustainability, logistical support and funding requirements needed for peace operations. This will also assist a smooth transition to UN operations, if necessary.

AU Logistical Infrastructure for PSO

2.29 Considering that poor equipment and logistics have often undermined effectiveness of African PSOs, it is crucial that adequate arrangements and resources be devoted to the establishment of ASF Military Logistical Depots (AMLD). It is clear that at both the AU and SRO level, there will be some requirement for a logistical infrastructure and resupply system. This could involve a mix of centralised (AU) and SRO stocks.

Equipment Standardisation

2.30 While standardisation of doctrine and procedures are both desirable and possible, it should be clear that due to different development processes of Member State defence forces, equipment standardisation will not be possible across the whole spectrum of ASF military equipment. However, the clear identification of key areas where interoperability is essential, such as inter-unit communications, is urgent. The issue of standardisation policy and the development of suitable technical solutions, where necessary, should be centrally managed at the AU.

Funding and Reimbursement

2.31 The parameters for financing the peace operations of the ASF and other operational activities related to peace and security (Article 21) provide for the establishment of the Peace Fund, subject to relevant AU Financial Rules and

Regulations. Excepting the regular budgetary appropriations that could be guaranteed, the AU has no guaranteed control over the other sources. The PSC therefore needs to be aware of the responsibility of making available such financial resources as are requisite for ASF mission accomplishment. In this regard, however, it is recalled that the Second Meeting of the ACDS made the following recommendations on funding:

- a. Initiating an annual fund raising week.
- b. Increasing contributions of Member States to the Regular Budget; increasing the percentage of the budget dedicated to the Peace Fund, that is, from six (6) to ten (10) percent.
- c. Soliciting for individual donations in cash or kind, and involving insurance corporations.

2.32 The issue of reimbursement for troop commitments, movements and airlifts, and logistical, as well as other operational costs incurred by Member States, is one that needs careful consideration. Except for some coalition interventions, particularly in West, Central and Southern Africa, lack of central funding and reimbursement for peacekeeping costs have severely inhibited the full participation of less endowed Member States. This situation has undermined multinational efforts of SROs and engendered sub-regional polarisation.

2.33 An appropriate policy decision is required on reimbursement rates for Member State commitments to the ASF. In addition to reimbursement of Member States, the contribution of the SRO itself needs to be considered when formulating a system of reimbursement.

Command, Control and Communication Considerations

2.34 Multinational brigades raise legal as well as technical command and control issues that need to be resolved prior to deployment. This could be achieved through appropriate AU command and control policies⁵, Letters of Exchange (LOEs), Letters of Intent (LIs) or MOUs. In general, the command of the brigades will need to reflect the multinational nature of the formation, and be combined with a system of rotation of staff appointments, having regard to the capacities, contributions, and professional competence levels in the respective defence forces of Member State.

⁵ . The UN has issued guidance on UN Command and Control authority that may assist development of AU Policy. See DPKO Paper of October 2001 titled "Command and Control of Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions".

2.35 **Skeleton Rapid Deployment Headquarters.** For rapid deployment of a multinational force, UN, African and other experience clearly indicate the need for an effective mission HQ to be functioning very early. As mentioned above for readiness at 30 days or less, experience indicates that this can only be achieved by the core of such a HQ already existing full time which is trained and competent in the appropriate command procedures. Standby procedures similar to the SHIRBRIG concept and the UNSAS “on call” HQ described in Annex F will assist development of such a capacity.

2.36 **Status of Affiliation of Contingents.** It is likely that not all the units contributed to the ASF will be self-sufficient, and that some will lack adequate operational resources. Such units will have to be regrouped with much stronger contingents of the ASF. This may engender some amount of political and legal implications in placing units under command of foreign officers and practical issues at the tactical level that will need close attention.

2.37 **Communications.** The Panel wishes to point out that deployed missions and operational activities require effective communications. This is one area requiring close examination to achieve a required level of standardization. While the use of satellite communications may be convenient in limited observer missions and between missions and the Commission/Secretariats, they are expensive and are not ideal for communications internal to peacekeeping force operations. Careful consideration therefore needs to be given to the types and mix of communications proposed for the respective mission scenarios.

**CHAPTER 3: OUTPUT I: AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE:
A SUGGESTED ACTION PLAN**

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3.1 By the provisions of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, the ASF will be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. It further states that the ASF shall, *inter alia*, perform functions in the following areas:

- a. Observation and monitoring missions.
- b. Other types of peace support missions.
- c. Intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU).
- d. Preventive deployment.
- e. Peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation.
- f. Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and
- g. Any other functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly.

3.2 As an approach, the development of the concept of the ASF must be informed by the dynamics of relevant conflict and mission scenarios, the instructive experiences of the existing Mechanism, as well as by the experience of the UN System in peace operations, and by other models evolved outside of Africa. As far as possible, the ASF will use UN doctrine, guidelines, training and standards. The concept will also need to be validated against pragmatic conflict scenarios.

3.3 There are clear, significant and fundamental gaps between the capabilities needed to realise the AU goals and current capacity. The main areas of concern being lack of political will and readiness; lack of financial resources; lack of equipment and logistical capacity; and in some areas, lack of training. For these

reasons, the full development of the ASF will need to be viewed as a longer-term project.

3.4 For the military, the basis of the ASF is a mix of observers and standby brigades. There are a number of options for development of the standby brigades. They can either be centrally managed by the AU, managed by SROs for the AU, or a combination of both (that is, progressively creating standby brigades in those sub-regions that have the capacity to do so, and creating another standby brigade centrally managed by the AU, which all Member States could contribute towards). The best approach for the African environment should be considered by the PSC and the ACDS.

3.5 Taking into account financial reality, previous ACDS guidance and experiences, in broad outline the Panel recommends that the ASF be developed in phases to provide:

- a. A reasonable level of staffing to develop a strategic level HQ (PSOD) capacity, managing an on-call individual reinforcement system to gain mission level (ASF) HQ capacity, and specialist mission level civilian components, such as those dealing with human rights.
- b. A system of sub-regionally managed standby brigade groups, eventually capable of deployment in 30 days, that maintains a small full time core planning staff (15) with individual on-call reinforcement of other brigade HQ staff positions, and a pool of units on standby in Member States that are supported by appropriate administrative, logistics and training infrastructures.
- c. An AU managed high readiness brigade capable of deployment in 30 days comprising a HQ, including a full time planning staff of 15, plus a pool of units able to be committed by Member States from all sub-regions, supported by appropriate administrative, logistics and training infrastructures.
- d. An AU-managed standby system of military observers and police capacity, preferably consisting of individuals nominated to on-call lists. Alternatively, if it is impracticable to provide names, Member States could also advise the numbers of appropriately trained and prepared military observers and police that they could provide.

3.6 The entire standby system would use as its basis for doctrine and training, concepts and material developed by the UN and SHIRBRIG and other

organisations (as outlined in the Standby models described in Annex F). It should also be linked into the UNSAS.

Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability

3.7 While the AU should provide overall political direction to peace operations in Africa that are not commanded by the UN, it is clear that some missions could be managed at the strategic level by SROs, but with AU and UN sanction as appropriate. Indeed, such SRO-mandated missions should have the involvement of the AU and the UN, which should, to various degrees, provide not only diplomatic support, but also direct financial and logistical assistance and assistance to mobilise material and financial support.

3.8 Financial constraints and a need to avoid duplication with the UN System dictate that, for the foreseeable future, full time strategic level HQ capacity in both the AU and SROs will be minimal. Besides ongoing efforts to enhance staffing levels within the relevant peace operations Directorates (this applies to the AU and ECOWAS, for instance), the AU and SROs should supplement their Commission/Secretariat HQ capacity by using UN and On-Call Member State personnel. It is possible reinforcements may also be available from other sources, e.g., external Partners and initiatives, the SHIRBRIG, etc. The AU should therefore explore avenues for the formulation of MOUs with these entities to that end. As far as the UN is concerned, the possibility of such an MOU exists.

3.9 **Phases**. The Panel recommends that strategic level AU HQ management capacity should be developed in two phases:

a. **Phase 1. (Up to 30 June 2005)**.

(1) **AU Capability**. The AU should develop and maintain the full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2 (AU/SRO military advice to political mission and co-deployed observer) missions, and establish a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 3 (stand alone observer) missions. The structure is at Annex D. Experience suggests that at this level, a senior officer of the rank of Brigadier will be required in the PSD to provide an appropriate level of strategic military advice. The AU should also commence to develop a high readiness brigade capability.

(2) **SRO Capability**. SROs should within capacity develop/evolve their standby brigades within this phase. Where they can develop standby brigade groups, SROs should, by the end

of this phase also develop the capacity to use a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 4 (AU/SRO PKF) missions.

b. **Phase 2. (1 July 2005 - 30 June 2010).**

(1) **AU Capability.** In this period, while maintaining its full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2, the AU should develop the capacity to manage up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions. The structure is at Annex D. Experience suggests that at this level, a senior officer of the rank of Major General will be required in the PSD to provide an appropriate level of strategic military advice.

(2) **SRO Capability.** All SROs should try to develop a standby brigade in this period, and those with existing brigades should increase their rapid deployment capability.

Mission HQ Level Management Capability

3.10 Even though the Director PSD should exercise overall responsibility for the establishment of the ASF, it is argued that the peculiarities of the standby arrangements and the initial requirements for its effective management, training and possible deployment, strongly suggest the need to develop a skeleton mission headquarters in Addis, under a Chief of Staff (COS), of the rank of Major General; this rank is considered appropriate for missions involving brigades or contingents drawn from more than one sub-region.

3.11 The COS and his skeleton HQ should be embedded with the Planning Element of the AU high readiness brigade. With the benefit of his peacetime command, control, training and administration of the standby arrangements, the COS could be redesignated as FC/CMO to deploy rapidly with the skeleton HQ/Planning Element Staff to ensure that the impending mission is provided with effective operational management and guidance. Alternatively, the COS and his HQ could remain in the mission area for the first 3-6 months of an operation, to make for its gradual relief by a mission headquarters staffed by personnel recruited for that purpose.

3.12 The Panel recommends that such capacity should be developed using an on-call system of individuals and standing logistics infrastructure as follows:

a. **Phase 1. (Up to 30 June 2005).**

- (1) **AU Capability**. The AU should develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenarios 1-3.
- (2) **SRO Capability**. Where they develop standby brigade groups, SROs should also develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenario 4 (AU/SRO PKF).
- (3) **Lead Nations and Coalitions**. Especially in sub-regions lagging behind with the establishment of peace and security protocols and mechanisms, the Panel recommends that encouragement be given to potential lead nations to form coalitions of the willing as a stop-gap arrangement, pending the establishment of SRO standby forces arrangements. In addition, however, it is recommended that at the AU level, potential lead nations be identified for Scenario 6 (intervention) type operations. These lead nations would be those Member States with standing deployable HQ capacity of greater than brigade level, and with forces that are capable of seizing points of entry, ideally using airborne or airmobile assets.

b. **Phase 2. (1 July 2005 – 30 June 2010)**.

- (1) **AU Capability**. The AU should develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF).
- (2) **SRO Capability**. SROs should continue to maintain and improve on their capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenario 4 (AU/SRO PKF).

The staff structure is at Annex D and logistics guidelines are at Annex G.

Mission Components

3.13 **Military**. The Panel recommends the following:

a. **Military Observers**.

- (1) The AU should centrally manage a standby roster of individual military observers in order to be able to establish up to two Scenario 3 (standalone observer) missions simultaneously. This would mean at least 300-500 officers in accordance with the ACDS recommendation. Those observers on the roster should be trained nationally and/or within regional Peacekeeping Training

Centres (PKTC), to UN standards and be held in Member States at 14 days notice.

(2) UN Guidelines for Military Observers should be used and modified as necessary for AU conditions. The Observers should be paid by their parent Member States, while the AU administers travel, mission subsistence, and other allowances in accordance with its established Administrative, Logistic and Financial Guidelines and SOPs.

(3) AU observer missions should be supported from the AU logistical infrastructure, which should include equipment maintained centrally (AU MLD).

b. **Formed Units.**

Where capable, by 30 June 2005, the AU and SROs should establish standby brigade groups in the case of the AU this should be a standby high readiness brigade) that would consist of:

(a) A small full time Planning Element (PLANELM) of 15 staff, who should have the requisite experience and skills. They should be nominated as an entity for Group 1 of the UNSAS On Call List, and should be paid by their Member States with a post allowance being paid by the SRO on the basis of the cost of living in the relevant HQ location. Facilities, common costs and staff helpers for operation of the PLANELM should be provided by the SRO.

(b) Selected PLANELM staff officers could undertake on-the-job experience with the Copenhagen-based SHIRBRIG. The UN should be approached to use the Trust Fund for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa to fund this. Selection should be a consultative process involving the UN, the AU/SRO and SHIRBRIG.

(c) The remainder of the brigade staff would be on call in Member States. These must be individuals who are identified by name and who possess the requisite experience and skills. All should be nominated as an entity for Group 2 of the UNSAS On Call List.

(d) Identified brigade units would be on standby in Member States, but must be subject to verification visits by the PLANELM staff to identify standards and shortfalls. Units should be nominated for the UNSAS RDL. Where shortages of major items of equipment are identified, these should be addressed through the use of central SRO stocks (this is described below).

(e) The pool of units that are identified as part of the system should exceed that required for an operation. This redundancy will allow for Member State decisions not to deploy, as well as allow for rotations and possibly more than one simultaneous mission.

(f) Central AU/SRO logistics facilities. SRO MLDs should hold standard stocks to cover typical shortages for sustainment and key items of equipment. The stocking policy should cover a brigade level deployment for 180 days. The MLDs should be controlled through a joint AU/SRO mechanism, but operated by regional staff. Alternatively, they could be managed by a contractor. Stocks should only to be used for UN/AU mandated or authorised missions.

(g) A system that would link the issue of equipment from the MLD, with final collective training, and certification that brigades/units are operationally deployable. Staff to support this collective training could be drawn from regional centres of excellence and/or from Member States. Ideally, if funding were available, dedicated collective training institutions could be established.

(h) The AU should jointly agree on locations of logistics infrastructure (MLDs) and training facilities with SROs, in order to maximise efficiency and effectiveness.

(2) Where a sub-region does not possess the capacity to establish a multinational brigade group organic to the SRO, or where for whatever reason a Member State wishes to contribute outside the brigade group framework, two options should remain open:

(a) **Option 1**. A Member State may wish to offer to serve as a lead nation with an established brigade HQ. In this case

other Member States could provide additional units on standby in a manner similar to that described above, with bilateral support to bring the unit up to RDL level as required.

(b) **Option 2**. The AU should manage a central high readiness brigade and standby system of units similar to SHIRBRIG and UNSAS. Units should be able to reach RDL level standards, if necessary through bilateral assistance. In particular, the units providing enabling capability for rapid deployment, should be included in this option.

(3) As regards employment, the Panel noted that a brigade would not be restricted to undertaking missions in its own sub-region. Where an SRO standby brigade is employed within its own region, the Panel is of the view that the command, control and management of such a brigade will be an SRO responsibility.

(4) Two or more brigades could be linked to establish a Scenario 5 (complex PKF) mission. Where such brigades are drawn from more than one SRO, or where a number of single nation standby units are composed for an ASF mission, the AU should assume command, control and administrative responsibility for such missions.

(5) Standby brigades could also be used as follow-on forces after the initial lead nation forced entry in a Scenario 6 (intervention) mission.

(6) Solutions should cater for a multilingual environment. In this vein, the formation of brigade groups should not exacerbate linguistic division that can be exploited by external actors. Multilingual capacity should be developed in the staff of the Planning Elements, perhaps through in situ language training, and ideally with the non-permanent staff.

(7) In some instances, Member States may offer specialised units that may be useful, but would not normally form part of a brigade group. To cater for this, the AU should include them in centralised arrangements managed at AU level.

3.14 **Police**. The Panel recommends the following:

a. **Individual Police Officers.** By 30 June 2005, the AU should establish and centrally manage a standby roster of individual police officers in order to be able to establish the police component of up to two Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions simultaneously. This would mean at least 240 officers, some whom would act as staff officers on the mission HQ. These individuals should be trained nationally to UN standards, or at regional and other centres of excellence, and be held in Member States at 14 days notice. UN Guidelines for Police Missions should be used and modified as necessary for AU conditions. Police Officers should be paid by their parent Member State, while the AU administers travel, mission subsistence and other allowances, in accordance with its Administrative, Logistic and Financial Guidelines and SOPs. Individual police standby arrangements should be linked to UNSAS.

b. **Formed Units.** Some Member States maintain formed units of police such as gendarmerie. By 30 June 2005 the AU should establish and centrally manage a standby system that would contain at least two company level units on 90 days notice, in order to be able to support two Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions simultaneously. These would be managed in a similar fashion to the RDL arrangements with verification visits, and as required, use the central AU logistical infrastructure. In a manner similar to formed military units, Member States providing police units would be reimbursed under a system similar to the UN, subject to necessary variations to suit AU conditions. The AU should be linked to UNSAS.

3.15 **Civilian Components.** The Panel recommends that by 30 June 2005 the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of mission administration, plus a roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, humanitarian, governance, DDR and reconstruction component structure shown at Annex E. Qualifications should be similar to that required by the UN, while the AU roster should be linked to UN rosters. On deployment civilian experts should be paid by their parent Member States, while the AU administers mission subsistence and other allowances in accordance with its Administrative, Logistic and Financial Guidelines and SOPs. An alternative for some capabilities may be to establish partnerships with other organisations that have relevant expertise, e.g., UNDP, UNHCHR and World Bank, for reconstruction, governance, DDR, human rights, etc.

AU, SRO and Member State Responsibilities

3.16 While there is broad collective responsibility for the system, the establishment and maintenance of the ASF will involve specific responsibilities for the AU, SRO and Member States as follows:

a. AU.

- (1) Sole African mandating authority for peace operations in situations consistent with the UN Charter and the CAAU.
- (2) Establishment and maintenance of a capacity for direct management of missions as required, with initial emphasis on Scenario 1-3 missions from 1 July 2005, and up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions by 2010.
- (3) Overall supervision of the AU system of standby arrangements to ensure standardisation, currency of information and sound linkages with the UNSAS.
- (4) Establishment and detailed management of central standby arrangements for:
 - (a) AU HQ reinforcement staff, including an MOU with the UN and other willing Partners and agencies.
 - (b) Mission HQ staff and the Planning Element of an AU high readiness brigade.
 - (c) Single nation military units in sub-regions where no sub-regional organisation or lead nation state has established a standby brigade group.
 - (d) Specialised military units that would not normally form part of a brigade group.
 - (e) Individual civilian police.
 - (f) Formed police units.
 - (g) Individuals for civilian components of missions
- (5) Review of UN doctrine and training material as necessary to suit African conditions and then promulgate this to Member States, SROs and the UN.

(6) Co-ordination of efforts to establish a logistical infrastructure consisting of a central and regional MLDs, as well as efforts to mobilise external assistance towards the establishment and stocking of the MLDs.

(7) Co-ordination of efforts to mobilise, harmonise and focus external initiatives (ACRI, RECAMP, etc.) towards standardisation of doctrine and quality peacekeeping training for peace operations.

b. **SRO.**

(1) If within capability, establishment and maintenance of a capacity for direct management of missions, with emphasis on Scenario 4 (AU/SRO PKF) missions.

(2) If within capability, establishment and maintenance of standby arrangements for:

(a) HQ reinforcement staff, including an MOU with the UN, under the auspices of the AU.

(b) Mission HQ staff for a Scenario 4 (AU/SRO PKF) mission.

(c) A standby brigade group, including training at brigade level.

(d) Direct management of sub-regional logistical and training infrastructures.

(e) Elements nominated to the AU high readiness brigade.

c. **Member States.**

(1) If within capability, provide individuals and units to AU high readiness and sub-regional standby arrangements, including permitting required verification visits by the AU, SRO and UN.

(2) Train individuals and units in basic military tasks using national doctrine and procedures.

(3) Train individuals and units in the particular tasks involved in peace operations, using UN standardised doctrine and training material, and where necessary, consistent with AU SOPs reflecting African situations.

d. **Priority of Effort**. The Panel recommends that, where required, the following factors be taken into consideration in determining the priority of effort in establishing the sub-regional standby brigades:

- (1) Regional volatility.
- (2) Regional political cohesion.
- (3) Existing security architecture and infrastructure.

Enhancing Co-operation with the UN

3.17 There are a number of areas where the ASF Concept and overall African peace and security agenda can be enhanced through co-operation with the UN. The Panel recommends that:

a. **HQ Capacity**. In establishing high readiness and standby brigade groups, the AU and SRO should establish an MOU with the UN to reinforce strategic HQ capacity, using an on call UN Planning, Liaison, and Advisory Team. Additionally the UN should consider on request of the AU reinforcing the UNLO office in Addis with a peacekeeping specialist.

b. **Standby Information**. Where Member States approve, the AU should ensure African standby information is included in UN standby databases. The UN should share its detailed requirements for military, police and civilian standby with the AU.

c. **Doctrine and Training Material**. The AU should consult closely with the UN to gain access to the latest UN peace operations doctrine and training material and modify this as necessary to suit African conditions. Essentially, all African peacekeeping centres of excellence should have and use such material. The AU, SROs and Member States should actively participate in the activities of the DPKO Training and Evaluation Service Standardised Generic Training Module Project. To that end, the UN (DPKO) should be invited to participate in the planning and conduct of all forms of peacekeeping training and exercises, including those within the frameworks of external initiatives.

- d. **On the Job Experience.** The AU and SROs should co-operate closely with the UN to gain experience at UN HQ, and with the Planning Element of the Copenhagen-based SHIRBRIG. The UN should be approached to fund this through the appropriate Trust Fund.
- e. **Logistics Co-operation.** Given the AU goal of handing over an operation to the UN as soon as possible, the AU should approach the UN with a view to co-operation in logistics support.⁶
- f. **UN Consultations with TCCs.** In order to take advantage of this provision, the Panel recommends that one or more ASF operational brigades should be organised in accordance with UN standards to be fielded in UN peacekeeping operations along the lines of SHIRBRIG. The strategy of task-organising special contingents for UN missions is currently being adopted by some national defence forces—India is a good example—which have, as a result, reaped enormous benefits, including operational expertise and financial resources, from participation in UN peace operations. The funding of regional operations could thus be “subsidised” with funds from ASF’s participation in UN missions. In addition to their being harmonised with commitments to the UNSAS, ASF databases will also benefit from that of the UNSAS and help provide a formal framework for bilateral MOU and/or LOEs between African TCCs and the AU Commission. This is consistent with the coherent brigade group concept contained in the Brahimi Report.

Command and Control Functions

3.18 Reiterating the assumption that the structures of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are of relevance, the Panel recommends the following command and control relationships and functions:

- a. **Strategic Chain of Command and Functions.**
- (1) In accordance with Articles 6 (Functions) and 7 (Powers) of the PSC Protocol, the PSC, as the decision-making institution, should be the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU peace missions and operations.

⁶ A key step in addressing the issues of African TCCs in the logistic support requirements for peace operations took place recently during the Partners in Peacekeeping Conference in UNAMSIL, 3-5 March 2003. Follow-up on these issues should be aggressively pursued by the AU.

(2) In accordance with Article 10 (The Role of the Chairperson of the Commission), political command and control of missions mandated by the PSC should be vested in the Chairperson, who should then submit periodic reports to the PSC on the progress of implementation of the relevant mandates of such operations and missions. The Reports of the Chairperson should include, but not be limited to the following matters:

- (a) Introduction.
- (b) Progress of implementation of the ceasefire and/or agreement.
- (c) Status of the mission.
- (d) Status of work of other commissions and agencies.
- (e) Humanitarian developments.
- (f) Human rights.
- (g) Confidence-building measures, etc.
- (h) Observations and recommendations.

(3) The Chairperson should, however, delegate authority for the political direction and administrative control of AU peace operations and missions to the Commissioner for Peace and Security. As part of his functions, the Commissioner for Peace and Security, should exercise delegated authority for:

- (a) Enhancing the rapid and effective response of the Commission to conflict situations.
- (b) Providing the Commissioner with early warning information and timely, informed analysis of current and potential conflicts, to facilitate appropriate and effective decisions and actions by the Commissioner and the PSC.
- (c) Providing facilities for collection, collation and dissemination of early warning data, and communication linkage with Member States, SROs and peace operations and missions.

(d) Providing analysis of conflict- and security-related information, and research into the root causes of conflicts, for the formulation of specific-, medium- and long-term policy options.

(e) Providing facilities for collection, collation and dissemination of early warning data, and communication linkage with Member States and field missions.

(f) The detailed planning, preparation, conduct, direction and sustainment of AU peace operations and missions.

(g) Assisting Member States and SROs in any activity related to peace support missions, defence and security matters.

(h) Providing planning guidance for the implementation of post conflict reconstruction.

(i) Provide administrative and technical support for PSC meetings and dissemination of its decisions.

(4) Similarly, the PSOD should be responsible for the routine execution of all decisions and issues relating to the planning, deployment and sustainment of missions.

3.19 **Chain of ASF Command.**

a. In Scenarios 2 and 3 missions, overall political control and overall direction, as well as the activities of the mission and consultations with other Organisations and agencies in the field, should normally be exercised and co-ordinated by an AU Special Representative (ASR) designated by the Chairperson. All heads of major components should report to him.


b. The Chairperson of the Commission will provide the ASR with legal and political advisers, and with a civilian administrative staff, as necessary.

c. Notwithstanding the designation of a Special Representative, command and control of the military components of an AU mission should be vested variously in an FC or CMO, who should be appointed

by the Chairperson. He should be provided with appropriate HQ facilities based on the type of mission to be undertaken.

d. Military personnel of AU peace missions should be under the authority of the Chairperson of the AU, through the FC/CMO, and should be directly answerable to FC/CMO for the conduct and performance of their duties. Member States contributing contingents and other military and civilian staff components to AU missions shall allocate them under the command and control authority of the AU.

e. The outline chain of ASF command and control in a top-down mode should be:



- (1) Commissioner, Peace and Security Department, supported by Director (PSD) and Head (PSOD).
- (2) Head of Mission (AU Special Representative).
- (3) FC/CMO.

This reporting channel should not preclude the Head of Mission, as and when appropriate, from direct access to the Chairperson of the Commission.

Communications

3.20 The Panel recommends the following capacity for communications:

- a. AU responsibility for providing communications will be focused at supporting the following:
 - (1) An HF digital encryption-capable communication systems linking the AU Commission with SRO/REC's Secretariats, Regional Offices and ASF Missions (administration and

operations), combined with land/GSM telephones and faxes, as well as broadband and Internet facilities.

(2) ASF HF digital encryption-capable communication systems (administration/operations) with rear link to the AU Commission, SROs and Regional Office(s).

(3) Sector/contingent/detachment (combat net radio), communications, rear link to ASF HQ.

(4) Broadband and cc-mail presence which should be provided by the ASF.

b. Contingent responsibility for providing communications should be focussed at supporting the following:

(1) Forward communications capable of maintaining the required command and control, security, and logistics nets required to support operations within the units' areas of responsibility.

(2) Separate contingent rear link to home country.

c. These links include telephone, VHF/UHF FM and HF communications available and meeting mission requirements.

3.21 **Force Integrity**. The Panel recommends the following in order to ensure force integrity and morale:

a. **Multinational Balance**. As much as possible, staff appointments at ASF mission HQs should reflect the multinational nature of the force, and should be characterised by the same principle of geographical distribution, subject to technical aspects of levels of command, the size and attributes of contingents, and the rank structure of their staff. Appointments should also be rotated periodically to ensure balanced national exposure and to forestall tendencies that excessive familiarity with particular appointments could breed.

b. **Consultations with Senior National Officers**. Senior national officers within the mission should be consulted on issues pertaining to the operations of his/her contingent.

Enhancing Co-operation with SROs

3.22 In general, the Panel recommends that in order to enhance AU-SRO co-operation, consultative meetings between the PSC and SRO security organs should be formalised. Additionally, the appropriate sub-regional Departments responsible for security should be involved in ASF mission planning.

Enhancing Co-operation with the International Community

3.23 It is in the interest of the AU to maintain co-operation with its traditional Partners in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on the PSC. Such co-operation should however be reviewed to allow for increased joint AU ownership of the relevant external initiatives and assistance. Towards this end, the Panel recommends that:

- a. The AU should negotiate with its Partners to share in the planning, objectives and conduct of external support initiatives; the objectives of training exercises should accord with requirements of the AU,
- b. The AU should encourage its Partners and donors to meet UN equipment standards in their assistance and initiatives.
- c. The AU should negotiate with the Partners and donors to have equipment donations through multilateral arrangements towards stocking, maintaining and managing AU/SRO MLDs.
- d. Explore through MOU, the possibility of strategic airlift of ASF equipment and personnel to and from mission areas, from external Partners.

3.24 In general, the harmonisation of security mechanisms and collaborative multilateral regional and sub-regional security with the UN and international community will facilitate global African strategies for peace support and peace-building efforts. In terms of external assistance and initiatives, it may facilitate a shift or change in the competing nature of external initiatives, and a move away from bilateral arrangements towards multilateral regional assistance arrangements. The G8 approach emphasising multilateral regional arrangements with African ownership underscores this point.

Other Suggested Actions

3.25 The Panel is of the view that the following additional actions need to be considered:

a. **Mandates.** Ceasefire or peace agreements negotiated by the AU, to be implemented by the ASF, should meet threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines.

b. **Entry-Exit Strategies and Mandates.**

(1) There is the need to highlight the requirement for a framework of entry and exit strategies informed by realistic criteria addressing the legal, political and moral dilemmas of intervention. The Fund for Peace (FfP) Seminar⁷ suggested that AU/SRO operations should be designed with the view to eventually handing over mandates and responsibilities to the UN, with or without the subsuming of regional forces. Where intervention takes place before appropriate authorisation, ex post facto, the approval of the AU and/or the UN should be sought. The PSC must be clear in its entry and exit strategies for each of the scenarios for which the ASF is being designed.

(2) For intervention, the level of coherence and capability required is such that a phased concept of deployment is required, involving a lead or single nation to seize a point of entry(s) to stabilise the situation, followed by standby brigade group(s) deployment.

c. **Staffing.**

(1) **Best Practices Capability.** Although not included in currently approved structures (PSOD), similar to DPKO, the PSD should develop a Best Practices capability, possibly using serving as well as retired officers.

(2) **AU Military Advisory Staff.** Considering the enormity of the military aspects of AU-UN consultations and

⁷ Reference is here made to the outcome of the Fund for Peace (FfP) Seminar, *Regional Responses to Internal War on the (African) Continent*, (Washington, 2001). In the main, the Conference recommended that: 1) the UN Security Council is the preferred authorizing body for military intervention; 2) in emergencies in which urgent action is needed, military intervention may be authorized by the AU (formerly OAU) or sub-regional organizations, but the Security Council must be informed and ex post facto approval must be sought. Sub-regional organizations must likewise inform and seek approval from the AU; ... 7) in exceptional cases, military intervention may be carried out legitimately by an African coalition of the willing provided that any such coalition immediately seeks ex post facto authorization from the UN Security Council, the AU, or from the relevant sub-regional organization, etc.

the implications of AU/SRO peace operations, the Panel is of the view that serious consideration needs to be given to the inclusion of a military liaison and advisory officer of appropriate rank on the staff of the AU Permanent Mission to UN HQ in New York, to facilitate appropriate military staff actions on issues relating to peace and security.

- d. **IT**. IT needs to be considered as a vital tool for ASF command, control and communications. Ongoing improvements in IT resources and facilities at the AU Commission and some SRO Secretariats should therefore be extended to the ASF. The ASF must also be provided with appropriate reliable and effective multiple link communications, including Internet access and mission Intranet facilities. In this sense, consideration should be given to the need to establish a small IT/EDP cell at the Commission (within the PSD), SRO Secretariats and within the rapidly deployable ASF HQ, which resources could then be expanded during deployment.
- e. **Quick Impact Projects**. Even though the ASF will not be expected to undertake serious humanitarian projects, it should be endowed with appropriate resources and capacity in specialised units, to undertake QIP and limited post-conflict reconstruction. This accords with the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel for UN peace operations.
- f. **Reimbursement**. The AU should decide as to whether it would reimburse contributors. Indications are that some Member States would be unable to contribute to operations without adequate reimbursement. If reimbursement is determined, using the relevant UN scales of reimbursement as a guide, the AU, in consultation with SROs, should determine its own scales based on its capacity to fund the reimbursement regime. A sample of the UN scales of reimbursement is at Annex G.
- g. **AU Logistical Infrastructure for PSO**. Any AU logistics support strategy should aim to enable rapid and effective deployment, on the one hand, and mission sustainability on the other. To this end, it is suggested that the AMLD should be incorporated into a system of sub-regional MLDs.⁸ In future, external logistical facilities in the region should be

⁸ Essentially, the idea of an OAU MLD started with the establishment of the Cairo Declaration establishing the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. It was given practical expression with a US initiative of providing military equipment assistance to support the projected 100-man OAU military observer force (MOF), in order to enhance the capacity of the OAU for PSO. The recommendations of

negotiated to support these MLDs. Alternatively, the AMLD could be centralised like the UNLB (Brindisi); this has the advantage of maximising the management and maintenance resources of the facility, even though it will also entail higher costs in strategic air and sea lifts.

g. **Equipment Standardisation**. This will probably involve various technical working groups in areas such as communications and IT, as well as key areas of logistics. Because of its very well developed system in this regard, NATO should be approached for advice on the systems they use.

h. **Funding**. To ensure availability of funds for the implementation of the Protocol, the Panel suggests that consideration be given to additional means being considered by some SROs, such as the levying of a peace tax. Additionally, assessed supplementary quotas could be made to meet the cost of specific PKOs. Furthermore, to stretch the value and application of available funds, and strengthen the confidence of external supporters, stringent measures for probity, accountability and transparency, need to be maintained. Stringent inspection and verification regimes at all levels of missions, and by appropriate AU Departments and Offices, will help to ensure this.

the ACDS for the establishment of a 500-man OAU-MOF and the standby brigades made its establishment more urgent. Subsequently, equipment has been donated by China (PR), France, Germany and South Africa. A new thinking on the MLD is the establishment of regional MLDs such as the EMLD and not a single MLD in Addis Ababa.

CHAPTER 4: OUTPUT II: MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Establishment

4.1 The Military Staff Committee is to be established pursuant to Article 13 of the PSC Protocol. In this respect, it should be established as a standing advisory military committee to the PSC.

Composition and Membership

4.2 According to the relevant Article, the MSC shall be composed of Senior Military Officers of the Member of the PSC. It also provides that any Member State not represented on the MSC may be invited by the Committee to participate in its deliberations when it is so required for the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities.

4.3 **SRO Representation** Given that operational capacity of the ASF is largely based on sub-regional groupings, the views of the sub-regions should be represented in the MSC. This creates a responsibility for Member States to consult with their sub-region, in order to accurately reflect the sub-regional position, and to periodically invite SRO representatives as observers to MSC meetings.

4.4 **MSC Membership**. Membership of the MSC should accord with those of the PSC. Members will serve the terms of their elected Member States serving on the PSC. In the event that an elected Member State of the PSC is not permanently represented by a Senior Officer in Addis Ababa, that Member State may authorize/designate another Member State which is not a Member of the PSC, to serve on its behalf on the MSC.

Functions

4.5 Having due regard to Article 13 of the PSC Protocol and informed by the functions of the MSC of the UN Security Council (Article 47), as well as similar provisions of NATO, the EU and the SHIRBRIG, the Panel proposes the following military advisory functions for the MSC:

- a. To advise and assist the PSC in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa,
- b. Similarly, to keep the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CDS) of Member States serving on the PSC and MSC well informed of all decisions of the

PSC, and their implications on peace and security in Africa, in order to facilitate their deliberations and decisions during MSC meetings at the level of ACDS.

- c. To ensure that policies and actions in the fields of conflict prevention, management and resolution are consistent with sub-regional mechanisms.
- d. To enhance co-operation in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding through consultations with the PSD (PSOD).
- e. Prior to submission of plans to the Chairperson, co-ordinate with the PSOD.
- f. Subject to the decision and authorization of the PSC, participate in or undertake visits to ASF missions, and other peacemaking and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of conflicts.
- g. Carry out any other functions, which the PSC may entrust to it.

Chairmanship

4.6 The modalities of the Chairmanship of the MSC should be guided by those of the PSC. Thus, the Member State holding the Chair of the PSC could also provide the Chair of the MSC. However, the practicalities of seniority of membership of the MSC and the need for continuity may require a longer term as Chair of this Committee. The Chairman might preferably be appointed by the AU, and should rotate on a regional basis. The Panel recommends that an appointment of about 12 months will provide a practical solution that will ensure effective functioning of the MSC. On assuming the Chair of the MSC, the Member State so elected should appoint a Senior Officer at least of the rank of Brigadier General.

4.7 In accordance with the Provisions of the PSC Protocol, the Chairman of the PSC should take appropriate measures for the convening meetings of the MSC at the level of the CDS. In all other cases, the Chair of the MSC will convene meetings and take appropriate follow-up measures.

Rules of Procedure

4.8 **Agenda.** The Panel recommends that the MSC should derive the agenda of its meetings from two sources:

- a. Members of the MSC should be given notification of all PSC meetings at the same time that members of the PSC are being notified, in order to facilitate their own deliberations, consultations, and provision of advice, prior to meetings of the PSC.
- b. As and when it is necessary to convene on its own accord, the MSC should develop its own agenda. The provisional agenda of such MSC meetings should be determined by its Chairman on the basis of items proposed by its Members, or advised/suggested by the PSD. The inclusion of any item in the provisional agenda may not be opposed by a Member.
- c. In general, the draft agenda may include the following items:
 - (1) Adoption of the agenda.
 - (2) Reading and adoption of the minutes of the previous meeting.
 - (3) Chairman's remarks and information.
 - (4) Mission/Security Information briefing.
 - (5) Substantive points (to be presented by nominating Member).
 - (6) Date and draft agenda of next meeting.
 - (7) Any other business.

5.9 **Meetings**. The Panel proposes that:

- a. The MSC should be in permanent sessions and should meet at the level of Senior Military Officers and CDS. It should convene as often as required, prior to all meetings of the PSC at the level of the Senior Military Officers, but at least once a month, prior to meetings of the PSC, which they should also attend to offer any necessary clarifications and advice when invited to do so. The MSC should also convene normally once per year at the level of the CDS, and include SRO representatives, to discuss questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa, and to review the activities of the MSC.

b. Upon notification of PSC meetings, the MSC should meet to deliberate on the military security implications of all issues coming before the PSC, and formulate common understanding and position on such issues.

c. If and when necessary/possible, it should arrange consultative meetings with the PSD in order to seek further clarifications on issues, or to acquaint the PSD with the perspectives and/or position of the MSC on issues.

d. The MSC should prepare briefs detailing the perspectives and/or position of the MSC regarding issues coming before the PSC, in order to facilitate the deliberations and decisions of the PSC.

4.10 **Quorum**. The number of Members required to constitute a quorum should be two-thirds of the total membership of the MSC, that is, 10 out of the 15 Members.

4.11 **Conduct of Business**.

a. In line with the PSC, the MSC should hold closed meetings, during which any Member who is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the MSC should not participate, either in the discussion or in the decision-making process relating to that conflict or situation. Such a Member should be invited only to present its case to the MSC as appropriate, and should, thereafter, withdraw from the proceedings.

b. When the MSC decides to hold open meetings:

(1) Any Member which is not a Member of the MSC, if it is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the MSC, should be invited to present its case as appropriate, without the right to vote, in the discussion.

(2) Any Member which is not a Member of the MSC may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the MSC whenever that Member considers that its interests are especially affected.

(3) Any Regional Mechanism, international organization or civil society organization involved and/or interested to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of relating to that conflict or situation, may be invited.

c. In appropriate ways and with appropriate institutions, the MSC may hold informal consultations with parties concerned with or interested in a conflict or a situation under its consideration, as well as with Regional Mechanisms, international organizations and civil society organizations as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities.

d. The MSC may also establish such working or working groups as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

4.12 **Decisions and Voting.**

a. Each Member of the MSC should have one vote.

b. Decisions of the MSC should generally be guided by the principle of consensus. In situations where consensus cannot be reached, the MSC should adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters should be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting.

4.13 **Other Rules of Business.** Within the foregoing framework, the MSC should evolve and submit its own rules for the conduct of business, records of meetings and any other relevant aspect of its work, for due consideration and approval by the PSC. The Chairman of the MSC may avail himself/herself of the services of the PSC Secretariat for the production of the records of meetings and any other relevant aspects of the work of the MSC. It will be wise for the MSC to be further guided by the relevant traditions of the PSC.

Accountability

4.14 The MSC should be an advisory Committee accountable to the PSC, even though it may consult with other institutions as explained in these provisions. It should have no executive powers of its own except as and when assigned by the PSC.

**CHAPTER 5: OUTPUT III: IMPLICATIONS AND PROPOSALS
FOR THIRD ACDS MEETING**

General

5.1 Since the second meeting of ACDS (Harare, Zimbabwe, October 1997), it has not been possible to fully co-ordinate efforts on the implementation of the recommendations of the meeting. Additionally, the UN System has embarked on the implementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel for rapid and effective peacekeeping deployments. This process has far-reaching implications for the implementation of the PSC Protocol, in particular, the capabilities of the ASF, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the CAAU.

5.2 To recapitulate, the Second ACDS Meeting, among other recommendations, emphasized the establishment of an OAU military/civilian observer force of 500 (100 from each sub-region), and standby force, comprising one sub-regional brigade each. Pursuant to these fundamental recommendations, the ACDS recommended appropriate procedures and structures for OAU's peace operations and training, as well as for the command, control and communications arrangements, and frameworks for logistical support, budget and funding.

5.3 In the main, the key implication for the recommendations of the ACDS is to seek to address the slow implementation of its recommendations from 1997 that are still relevant to the capabilities of the ASF. It needs to specifically address:

- a. The significant requirements needed to realize the establishment of the ASF in the areas of the multidimensional strategic and the mission HQ management.
- b. The availability of AU military components and troop commitments.
- c. AU equipment and logistical capacity.
- d. The introduction of AU doctrine and concept of training; and
- e. Consider appropriate financial recommendations to support the establishment of the ASF for submission to the PSC.

5.4 Against this background, the Panel wishes to draw ACDS attention to some outstanding issues from its previous recommendations, the revised guidance of the PSC Protocol, and the Panel's proposals outlined in its Concept paper that have clear implications for its future recommendations.

Management Capabilities and Components

5.5 The proposed management capabilities at the strategic and mission HQ management levels; the composition of the high readiness and standby units of the ASF; and the RDL/degree of standby and deployment notices; all have implications for national military staffing, troop commitments, training, logistics and finances of the defence forces of Member States.

5.6 The ACDS will need to reach broad agreement on the level and staffing composition needed to achieve a strategic level HQ capacity in two phases: 2003-05 and 2005-10. It also needs to assess the practicability of the individual On-Call system of reinforcements and standby units, as opposed to a quota system that may be met by Member States as and when required. This agreement will facilitate the assessment of MOU requirements from the UN and the SHIRBRIG.

Coalition and Lead Nation Interventions

5.7 For Scenario 6 (intervention) missions, consideration needs to be given to coalition and lead nation interventions, especially its regional political implications. The Panel foresees significant difficulties with the ASF undertaking interventions in the short to medium term. By implication, the ASF should be developed in the long term to undertake these operations.

Mandating Authorities

5.8 The understanding that the AU is the sole legitimate African mandating authority for peace operations, in particular interventions, has implications, for UN (Security Council) authorization of African interventions, and for the mandating of purely SRO peace operations should be considered by the ACDS. While it may be clear that the AU would seek UN Security Council authorization for African interventions, it has to be clearly understood that SROs would also require AU authorization of their peace operations. This is a matter for harmonization of AU/SRO security mechanisms.

Priority of Effort

5.9 Even though the establishment of the structures of the ASF is to be phased, it is clear that SROs will present different levels and rates of accomplishment. By implication therefore, having regard to the proposed factors, a decision is required on AU/SRO focus of effort towards establishment of the AU high readiness capability and the sub-regional standby brigades.

Standby Information (Database)

5.10 The effective establishment of the ASF is linked to sharing and management of the information on Member States that have made commitments to the UNSAS, as well as the UN sharing its requirements for military, police and civilian standby with the AU. This implies a more intimate co-ordination, and agreement by Member States to the release of information.

Doctrine and Training Material

5.11 The starting point for standardization is the promulgation of AU/SRO SOPs, which include significant doctrine for peace operations, plus the establishment of regional centers of excellence, whose curricula would also be consistent with UN doctrine. While the respective SOPs need to be harmonized, agreement needs to be reached on the regional centers of excellence. In addition, with reference to external initiatives, agreement has to be reached on the multilateral framework for the engagement of African Partners.

Command and Control

5.12 Command and control of multi-SRO missions has implications for the division of roles between the AU and SROs. Agreement is required on the need to vest command and control arrangements of such missions in the AU. In addition, the ACDS need to understand clearly that their Member States would allocate their contingents under the command authority of the AU. This would be in accordance with an agreed AU command and control policy, which needs to be developed and might be based on existing UN command and control documentation.

Communications

5.13 There is need to establish a technical group to determine the exact structure of communications and IT required across the full spectrum of missions, and between and among Member States, SROs and ASF missions.

Enhancing Co-operation with SROs

5.14 In general, as far as the ACDS is concerned, there is need to formalize their meetings within the framework of the MSC. Considering the proposed membership of the MSC, clarity is required on the inclusion of the SRO Secretariat responsible for defence, security and peace operations, etc., to be incorporated in to the ACDS meetings.

Enhancing Co-operation with the International Community

5.15 As a minimum, consideration should be given to the participation of the Chair of the MSC in consultative meetings with the international community, to provide African military perspectives on substantial ASF military issues. Similarly, the ACDS may wish to assess the merits of a Military Advisory Staff at the AU Permanent Mission to the UN HQ in New York.

Reimbursement

5.16 The ACDS may wish to press the case for an agreed AU policy on reimbursement of Member State contributions to the ASF.

AU Logistical Infrastructure for PSO

5.17 Further to the case made for standardization of doctrine and training, the ACDS need to define a regional concept of logistical support infrastructure that would also harness external assistance inflows towards centers of excellence as well as collective regional training.

Equipment Standardization

5.18 The ACDS would best be suited to appreciate the implications of standardization of equipment. It should be their responsibility to clarify for AU action the framework for standardization, and further steps towards convening a technical meeting to provide advice on this issue.

Funding

5.19 While funding of ASF training, deployment and sustainment would be an AU/SRO function, the ACDS need to reflect on modalities for administrative and logistical inspections, and the appropriate verification regime, to enhance accountability in ASF missions, in order to promote international community confidence.

Conclusion

5.20 The proposed ACDS Meeting should therefore aim at broad consensus on these issues and proposals that are relevant to ongoing consultations with the UN and the international community. In addition, they should be aiming at making appropriate contributions to the formulation of a global African defence and security strategy and architecture, as inputs to ongoing consultations on African Defence Policy. The ASF is a vital part of this architecture.

5.21 In this respect, the ACDS should aggressively seek fresh responses from Member States and SROs to restart the implementation of further recommendations they would be making.