

NAIROBI PEACE INITIATIVE-AFRICA

**REPORT OF PART II OF A PEACEBUILDING
PRACTITIONERS' REGIONAL WORKSHOP ON CONFLICT
EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE METHODOLOGY AND
APPLICATION**

KENYA SCHOOL OF MONETARY STUDIES

NAIROBI, KENYA

16 – 22 FEBRUARY 2003

CONTENTS	PAGE NUMBER
Abbreviations	3
Executive Summary	4
Opening Session- Welcome remarks	6
Expectations from participants	7
Overview of PART 1 workshop	7
Risk Assessment template and Methodology	8
Engendering assessment	13
Review of CIFP Great Lakes Report	15
Introduction to Risk Assessment	16
Proximate indicators in Conflict Analysis	17
Conflict monitoring: Methodology and Application	18
Operationalizing monitoring	19
Managing risks in conflict monitoring	21
Conflict reporting	23
Conflict prevention-Linking warning to response	25
Response mapping	25
Role of outside Policy Makers in Conflict Analysis	26
Strategic Roundtable Conference	28
Way Forward	29
Closing Session: Returning to the real world	30
Annexes: -	
Annex 1: Sharing of experiences	31
Annex 2: Group Work-Identify events that lead to high-risk factors	35
Annex 3: Group Work-How to identify events in Conflict Analysis	41
Annex 4: Group Work-Developing a Conflict Report/ Policy Brief	47
Annex 5: List of participants	55

ABBREVIATIONS

AU	-	African Union
Bakurata	-	National Muslim Council (TZ)
CCM	-	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCT	-	Christian Council of Tanzania
CIFP	-	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
CUF	-	Civic United Front
CRS	-	Catholic Relief Services
CSOs	-	Civil Society Organizations
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	-	East African Community
EDP	-	Externally Displaced People
ER	-	Early Response
EW	-	Early Warning
FEWER	-	Forum for Early Warning & Early Response
IDP	-	Internally Displaced People
KYPPEDE	-	Kibera Youth Programme for Peace and Development
LRA	-	Lords Resistance Army
NPI-A	-	Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa
NCCK	-	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NRM/A	-	National Resistance Movement/ Army
OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
PRA	-	People's Redemption Army
TEC	-	Tanzania Episcopal Conference
TPDF	-	Tanzanian People's Defence Force
TZ	-	Tanzania
UN	-	United Nations
UNLA	-	Uganda National Liberation Army
UNRF	-	Uganda National Rescue Front
UPC	-	Uganda Peoples Congress
UPDM/A	-	Uganda People's Democratic Movement/Army
UPM/A	-	Uganda People's Movement/Army
WANEP	-	West Africa Network for Peace building

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part II of the peacebuilding practitioners' Regional Workshop on Conflict Early Warning and Response Methodology and Application was held in Nairobi, between February 16 – 22, 2003.

There was a need for the participants who had attended the Part 1 workshop in July 2002 to gain more insight into Conflict Early Warning to Response methodology and its application. It is upon this background that NPI-Africa organized Part 2 of the workshop, whose objectives were:

1. To assess the progress achieved since the July 2002 Part 1 workshop
2. To continue exposing participants to current thinking and debate regarding early warning and response in conflict and peacebuilding
3. To expose participants to tools and concepts in qualitative and quantitative risk and opportunity assessment and analysis in potential or real conflict situations
4. To explore how practitioners can link more strategically their analysis of the context to the development of response strategies.

The avoidance of escalation depends heavily on the mechanism put in place to deal with manifestations of the conflict. It is imperative that actors in peacebuilding keep themselves ready to deal with the problem of conflict and instigating factors early enough.

The workshop participants came from Canada, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda and United Kingdom.

Topics in the training included: Risk Assessment template and Methodology; Engendering assessment; Review of CIFP Great Lakes Report; Conflict monitoring: Methodology and Application; Linking risk assessment with monitoring; Managing risks in conflict monitoring; Conflict reporting; Conflict prevention-Linking warning to response; Response mapping; Mobilizing for response: Strategic Roundtable; Policy analysis and influencing; Group work and the Way forward.

Discussions revolved around issues of application of the concepts of the training. Some of the participants shared experiences and consulted for clarification where necessary. The main output of the discussions was: highlights on traditional peacebuilding practices, homegrown peacebuilding strategies and suggestions about engendering the peacebuilding process including the contribution that the unique nature of women could make to peacebuilding. Participants discussed at length issues pertaining to early warning and the relationship with early response.

Among others the following recommendations were made:

- ◆ To build alliances and share information through a newsletter/ bulletin (electronic)

- ◆ Establish a regional network of EW & ER practitioners to address common problems, to share experiences and provide support to each other.
- ◆ Train in EW & ER methodology and application to introduce the concept of EW & ER to trainers of peacebuilding.
- ◆ Curriculum development on peace training to enhance a culture of peace through the learning institutions and the media.
- ◆ Sensitizing military and police on conflict transformation to integrate with the civil society and other actors through training, research and exchange programmes.
- ◆ Appoint a team leader who will be the focal point to coordinate each activity mentioned.

In conclusion, it was agreed that peacebuilding activities should be coordinated at all levels local, regional and international.

OPENING SESSION

BY FLORENCE MPAAYEI

In his welcome address, **Harold Miller of NPI-Africa** remarked mainly on what he has learnt from his engagement with NPI-Africa. These important elements are the software and hardware that help peacebuilders in their work.

The Software is the methodologies, framework and theories that help us to understand our changing world.

The Hardware, are the values or canons of understanding regarding a peaceful society. He cited the 1960-70s when there existed an African writers series, a respected source of wisdom on African experiences and issues respected the world over. This hardware is accumulated through talking with elders and is aimed at achieving the good of the society. However, at the moment there is a crisis of such a canon and it is up to peacebuilders to create or press for the creation of one.

Engagement comes about when the software and hardware come together. The price of peace is perpetual engagement of all elements in society from local to global level. There is need for a new core of people voluntarily taking upon themselves tasks of engaging elements of society. The result of our deliberate engagement will determine future results. NPI-A, WANEP and others are engaged for peace.

Samuel Doe of WANEP, after conveying greetings from West Africa, commended the Kenyan success in the past general elections. He acknowledged that this was the general perception of people in other countries. Mr. Doe noted that Kenya had set a new standard, goal or achievement for Africa. He hoped that this euphoria or change would be maintained for the good of all people.

He also noted that peace organizations should come together to make sure that the process of maintaining or consolidation the peace process in Kenya continues. In that context, Mr. Doe added that Early Warning is about vigilance and this will allow us to have a way of moving forward as Africans.

Prof. David Carment the Principal Investigator of **CIFP** thanked NPI-Africa for the opportunity to facilitate in yet another Early Warning workshop. This was an opportunity for him and the participants to learn from each other, as Early Warning and conflict prevention need to be done at the local level.

He briefed the participants on his work at FEWER, which is a network that provides background information on conflict early warning for early response but actors on the ground do the implementation. This background information or methodology is the software that makes work easier.

David also represents FEWER where WANEP and NPI-A are members. As a facilitator he was to help the participants gather more information on Early Warning through an interactive learning process. He introduced the topic on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) and the role they play in Early Warning systems.

The participants re-introduced each other and gave their expectations of the workshop.

The participants set out the following expectations for the workshop:

1. Design and implement EW & ER methodology for University curriculum.
2. Learn EW & ER skills in order to prevent conflict in different areas.
3. Networking in areas of conflict
4. Engagements regarding EW & ER and advocacy.
5. Cross border conflict: disarmament
6. How to identify Risk indicators
7. EW & ER: Case studies and experiences
8. Learn about Kenyan experience - General elections and transition. Understanding Conflict in relation to the Kenyan constitution debate: The place of EW & ER especially between the Christians and Muslims.
9. Civil society participation or role in conflict prevention.
10. Linking theory and practice of EW & ER.
11. Deepen and solidify EW & ER expertise.
12. Definition of conflict, pre-conflict, crisis, outcome and the dominant characteristics manifesting in each phase.
13. The conflict carrying capacity in relation to teamwork or team building, the peace generating factors and the root causes of conflict mapping.
14. As peacebuilders, they acknowledged that there was a spiritual dimension to conflict prevention. They expected to have meditations everyday to reflect on peace.

Lastly came the sharing of experiences and how the participants applied the knowledge acquired in the Part 1 workshop, (*Refer to Annex 1*).

OVERVIEW OF THE LAST TRAINING

BY THELMA EKIYOR

The overview of the last training was a clarification on definition of concepts in the following areas: conflict analysis; conflict prevention; phases of conflict; goals of early warning; stakeholder analysis; scenario building; gender sensitive conflict prevention systems; response mapping and the way forward.

Discussions centered on the linkages of EW to ER. The participants' expectations were to understand the linkages in terms of the capacity to respond, the willingness of the actors especially, the end-users of the EW reports to respond to the warnings and indicators sent out to them.

RISK ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE AND METHODOLOGY

BY PROF. DAVID CARMENT

Risk assessment is the calculation of the degree of danger attached to a course of action for the purpose of uncertainty reduction.

“Risk assessment and Early Warning are distinct but complementary activities. Risk assessments are based on the systematic analysis of remote and intermediate conditions. Early warning requires near-real-time assessment of events that, in a high risk environment, are likely to accelerate or trigger the rapid escalation of conflict”.

The discussion was on how to apply risk assessment reports, this being the proper use of reports in a high-risk situation by checking on the merits of the analysis; identifying critical indicators; recognizing that a quality report does not guarantee the right response because of different constraints; finally convincing actors that EW needs fast response as early response is less costly than later response.

The discussion on the linkages of EW and risk assessment followed these stages:

1. The conflict management spectrum
2. The conflict transformation spectrum - conflict escalation, conflict endurance, conflict termination and conflict resolution.
3. Relevance of Early Warning
4. Analytical needs
5. The Early warning and risk assessment typology.

1. The conflict management spectrum

1st stage - Conflict Formation is characterized by unstable relations/latent conflict calling for preventive diplomacy/preventive deployment in order to mitigate/prevent conflict as in Macedonia (1992-1999).

This stage identifies the proper means to respond to conflict with minimum losses in the cheapest way, mainly with the use of civil society.

2. The conflict transformation spectrum

2nd Stage - Conflict Escalation is characterized by sporadic violence and high tensions calling for crisis management/crisis intervention to de-escalate/reduce tensions as in Croatia and Bosnia.

3rd Stage - Conflict Endurance is characterized by intense armed violence calling for mediation with leverage/peacekeeping/enforcement to contain/ control violence as in Bosnia (1991-1995).

4th Stage - Conflict Termination is characterized by a cease-fire/ reduced violence calling for negotiations and/or peacekeeping in order to prevent recurrence as in Kosovo 1999.

5th Stage - Conflict Resolution is characterized by interdependence/cooperation so that new institutions and peace building can take place to address the underlying sources of conflict as in Bosnia (current).

3. Is Early Warning difficult or necessary? - What hinders its implementation?

- Cost Effective Argument
- Targeted Policy options
- Mainstreaming
- Inverse U Curve-signals/noise ratio
- Type 1 and 2 errors include:
 - Type 1 - Warning is given when it was unnecessary
 - Type 2 – No Warning is given when it should have been

4. Analytical needs

A) For one to maximize the use of a risk assessment report, they have to understand the 3 elements controlling the conflict

- Conflict generating factors
- Stakeholder agendas and grievances
- Peace generating factors (structural and dynamic peace developments, effectiveness of peace-making/building activities etc.)

B) Confirm from a range of other data sources and analytical methods the reliability of the information, such as

- Micro-level assessments e.g. events and perceptions not covered by the media
- Intermediate and micro-level events such as those covered by newswire reports e.g. Reuters, BBC and expert analysts
- Macro-level trends using structural data and leading indicators

After getting risk assessment reports, there is a need to focus on key actors and decision-makers. This analysis will assist in getting a good diagnosis to determine the causes and consequences of conflict. The conflict potential is ultimately determined by stakeholder behavior.

Risk Assessments help to give good indications of where Early Warning should be a priority and for developing an effective response.

5. An Early warning and risk assessment typology

The typology operates on 3 levels of Analysis:

- Macro or long-term processes associated with system-structure transformation and the associated problems of the emergence of weak states.
- Intermediate mechanisms associated with institutional viability and state weakness, that is behavior of actors
- Micro/short-term selection processes and mechanisms that account for preferences of violence over pacific forms of strategic interaction and the subsequent escalation and / the duration of ethnic hatred, violence, repression and war at specific points in time.

CASE STUDY APPLICATION OF FEWER METHODOLOGY

CIFP METHODOLOGY

The procedure laid out in the CIFP (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy) methodology paper is for the purpose of clarifying the methodological procedures in generating risk assessment reports for foreign policy analysts and for the early warning research community among other end users.

Definitions used in the methodology context:

Early warning represents a proactive political process whereby networks of organizations conduct analysis together in a collective effort to prevent likely events from occurring as in the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER).

FEWER defines *early warning* as the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of:

1. Anticipating the escalation of violent conflict
2. Development of strategic responses to these crises; and
3. The presentation of options to critical actors for the purpose of decision making

Formally, a *risk* is an expected value indicating probabilities about consequences. Other sources define risk as the degree of danger associated with a given operation, course of action, or failure to act in crisis situation. Since some high risk operations promise high gains, strategies sometimes take a calculated risk. For forecasting, there are levels of risks e.g. high risk, high moderate risk, moderate risk, low moderate risk and low risk.

Risk assessments provide policy relevant forecasting, where forecasting is about the likelihood that an event will happen. They are diagnostic, prescriptive and complement early warning. By themselves, they cannot be expected to provide precise points at which specific events are likely to occur.

Risk assessment and early warning are distinct but complementary activities. Risk assessments are based on the systematic analysis of remote and intermediate conditions. EW requires near-real-time assessment and monitoring of events that, in

a high-risk environment are likely to accelerate or trigger the rapid escalation of conflict. Risk assessments provide the context. EW is interpretations that the outbreak of conflict in a high-risk situation is likely and imminent.

In the risk assessment for CIFP, the dependent variable is “conflict potential” as defined by FEWER. Risk assessment models provide a framework that enables analysts to interpret the results of local monitoring. CIFP political risk assessments rely on structural data such as cross-national indicators created by the World Bank, the IMF, UNDP as well as customized indicators.

The CIFP product incorporates open data sources and has unique indicators, all of which are coded and indexed on a 9-point scale. The data set includes measures of government stability, population heterogeneity, incidents of state failure, political violence, crime and terrorism, relationships with neighbors, the regional balance of power, major arms importers and exporters and the leading players in regional security.

It is apparent that a proactive approach to peacebuilding will be more cost-effective and humane. It is better, in terms of both economic and human resources, to avoid conflicts and disasters than to deal with their outbreak and aftermath. Ultimately the goal of presenting analyses and policy recommendations is to assist policy makers in taking action to prevent, contain and mitigate economic, humanitarian and environmental crises, and the outbreak of violent conflicts. Therefore, a secondary concern is resource allocation that will make effective use of EW information.

RISK ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE AND METHODOLOGY REVIEW

Risk assessments precede and complement early warning, through identifying background and intervening conditions that establish the risk for potential crisis and conflict. They focus monitoring and analytical attention on high situations before they are fully developed and provide a framework for interpreting the results of real-time monitoring of events.

Structural indicators of conflict potential

In order to establish a framework for analyzing the emergence of violent conflict, it is necessary to understand how crises typically develop and which possible avoidance efforts can be effective. In general terms, the factors that contribute to conflict escalation are categorized as “structural factors,” “accelerators,” and “triggers”.

1. Structural factors or root causes are those factors that form the pre-conditions of crisis situations, such as systematic political exclusion, shifts in demographic balance, entrenched economic inequities, economic decline and ecological deterioration;
2. Accelerators or precipitators are factors that work upon root causes in order to increase their level of significance; and,
3. Triggers are sudden events that act as catalysts igniting a crisis or conflict, such as the assassination of a leader, election fraud, or a political scandal.

In the CIFP framework, risk refers to the presence of conditions that inform the likelihood that some outcome will occur. Risk assessments therefore have the objective of developing knowledge of the causes that produce specific effects. Given that the primary dependent variable of CIFP risk assessments is “conflict potential”, these causes, e.g. can either be conflict engendering or peace-engendering, with their effects being either negative (such as an outbreak or intensification of violent conflict) or positive (such as the cessation or abatement of violent conflict).

In order to assess the conditions underlying conflict potential, it is necessary to identify a set of associated indicators. Often a crisis has no single cause and furthermore the different contributing causes vary in importance. Variables may at times reinforce each other, while at other times they may neutralize one another. Thus, the analysis of conflict potential requires an assessment of the relative importance of different indicators and their inter-relationships.

The structural indicators included in the CIFP risk assessment reports cross nine interrelated issue areas identified as potential “problem areas”: history of armed conflict; governance and political instability; militarization; population heterogeneity; demographic stress; economic performance; human development; environmental stress; and international linkages.

Accordingly, CIFP rates a country’s degree of risk in terms of *structural instability*. Risk is considered high in cases where a country has an enduring history of armed conflict, is politically unstable or has unrepresentative or repressive political institutions, is heavily militarized, has a heterogeneous and divided population, suffers from significant demographic and environmental stresses, has had poor economic performance and low levels of human development, and is engaged with the international community in ways that detract from, rather than contribute to, peaceful conflict management.

On the other hand, *structural stability* is considered high in countries that have developed stable democratic political institutions, that respect fundamental human rights, that have successfully managed conflict without resorting to violence, that invest less in the military, that lack profound ethnic or religious cleavages or demographic stresses, that have achieved sustainable levels of economic development as well as healthy social and environment conditions, and that are free from serious external conflicts and threats.

CIFP risk assessment indicator definitions

Operationalization of indicators: CIFP “Risk index”

CIFP assesses country risk by means of an overall *country risk index*. The higher the risk index, the greater the assessed risk of conflict that country faces. The risk index consists of the weighted average of nine composite indicators, corresponding to the nine issue areas outlined above: armed conflict, governance and political instability, militarization, population heterogeneity, demographic stress, economic performance,

human development, environmental stress and international linkages. Each of the nine composite indicators is derived through averaging the individual risk scores for a number of leading indicators within each issue area.

The weighting of each of the nine composite indicators is as follows: leading indicators within each issue area are themselves assessed in terms of three separate scores: the country's performance for a given indicator relative to other countries, *global rank score*; the direction of change for a given indicator, be it improving, worsening, or remaining level *trend score*; and the degree of fluctuation in a country's performance for a given indicator, *volatility score*.

ENGENDERING ASSESSMENT: GENDER SENSITIVE INDICATORS **BY THELMA EKIYOR**

The introduction centered on the theories of the Gender sensitive conflict prevention systems. This includes:

- Hypothesis of Engendering
- Why gender systems are necessary
- Inclusion of women in the process

Gender sensitive indicators that capture gender related changes in society over time.

- Elevate status of women for total engendering of issues
- Many women dreamt of war for the last 12 years as part of EW even Juju men predicted war systematically
- Role of tradition in EW in West Africa.

Difference between gender and gender sensitive indicators:

- Indicators based on gender provide factual information of the status of a particular sex e.g. 50% of women are illiterate.
- Gender sensitive indicators provides direct evidence of the status of women relative to an agreed normative standard or reference group e.g. 80% women are illiterate compared to 20% men.

Engendering existing systems:

- In 1995, UNDP engendered the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Gender Development Index (GDI) for countries with a poor record in gender equality.
- Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) - variables to measure relative empowerment of men and women in political and economic spheres.

Gender sensitive root or structural indicators:

1.Social-cultural

- Acceptance of domestic violence
- Discriminatory cultural practices e.g. FGM
- Harsh discrimination of religion of men and women

- Women's lack of control over reproductive rights
- High illiteracy in women as compared to men e.g. the girl child
- Numbers of boys and girls in post-secondary education because of marriage
- Value added to male or female infants
- Maternal mortality rate - health is undervalued, poverty endemic, orphans, bad or poor social amenities and women more prone to violence.

2.Political

- Fewer women in parliament or legislative processes
- Constitution that favors men or vice versa
 - Male dominated military because they were traditionally the protectors and raiders
 - Discrimination against men who do not join the military

3.Economic

- Levels of women and men in the labor force
- The pay structures for men and women both having the same qualifications and experience.
- Discrimination of women for certain jobs - with existing systems that have been engendered
- Undue stress on men as providers
- Women not allowed to own property

4.Human Rights Indicators

- Rape of men and women
- Flogging e.g. in public
- Restricted movement of men and women
- Inhumane widowhood practices
- Forced marriage
- Teenage marriage

Values have been developed over time and things have changed e.g. the myth that women are victims while they are sometimes the perpetrators of violence.

REVIEW OF CIFP GREAT LAKES REPORT

BY PROF. DAVID CARMENT

STRUCTURAL INDICATORS SPECIFIC TO THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA

The discussion centered on the CIFP framework of structural indicators that are most prevalent or specific to the African Great Lakes region. Some of these structural indicators are accelerators to the expected outcome.

The indicators of conflict or accelerators in the history of armed conflict are:

Observable:

- Refugees
- IDPs
- Physical destruction or destruction of infrastructure
- Armed groups
- Consolidation of power among groups
- Presence of soldiers
- Increased number of disabled, orphans, street children and widows
- Abandoned farms, market places, social places e.g. bars closing earlier than expected
- Observe level of progress with post-war expectations of the people

Unobservable/Psychological indicators are:

- Mistrust
- Intolerance of political dissent
- Panic

Indicators of governance are:

The level of democracy is indicated by:

- Number of private FM radio stations
- Number of political parties
- Number of privately owned newspaper
- Number of free expression rallies
- Number of free elections
- Lack of opposition
- Civic education from the government, civic groups and other providers.
- Level of concentration of power
- The human rights record

Group work

The group work was an exercise to identify events that are associated with high-risk structural changes (events conflict analysis) in the 5 regions of Ethiopia, Kenya Rural Kenya Urban, Uganda and Tanzania. In each region the participants were to:

1. Identify relevant structural risk factors using the CIFP framework and other sources
2. Weigh/rank the importance of each indicator ranking
3. Explain the linkage to conflict potential

REFER TO ANNEX 2

INTRODUCTION TO RISK ASSESSMENT **-THE FAST METHODOLOGY** ***BY PROF. DAVID CARMENT***

FAST-Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding

In 1998, the Swiss Peace Foundation launched a political early warning project called FAST. Its objective is the early recognition of impending or potential crisis situations for the purpose of early action and conflict prevention.

FAST aims at enhancing the political decision maker's ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner in order to formulate coherent political strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflicts.

FAST Unique features are:

1. *Combined methodology* that has a comprehensive approach in its methodology in both the qualitative and quantitative elements.
2. *Customized products* to serve as a decision-making instrument or as a comparative analysis tool in early warning mechanisms and the diverse needs of all clients (state authorities, NGOs or private business companies).
3. *Focus of warning* which monitors both short-term and long-term crises potentials as well as structural and operational strategies for conflict prevention.

FAST Country risk profile

- The annual FAST Country risk profile discusses root (structural), proximate and intervening factors that may lead to armed conflict, hamper conflict resolution or provide a window of opportunity for de-escalation and peace-building efforts.
- The crucial feature of the annual assessment is the formulation of case scenarios and detailed policy options identifying an overall strategy, steps toward implementation (including obstacles to be overcome) and specific tools/programmes
- In addition, key actors are profiled and a set of background information is provided (e.g. chronology of events, tension barometers, strategic information on political, economic/ecological, socio-demographic and military aspects of a country).

PROXIMATE INDICATORS IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS

(A case study of Nigeria)

BY THELMA EKIYOR AND SAMUEL DOE

Scenario building of the widespread outbreak violence in the Nigerian 2003 elections using a time-line as a tool to Early Warning.

Nigeria has witnessed several coups after every general election since their independence in 1960. Events over the years whether economic, social, cultural or political have acted as structural indicators that WANEP and other peace organizations have used to build a scenario to predict the outcome of the 2003 general elections

There are also diverse accelerating or proximate indicators, which are social, political and economic in nature that have hastened conflict in the six zones of Nigeria.

The following is an example of how a Time-Line can be used as a tool for Early Warning

YEAR	EVENTS IN NIGERIA
1960	Independence from the colonialists
1963	1 st Military coup
1966	2 nd Military coup
1967	Civil War- the Biafra War
1972	Assassination of Head of State
1979	The Shagari government
1983	Buhari coup
1986	Babaginda coup
1988	Islamic state
1992	- June 12 th Abiola takes Presidency - Abacha coup
1998	Death of Abacha
1999	- May 29 th elections, Obasanjo president - Northern states implement Sharia Law - Invasion of Odi - New constitution divides Nigeria into 6 geo-political zones
2001	- Assassination of the Attorney General - September 11 th bomb blast - Police Strike
2002	- Miss World Contest saga - Impeachment attempt on Obasanjo - Ethnic clashes & army involvement in oil producing areas

The basic outcry in Nigeria is that every former president has been from the more developed North. The South complains that it owns the oil whose income develops the North at its expense. The marginalized and derived South wants independence as it contributes 95% of the GDP while there is no development in the area especially in education and health infrastructure.

These proximate (catalyst) events and changes have become the structural indicators that WANEP has used in Nigeria's conflict analysis. Nigeria also has the conflict capacity because of its size and large population (Approx. 125 million).

The conclusion is that conflict or an anticipated outcome can be measured using both structural and catalyst indicators. Events can be linked to its continuity through the structural factors or its discontinuity by other triggers.

Group work

The group discussion set out to analyze the dynamic processes of structural risk assessment that can be used to identify events in conflict analysis. This was done using a time-line as a template structure to answer the following questions:

1. Identify anticipated outcome
2. Link events to each risk factor
3. Identify peace-contributing events

REFER TO ANNEX 3

CONFLICT MONITORING: METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATION ***BY SAMUEL DOE***

The following is a summary of the group work reports on monitoring: the definition; what should be monitored; how to monitor; steps to follow in monitoring; principles that guide conflict monitoring.

Definition of Monitoring

- A process of investing and systematically observing and recording in order to know the status, intensity, and magnitude of a situation.
- It is a process that leads to fact finding in order to better understand a situation and determine the action and response.

What should we monitor?

- Relationships between people
- Stakeholders and their agendas or interests
- Actors and behaviors (according to age, gender, diversity) - Grievances/ positions actions/ utterances, mood, attitudes of the people, the media, consequences e.g. casualties, interventions
- Dynamics - events, consequences, impact, magnitude, trends, peace enhancing or destabilizing factors

How to monitor: steps to follow

- Develop framework
- Undertake risk assessment
- Establish and validate reliable sources
- Periodic information gathering
- Continuous validation of authenticity and relevance of information
- Observing personally or through others the indicators of a conflict situation

- Use empirical techniques e.g. interviews, participant observation, living with the people in the conflict, train monitors etc.
- Identify stakeholders e.g. end users
- Mobilize (human, financial) resources
- Set time frame and parameters for mapping and boundaries
- Plan or strategize (set objectives, end product)

Steps in monitoring

- Understand the history of the conflict through - reviewing literature, interviewing people, collecting data from the people
- Determine where to look for information
- Acquire resources necessary to enable you to monitor
- Recording at each step
- Disseminating the monitoring report

Principles for effective monitoring

- Objectivity-neutrality; not taking sides
- Accuracy and honesty
- Preparedness - being true to the whole exercise; gathering resources; timelines; risk identification and how to overcome them
- Inclusiveness
- Confidentiality
- Engendered process/outcome
- Accountability and transparency
- Continuity of monitoring
- Timeliness of reporting

OPERATIONALISING MONITORING

Monitoring could indicate a process that is systematic, observable, following a purpose and information action (i.e. taking stock, trends, magnitude, intensity, analyzing and assessing an event).

In the monitoring process, the body of knowledge or information perceived as the threat to early warning is used to come up with a threat statement. For a threat statement to make sense, it will have to be effective to the end-user, as it will only affect them individually.

The threat statement is constructed from the recorded data. The early warning warners are usually not the analysts. So skill is required in the process from monitoring to early warning.

What is being monitored?

The actors' behavior, relationships, power bases and interests are the issues being monitored.

The actors' *objective* behavior indicators are statements and rumors related to the conflict. The *subjective* indicators are the breakdown of communication, irregular

movements, secret meetings, groupings, purchases and price increases, witchcraft related sacrifices and killings e.g. of women to get body parts for sacrifices.

Relationships among the actors being monitored starts to polarize, there is bad language (abusive), selective marketing or there is at times no marketing; use of public transport changes, there is increased irritation, there is no grazing for cattle in cases of expected cattle rustling.

The power base is related to the capacity to act and to mobilize; the number and public display of weapons; alliance formation and even personalizing the leaders to make them appear 'big' and more important.

The two challenges of monitoring is that there could be too many interrelated indicators to observe or too little to observe.

Value of an indicator is monitored through the following:

1. Frequency of the information i.e. The recurrence of the same information
2. Reliability of source e.g. through the media
3. Access to source of information
4. Accuracy of information on the indicator
5. Direct relevance to the threshold event
6. Salient indicators - whether they are valid, frequent and have direct catalytic effect on the greater event and their magnitude.
7. Link between structural indicators and monitoring - sift through the body of information for what exactly to monitor
8. Must be easy to measure although it would be hard to quantify some of the issues that have been related to Early Warning in Africa e.g. dreams, visions, revelations, prophecies, attitudes and the use of community seers who have influenced negative behavior.

Establish a framework for monitoring

- Data collection framework
- What to look for – in setting out parameters, hypothesis, techniques in monitoring e.g. the work of militias, political assassinations and even religious issues.
- Where to look for information - political leaders, religious leaders, in the media, libraries, the Internet and contacts within the militia.
- How to look from the primary and secondary sources- through observing, interviews, Participatory Rural Approach (PRA) and published materials (secondary).

MANAGING RISKS IN CONFLICT MONITORING

BY SAMUEL DOE

Early warning and risk assessments are equivalent to intelligence reports. The process of acquiring this information is dangerous both to the individual and to the institutions involved.

To note is that Early Warning was conceptualized after the Rwanda genocide where warning of the impending conflict were sent out but no action or response was taken.

Early warning represents a proactive political process whereby networks of organizations conduct analysis together in a collective effort to prevent likely events from occurring as in FEWER.

FEWER defines EW as the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crisis for the purpose of:

1. Anticipating the escalation of violent conflict
2. Development of strategic responses to these crises
3. The presentation of options to critical actors for the purpose of decision-making

A *risk* is an expected value indicating probabilities about consequences. *Risk assessment* provides policy relevant forecasting, where forecasting is about the likelihood that an event will happen. They are diagnostic, prescriptive and take the form of a conditional generalization. Risk assessments precede and complement early warning - by themselves they cannot be expected to provide precise points at which specific events are likely to occur.

The dependent variable in risk assessments is *conflict potential* as defined by FEWER. The areas whose leading indicators show a higher probability of conflict potential will have a corresponding level of risk.

Vulnerability is the issues that work to increase the risks through behavior at an institutional level. The lower the vulnerability, the lower the risk.

THREAT ANALYSIS

This is done before sending staff or monitors to the field through the following:

1. Context analysis to check threat in an area.
2. Trend analysis is to determine incidents and accidents e.g. death of peacekeepers by mapping incidents that have taken place or the number of accidents that forms the trends of risks.
3. Listing of threats depending on the credibility of the source.

The preventive measures can either be proactive by conducting regular risk assessments or reactive through the following ways:

- Being discreet or disguise self
- Use civil society to mobilize
- Join international networks
- Recruit trustworthy people
- Build a local profile
- Make contacts among the security forces
- Educate family and friends on safety

Risks to personal security

Who may be at risk?

- The *monitors*; potential threats to security, liberty or life of the monitors are numerous
- Their *contacts*: they are potentially faced with similar forms of risks
- Their *family, friends, colleagues* etc.

Where are the risks coming from?

- They may originate from the police, security or military forces; local chiefs; opposition groups; rebel forces; individual violators of human rights, their friends and relatives; members of civil society etc

What are the risks?

- Threats to the physical security of the human rights monitors include: attempted murders, death threats, rape or attempted rape of women human rights monitors; beatings, police brutality or harassment, arbitrary detentions; bombings of the office or homes; arson; mock thuggery; politically motivated burglaries of activists homes and offices; intimidation; humiliation etc.
- Other risks to personal security originate from: infiltration of the organization; phone tapping; trailing of people; lack of police protection etc.

One may be particularly at risk during fact-finding

- Risks to the monitors' life or physical well-being may be heightened in the course of specific investigation because of the nature of the case being investigated or the location of the investigation e.g. there may be increased vulnerability because of: poor communication networks, absence of the usual support network; travel into war zones.

CONFLICT REPORTING

BY THELMA EKIYOR

Conflict reports should inform on risk assessment. The proactive measures to prevent conflict affect both the local actors and policy makers.

There are three types of reports:

- Risk and opportunity assessment report
- Policy briefs
- Situational report
- Field report
- Thematic report

A ***risk and opportunity assessment report*** is not alarmist and it opens doors of opportunity. It focuses on structural changes over time and includes:

1. An executive summary that has:
 - Overview and an introduction of who you are and the end-user
 - Objectives
 - Methodology
 - Findings or results
 - Conclusions/summary
 - Recommendations
2. Geopolitical dimension indicates:
 - Cumulative stability and instability factors; political, economic and socio-cultural indicators.
 - Key peace or conflict indicators
 - Scenarios - best and worst and realistic
 - Conclusion
3. Brief history, sociological and ethnological background
 - Manage risk in the scenario
 - Conclusion is about the response options

Policy briefs help policy makers formulate response options on the basis of analysis. It mainly focuses on stakeholder variables and is shorter than the Risk and opportunity assessment report. The briefs include:

- An executive summary;
- The key indicators;
- Scenarios - best case, worst case, realistic case;
- Conflict indicator variables;
- Stakeholder variables;
- Directions for response - which act as recommendations or suggestions to where the policy maker should prioritize depending on the scenario.

The ***Situational report*** looks at updates of conflict trends and events focusing on accelerating factors and changes taking place in structures leading to anticipated outcomes. The key points should have objectivity, neutrality, and impartiality to avoid bias. The report updates should be regular field reports as the scenarios give the bigger picture with a dynamic link to anticipated outcome.

Field Interview Report is a report of the field activities and should include:

- Executive summary
- Geo-political situation
- Brief historical/ sociological/ethnological analysis
- Body-cumulative stability and instability; key conflict indicators/accelerators; scenarios
- Conclusion; directions for response

The ***thematic report*** focuses on a particular issue specific to a conflict that is used for learning purposes and not in the Early Warning framework.

In conflict reporting, select a medium, which is in the form of:

- Testimony
- Film
- Pictorial evidence
- Code

The effectiveness of a report is in the communication network, which must have

- Monitors
- Analysts
- End-users

GROUP WORK

The group work was an exercise on developing a conflict report. The policy briefs were on Ethiopia; Kenya Rural; the Kenyan Urban slum violence; Tanzania and Uganda.

REFER TO ANNEX 4.

CONFLICT PREVENTION - LINKING WARNING AND RESPONSE

BY SAMUEL DOE

The prevention mechanism seeks to avert danger or conflict. The danger can be prevented at:

1. Pre-conflict stage - early early warning for early early response
2. Crisis stage - early warning for early response
3. Post-crisis stage - early early warning for early early response

Strategically there are different measures of intervention for prevention at different levels:

The primary level has two measures:

- (a) Proactive measure - building on the values and strengths of a community i.e. the opportunities so that threats are diminished (strategic risk and prevention assessment)
- (b) Prophylactic measure - preventive medicine to deal with a specific problem in the society. It is more strategic than (a) above. It requires in depth analysis to get the right measure to prevent the problem

The secondary level is desirable when conflict has happened and it has 3 measures:

- (a) Active measure to tackle key actors, weapons, mercenaries, soldiers, reducing women and children's death
- (b) Reactive strategy to put buffer zones to reduce the scope and spread of conflict but not to stop it
- (c) Palliative measure is used to reduce the impact of human suffering through humanitarian activities and other strategies to deal with impending conflict.

BRIDGING WARNING AND RESPONSE

1. Policy options - the quality of policy option
2. Dissemination - selection of end-users by first doing stakeholder analysis in order of importance; analyze access to stakeholders to bring out an effective report
3. Lobby by follow-up - negotiating with key actors to seek support
4. Advocacy - a form of response that works behind the scene by one standing in the gap of a weaker person or institution.

RESPONSE MAPPING

This framework has 9 tracks or strategies, which can be narrowed down into 3 main tracks.

Track 1: formal intervention by professionals through

- Diplomacy for reconciliation through inducements and conciliation
- Military engagements through
 - Peacekeeping
 - Observation missions

- Peace enforcement
- Development Aid
- Direct/active peacebuilding through mediation and negotiation leading to accords and agreements

Track 2 is an informal intervention in conflict achieved through a strategic planning process that

- Provides deeper understanding of a situation through workshops, assemblies and conferences to learn basic skills in negotiation so that all can work towards peace.
- Share vision-envisioning peace in the future for conflicting parties.
- Psycho-social recovery process to conflict trauma

Track 3 deals with community participation of stakeholders by:

- Re-building of community infrastructure where conflict took place.
- Trauma healing
- Tolerance reduction programme

ROLE OF OUTSIDE POLICY MAKERS IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS
BY PROF. DAVID CARMENT

Structural and operational responses to policy interventions for policy makers from the DAC and OECD

OPERATIONAL	STRUCTURAL
<p>Hands On/Top Down</p> <p>Top-down, donor to grassroot (hands-on), to help modify behavior through incentives, sanctions, amnesties, peacekeeping and peace enforcement responses.</p>	<p>Hands On/Top Down</p> <p>(Giving avenues of responding) through defence alliances, economic organizations, World Bank, International Criminal Court (ICC)</p>
<p>Hands Off/Bottom Up</p> <p>Bottom-up, grassroot to donor, blue-prints (hands-off) and resources for training to help in mediation and preventive conflict prevention</p>	<p>Hands Off/Bottom up</p> <p>(Giving assistance) through Bilateral, multi-lateral aid to early warning networks, Overseas Development Agency (ODA)</p>

The emphasis for western donors is the lower right hand quadrant hands-off approaches for indirect structural responses to conflict. This approach requires resources, coordination and agreement between stakeholders and that is why there is a need for the structural elemental assistance to developing countries.

DEVELOPING A POLICY BRIEF FOR POLICY MAKERS – How policy makers apply conflict prevention

Conflict Prevention Regional Networking (CPRN)

Policy makers have mainstreamed their EW networks to improve cross-national collaboration by forming Conflict Prevention funds and by pooling their resources. Canada has a peacebuilding fund that targets NGOs. There are also secretariats, foreign ministries and regional organizations that run Conflict Prevention units e.g. the European Union, Sweden and UK.

Issues specific to the international community

Security factors associated with the conflict and deemed to be important to the donor community include child soldiers, land mines and small arms. The problem is that these issues are only symptoms of bigger structural problems. These issues often confuse local conflict analysts who have a more general approach than the one specific to a donor community's agenda.

Other issues are related to

- NEPAD
- Human security - *'Freedom from fear, freedom from want'*

Crucial points to influence policy makers

(a) Operationally relevant

All information should be geared towards generating a response. There is a need to know about a donor community's:

- Tools and instruments to accomplish the response
- Need to generate response
- Their hierarchical constraints and structures of response

(b) Consistent with flow of information

The source of information should be realistic and consistent with other organizations and contacts. Using reputable secondary sources should complement the existing analysis of other groups.

(c) Decision support tools

Graphic interpretations of the flow of events should be used together with a narrative and short policy brief e.g. graphical points of information are most useful, as most policy makers do not have time to read long narratives. The Internet can be used to consider other options and to obtain data to support existing information.

STRATEGIC ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE

BY SAMUEL DOE

A *strategic round table* is a conference convened with key middle level actors, mostly "coalition of the willing" for the purpose of macro-level multi-sectoral planning. These are policies that work together for the good of conflict prevention but it is not a mediation process.

Strategic refers to direction, future analysis of self-potential and power /weakness, mapping of resources and futuristic planning. *Round table* means that the actors invited are equal, have openness, dialogue and are expected to be inclusive. A *strategic round table* is a forum for equals who are thinkers and capable to rationally plan and contribute rationally to broad issues affecting all in the society.

The challenge and dilemma is the presence of spoilers who could be opinion leaders and who are capable of dragging, sabotaging or undermining the process.

Who comes to a strategic round table

These middle actors are representative and should not be more than 20 people:

- Religious leaders
- Media-influential editors
- Government ministers from the foreign affairs and internal security
- Leaders of civil society organizations
- Ambassadors
- IMF representative
- UN Agencies e.g. UNDP
- Peace organizations
- Development organizations

Steps of a roundtable conference

1. Discuss conflict factors, their interconnections and relative importance after research and analysis.
2. Define and agree on long-term peace objectives for the region
3. Identify key potential spoilers and reconcilers using stakeholder analysis of their interests at 3 levels:
 - Stakeholders aware of dividends of the conflict - the size, how much e.g. politicians.
 - Stakeholders whose dividend is in resolving militarization e.g. business people, robbers.
 - Stakeholders unaware of their gains either positively or negatively who need to be informed to cross over to either side.
4. Identify key preventive instruments (developmental, diplomatic, security, economic etc) that can address these issues to improve economy and strengthen the police.

5. Divide roles and responsibilities among the key actors (local, regional and international according to comparative advantages to other actors).
6. Decide on the time frame for activities and identify possible donors.
7. Design follow-up, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and make a commitment to one another.

Outcome of a roundtable

- A verified conflict report that is more authentic
- A strategic plan
- Mobilization of actors so that they can be invigorated to act and sustain the momentum. Therefore the process has to be short.
- Proposals for donor action
- Framework for monitoring and evaluation of the commitments - through learning the process and adding greater leverage that increases networking and credibility for future reference.

WAY FORWARD

BY PETER MARUGA

As an outcome of the training the following is a summary of the activities that the participants envision doing together to help in conflict prevention in the region.

OBJECTIVE <i>WHY</i>	ACTIVITY <i>WHAT</i>	STRATEGY <i>HOW</i>	PARTNERS <i>WHO</i>	DATE <i>WHEN</i>	TEAM LEADER
Sensitizing military & police on conflict transformation in its south region to integrate with civil society and other actors.	Training, research, exchange programmes	Lobbying/ advocacy	NPI-A, FEWER, department of defense, Office of the president, Save the children		NPI-A
Sensitize the media to integrate the concept of Peace building in the curriculum	Training and sensitization, review the curriculum	Lobbying, advocacy and networking	Life and peace, media houses, Kenya Union of Journalists, NPI-A, AACC, APFO		Partners for peace
Enhance a culture of peace through learning institutions	Curriculum development, peace training	Integrating it in education curriculum in schools	Ministry of education, religious institutions, civil society, UNESCO,		Partners for peace
To share experiences, provide support to each other	Constitute a network of EW&ER practitioners	From national networks, integrate within organizations, link with existing orgns, exchange programme	NPI, FEWER, Great Lakes network on early warning, early response & local partners	April-May 2003	
Introduce the concept of EW & ER	Train in EW & ER	Identify trainers; select topics to be		Before end of	

to train trainers	methodology and application	covered; organize country training; monitor EW&ER		2003	
Sharing information	Newsletter bulletin (electronic)				NPI, APFO Website

CLOSING SESSION

The closing ceremony of the workshop signaled the return to the real world. There was consensus that there was a need for peacebuilding activities and coordination for these activities at local, regional and international levels of society.

Florence Mpaayei of NPI-Africa, thanked participants and the facilitators for the work accomplished.

The workshop closed with a word of prayer.

ANNEX 1

SHARING OF EXPERIENCES BASED ON LAST WORKSHOP

Kenyan Forests Scenario

George Macgoye, a District Commissioner (DC) in Kenya, noted that the concepts of scenario building for volatile situations and every technique learnt in the previous workshop were useful in making choices as well as advising his bosses and workforce at the provincial level in the course of action in situations of conflict within the region. The concept of conflict analysis was also very helpful.

DC shared his experience of removing people from the forests where they had gone to grab land. These people had the "blessings" of powerful people in the former regime. This was a scenario for serious conflict but after monitoring the indicator indexes he was able to judge that there was no serious threat as there was no fighting but this was an issue of land grabbing. The rumors were that this would lead to clashes but there was no cause for alarm as the people involved just wanted to get a reaction from the government and there were no indicators to show otherwise.

Shootings and cattle rustling were the minor incidents, which were treated as crimes. DC worked with the Ugandan administrators and other counterparts to deal with issues of arms. To this effect the recovery rate of the stolen animals was very high between the Pokot of Kenya and the Karamajong of Uganda because of dialogue.

Kenyan Police Training

Peter Kimanthi, Provincial Police Officer, Rift Valley (a province in Kenya) commented on the Kenyan Police Training. After the Mombasa workshop, he initiated a two-weeks training of 25 police officers in Nairobi with the aid of Oxfam, a donor organization.

On a personal level he has engaged in more training in South Africa. The training was on Conflict Management as police are the ones who mainly find themselves in conflict situations. The training was useful especially during the election period. Areas that were expected to be violent were controlled.

Other participants noted that police should encourage the strength of relationships and use this window of opportunity to discount intelligence reports. The technique of conflict analysis would be better than the police using gut feelings. The police should also use conflict mapping as a language of communication to make information flow faster and more accurately.

The Kibera Slums of Kenya

Kennedy Onjweru, coordinator of KYPPEDE, noted that the situation at Kibera slums in Nairobi was predicted to be very volatile especially during the election period. The 500-hectare land hosts approximately 700,000 people leading to resource-based conflict for essential commodities like water.

During the election period young people who participate or perpetrate violence were identified as the major actors and were trained in conflict management. Scenarios were built, indicators identified and responses developed to include the young, women, religious leaders and police in the community through workshops and other fun involving activities.

Touts who were the major role players were taught on how to have respect for diversity without fighting. These touts were at the forefront two days before the elections in demonstrations on peace and the need to vote wisely in the slum.

There was also need for Early Response to involve all stakeholders especially the police in the community activities. This led to a community policing initiative in which young people were trained on peacebuilding. The youth who were the real actors of violence saw their perceptions change for peaceful elections.

Kenyan Women's participation during the elections

Berewa Jommo of the African Community Education Network/Women's Peace Forum (ACEN/WPF) described how women were mobilized, trained and educated on how to be election violence observers and monitors. Their capacity for research was strengthened.

She noted that during Kenya's past election, all stakeholders were involved, religious organizations, the civil society and police. This led to a lot of advocacy and pressure for peaceful elections. The Electoral Commission of Kenya was committed to do all that was expected even suing for malpractices. The politicians also committed themselves through the codes of conduct to maintain and uphold a peaceful, free and fair election.

Tanzania Coast Peace projects

The reporting participant, David Rwegoshora, Project Officer (Peace and Capacity Building) with the CRS, Tanzania, facilitated training of peacebuilding projects in the Coast province in Tanzania. The region had experienced post election violence the year 2000. They worked with all the key project stakeholders like the Catholics, Protestants and Muslims at the National Peace Executive Level to build the capacity of Tanzanians in peacebuilding.

Uganda peace activities

There is apathy to the few women related peace activities in Uganda. Jessica Nkuuhe of ISIS-Women's International Cross-cultural Exchange (ISIS-WICCE) reported that her organization tried to change this perception by doing an Early Warning video documentary on women and war in Uganda.

This documentary was initially shown to Members of Parliament, government officials and other leaders. It was later shown on the national TV channels. The documentary challenged Ugandans on their common problems. This has initiated

discussions and building of capacity for women-led peace building and conflict management activities.

A project evaluation of the Karamoja disarmament showed that women were not happy with the disarming of their men as it portrayed them as women-like. The evaluation also proved that disarmament could only be effective if it is done simultaneously at cross-borders of Kenya and Uganda and at all levels to include gender, social and economic aspects.

Academic Approach

A Kenyan university lecturer, Singo Mwachofi, said that materials from the previous workshop were very helpful in his teaching and curriculum formulation in the theories of Early Warning and Early Response. He shared the information acquired with other research organizations.

At his own capacity he was able to analyze conflict through scenario building and identifying actors involved in conflict situations. For example, in the case of cattle rustling in Northern Kenya, poverty, governance and culture play a big role in the conflict situation in the area.

Ethiopian scenario

Aberash Gobena of the Peace Commission of the Ethiopian Evangelical Church (EECMYCO) shared about the experience she acquired, that involves peace building and development.

She translated the material received from previous workshop to the local language so that all at the grassroots could understand, those in tribal areas, other representatives and stand-by peace committees. She also furthered the concept of training to include education and gender in conflict transformation and peace building.

NCKK activities-Journalist view

Christine Pekeshe, a Field Journalist with NCKK - Community Peace building and Development Project gave an overview of how her organization and other church leaders engaged other stakeholders in Uganda at the Karamoja border. The tribes are now willing to work together to solve the small arms crisis at the borders of Kenya, Sudan and Uganda.

The journalist utilized the skills of conflict analysis and mapping to make an assessment of the situation in the conflict zones and advice her bosses on the real problems and issues in the field. For example, in a fact-finding mission in Molo District of Rift valley province where there were incidents that could lead to a resurgence of pre-election tribal clashes.

Ugandan Challenges

Rose Othieno of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE) said that the materials from Part 1 workshop were very useful in training in conflict transformation in EW and ER especially among the Karamajong and Teso involved in the small arms conflict. The challenge is how and when to bring all relevant stakeholders together in this complex scenario and for them to agree to a more participatory approach to the peace process.

The training helped CECORE to design project follow-ups and evaluations in conjunction with other civil society actors, the military and the government.

Northern Uganda and Sudan

Cosmas Lam of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) commented on the relevance of the concepts and methodologies acquired in the Part 1 workshop in the Iron-fist operation protocol.

The training assisted his organization to expand its capacity, promote the concepts of EW and ER in advocacy, build scenarios for regional dialogue between the government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

The two main challenges of this process is firstly coalition building and networking of partners and collaborators. Secondly being serious, truthful and committed to the peace process by all stakeholders.

Kenyan Church Worker in Pokomo Community

Abarijah Kinnogah of the Coast Interfaith Clerics Peace Initiative reported that as a church worker he benefited from the training. This approach helped him understand the actors in the constitution review process especially between the Christians and the Muslims, as in each case the perceived enemies have rights.

The cleric was able to understand coalition building, identify key actors for peace building and sustenance especially in the Pokomo community, which he represents.

ANNEX 2

UGANDA

Structural Risk Factors in order of importance

1. *Governance and political instability*

- Intolerance in the system
- Lack of accountability
- Endemic corruption
- Lack of transitional leadership
- Governance more personality-based other than following established system

2. *History of armed conflict*

- Since 1966 during the attack on Kabaka's Palace, Obote 1, Mutesa, Amin, Lule, Binaisa, Muwanga, Obote 2, Okello and Museveni.
- Recently involvement in armed conflict in neighboring countries.

3. *Militarization*

- Excessive military expenditure (23% on other budgets to put on military expenditure).
- Reduced expenditure in other sectors
- Increased tension
- Arrogance perpetuating existing conflicts
- Militarization of citizens

4. *Population heterogeneity*

- Ethnicity
- Tribal and religious-orchestrated issues - North-south divide; Bahima-bairu divisions in Ankole area, thus myths and stereotypes about other tribes.

5. *International linkages*

- Prevalence of armed conflict in the region (DRC, Rwanda, Sudan)
- Conflict between the pastoral communities in the region.

6. *Economic performance*

- Wealth in the hands of a few
- Many corruption cases
- Tension between the haves and have-nots
- Unequal/ equitable investments
- External or foreign investors vs. locals

7. *Demographic stress*

- High population growth rate
- Big portion of the population in the youthful years
- High unemployment rate

8. *Human development*

- Poor living standards at the household levels
- Unemployment

9. Environmental stress

Land degradation/ deforestation caused by

- Internally Displaced Persons
- Refugees
- Illegal felling of trees for timber
- Cutting down of forests for security reasons
- Disrespect for forests e.g. cutting down of forests for farming purposes.

The challenges of engendering the process are:

- Women elected (30%) but not properly facilitated and there are no legal frameworks
- Prohibitive norms and traditions
- How do we engage the process of transformation to engender the peace process?

KENYA RURAL

ISSUE AREA	INDICATIVE ISSUE OF CONCERN	LEADING INDICATORS
<i>History of armed conflict</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violent conflict due to cattle rustling and grazing rights - Lack of trust in the govt. by the community - Presence of illegally acquired firearms - Lack of institutional capacity to introduce new interventions - Retarded development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of people killed - Loss of livestock - Number of internally displaced people - Closure of institutions i.e. schools, hospitals and even churches - Lack of commerce and services
<i>Governance and political instability</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Skewed representation and political polarity can aggravate violent conflict - Communal domination and ethnic tension - Corruption and nepotism leading to loss of confidence in state institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political intolerance - Perpetual incumbency of elected leaders - Dynastic kind of leadership - High levels of corruption
<i>Militarization</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High level of military militia groups, home guards, guardians, youth groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proliferation of small arms - Frequent armed conflict incidences - Several militia groups
<i>Population Heterogeneity</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conflict between pastoralists and farmers - Mobility of nomadic groups gives unfair advantage to the farming communities - Economic disparities between communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ethnic chauvinism - Differentiating endowment
<i>Demographic stress</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High population in market centers accelerates risks of conflict and by raising competition for physical and social resources - Unemployment-uptsurge of idle youths leading to increased criminal activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased crime rate - High death rate - Outbreak of diseases-HIV/AIDS - High incidences of crime
<i>Economic performance</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic decline, no investment leading to high levels of poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poverty and economic stagnation

	and crime	
Human development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor living standards - Lack of vital services - Delinquency-teenage pregnancy, child labour 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor services - Poor school environment
Environmental stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor utilization of arable land - Diminishing returns on land - Deforestation-cutting down of trees for wood fuel leading to pressure on natural resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Depletion - Deforestation
International linkages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regional instability or porosity of borders has led to the influx of firearms - Unchecked movements of tribal groups and livestock leading to poor policing along the common borders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emergence of cross border peace initiative

Weighing the importance of each of the above indicators:

1. History of armed conflicts
2. Militarisation
3. Governance and political instability
4. Population Heterogeneity, Demographic stress and Economic performance
5. Human development and Environmental stress
6. International linkages

Linkage to conflict potential:

In the Kenya rural and northern rift areas, the conflict potential is at medium risk in the following areas:

- Levels of management of conflict will determine whether it will come down or escalate.
- There is need for alternative interventions for example in agriculture alongside disarmament

ETHIOPIA

1. Structural Risk Factors

History of armed conflict (3 wars)

- Haile Sellasie (pre 1974)
- Military govt. - Derg (1977-78)
- EPRDF/EPLF-1998
- Border not demarcated (Ethiopia vs. Somalia, Ethiopia vs. Eritrea)

2. Governance and political instability

- Lack of adequate or effective political institutions to channel grievances
- Unconsolidated democracy
- Lack of effective implementation of the constitution

3.Militarisation

- Excessive military expenditure
- Increased military expenditure contributed adversely to destabilize regional peace and stability

4.Population heterogeneity

- Political and economic inequalities among groups will create potential for conflict.
- External support of conflict.
- Constant risk of military threat.

5.Demographic stress

- Rural urban migration
- Unemployment rate is increasing
- Unemployed youth also increases leading to alcoholism, drug taking and HIV/AIDS
- High population growth rate as compared to GDP

6.Economic performance

- Fall of coffee price in Ethiopia-foreign exchange decreased.
- High debt servicing
- Frequent drought and famine leads to food shortage
- One of the poorest or least developed countries in the world.

7.Human development

- Inability of government to provide necessary services

8.Environmental stress

- Rate of deforestation is about 3%
- Migration and displacements have led to refugees

9.International linkage

- Territorial disputes-Ethiopia vs. Eritrea and Ethiopia vs. Somalia
- Conflicts in the neighboring countries of Somalia and Sudan

Ranking:

- | | |
|--|---|
| - Population heterogeneity | 9 |
| - International linkage | 8 |
| - History of armed conflicts | 7 |
| - Militarization | 6 |
| - Environmental stress | 5 |
| - Demographic stress | 4 |
| - Government and political instability | 3 |
| - Human development | 2 |
| - Economic performance | 1 |

KENYA URBAN - A CASE STUDY OF KIBERA SLUM

ISSUE AREA	INDEX	LEADING INDICATORS
<i>History of violent conflict</i>	6	Leads to ethnic and religious tension over the years, people arming themselves with crude weapons, small differences escalate to outbursts
<i>Militarization</i>	5	Youth being co-opted into militia group/ gangs, cause political violence to influence election outcome, insecurity
<i>Political instability</i>	6.5	Political thuggery, Kibera as a national outlook/target, (determination factor), influence people for favours.
<i>Population heterogeneity</i>	7.5	Ethnic division settled along ethnic lines, tensions, neglect along ethnicity
<i>Demographic stress</i>	9	Population of 700,000 in 500 ha (1000/ha) scrambling for limited available resources. High rate of unemployment, militia groups, social decay leading to HIV/AIDS etc.
<i>Economic performance</i>	8.5	Govt. neglect - little/no economic activities for sustenance
<i>Human development</i>	9	Sub-standard living conditions, domestic violence, human rights abuse (child), poor infrastructure, low level of skills
<i>Environmental stress</i>	8	Poor sanitation
<i>International linkage</i>	1	- Conflict induced by international linkages/events - Proliferation of small arms from neighboring war-torn countries.

The mean scale for the indexes was high which means that conflict in Kibera is high risk.

TANZANIA

STRUCTURAL FACTORS	INDICATOR	INDICATOR LINKAGE TO POTENTIAL CONFLICTS	RANKING OF INDICATORS	CURRENT TRENDS
<i>History of armed conflict</i>	No. Of refugees hosted (800,000-1 million)	- Competition for resources (health facilities, land, infrastructure) - Environmental destruction (Ngara/Kigoma cases) - Influx of illegal firearms used to abuse human rights and peace - Conflict between TZ & Burundi govts. due to accusation that TZ govt. is supporting the rebels in the refugee community to attack Burundi govt.	Very high risk	Decreasing with the reducing of refugees
	EDPs to Mogadishu and Shimoni (thousands)	Political conflicts between CCM and CUF in Pemba and Ugunja (2001)	High risk	Decreasing with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord
	Death of people (31 people)	As above. Political conflict between the ruling party and opposition party	Very high risk	Normal/stable

<i>Governance and Political instability</i>	Regime durability (1961-2003) CCM in power for more than 40 years	Tension between the grassroots community and the existing regime due to discontent/dissatisfaction with the regime for not meeting their needs.	High risk	Decreasing especially with the: poverty reduction strategy in place
	Corruption (2 nd in E. Africa; top 10 in Africa)	Poverty as a result of misappropriation of govt. funds		
<i>Militarization</i>	N/A	-	-	-
<i>Population heterogeneity</i>	Religious diversity	Christian-Muslim conflict situation	Very high risk	Increasing
<i>Demographic stress</i>	Youth bulge	Youth participation in street demonstrations/ violence due to lack of employment	High risk	Increasing
<i>Economic performance</i>	-GDP growth rate and per capita income is low - Inflation is high TZ is one of the poorest in the world	Low standards of living leading to vicious circle of poverty	High risk	Increasing
<i>Human development</i>	Access to improved water sources (54%)	- Competition for the few water sources available - Outbreak of water-related diseases/ skin diseases	High risk	Reducing
	Sanitation services (50%)	Outbreak of water/sanitation related diseases e.g. cholera	Medium risk	Reducing
	Life expectancy (44 years)	-Many orphans - Lack of productive labour force	High risk	Increasing
	Infant mortality (100/1000 live birth)	Lack of productive labour force	High risk	Reducing
<i>Environmental stress</i>	Rate of deforestation (high)	- Food shortage - Malnutrition - Food and health insecurity	Medium risk	-Reduces with reduction in number of refugees - Increases with cultivation of tobacco
<i>International linkage</i>	-	--	-	-
<i>Constitution Review</i>	New constitution in place	Tension between the ruling party and the opposition party	High risk	Increasing

ANNEX 3

UGANDA

What we are warning about: possible outbreak of violent conflict or coup d' etat.

Structural indicators: governance and political instability characterized by a history of armed conflict and militarization.

Chronology of events in relation to the indicators:

YEAR	EVENT
1961	Self rule under the Democratic Party whose leader was Benedicto Kiwanuka.
1962	Political independence with a federal constitution (executive prime minister) after the victory of UPC following their alliance with the Kabaka Yekka (Kabaka Alone) Party.
1966	The Buganda crisis-the beginning of 'militarizing' politics
1967	'Pigeon hole' republican constitution
1968	The common man's charter
1969	Attempted assassination of president A.M Obote; banning political parties; one party-Uganda People's Congress (UPC) state
1971	Military coup by Idi Amin assisted by Britain & Israel; rule by decree; killing of Acholi & Langi in the army and later intellectuals from all parts.
1972	Invasion of Uganda by exiles from TZ, their defeat and subsequent massacre; economic war and expulsion of Indians
1977	Collapse of EAC; massacre of Anglican archbishop and 2 ministers
1978	Attack and conquest/annex of TZ; Moshi conference of Uganda exiles and formation of Uganda National Liberation Front/ Army (UNLF/A); Attack of Uganda by UNLA with support of TPDF.
1979	Overthrow of Amin Y. Lule (60 days), Binaise in charge of the military commission
1980	General elections (rigged); UPC in power (Obote)
1981	Museveni and 27 others launches a protracted war against Obote 2 govt.
1981-85	'Luwero Triangle'; state inspired violence; rebellion in West Nile; destruction of West Nile and the population to exile
1985	Conflict between Acholi & Langi UNLA officers; overthrow of Obote by Acholi officers (Okello's) Tito and Bazilio; Nairobi Peace talk between Tito Okello and Museveni.
1986	NRM/A takes power in Kampala; The Okellos retreat north and into the Sudan; resistance against the NRM/A in the north (Acholi-Lango) and East (Teso) by the UPDM/A and UPM/A respectively. Establishment of Resistance councils and National Resistance Council (Interim parliament).
1988	Peace Accord between NRM & UPDM/A
1989	Emergence of Alice Lakwena Auma, later Joseph Kony (LRA) to date. Cattle rustling by armed Karamajong herdsmen in Eastern and Northern Uganda. End of rebellion in Teso.
1990	"Operation North" an attempt to stamp out the rebellion during which the area was cut off from the rest of the country. 18 prominent politicians were arrested and imprisoned. They later sued government and were paid for wrongful detention.
1993/4	Hon. Betty Atuku Bigombe, who was Minister of State for the Pacification of the North, engaged the LRA leader Joseph Kony in dialogue. However, it later collapsed.
1994	LRA moves and sets camps in Sudan from where they received logistical support from the Khartoum government. A Constitutional Commission established to collect views for a new constitution. Later, a Constituent Assembly debated and passed the new constitution in the following year.
1995	Killings and abductions by LRA. The enactment of the new Constitution (1995).

1996/7	Presidential and Parliamentary elections. The conflict in the north escalates and people forced into the IDP camps. Emergence of the Allied Democratic Force/Army (ADF/A) in Western Uganda.
1999	Uganda-Sudan Peace Accord in Nairobi, Kenya mediated by former American President Jimmy Carter under the auspices of "The Carter Centre" and witnessed by Kenyan President, Daniel Arap Moi.
2000	A national referendum held to determine the political system for the country. The 'Movement' system won, but the multi-parties had boycotted the referendum. Critique of the Movement by Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye.
2001	Presidential election won by Yoweri Museveni followed by Parliamentary elections. Constitutional Review Commission and process set. Uganda-Sudan protocol allowing Uganda to pursue the LRA into the Sudan under the "Operation Iron Fist".
2002	Re-entry of LRA into Uganda; arrests of political opponents on treason charges

Conflict reduction capacity

- Uganda/ Sudan relationship
- Amnesty law
- Uganda-Rwanda dialogue
- Contacts with LRA
- Presidential Peace Team for possible talks with LRA
- Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF 2) Accord with the government of Uganda.
- Intervention of civil society including religious and cultural leaders

Risk/conflict generating factors

- Banning political parties (opposition)
- Arrest of persons seen as opposing government
- Buganda's demand for a federal status
- Defection of senior Army officers
- Increased insurgency in Northern Uganda
- "Re-armament" - Karamoja in north-eastern
- Advocacy for third term for president Museveni

ETHIOPIA

RISK FACTOR	INDICATOR	LINKAGE TO POTENTIAL CONFLICT	RANKING	CURRENT TREND
<i>History of Armed Conflict</i> - Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998	Failure to demarcate border between Ethiopia & Eritrea	War broke out in 1998	High Risk	Peace Negotiation; Borders & demarcation process
<i>Governance & Political Instability</i> a) Lack of adequate/effective instrument to channel grievances	a) Delay in justice system	a) People unduly imprisoned; family disintegration, loss of property.	a) Very High Risk	a) Judges, prosecutors, Police trained to expediate justice;

b) Democracy not strengthened	b) Human rights violation; Election inequalities	b) People disappear, imprisonment or killed	b) Very High Risk	b) Establishment of justice and Human Rights Institutions;
c) Lack of effective implementation of constitution	c) Delay in justice system; Human rights violation	c) Ruling party stays in power - public dissatisfaction	c) Very High Risk	c) Manpower training & establishment of relevant offices
Militarization- Excess military expenditure	High budget allocation for military.	Decrease in budget for social services & development; Foreign assistance reduced due to increase in military expenditure.	High Risk	World Bank urges reduction in military expenditure. No. Of army reduced during the Ethio-Eritrean war.
Population Heterogeneity	Nepotism	Dissatisfaction leading to tension	Very High Risk	-
Demographic Stress	High rate of population, unemployment & rural-urban migration	Inadequate food; possibility of riots; no jobs & limited opportunities.	High Risk	Investment opportunities in rural areas
Economic Performance	Fall in coffee price; High debt servicing; Frequent drought & famine.	Decline in economy, standard of living & hunger and starvation.	Very High Risk	Negotiation to improve coffee price; World Bank to conceal heavy debt; seeking food assistance; Strategies for food security.
Human Development	Lack of adequate social services	High infant & Maternal mortality rate.	Very High Risk	Effort to improve social services
Environmental Stress	High rate of deforestation	Degradation of soil	Very High Risk	Improvement of agriculture through irrigation; Tree planting; Soil & water conservation.
International Linkages	Regional instability	War with Eritrea & Somalia	Medium Risk	Improving diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries; Demarcation of the Ethiopia-Eritrean border.

KENYA RURAL

ANTICIPATED OUTCOME	INDICATIVE EVENTS	CONFLICT ENHANCING CAPACITY	PEACE GENERATING CAPACITY
History of Armed Conflict –Intermittent clashes between settled & nomadic communities.	Seasonal drought	Climatic differences & limited pasture	Intervention by elders, Religious & Civil Society; Government Security
Governance & Political Instability –Increased cross border cattle rustling	Less chances within Kenya & move to neighboring Uganda	Restoration of order; Poor infrastructure/communication; Lack of capacity to deal with situation in Uganda.	Goodwill between governments; cross border peace initiatives & capacity building; Network & collaboration among stakeholders
Militarisation –Increased cross border raids and domestic violence	3 recent attacks in Uganda & domestic brawls.	Presence of firearms; idleness	Disarmament, improved policing & interventions by stakeholders
Population Heterogeneity –Conflict over pasture	Drought; Pastoralism & over stocking of animals	Climatic changes & Excess animals	Socio-economic intervention
Demographic Stress – Re-occupation of land & reverse displacement	Change in government	Displacement	Re-settlement
Economic Performance – Famine	Poverty	Displacement	Re-settlement
Human Development – Poverty	Displacement	Lack of purchasing power	Humanitarian assistance
Environmental Stress – Crop failure	Environmental degradation	Collapsed eco-system	Humanitarian support
International Linkages	Cross border cattle rustling	Weak border security	Inter-governmental agency & civil society cooperation

KENYA URBAN

DEMOGRAPHIC STRESS IN KIBERA SLUM, NAIROBI

2. From Post independence the **structural factors** that have affected the demographic stress in Kibera slum are:

- Rural-Urban migration;
- Inadequate housing and planning policies and mechanism,
- Government failure to provide security of tenure

From December 2001, the structural factors have been:

- Government neglect
- Unemployment & poverty
- Culture of violence

3. **Trigger Events:**

- Up-grading schemes

- Presidential decree on rent
- Potential up grading

4. Proximity Events:

- Overcrowding due to housing shortage and informal settlement
- Lack of infrastructure and social amenities
- Unattached population bulge
- Politicization of ethnicity and religious diversity
- Gangsterism due to political incitement
- Economic polarization along tribal lines
- Xenophobia & ethnic animosity
- Environmental degradation

5. Outcome

- Domestic violence
- Demolitions
- Rape, maiming & deaths
- Business closure
- Militarization
- Closure of schools

6. Peace Enhancing Events/agents

- Interfaith intervention & alliances
- Youth and women groups
- Government
- Peacebuilding structures and process
- Humanized and engendered housing

TANZANIA

STRUCTURAL RISK FACTORS FOR THE HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICTS

The following are historical events that indicate predict the likelihood of violence before and after the multi-party general elections in Tanzania in 2005.

YEAR	EVENT
1961	Independence leading to Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU)
1964	Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar leading to Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)
1967	Launching of 'Arusha Declaration' associated with TZ philosophy of socialism and self-reliance
1985	Mwalimu Nyerere steps down (transition period)
1985-95	Period of president Hassan Mwinyi
1992	Multi-partyism framework accepted by TZ; CUF formed
1995	First multi-party elections, CUF wins 50% of parliamentary seats; CUF said elections were not free and fair and rejected elections and boycotted parliament; conducted street demonstrations against CCM.
2000	Second multi-party elections; CCM wants elections repeated in Zanzibar; CUF rejects results and boycotted parliament
26/01/2001	CUF conducted street demonstrations in Dar-es-salaam, Pemba and Ugunja; 31 killed, thousands externally displaced, hundreds displaced, loss of property, psychological trauma of EDPs and IDPs.
10/10/2001	Arusha Peace Accord signed by the two parties but has not been released to the public.

Specific events linked to pre and post election violence in Tanzania:

- Street demonstrations by CUF against CCM in 1995 as the elections were not free and fair
- Violent conflict between CUF and CCM in 2000 elections, 31 killed, thousands EDP, hundreds IDP
- Influx of small fire-arms by refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and DRC
- Youth bulge associated with economic stress and unemployment leading to youth manipulation and participation in violence
- Muslim - Christian conflicts due to perceived Muslim marginalisation and lack of public social services such as education which may aggregate Muslim participation in conflict
- Corruption
- Low standard of living due to low GDP growth rate, per capita income, and inflation leading to discontent.
- Poor disaster, emergency preparedness and response strategies (EPR) e.g. the 1997 Lake Victoria disaster caused by a marine vehicle where victims were not compensated. This increases frustration and participation in violent conflict.

Peace contributing events in relation to anticipated outcome:

- Peacebuilding projects are in place and operational at local and international level.
- Signing of peace accord between CUF and CCM-local level or peace contributing efforts.
- Interfaith dialogue is in place and operational - local regional, international level.
- Income generation projects for youth in the coastal zone (prone area) - local regional, international level of efforts.
- Constitutional review process still going on - local level of efforts
- Nationalism/national hood leading to coherence and feelings of oneness (Undugu) - local level
- Use of common language (Kiswahili) that is widely spoken in rural and urban areas of TZ - Local level
- Tanzania membership to EAC increases its access to peace since EAC is an instrument for peace-local/regional level of peace contributing efforts
- Disarmament of small arms- TZ is a focal point of Nairobi Declaration to eradicate proliferation of small arms in East Africa; small arm mapping project in TZ, which seeks to plot arms and facilitate disarmament – regional level of efforts.
- Tanzania as a peace anchor in Africa with culture of tolerance, is one of the peace contributing event - local level of peace contributing efforts.

ANNEX 4

UGANDA

Key Indicators/Accelerators

- (a) Political Intolerance
 - Arrests and detention without trial
 - Harassment of individuals with opposing political views
 - Suppression of political expression (ban on political parties)
- (b) Militarization
 - Increase in defense budget
 - Open display of weapons
 - Military science courses
 - Desertion of senior military officers and the alleged formation of the Peoples Redemption Army (PRA)
 - Increase in the number of private security firms
- (c) Abundance of illegal small arms
- (d) Manipulation of the Constitutional Review process is an attempt to get a 3rd term for the current President.
- (e) Conflict between the government and the Judiciary leading to compromise by some judges
- (f) "Operation Iron Fist" that has escalated the conflict in northern Uganda.
- (g) Internally Displaced Persons

Scenario Indicators: *Stakeholder Variables*

- Government of Uganda has a central role to play in providing the necessary space for dialogue and political expression.
- Rebels fighting and those intending to fight the government should respond to the demand for dialogue by the population.
- Civil society organizations should play their role in sensitizing the community for peace.
- The international and donor communities should play their appropriate role in exerting pressure on the belligerent groups.

Scenario Building

Worst Case Scenario – The war in northern Uganda escalates. Uganda government remains adamant against dialogue. More deaths in the IDP camps. The constitutional review process is manipulated to give the President a 3rd term. People who feel disgruntled attack the country leading to violence.

Best Case Scenario – The President accepts dialogue with rebels and opens up political space. He commits himself to his last constitutional term. There is a free and fair election and transition to a new government in 2006.

Realistic Scenario – The President continues with his current position on the question of succession and political space, suppressing political parties. The situation drags on until the next elections in 2006. The current conflict escalates.

Options/suggestions for Response

- Sub-regional groups need to put pressure on the government of Uganda to pursue peace.
- The Government of Uganda should give priority to the freeing of political parties and opening the political space to discuss the future direction of the country.
- Joint forums for government and CSOs to map out programmes for building a harmonious Uganda.
- Regional bodies such as the EAC should be able to solve regional issues of concern.
- Deliberate effort to develop areas hitherto marginalized economically.

POLICY BRIEF ON KENYA URBAN SLUM VIOLENCE

Executive Summary

On Monday, February 17th 2003, violence erupted in Mathare North, leaving at least one person dead and millions of shillings worth of property destroyed. The rioters were demanding 70% rent reductions.

This is the second time in less than one and a half years that violence related to living conditions in Kenya's urban slums has erupted. In December 2001 riots broke up in Kibera, leaving more than 20 dead, dozens maimed and thousands of families displaced, with destruction estimated at about 100 million shillings.

Unless steps are taken to address the housing related problems in the urban slums in Kenya, the violence is likely to spill over to other slum areas in Nairobi and eventually to the other parts of the country.

Salient indicators

Slum upgrading programmes in Nairobi have been characterized by lack of political will, inadequacy of both plans and related resources, and deeply rooted suspicion on the part of affected populations.

As was evident in Mathare Valley in 2000 and Pumwani before that, the affected populations have reacted violently, or almost violently, and the projects have been subsequently suspended.

The government remained largely absent, failing to provide either policy or practical guidelines for the projects. Civil society actors have led the projects - the Catholic Church in the case of Mathare valley, where a foreign donor preferred to channel funds through the church.

This was the situation obtaining at the time of this December 2002 general elections. Through its manifesto, National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), the ruling party promised to address issues of poverty, to create 500,000 jobs in the first year, housing-particularly in urban slums, land tenure etc. These promises created very high expectations on the part of the slum dwellers.

Whether this is the cause for the current riots, or there has been political incitement, is not clear.

Realistic scenario

With the general economic stagnation, the conditions in the urban slums continue to deteriorate. Heightened rural-urban migration involves mainly unattached young males-unemployed or doing menial poorly paid work or hawking, frustrated and disillusioned. The resulting family disjointedness has a direct correlation to the moral decadence and lawlessness that have given rise to a culture of gangsterism and endemic insecurity. Thus domestic violence soon finds expression in the public sphere. The economic decay, environmental degradation, lack of social amenities and the general idleness of energetic young men leads to palpable hopelessness. All these elements fuel deadly violence.

Best-case scenario

Housing upgrading programme based on collaborative problem solving and consensus building between the NARC government and slum dwellers. Government steps in the gap to defend the interests of landlords while promoting the right to decent, family oriented, affordable shelter for the poor.

Worst-case scenario

The government would not see the need of including the people who would be affected either negatively or positively in the intended slum upgrading process that might lead to escalation of already tense situation in the urban slums of Nairobi.

Likewise, the government would not be able to address what they promised in their campaigns of providing 500,000 jobs that would stop rural-urban migration therefore demographic stress continues to grow uncontrollably.

Suggestion for policy

- Need to review both land and housing laws
- Intensify decentralization process of industries to rural areas to curb rural – urban migration
- Reviving the agricultural sector
- Collaboration between government officials and communities to plan and implement peace and conflict transformation initiatives.

KENYA RURAL POLICY BRIEF

<i>ISSUE</i>	<i>KEY INDICATOR/ACCELERATOR</i>
Cattle rustling and Ethnic Clashes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climatic changes • Proliferation of small arms • Ethnicity • Economic disparity • Political alignment (Alliance) • Massive areas of unoccupied land

SCENARIO STAKEHOLDERS

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Region</i>
Pokot	West Pokot/Transzoia
Luhya & settled communities (E.g. Nandi, Kisii, Kikuyu)	West Pokot/Transzoia
Civil Society	CJPC (Catholic); NCCK; World Vision (POKATUSA)

SCENARIO INDICATORS

- Pasture
- Land
- Livestock
- Water

Emerging Scenario

With adverse climate in West Pokot/ Northern Kenya, the Pokot cattle will increasingly be forced to enter into farmlands belonging to the Luhya and other settled communities. If the government and other stakeholders do not intervene and mediate effectively there is a likelihood of ethnic clashes. Effective and timely mediation will lessen the risk of loss of life, cattle and displacement of people.

The likely scenario

If the Pokots are given some fair concession to graze their animals, there is a likelihood of peaceful co-existence and peaceful return back home when the climate becomes favourable in their area.

Worst Case Scenario

Failure to give concession to Pokot livestock, spells doom for them as there is no alternative pasture within their reach and their cattle must survive. In that event, there would violent engagement and cattle rustling between the Pokot and settled communities.

SUGGESTION FOR POLICY

1. De-stocking programme for Pokot cattle coupled with alternative livelihood and economic opportunities.
2. Education and awareness creation down play ethnicity and enhance stakeholder awareness and participation
3. More comprehensive security and administrative measure by the government.

A POLICY BRIEF ON ETHIOPIA/ERITREA WAR/CONFLICT

KEY ACCELERATORS/ INDICATORS

- Trade stopped between the two countries
- Increased purchase of military hardware-military expenditure went up
- Confiscation of property such as houses, freezing of bank accounts by either country on subjects of the other country
- Expulsion of Ethiopians from Eritrea and Eritreans from Ethiopia
- Severing of diplomatic relations
- Closure of border
- Aggressive media propaganda
- Communication/transport, telephone and other shared infrastructure between the two countries
- Eritrea stopped Ethiopia from using the Port of Assap
- Ethiopia refused to accept (NACFA) as a mode of payment and demanded to conduct trade in hard currencies
- Death of civilians and soldiers
- Displacement of families particularly those along border areas
- Mobilization of civilians for war
- Schools along border areas closed
- Deployment and military build-up along border areas
- Invasion of Badme by Eritrea

Scenario indicators (stakeholders)

- Eritrea: Invaded Badme
- Ethiopia: Appealed to international community but also fought back to drive out Eritrean soldiers.
- AU/OAU & UN: urged for a ceasefire/ status Ante and negotiation
- Algeria: Provided the venue/ facilitation in Algiers
- Rwanda/USA: tried to mediate
- Religious groups from both sides met in Norway to try to facilitate a peaceful settlement
- Civil society e.g. Peace and Development Committee (PDC)

Emerging Scenarios

Worst Scenario:

War breaks up

Realistic Scenario:

Return to previous position

Best Scenario:

- Demarcation of borders
- Compensation
- Resumption/normalization of diplomatic relations
- Resumption of trade
- Adoption of acceptable mode of exchange
- Resettlement and re-union of broken families

POINTERS OF RESPONSE

- Implementation of the Hague decision
- Reconstruction of infrastructure/houses
- De-mining of mines along borders
- Assistance to facilitate demarcation process
- UNAMEE to remain until the border is demarcated, tension reduced and peace restored
- Ethiopia allowed the port of ASSAP
- Encourage sports, cultural/education of women, to build confidence and goodwill
- Claim to be decided by an international tribunal
- Trauma healing or counseling of victims and their families.

TANZANIA

POLICY BRIEF REPORT

Structural risk factor: history of armed conflict

Anticipated outcome (warning) - pre and post elections violence (2005) in Zanzibar (CCM vs. CUF).

1. Key conflict accelerating indicators

- Street demonstrations by CUF in Pemba, Ugunja and Dar-es-Salaam in 1995 during the first multi-party elections

- Death of 31 people, thousands of EDPs and hundreds of IDPs associated to street demonstrations by CUF in Pemba, Ugunja, Dar-es-Salaam during the second multi-party elections in the year 2000.
- Absence of the new constitution that represents and reflects the needs of the big segment of Tanzania's population
- Influx or infiltration of small firearms brought in by refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Youth bulge associated with economic stress and unemployment
- Christian - Muslim conflict

2. Scenario indicators

Stake-holder/ actor Analysis

Primary actors

- The ruling party - Chama cha Mapinduzi
- The opposition party - Civic United front (CUF)

Secondary actors

- Other political parties e.g. Tanzania Liberal Party (TLP)
- Christian organizations
- Muslim organizations

Interested parties

- Civil society organization (CSOs)
- Arabs
- Individuals (voters)

Power base/position

- CCM - wanted and still wants to remain in power
- CUF - wanted and still wants to remove ruling power and authority from CCM.

3. Driving Forces

Actors behavior

CUF: Wanted and still wants the constitution to be reviewed in order to get a new constitution which represents and reflects the needs of the majority of Tanzanians

CCM: Initially was not willing and ready to review the constitution

CUF: wanted the elections to be repeated in all constituencies instead of 16 in Pemba and Ugunja

CCM: rejected the idea of repeating elections for political reasons and that people have shown their will.

4. Pointers for response mapping

WHO-ACTOR/S	WHERE-LEVEL OF RESPONSE	WHEN-MONTH/YEAR	HOW-RESPONSE STRATEGY
CCM & CUF	National	April 2001	Diplomacy- where CCM and CUF had an open dialogue/ interactions to initiate a peace process
Parliament	National	April 2001	Diplomacy-reviewing the constitution
TEC	National, district/local level	April 2001	Diplomacy- inter-faith and inter-political dialogue to restore peace in TZ
CCT	National	April 2001	Diplomacy-inter-faith and inter-political dialogue to restore peace in TZ.
Bakwata	National	April 2001	Diplomacy-Interfaith dialogue to restore peace in TZ.
CRS Org.	International, regional, national level	October 2001	Financial and technical support to interfaith and inter-political leaders (palliative measure)-to reduce impact of conflict
Trocaire Org.	International/regional levels	October 2001	As above
CCM & CUF	National	October 2001	Signing of peace Accord as a strategy for active peace building process
NPI-Africa	Regional	October 2001	Training of interfaith leaders/ facilitators to deepen their understanding of the root causes of conflict.
Peasants	Grass-root community	Feb-2001	Good will and moral support

ANNEX 5: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. Abarijah P'Mine Kinnogah
Secretary
Coast Interfaith Clerics Peace Initiative
P. O. Box 86821
Mombasa-Kenya
Tel: 254-11-487089/722-749295
Fax: 254-11-230554
Email: kinnogah@hotmail.com
2. Abdi A. Mohammed (Baffo)
Executive Director
Dalsan Consulting
Km 4 Street
Mogadishu-Somalia
Tel: 252-1-215292
Fax: 252-59-33033
C/o P. O. Box 2018, KNH
Nairobi-Kenya
Email: baffo@nbnet.co.ke
3. Aberash Gameda Gobena
Personnel & Administrative Services
Head and Vice Chairperson Peace Commission
The Ethiopian Evangelical Church
Mekhane Yesus Central Office
(EECMY CO)
P .O. Box 2087
Addis Ababa-Ethiopia
Tel: 251-1-151641
Fax: 251-1-534148
Email: aberashgg@yahoo.com
4. Berewa Jommo
Regional Director
African Community Education
Network (ACEN)/Women's Peace
Forum (WPF)
4C Adalyn Flats, Ngong Road
P. O. Box 2935-00200, City Square
Nairobi-Kenya
Tel: 254-2-715808
Cellphone: 254-722-344731
Email: berewajommo@yahoo.co.uk
acen@acenafrica.org
5. Christine Mwaka Pekeshe
Field Journalist
NCKK-Community Peacebuilding and
Development Project
P. O. Box 723
Eldoret-Kenya
Tel: 254-321-31384
Fax: 254-321-22020
Email: rpekeshe@yahoo.com
6. Cosmas Oryem Lam
Programme Co-ordinator
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace
Initiative (ARLPI)
P.O. Box 104
Gulu-Uganda
Tel: 256-471-32484
Fax: 256-41-250828
Cellphone: 256-77587831/77-73284
Email: arlpi@africaonline.co.ug
lamoryem@hotmail.com
7. David Edward Rwegoshora
Project Officer (Peace and Capacity
Building)
Catholic Relief Services-Tanzania
P. O. Box 1687
Mwanza-Tanzania
Tel: 255-28-2502070
Fax: 255-28-2500449
Email: david@crstanzania.org
8. George N. Macgoye
District Commissioner
Office of the President, Provincial
Administration
P. O. Box 11
Kitale-Kenya
Tel: 254-325-30411 (O)/ 30811(H)
Fax: 254-325-31617
Email: gmgoeye@yahoo.com
9. Grace Ndugu
Peacebuilding Officer
Catholic Relief Services-Kenya
P. O. Box 49675
Nairobi-Kenya
Tel: 254-2-37450788/7
Fax: 254-2-3741356
Email: gndugu@crsnairobi.org
10. Jessica Babihuga Nkuuhe
Associate Director
Isis-Women's International Cross -
Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE)
Plot 32 Bukoto Street Kamwokya
P.O. Box 4934
Kampala-Uganda
Tel: 256-41-543953
Fax: 256-41-543954
Email: isis@starcom.co.ug
Kembabazi2002@yahoo.com

11. Joseph K. Cheruiyot
 Producer
 Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
 (KBC)
 P.O. Box 30456
 Nairobi-Kenya
 Tel: 254-2-223757
 Fax: 254-2-220675
 Email: jruiyot@yahoo.com
12. Kennedy Odhiambo Onjweru
 Coordinator
 Kibera Youth Programme for Peace
 and Development (KYPPEDE)
 P. O. Box 10805-00100
 Nairobi-Kenya
 Tel: 254-733-576642
 Fax: 254-2-577551
 Email: kenodhiss@yahoo.com
 kyepede@yahoo.com
13. Kizito S. Sabala
 Program Officer
 Africa Peace Forum (AFPO)
 P. O. Box 76621 (Yaya Centre)
 Nairobi-Kenya
 Tel: 254-2-574092/96
 Fax: 254-2-573839
 Email: sabala@amaniafrika.org
14. Leyla-Claude Werleigh
 Cross-Cutting Programme Co-
 ordinator
 Forum on Early Warning and Early
 Response (FEWER)
 FEWER Secretariat
 Old Trueman Brewery
 91-95 Brick Lane
 London E1 6QN, UK
 Tel: 44 20 7247 7022
 Fax: 44 20 7247 5290
 Email: lwerleigh@fewer.org
15. Moses Wanyama Masinde
 Information Officer
 National Council of Churches of
 Kenya (NCCK)
 P .O. Box 45009
 Nairobi-Kenya
 Tel: 254-2-721249/729422
 Email: masindez@yahoo.com
16. Nuria Abdi Abdullahi
 Co-ordinator
 Wajir Peace and Development
 Committee
 P. O. Box 224
 Wajir-Kenya
 Tel: 254-136-21427/ 21359
 Email: nabat@nbnet.co.ke
17. Peter Masemo Kimanathi
 Provincial Police Officer
 Western Province
 Kenya Police, Vigilance House
 P.O. Box 30083
 Nairobi-Kenya
 Tel: 254-331-20333/4/5
 Fax: 254-331-20855
 Email: kimanthi50@yahoo.com
18. Rose N. Othieno
 Administrative Officer
 Centre for Conflict Resolution
 (CECORE)
 P.O. Box 5211
 Kampala-Uganda
 Tel; 256-41-255033/234405
 Fax: 256-41-255033
 Email: cecore@africaonline.co.ug
19. Singo Mwachofi
 Moi University
 Department of Government and
 Public Administration/ Centre for
 Refugee Studies
 P .O. Box 3900
 Eldoret-Kenya
 Tel: 254-321-43620 Ext. 355/240
 Fax: 254-321-43041
 Cellphone: 254-722-237738
 Email: tomsingo@yahoo.com
20. Yusuf Hassen
 Deputy Executive Director
 Peace and Development Committee
 P.O. Box 41879
 Addis Ababa-Ethiopia
 Tel: 251-1-511966/515714
 Fax: 251-1-515714
 Email: pdc@telecom.net.et

FACILITATORS/ORGANIZERS

21. Dorothy Ndung'u
 NPI-Africa
 P. O. Box 14894
 Nairobi-Kenya
 Tel: 254-2-4441444/4440098
 Fax: 254-2-4440097
 Email: npia@africaonline.co.ke
22. Dr. Kabiru Kinyanjui
 NPI-Africa
 P. O. Box 14894
 Nairobi-Kenya
 Tel: 254-2-4441444/4440098
 Fax: 254-2-4440097
 Email: npia@africaonline.co.ke

23. Florence Mpaayei
NPI-Africa
P. O. Box 14894
Nairobi-Kenya
Tel: 254-2-4441444/4440098
Fax: 254-2-4440097
Email: npi@africaonline.co.ke

24. Harold Miller
NPI-Africa
P.O. Box 14894
Nairobi-Kenya
Tel: 254-2-4441444/4440098
Fax: 254-2-4440097
Email: npi@africaonline.co.ke

25. Peter Maruga
NPI-Africa
P.O. Box 14894
Nairobi-Kenya
Tel: 254-2-4441444/4440098
Fax: 254-2-4440097
Email: npi@africaonline.co.ke

26. Prof. David C. Carment
Centre for Security and Defence
Studies
The Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs
Carleton University
1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada, K1S 5B6
Tel: 1 613 520 6655
Fax: 1 613 520 2889
Email: dcarment@ccs.ca
Website: www.carleton.ca/cifp

27. Samuel G. Doe
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
(WANEP)
Ampomah House, 3rd Floor
37 Dzorwu1u Highway
P. O. Box CT 4434

Cantonments, Accra-Ghana
Tel: 233-21-221318/221388
Fax: 233-21-221735
Email: sdoe@wanep.org

28. Thelma Ekiyor
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
(WANEP)
Ampomah House, 3rd Floor
37 Dzorwu1u Highway
P. O. Box CT 4434
Cantonments, Accra-Ghana
Tel: 233-21-221318/221388
Fax: 233-21-221735
Email: tekiyor@yahoo.com

VISITORS

29. Sue Le Mesurier
Head of Conflict Prevention
Saferworld
46 Grosvenor Gardens
London SW 1 W 0EB, UK
Tel: 44 20 7881 9290
Fax: 44 20 7881 9291
Email: slemesurier@saferworld.org.uk
Website: www.saferworld.org.uk

30. Tanja Suvilaakso
Programme Office, NGO Unit
Department for International
Cooperation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Finland
Tel: 358916056241
Email: tanja.suvilaakso@formin.fi

RAPPORTUER

31. Eleanor M. Githogori
P. O. Box 53340-00200
Nairobi
Tel: 254-722-265306
Email: eleanormuthoni@yahoo.com