

CÔTE D'IVOIRE:
NO PEACE IN SIGHT

12 July 2004



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Accords have been badly compromised by a lack of good faith and political will. All the key issues -- nationality, eligibility for elections, and disarmament -- that they attempted to address in order to restore peace and national unity to Côte d'Ivoire and lead it to presidential elections in October 2005 are stalemated. No political actor has shown the will to break the impasse. Opposition parties have left the Government of National Reconciliation. The *Forces Nouvelles*, remnants of the armed group that attempted a coup in September 2002 and subsequently took control of the north of the country, not only refuse to disarm until after elections, but are flirting with secession.

The international community, and especially the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), needs to take on the spoilers more assertively and openly. Its diplomacy should be backed by a strong attempt to end impunity. Otherwise there is real risk not only of continued violence but that the war could spread across West African borders.

Several elements of the Ivorian equation work against a political solution. The situation is triangular, linking the political elite, the security forces and militias, and business interests connected to economic, often criminal, networks. The latter work in conjunction with the political elite and are quick to take advantage of the services of either security forces or militias. None of these groups is homogenous, and internal rivalries are aggravated by the fact that President Gbagbo and the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) are relative newcomers to the political-business networks dominated for almost forty years by the late President Houphouët-Boigny's *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) party.

The long-term context of the crisis includes twenty years of economic downturn, an explosion of the number of unemployed (but often well-educated) youth, and competition for the illicit spoils of the state.

The de facto partition between north and south has made this competition even sharper. The FPI accuses the *Forces Nouvelles* "rebels" of having risen to power by illegitimate means, while the latter accuse President Gbagbo, winner of the dubious 2000 elections, of using militias and special forces to intimidate and kill political enemies and economic challengers.

To get to the heart of Côte d'Ivoire's problems, it is necessary to understand their economic dimension, and in particular, in terms of the old dictum, to "follow the money". The political impasse is exceptionally lucrative for almost everyone except ordinary citizens. Major government figures have been accused of using state monies, especially from the Enron-like maze of interlinked institutions within the cocoa marketing system, for personal enrichment, purchasing weapons, and hiring mercenaries. Members of the *Forces Nouvelles* have been accused of monopolising lucrative economic activity, including the trade in cotton and weapons. Some observers have gone so far as to say that the killings of perhaps 120 citizens attempting a peaceful protest in Abidjan on 25-26 March 2004 originated in a power struggle between the ruling FPI and the opposition PDCI over who would control the lucrative rents emanating from corruption at the port.

It is not just leading politicians who may gain from the current situation of neither peace nor war. Many others, from businessmen close to the government to municipal political bosses, benefit through business interests that are frequently protected (or expanded) by militias of otherwise unemployed youth styling themselves as "Young Patriots". These "patriots" themselves can become quite rich. Militia leaders drive in expensive cars with numerous bodyguards and are said to receive as much as \$80,000 a month from the presidential coffers. At the same time, members of the security forces use roadblocks throughout the country to stop civilians and shake them down.

The Linas-Marcoussis Accords are the product of compromise and thus contain elements displeasing to every party. However, calls to scrap or renegotiate them miss an important point. As some in Côte d'Ivoire ask, what improvements would a new document make? The key issues addressed in the Accords are as pressing as ever. The problems lie in their application, and the sophisticated strategies of the two sides that range from the legalistic (pitting the constitution against the Accords) to the demagogic. Diplomacy built upon the assumption that the political actors aim to address these issues in good faith is doomed to failure. Low-level insecurity can be good for business.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of National Reconciliation:

1. Prioritise the elements of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords central to holding the October 2005 presidential elections and implement these within the shortest possible time, specifically articles 1 and 2 of Annex I (citizenship and identification), articles 1 and 2 of Annex II (the electoral system), and articles 1 and 2 of Annex III (eligibility for presidential election), and pursue Annexes VI (human rights) and VII (disarmament) in collaboration with ECOWAS and United Nations partners.
2. Resume control of the crossing points on the border to Liberia, and impose order in the zone under government control.

To the *Forces Nouvelles*:

3. Return to the Government of National Reconciliation.
4. Resume attendance at quadripartite meetings of armed forces.
5. Disarm without preconditions at the appropriate point in a process of applying the Linas-Marcoussis Accords.

To the RDR and PDCI Parties:

6. Resume membership of the Government of National Reconciliation.
7. In the case of the PDCI, assume a mediating role within the Government of National Reconciliation appropriate to its position between the *Forces Nouvelles* and the FPI.

To President Laurent Gbagbo:

8. Reinstate all ministers who are members of the Government of National Reconciliation and permit them to assume full control over their portfolios.
9. Ban, discouragem and dismantle all militias, particularly those with a close connection with the *Présidence*.

To the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR):

10. Broaden disarmament to include all non-official armed forces, including pro-government militias or "parallel forces".

To the Gbagbo Government's Army (FANCI):

11. Resume attendance at quadripartite meetings of armed forces, reinstate command and control and actively enforce a ban on militias.

To French Licorne Forces:

12. Move as quickly as possible to withdraw from highly visible and exposed public functions as ONUCI becomes able to take them on, and reconfigure as a rapid deployment force.

To the UN Mission (ONUCI):

13. Ensure full deployment of the remaining 3,000 troops as soon as possible, begin to patrol the Liberian border in conjunction with UNMIL, and organise quadripartite meetings to include Licorne, *Forces Nouvelles* and FANCI.
14. Proceed with the establishment of an independent radio station to counter the effect of inflammatory broadcasts by local media.
15. Attack the problem of impunity by insisting that Côte d'Ivoire ratify the statute of the International Criminal Court or otherwise indicate its acceptance of ICC jurisdiction with effect from 19 September 2002.

To the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):

16. Make clear the deep level of regional concern by assuming a higher public profile, thereby undercutting the government's claim that President Gbagbo is supported by African leaders and opposed only by France, and use all available means to keep Guinea out of the conflict.

Dakar/Brussels, 12 July 2004

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I. INTRODUCTION

On the morning of 25 March 2004, citizens attempting to gather in the working class areas of Abidjan to march in protest against President Laurent Gbagbo and his party, the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), were prevented from leaving their neighbourhoods and attacked by a combination of militia members and Ivorian security forces. The protesters killed two police officers, while at least 120 of their own number died. A commission of inquiry appointed by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded that:

What happened on 25 and 26 March was the indiscriminate killing of civilians and the committing of massive human rights violations. The march became a pretext for what turned out to be a carefully planned and executed operation by the security forces...and the so-called parallel forces under the direction and responsibility of the highest authorities of the State.¹

The 25-26 March killings were part of a continuing ebb and flow of instrumentalised violence orchestrated by various actors in the Ivorian conflict. The UN report also pointed to the "political responsibility of those who had planned the march", who, "must have realised that it would be too risky", and thus did not themselves participate. An expatriate who follows the Ivorian political scene closely went further, describing the political usefulness of a mass grave, ("*la volonté d'avoir un nouveau charnier*").²

Campaigning for the October 2005 elections has already begun, and the campaigns seem oriented simultaneously toward the outside world and inward. Each side is looking for ways to disqualify the others, and accusations of human rights abuses, collusion with foreign mercenaries, and doubts about nationality all serve the same purpose. The politics of disqualification in Côte d'Ivoire is well-documented,³ and such attempts underlay the basic political strategies of both Henri Konan Bédié (President from 1993 to 1999) and Robert Gueï (President from the 1999 coup to 2000), as well as those who now running.

Politicians also try to turn the operation of national politics to their personal and factional advantage. President Gbagbo has often been able to step aside with seeming neutrality, while allowing the National Assembly to do the dirty work of opposing the Linas-Marcoussis accords. Assembly President Mamadou Koulibaly and the Assembly's FPI head, Simone Gbagbo (the President's senior wife), have been in the forefront of attacking the Accords and attempting to eviscerate them. The dynamics in the Assembly are skewed because Alassane Ouattara's *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR) party boycotted the last legislative elections. While the FPI lacks a majority, the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) and other opposition parties

morts comme moyen d'accession au pouvoir d'Etat: Resultat de la peur de compétir", open letter published on Abidjan.net, and "Bédié cherche désespérément des corps", *Notre Voie*, 30 March 2004.

³ See ICG Africa Report N°72, *Côte d'Ivoire: The War Is Not Yet Over*, 28 November 2003. The attempt to disqualify former Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara as a presidential candidate was at the heart of the PDCI's development of the concept of *Ivoirité*, a combination of pseudo-philosophical ruminations on the essence of Ivorian nationality and legal barriers (particularly Article 35 of the constitution) to Ouattara's candidacy. On *Ivoirité*, see, *L'Ivoirité: Ou l'esprit du nouveau contrat social du Président Henri Konan Bédié* (Abidjan, 1996) and Bruno Losch et al., "Côte d'Ivoire, La tentation ethnonationaliste", special issue of *Politique Africaine*, N°78, Paris, 2000.

¹ The UN report specified that it had verified that, "at least 120 people were killed, 274 wounded and 20 disappeared. These figures are by no means final". Against this, the president and armed forces claim that only 37 were killed, and opposition groups have claimed the number was between 300 and 500. Many diplomatic sources indicated to ICG their belief that the actual number was between 200 and 250. ICG interviews in Abidjan, April-June, 2004.

² ICG interview, Abidjan, 19 April 2004. See also "Le nombre de

have not been united in pushing for implementation of all elements of the Accords.⁴

This politics not only pits parties against one another; it also pits the Government of National Reconciliation, which includes a variety of opposition groups, against the National Assembly, dominated by the FPI and PDCI. In this contentious politics, Seydou Diarra, the prime minister and head of the reconciliation government, is often handicapped by a lack of effective authority. Sometimes undercut by the *Présidence*,⁵ sometimes by the National Assembly, and sometimes by the "patriots" who claim to represent the opinion of ordinary Ivorian FPI supporters, he has maintained a quiet calm in the face of many provocations. This aplomb may be a thing of the past. After President Gbagbo announced the firing of three opposition party ministers and claimed to have consulted with Diarra -- something Diarra's office denied -- the prime minister announced that he would be unable to call meetings of the government until a number of roadblocks to political progress were removed.

French troops, having initially intervened in September 2002 to save President Gbagbo, have established a 4,000-strong force, Operation Licorne. The Licorne troops maintain a neutral buffer zone, the *zone de confiance*, which keeps government and former rebel forces apart but also perpetuates the north-south division of the country while complex political manoeuvring continues in Abidjan.

Alongside political inertia, violence with impunity has become the norm in many parts of Côte d'Ivoire. Although Abidjan's neon lights still shine brightly over the night-time lagoon, infrastructure remains mostly intact, and immigrants from elsewhere in West Africa stay on because there is still more money to be made in Abidjan than at home, economy and society are approaching the breaking point. While the war did not prevent record cocoa harvests in 2003, aging cocoa trees, the fact that many workers who usually maintain the plantations have been chased away, and lack of money to buy insecticide make a repeat of this feat unlikely. French conglomerate Bolloré is looking to sell its cocoa holdings, the African Development Bank has moved from Abidjan to Tunis, and many UN and

NGO agencies have moved their regional offices to Ghana or Senegal. This pullout may accelerate with the end of the school year, and if anti-French/anti-white attacks continue, many expatriates with families may not return in September.⁶ Self-styled "Young Patriots" and ideologues close to the president may rejoice at this, but many Ivorians would undoubtedly experience a worsening of the crisis that has been squeezing the economy for more than fifteen years.

The stakes in Ivorian politics are largely economic, although the debate is predominantly phrased in ethno-nationalist terms. Violence or the threat of violence facilitate economic gain at many levels simultaneously. At the highest levels, members of the political class may be the targets of assassinations, like former President Gueï, who was killed on 19 September 2002. At the lowest levels, unemployed youths join militias, while "patriots" and municipal politicians encourage villagers to evict "foreigners" and take their land. In between, members of the armed forces and militias augment their salaries by robbing civilians at roadblocks and in neighbourhoods, and work for businessmen who use them to settle scores.

The self-serving pursuit of money and power is one side of a dual dynamic. The other side is a profound disagreement about who is, or should be, an Ivorian citizen. The "Ivorian miracle" -- the term widely used in the 1960s and 1970s to describe Côte d'Ivoire's impressive economic growth and apparent success as a model developer -- was based on equal parts of foreign capital, cheap labour from poorer neighbours, and Ivorian land, labour and policies. With economic downturn from the late 1980s, the fight for diminishing resources has become increasingly bitter, and anti-foreigner rhetoric among those who consider themselves "true" Ivorians has gained momentum. The politics of identity in Côte d'Ivoire today are the product of a complex interaction between deep-seated resentments and transparent attempts to manipulate anti-foreigner rhetoric for political ends. It is important to understand this dynamic in order to untangle the web of rhetoric, public sentiment, and political machinations in which the national press often plays an important role.

⁴ This is not surprising, given that the PDCI, the other most strongly represented party in the legislature, developed the exclusionary laws and policies struck down by Linas-Marcoussis.

⁵ Not easily translated into English, the term *Présidence* represents not only the president himself, but his group of closest advisors, party cadres and the various security forces based at the presidential palace.

⁶ As Europeans leave, it appears that Lebanese businessmen are staying, and indeed profiting from the exodus. One source identified the present Lebanese population in Côte d'Ivoire at 170,000. ICG interview with journalist, 12 June 2004.

Côte d'Ivoire had 30 years of friendly post-colonial relations with France that benefited elites in both countries, as well as many ordinary Ivoirians, especially those involved in the cocoa and coffee sectors. As France has become less protective of and involved in Ivorian affairs, a love-hate relationship has emerged. Anti-French rhetoric is often demagogic and self-serving. It has found fertile ground in popular beliefs about international conspiracies to strip the country of its wealth. In these conspiracies, France is portrayed as financing and directing an international coalition that imposes painful World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions. The tight-knit relationship that linked France and Côte d'Ivoire until the late 1980s has come unravelled.

In the person of Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the theories of an international plot bring anti-European rhetoric together with the rejection of African immigrants living in Côte d'Ivoire. These immigrants, predominantly from Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea, make up 26 per cent of the population. Ouattara, a former senior official at the IMF and prime minister under long-time President Houphouët-Boigny, has been barred from the last two presidential elections because of questions about his national origins. Article 35 of the constitution requires that anyone running for president must be born in Côte d'Ivoire of parents both born in Côte d'Ivoire.

Here again, cynical demagoguery met popular resentment. In the mid-1990s, President Henri Konan Bédié sought to disqualify his biggest political rival and found that arguments about nationality resonated with many in the southern half of the country. The notion that immigrants are "taking bread out of the mouths of Ivoirians" has grown in proportion to the depth of the national economic crisis. Moreover, the politics of resentment that grew out of Bédié's concept of *Ivoirité* and into today's ultra-nationalist FPI rhetoric has increasingly lumped immigrants together with people born in the Maninka and Senoufo regions of the north. These divisions, which began as political rhetoric in the 1990s, have now been consolidated by the partition of the country since September 2002. The longer Côte d'Ivoire remains divided, the more the differences between north and south take on a primordial appearance.

The other factor that threatens to make the divisions within society much more dangerous is violence. ICG researchers over the past year have accompanied colleagues who were stopped and even

arrested, apparently only because of their "northern" origins. They have themselves been robbed and been in vehicles whose drivers have been robbed. They have witnessed live ammunition being fired at roadblocks to force vehicles to stop and a killing in Abidjan. Many Ivoirians have experienced much worse, and such memories die hard. Although this report argues that much of the rhetoric of division and ethno-nationalist hatred on both sides of the conflict is highly theatrical and a cover for illicit economic gain, it is clear that Côte d'Ivoire is rapidly approaching a tipping point, at which the rancour risks reaching a dangerous new level. The clearest example is in the centre-west and far west of the country, where small tit-for-tat killings between local populations and immigrants from Burkina Faso or of Burkinabé origin are drawing the line between communities in blood.

The relevant problems surrounding Ivorian citizenship and its ramifications for electoral eligibility, land ownership, and human and civil rights are all addressed by the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. Many observers have concluded that some if not all political actors are allowing the Accords to wither and die. If this continues for another four to six months, there is little chance that the October 2005 elections will take place. If the goals are to end the division of the country, to disarm all unofficial combatants (including militias), and to set the scene for legitimate elections, actors both inside and outside Côte d'Ivoire must take decisive action in the next months. Two concrete steps would be to investigate and prosecute those presently organising the political violence with impunity, and to investigate the criminal politico-economic networks that make impasse such an attractive option for the political class.

II. DYNAMICS IN ABIDJAN

A. THE IVORIAN SHADOW STATE

The 25-26 March 2004 killings nearly coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, and many commentators raised the possibility that Côte d'Ivoire might become "another Rwanda".⁷ The implication was that the parallels were numerous: deep-seated interethnic hatred, politicians ready to use such divisions to their own ends, irresponsible media that fuelled violence with inflammatory portrayals of "enemies". The warning was that if the international community did not take Côte d'Ivoire seriously, it could find itself once again standing by while, at the least, large-scale ethnic cleansing took place.⁸

The stakes, logic and motivations of the Ivorian crisis might, however, be much closer to those of the fourteen-year war in Liberia, in which violence was used to facilitate the looting of the country's wealth, from timber resources to zinc roofing panels. In Liberia, like Sierra Leone, the war developed out of the pre-existing shadow state, a patronage network connected to criminalised economic activity that operated parallel to the formal state, which was allowed to collapse.⁹ At first sight, Côte d'Ivoire does not appear to fall into the same category as Liberia or Sierra Leone. It is clearly not the "failed state" they became; the roads are still in good condition, the country is still shipping more cocoa than any other, and Abidjan's Plateau neighbourhood is home to many skyscrapers.

The Ivorian style of wealth-extraction is much more sophisticated than that practiced in Liberia. Under President Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993), the government learned that the most lucrative

rents could be extracted from the robust cocoa and coffee economy. The president's slush fund was connected to the cocoa marketing board and its associated structures (*filière*) and operated through complex financial transactions. Many of the actors in the Ivorian crisis may well be involved in criminal activity, but the most powerful bear little resemblance to the warlords of Sierra Leone and Liberia.¹⁰ The labyrinthine cocoa *filière*, a kind of Enron-type structure of front companies, secret bank accounts, and transfer of funds with multiple layers of insulation between the criminal acts and their eventual beneficiaries, is the ultimate testament to their sophistication.

The political elites' skilled use of the media has led many to believe that the Ivorian crisis is really about deep-seated hatreds with a long history.¹¹ However, as soon as one shifts focus to the fact that by capturing power, political figures gain control of a lucrative clandestine economic network, it becomes clear that much of the hate rhetoric serves one of two purposes: in the short term, it can be a useful diversion that masks economic pillage, while in the longer term, it can be a useful way to disqualify opponents in order to monopolise political -- and thus economic -- power. All the major players in Ivorian politics today -- Laurent Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bédié, Alassane Ouattara -- came out of the machinery of Houphouët-Boigny's one-party state. While some in Côte d'Ivoire complain that the rate of skimming has accelerated to unseemly speeds, the basic technique was perfected by *Le Vieux* (Houphouët-Boigny) himself.

Today's political actors have found that war serves as an excellent means of enrichment, and they may be ill-served by the restoration of peace and security. It is worth asking what would become of militia leaders like Charles Blé Goudé and Eugène Djué if Côte d'Ivoire regained stability? What would become of their patrons and those responsible for clandestine arms purchases? What would happen if all the roadblocks in Côte d'Ivoire were dismantled because there was no longer the excuse that "it is a time of war"? How much money would it cost members of the *Forces Nouvelles* if they lost not only control of cotton exports and arms sales, but also the informal taxes levied on the de facto duty-

⁷ "La Côte d'Ivoire sur les traces du Rwanda", *Le Courrier d'Abidjan*, 6 May 2004; "On nous cache un génocide", *L'Intelligent d'Abidjan*, 19 April 2004; "Alassane Salif N'Diaye: 'La Côte d'Ivoire peut être pire que le Rwanda'", *Le Patriote*, 15 April 2004; "Après le documentaire sur le génocide du Rwanda- Des similitudes avec la Côte d'Ivoire qui inquiètent", *Notre Voie*, 13 April 2004.

⁸ The French were and remain especially sensitive to the possibility of being held responsible for another such tragedy.

⁹ The concept of the "shadow state" has been developed by William Reno in *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, 1998). Reno argues that especially after Cold War patronage dried up, the political classes of these countries actively promoted the collapse of the state and its normal policing, revenue-collecting and social service functions, the better to pillage the national economy and keep patronage networks alive.

¹⁰ The resemblance to Charles Taylor, the perversely clever military and economic tactician, is however quite close. Côte d'Ivoire's economy can support many such operators.

¹¹ Many newspapers in Abidjan are affiliated with a political party.

free economy of the north? Other than ordinary citizens, who would gain from peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire?

The disappearance of the French-Canadian journalist and researcher Guy-André Kieffer on 16 April 2004, has been treated in many quarters as a repeat of the murder of Jean Hélène, the *Radio France Internationale* reporter who was shot by police officer Théodore Séry Dago on 21 October, 2003. In fact, the situation is considerably more complex. Kieffer was not just a journalist. He also worked as a businessman and consultant in the cocoa business while writing about the sector for *La Lettre du Continent*, a newsletter that exposes the economic underside of African political patronage. According to diplomatic sources,¹² Kieffer had been hired by the president's office to investigate corruption within the cocoa business and the Ivorian government. Before long, he was pulled up short and told that he was pushing rather too hard, and his research should end.¹³ Some of his findings have been published in *La Lettre du Continent*, and they paint a picture of exceptionally sophisticated fraud.

The cocoa *filière* system operates through a nexus of interconnected institutions that make up the cocoa and coffee marketing system. As a scholar of Ivorian politics has explained, for most of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, it paid peasant farmers "about 25 per cent of the world market price of Ivorian coffee and cocoa, about 10 to 12 [per cent] went to commercial intermediaries, and all the rest went to the state".¹⁴

The redistribution of economic benefits in Côte d'Ivoire tends to come through more sophisticated and complex enterprises than the extraction of

diamond or timber, as in Liberia or Sierra Leone, usually involving some form of money laundering, with the proceeds often misappropriated by local actors to purchase weapons or fund political campaigns, or siphoned to foreign partners. It has been alleged, for example, that:

- A front company acting under the patronage of government officials signed a multi-billion dollar contract with the Ivorian government to build industrial complexes, military and police facilities, schools and hospitals and hundreds of thousands of apartments, securing extensive tax exemptions; fictional investments were then made in this company to generate tax credits in another country, with these in turn being used for money laundering.
- A foreign company added its capital to an Ivorian company, allowing the latter to become a commercial bank so that the government and senior officials would be able to siphon money from loans or grants to Côte d'Ivoire from international institutions, with the foreign backers of the company using the newly minted bank to launder money.
- More than \$100 million have disappeared from one of various institutions within the Ivorian *filière* system meant to support the price offered to cocoa farmers, with some of the missing funds placed into an "account" in a phantom Ivorian bank and later used to buy weapons in a deal managed by an off-shore company.
- Côte d'Ivoire paid a month's salaries for all civil servants in another West African state, the supposed purpose of the transaction being to return to that state's government money that had earlier been stolen and placed in an Abidjan bank account by that country's former military strongman. The transaction freed for other purposes funds allocated for salaries in the other state's current budget -- purposes not subject to donor control.

B. A GENEALOGY OF IMPUNITY

Capturing political power in Côte d'Ivoire is a high-stakes game. In this respect Ivorian politics resembles that in countries like Nigeria and Angola. The attempts to disqualify an opponent rest on the often-discussed issues addressed in Linas-

¹² ICG interviews, Abidjan, April, May, 2004.

¹³ This was the same fate that befell François Kouadio, inspector at the Ivorian government's own internal inspection agency, *L'Inspection Générale d'Etat*. At the request of President Gbagbo in March 2002, he undertook a study of the reformed *filière* system. Entering into the labyrinthine system meant to support the minimum purchase price of cocoa for individual planters, he quickly found massive gaps in accounting, including gifts of 1.2 billion CFA (\$2.22 million) and evidently unpayable "loans" of over 100 billion CFA (\$185 million) to two front companies, ANAPROCI-SA and its subsidiary, SIFCA-Coop. Kouadio soon found himself a pariah within his own organisation and hiding to save his life. See "Rapport d'inspection des structures et des mécanismes de gestion de la filière café/cacao campagnes 2000/2001 et 2001/2002", April 2002, and interview in *Le Patriote*, 12 August, 2002. Kouadio is still in hiding, according to diplomatic sources.

¹⁴ Catherine Boone, *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 226.

Marcoussis, like nationality, eligibility for elected office, and land tenure. However, capturing and keeping power often requires allies at all levels of society. Each group seeks to advance its financial and political interests within the limitations dictated by the system. Since the 1999 coup that put Côte d'Ivoire into a downward spiral, the armed forces have played an increasingly central role alongside (or in place of) politicians. The bad faith of most political actors is complemented by the casual brutality of some members of the armed forces and their unofficial or "parallel" comrades. The abuse of civilians in Côte d'Ivoire is not a phenomenon introduced by the 1999 coup d'état or the civil war. The degradation in command and control in the armed forces goes back to military pay cuts during the late Houphouët-Boigny period.

On the night of 6 to 7 June 2004, armed men attacked the village of Gohitafla from the north. Combined government (FANCI) and Licorne forces fought them off, killing fifteen and capturing ten, while losing five FANCI soldiers.¹⁵ On the morning of 7 June, "patriots" accused the French of either organising the attack or having failed to protect civilians. They first burned tyres and threw rocks in front of the French embassy and later dispersed (under tear gas attack) to threaten whites and damage their cars in the Plateau neighbourhood of Abidjan. Commenting on the acts of the "patriots", the FPI newspaper *Le Temps* commented, "The Ivorian street becomes an unavoidable part of the management of Côte d'Ivoire's destiny. Whoever wants to ridicule this country will find them blocking their way. Licorne just learned that lesson. So much the better!"¹⁶

Since 19 September 2002, various forms of "parallel forces", as the Ivorian government called them (acknowledging their role in the 25-26 March killings)¹⁷, have operated in Côte d'Ivoire. They range from village self-defence patrols, often poorly armed and untrained, to highly armed groups trained by elements of the Ivorian security forces, and mercenaries from Israel, France and South Africa.¹⁸ There has been considerable mixing of Liberian and

Ivorian personnel, especially between the Liberia-based Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) group -- one of the rebel organisations that helped overthrow Charles Taylor in 2003 -- and various Côte d'Ivoire-based militias, including the *Forces pour la Libération du Grand Ouest* (FLGO). These militias are not the unruly mobs they sometimes appear to be. They are well-organised and have internal hierarchies, leading to the presidency. They carry identification cards, and in some cases exhibit better command and control than the armed forces.¹⁹ Eugène Djué, "Maréchal" of the *Union pour la Libération Totale de la Côte d'Ivoire* (UPLTCI), claims to lead 70,000 "patriots," and "General" Charles Blé Goudé of the *Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes Patriotes* (COJEP), some 25,000. In the west, Bertrand Gnatoa, the "Commandant" of the Gagnoa-based *Front pour la Sécurité du Centre-Ouest* (FSCO), claims to lead 14,031 troops. Smaller groups, like those under the umbrella *Groupe Patriotique pour la Paix* (GPP), have in many cases been highly trained. The GPP has been officially disbanded but instantly reconstituted at least in part as the *Front de Libération National* (FLN), led by Moussa Touré, whose *nom de guerre* is Zeguen.²⁰

ICG earlier chronicled the rise of such militia leaders as Djué, Blé Goudé, and Guillaume Soro within the violent student politics of the 1990s.²¹ During this period, students were encouraged by the FPI (then still a marginalised opposition party) to engage in a kind of violent campus politics that culminated in Mafia-like control of portions of the university housing system and attacks against perceived enemies with machetes on university

¹⁹ ICG interview with European intelligence source, Abidjan, 19 April 2004. This source specified that over 95 per cent of the weapons distributed to police commissariats on the night of 24 March 2004 for use by militia members were returned to the presidential palace by 28 March.

²⁰ See "Le Front de liberation national (ex-GPP) a vivement réagi hier, suite à la lettre du Premier ministre au président de la République", *Les Echos du Matin*, 24 May 2004. On 15 May 2004, ICG researchers saw a group of approximately 150 FLN militia members in the Cocody neighbourhood of Abidjan. These militia members, some without shirts and others wearing new black FLN t-shirts, took over one of the main streets, marching in formation, chanting, and openly menacing vehicles that they considered in their way. Some wore white kaolin or black face paint, and they appeared to cultivate the most intimidating possible mien. An Ivorian woman on the sidewalk watched with her mouth wide open in disbelief.

²¹ See ICG Report, *Côte d'Ivoire*, op. cit., including the list of 23 smaller militias on page 43.

¹⁵ "Côte d'Ivoire: Helicopter gunships attack as 20 die in ground clashes", IRIN, 8 June 2004.

¹⁶ "La rue ramène la Licorne à l'ordre", *Le Temps*, 12 June 2004.

¹⁷ Minister of Security Martin Bléou used this term in a 1 April 2004 televised speech.

¹⁸ ICG interviews with European intelligence sources, April-June, 2004. See also ICG Report, *Côte d'Ivoire*, op. cit.

grounds.²² All these figures served at one time or another as head of the FPI-affiliated *Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire* (FESCI). They, like FESCI's current leader, Serge Kuyo, specialized in a form of racketeering that was based principally on the targeted use of violence, strong rhetoric and threats. It was an effective tactic on the campus of the University of Cocody, and it remains an effective tactic in the streets of Abidjan. With the ascension of the Gbagbo government, the FESCI was a ready-made parallel force that could go under or around the official security forces.

The security forces themselves are sharply divided along at least two axes. First, there is a split between the more "republican" mass of the police, gendarmerie, and FANCI on one hand, and the special units, such as the *Brigade Anti-Emeute* (BAE), the *Garde Présidentielle* (GP), and the *Groupement de Sécurité Présidentielle* (GSP) on the other. These latter groups are small, display much greater ethnic homogeneity (they are said to contain a majority of Bété soldiers, of the same ethnic group as the president), and have been accused of many of the worst abuses from before the 19 September 2002 coup attempt. These special forces serve as a praetorian guard to the president, and it is understood that their allegiance would be solid in the case of a coup attempt. They purportedly include such figures as Anselme Seka "Seka Seka" Yapo, Patrice Baï, Edouard Kassaraté, Bruno Degbo Blé and Nathaniel Ahouma Brouha, several of whom have been implicated as members of death squads.²³

The existence of death squads, the brutal "mopping up" operations in Man and Daloa, where members of some of the same units (particularly the BAE) are

accused of extrajudicial murders,²⁴ and the 25-26 March killings have given a very bad name to the Ivorian security forces. Numerous sources indicate that the regular security forces are indignant over the implication that they perpetrated these crimes.²⁵ Within this moderate group, however, there is a second fault line, a generational one. While the higher cadres may see their allegiance as being to the nation, many younger officers do not share their view. They and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are far "hotter" and come out publicly in favour of a "reconquest" of the north.²⁶ Two bases are closely allied with this rhetoric: the one near Akoedou, where Lieutenant Zadi leads a battalion said to be eager for resumption of war,²⁷ and Yamoussoukro, where Lieutenant Colonel Mangou is also said to be eager to fight.²⁸ Zadi, who has a reputation for flouting the chain of command, marched at the head of 200 civilians who challenged the Licorne forces inside the *zone de confiance* in December 2003, claiming they would go on to Bouake, the headquarters of the *Forces Nouvelles*. The killing of a French Licorne soldier by a FANCI soldier near Yamassoukro on 25 June 2004 appears to be another instance of soldiers acting outside the chain of command.

The issue of intergenerational tensions is of long standing. Indeed, many soldiers at the heart of the rebellion in September 2002 were of the spurned younger generations, whose subgroups with names like Cosa Nostra, Les Zinzins, and Les Bahéfoués Gbagbo wanted to demobilise. However, the structural problems of insubordination and impunity did not begin on 19 September 2002 but in the early 1990s, when the Ivorian army was still an *Armée fonctionnaire*, part of the professional civil service that had never been called upon to go to war.²⁹ The Ivorian economy was already shrinking, and the Houphouët-Boigny government had cut soldiers' pay as a part of structural adjustment demands. The

²² See Yacoube Konate, "Les enfants de la balle. De la FESCI aux mouvements des patriotes", in *Politique Africaine*, N°89, March 2003, and "FESCI, Financements, méthodes, arsenal ... Des révélations explosives", *24 Heures*, 15 May 2004. One foreign researcher saw a student killed in front of the library by student militia members in the early 1990s. ICG interview, Dakar, 29 June 2004.

²³ A United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report released on 24 January 2003 as well as a French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) report presented privately the same day implicated Yapo and Baï in particular. The French intelligence report was partially conveyed in a series of articles by Stephen Smith in *Le Monde*. Both President Gbagbo and his wife vigorously deny claims that they were involved with their close associates in planning the assassinations of such figures as former President Rober Guéï, Dr. Benoît Dacoury-Tabley (brother of former FPI number two turned rebel Louis Dacoury-Tabley) and Dioula comedian/RDR member Camara H. They sued *Le Monde* in the French courts for libel, but their case was dismissed on 7 July 2004.

²⁴ Both towns changed hands between the rebels and FANCI in the first months of the war. Both sides are accused of extrajudicial killings of civilians who purportedly supported the other side.

²⁵ ICG interviews, April-May 2004. See also "Nous préparons une autre rébellion armée", *Le Jour Plus*, 29-30 May 2004, an open letter by FANCI officers that warns that the Gbagbo government's support of the "patriots" and a culture of impunity more generally will inevitably lead to those "patriots" becoming the next group of rebels.

²⁶ These hawkish "*va-t-en guerre*" figures are not only from the younger generation, but also some of the senior officers close to the Gbagbo regime, many of them of Bété or related ethnicities.

²⁷ Military source, Abidjan, 2 June 2004.

²⁸ "Côte d'Ivoire: Parallel Universe", *Africa Confidential*, vol. 45 N°11, 28 May 2004.

²⁹ ICG interview with diplomatic source, Abidjan, 22 April 2004.

laissez-faire attitude toward soldiers finding other methods to pay themselves -- namely by robbing the civilian population -- allowed the government to save money while the soldiers earned more.

At the same time, the army came to be seen by some privileged families as a better place to situate their sons than the civilian professions or civil service. Sons of rich or politically influential families came increasingly to comprise a significant percentage of new recruits, and increasingly insubordination from such recruits went unpunished. This process took place from May 1990 to October 1995, when Robert Gueï was chief of staff.³⁰ Another source, describing the breakdown of command and control under Gueï in the first half of the 1990s, noted that this process and the formation of the first militias went hand-in-hand.³¹

A recent report describes the Ivorian army as a "security apparatus, which operates outside the official chain of command, leaving Army Chief of Staff Mathias Doué and ground forces commander Gen. Denis Bombet with limited real power".³² ICG observations on the ground agree with many Ivorians' accounts that older soldiers and officers, often law-abiding and correct in their general behaviour, are outflanked and sometimes contradicted by their junior colleagues. The Amnesty International report on the 25-26 March killings in Abidjan quoted a victim:

Finally an officer of higher grade arrived, I recognised him by his insignias and asked him to help me. He wanted to help me but the young soldiers told him, "the hierarchy and the stripes on your sleeve, that's not for today. That's for times of peace. Today, it is we who are running the show".³³

In response to the charges in that report as well as the UN commission of inquiry, and many eyewitnesses, Minister of Security Martin Bléou acknowledged the existence of "parallel forces" in a speech given one week later. Even President Gbagbo, using a strategy characteristic of his government's reaction to criticism, acknowledged the militias but claimed to

be powerless to do anything about them and shifted responsibility onto the French and the UN to fix the problem.³⁴ This rhetoric involves another characteristic twist of logic. The president admits the problem, but says that unfortunately little can be done because the nation finds itself in a state of war.³⁵ The implication is that the war, imposed from outside and against the government's will, causes unfortunate inconveniences. In fact, the acts and words of Gbagbo's most ardent supporters, from President of the National Assembly Mamadou Koulibaly to the "Young Patriots", have fostered an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, silencing dissent, and ultimately contributing to the state of neither peace nor war.

The militias that first appeared in the early 1990s, fostered by both the FPI and PDCI parties, grew alongside the military junta of 1999-2000 and have exploded under the Gbagbo government. The winners of the 2005 elections, no matter who they are, will have to reckon with them as they have become formidable political actors who can neither be legislated nor wished away. If Ivorians are not to continue living under a reign of terror, it will take concerted effort by politicians and security forces to bring them under control. The questions surrounding the militias in Abidjan are exactly the same as those surrounding ex-combatants elsewhere in West Africa: what will they do after their patrons have stopped supporting them? How will they earn a living? How will they learn to move away from a culture of violence and easy money? What will stop them from offering their services to other political parties or insurgent movements?

³⁴ President Gbagbo wrote: "The report rightly mentions the existence of parallel forces and establishes that they perpetrated exactions and other human rights violations against some populations (paragraph 39 of the report). This is true and this fact was denounced by the Minister of Security in a 1 April 2004 televised speech. This situation is undoubtedly due to the state of war in which the country has been which has allowed the proliferation and circulation of uniforms and fatigue trousers and above all firearms. Security and defence forces were ordered to do their best to tackle this situation of insecurity. The will to fight of individuals and groups who operate, occasionally, at night, is such that free phone lines were created at the Security Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office to point out any suspect presence. This was reinforced by the requests presented to the French Ambassador and to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Abidjan, aimed at the creation and setting in motion of mixed patrols to protect the populations".

³⁵ See ICG Report, *Côte d'Ivoire*, op. cit., for an analysis of President Gbagbo's alternation of aggressive and then passive rhetoric, in connection with which he usually allows others to do the dirtiest work and then plays the role of conciliator after the fact. That he has not distanced himself from any of the most troublesome elements of his entourage, however, is an indication of where his allegiances lie.

³⁰ Gueï was fired by President Bédié for refusing to break up anti-government protests in Abidjan.

³¹ ICG interview, Dakar, 5 June 2004.

³² "Côte d'Ivoire: Parallel Universe", op. cit.

³³ "Côte d'Ivoire: Indiscriminate and Disproportionate Repression of a Banned Demonstration", Amnesty International, AFR, 31 April 2004, p. 7.

Political violence, impunity, and breakdown of command and control within the military are the pre-eminent problems in the Côte d'Ivoire crisis. They were key elements of the December 1999 coup and the September 2002 coup attempt. They have a central place in day-to-day life in the south. They are where political manoeuvring, abuse of civilians by armed groups, and corrupt business practices meet -- but they are also amenable to concrete intervention. The announcement by the Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on 22 June 2004 of a commission of inquiry to research all human rights abuses since 19 September 2002 is welcome. This commission, however, will need ultimately to be backed by an effective judicial enforcement process -- as, for example, in Sierra Leone³⁶ -- although all parties to the Ivorian conflict could muster significantly more resistance to such a court's operation than has occurred there.³⁷ The International Criminal Court (ICC) might also prove to be an appropriate tribunal, although it is presently still finding its feet, and preoccupied with references from Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

C. "A SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE"

President Gbagbo's entourage tends to blame most problems on either Alassane Ouattara or France. Anti-French rhetoric is a canny strategy in a country where even those who oppose the FPI tend to share a complex ambivalence regarding the former colonial power. France is the favoured target of the Young Patriots and their patrons in the ultranationalist wing of the FPI. President of the National Assembly Mamadou Koulibaly is one of the most vociferous and articulate of these critics. He wrote the preface to the book *France's War Against Côte d'Ivoire*,³⁸ by Antoine Ahua³⁹ and Gary K. Busch. Alain Toussaint,

a former spokesman for President Gbagbo, referred to the alleged collusion among France, Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaoré, and RDR leader Alassane Ouattara as a "permanent plot" (*complot permanent*), against Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁰ In West Africa, this kind of talk is old wine in a new bottle. Since the 1950s, revolutionaries in countries like Guinea, Mali and Ghana have criticised Côte d'Ivoire for being the region's leading neo-colonial stooge, warning that even if Ivorians reaped the benefits of collaboration with the former coloniser for a few decades, they would suffer in the long term. Even Houphouët himself used the term "*complot permanent*" during the "cocoa war" of 1987-1989, when he boycotted the world market and tried to dictate the price of Ivorian cocoa.

That failed attempt as well as the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc not only meant hardship, but also caused some Ivorians to have doubts about the direction of their country since independence. It appeared that the economic success had been possible only so long as it served the larger interests of French business and politicians as well as the world economy. The idea that these interests could work against Ivorians as much as they had once worked for them became persuasive in the 1990s, as France increasingly disengaged from its former colonies. In economic decline and with a soured relationship to the former colonial power, Côte d'Ivoire finds itself today where many African countries were in the 1950s and 1960s. "Patriots" like Blé Goudé have taken up the cry for a "second war of independence". The intimacy of the historical ties to Paris has provided material for demagogues, despite the fact that France saved President Gbagbo from being overthrown and quite possibly prevented a full-scale civil war by its prompt intervention in September 2002.

Both threats and attacks on French citizens have increased since the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. The French expatriate population, about 60,000 in the 1970s, had already dropped to 16,000-20,000 before the September 2002 war. It now stands at 11,000-12,000 according to the French embassy, or 8,000 according to a recent article.⁴¹

³⁶ Côte d'Ivoire signed the ICC treaty on 30 November 1998, but has not yet ratified it.

³⁷ After ten years of war, there is a considerable "will for peace" in Sierra Leone that has helped the process overcome a variety of political hurdles. In Côte d'Ivoire, the period of actual fighting during the war was only a few weeks, and many Ivorians have not felt its effects directly. The fact that interventions in Côte d'Ivoire are relatively proactive and in some ways preventative raises a set of problems that distinguish peacemaking efforts there from those in neighbouring countries.

³⁸ *La guerre de la France contre la Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan, 2003).

³⁹ Ahua, a dual citizen, has since gone into exile in Canada. In April 2004, he pleaded guilty to an attempt to organise a coup but argued that he had planned a coup against the prime minister and head of the Government of National Reconciliation, not against the

president. No charges were filed against him, and he was asked to leave the country.

⁴⁰ ICG interview, 19 April 2004. This is a phrase once made popular in neighbouring Guinea by socialist dictator Sékou Touré.

⁴¹ "La grande peur des Français de Côte d'Ivoire", *Le Figaro*, 21 May 2004.

About half are Franco-Ivorian or Franco-Lebanese binationals, and less likely to be targeted. Many European expatriates in Abidjan indicate they will leave Côte d'Ivoire for the three-month school vacation. Whether they return in September will probably depend on the situation at that time.

In the last three months, anti-French rhetoric has taken two new turns. French schoolchildren have been specifically targeted by militia leaders. On 13 May, a group of "patriots" on their way to protest in front of the UN (ONUCI) headquarters stopped and boarded a school bus filled with French primary school students.⁴² After threatening the children, they were talked out of taking the bus for transport to their protest. On 18 May, about fifteen militia members entered the French *lycée* and attacked two students and an administrator.

The second turn has been toward a more generalised form of anti-white violence. During the same 13 May disturbances, one employee of the European Union, who was European but not French, was hit in the head with a rock and received five stitches. On 7 June, uprisings that started with militia members throwing rocks and burning tyres in front of the French embassy turned into what many press sources described as a "hunt for whites". Although French citizens were particularly targeted (the French embassy reported 34 citizens attacked, of whom three were lightly injured), an American car was stoned, and a Lebanese businessman was attacked.⁴³ During this same uprising, more than 30 UN vehicles in a parking lot had their windcreens and headlights shattered in addition to other damage.

In the context of claims about French complicity and allegations of a French stranglehold on the Ivorian economy, it is important to look at what France's economic interests are. In the wake of the structural changes demanded by the World Bank and IMF in the 1990s, French businesses gained new market shares in a number of sectors. Their presence was reinforced by the privatisation of parastatals such as the water, electric and telephone companies. Since the mid-1990s, there has been first a rise and then a rapid fall in French direct investment. French investments, the equivalent of €8.2 million in 1995, were €152.6 two years later. After the December 1999 coup, they began to fall

precipitously, and by 2002 Côte d'Ivoire was 184th among countries for French direct investment worldwide.

Despite rapid disinvestment, a strong French presence in the economy still exists. According to the data of the Agency for the Promotion of Investments in Côte d'Ivoire,⁴⁴ France is the leading foreign investor with 147 registered subsidiaries in 2003 and 1,000 companies belonging to its businesspeople. Côte d'Ivoire is the first business partner of France in the CFA franc zone, and the third in Sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa and Nigeria. Some of the most important French investments are in:

- communications: France Télécom bought 51 per cent of Citelcom -- now Côte d'Ivoire Télécom -- in 1997; Orange, Côte d'Ivoire's biggest cellular communications company, is also French;
- automobiles: French cars are the most commonly bought new models, edging out Japanese;
- transport: Groupe Bolloré holds 67 per cent of Sitarail, which runs the railway between Abidjan and Ouagadougou.⁴⁵ During President Gbagbo's February 2004 visit to Paris, it acquired a non-competitive contract for the Port of Abidjan's Vridi Terminal.⁴⁶ Air France, meanwhile, owns 51 per cent of Air Ivoire;
- electricity: Bouygues acquired the concession for the electric company Ciprel and 25 per cent of the *Compagnie Ivoirienne d'Electricité* (CIE) through its subsidiary SAUR; and
- water: Bouygues controls 47 per cent of the national water company (Sodeci) through its subsidiary SAUR.

⁴⁴ Centre de Promotion des investissements français en Côte d'Ivoire (CEPICI). Because this is an organisation whose raison d'être is bringing French investment into the country, these figures may be overly optimistic.

⁴⁵ *Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent*, N°2266, 13-19 June 2004.

⁴⁶ The controversy over the port involves not only Gbagbo protégé Marcel Gossio (the President's appointed director) and opposition party leaders like Kobenan Anaky and Patrick Achi, but also the World Bank, which has noted its concerns over the fact that the Bolloré contract was established without a public bid. FPI writers refer to the deal as Laurent Gbagbo's "gift" to French President Jacques Chirac but Minister of Economy and Finances Bohoun Bouabré insists there were two previous bids that failed, thus opening the way for a one-on-one deal.

⁴² ICG interview with a parent of one of the children, 13 May 2004.

⁴³ ICG interview with journalist, Abidjan, 10 June 2004.

Some of the privatised companies listed above have significant symbolic importance.⁴⁷ However, the strength of the Ivorian economy is agriculture: cocoa, coffee and timber make up 40 per cent of GDP.⁴⁸ Below is a ranking of the countries of origin of the 50 largest cocoa exporters from Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁹

Ranking of the countries of origin of the fifty biggest cocoa exporters from Côte d'Ivoire

Country	Market Share (%) 2/03-1/04
U.S.	24.89
Côte d'Ivoire	19.36
France	15.03
UK	11.84
Netherlands	7.48
Singapore	5.84
Brazil	5.52
Hong Kong	5.24
Other	4.8

In the overall ranking of cocoa exporters, two American, one British, and one Dutch company lead the biggest French exporter, Proci, which holds 6.83 per cent of the total cocoa market. Of the top 50 exporters, French or part-French-owned companies hold the fifth, eighth, ninth, 35th and 41st places. Of these, the Bolloré subsidiary Dafci, the second largest French exporter of cocoa in 2003, is selling its interest.

The answer to whether French companies control too much of the economy seems to be that they are still heavily involved, but their investments are becoming increasingly lean and strategic and are no longer accompanied by the former level of political support from the French government. French investments paradoxically are both too much (still

quite visible) and too little (offering no promise of resolving the country's economic woes).

At the same time, France is still an important donor in Côte d'Ivoire even though others have halted their aid programs. It is difficult to assess the exact balance between French business profit and aid. Indeed, France does not just grant funds through its own cooperation budget but also contributes through the EU. The aid budget has not changed since 19 September 2002. France gives €13.9 million to the Service of Cooperation and Cultural Action (SCAC) for cooperation projects, including €6.2 million for staff salaries and €5.68 million for project implementation. The Special Priority Funds (FSP) are jointly managed by SCAC and the Ivorian state. These funds have increased since the war began to provide for youth reinsertion and rehabilitation programs.

Charles Blé Goudé's highly rhetorical claim that "Côte d'Ivoire will not be free until the last French citizen leaves!" does strike a chord with many Ivorians, indeed with many francophone Africans, when they contemplate the close and often ambivalent relations between France and its African "backyard". France's withdrawal from the Ivorian economy would today make much less difference than a decade ago. It is not that Paris has a stranglehold on the economy as some close to President Gbagbo imply, but that the French presence has weakened to the point where Ivorians can consider the possibility of pushing them out entirely. The anti-French rhetoric may have broader public support than other aspects of the rhetoric of the FPI and its leaders. That is why other representatives of the international community, and particularly ECOWAS, should take the lead in frank and public negotiations with all parties to the Côte d'Ivoire crisis.⁵⁰

Overall, Côte d'Ivoire's economy appears to be headed toward crisis. Several months ago, its overdue payments to foreign institutions were estimated at over 390 billion CFA francs (\$722.2 million), and overdue payments to Ivorian institutions at over 120 billion CFA francs (\$222.2 million).⁵¹ On 16 June 2004, the World Bank suspended all payments to

⁴⁷ A West African intellectual, when asked whether France really controlled such a large part of the Ivorian economy, pointed to the electric, water, and two telephone companies, insisting, "They control the four key sectors". ICG interview, Abidjan, 22 May 2004.

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of Energy, "Côte d'Ivoire Country Analysis Brief".

⁴⁹ Information made available to ICG by a cocoa industry specialist, Abidjan.

⁵⁰ This recommendation is linked to that below about the rapid full deployment of the ONUCI force and the French Licorne force's move toward relative invisibility.

⁵¹ "Côte d'Ivoire : Comment va l'économie?", *La Lettre du Continent*, N°448, 3 June 2004 citing figures quoted at the spring meeting of the CFA franc zone countries.

Côte d'Ivoire on the grounds that a scheduled repayment of \$20 million had been overdue for 60 days.⁵² While the Bank called this decision "purely technical", the government called it a "political decision". Given the Bank's longstanding concerns about the government's fraudulent financial practices, this is probably true.

D. INTERNAL MEDIATION

France has already moved into the background of the negotiations surrounding the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. Who will now step forward? The UN mission has recently come in for the same kind of scathing criticism from President Gbagbo's circle. The rhetorical level rose after the release of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights team's report on the 25-26 March events. The presidential press office released a "letter" said to be from lawyers representing Alassane Ouattara in which the latter told the commission what to investigate, how to do it, and even named its members. A newspaper pointed out that neither the telephone number nor the e-mail address listed for the law firm worked, and the letter was filled with errors, ranging from grammatical to the name of the addressee, Bertrand Ramcharan, the Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The ONUCI headquarters has experienced demonstrations outside its offices by both young male and female "patriots".⁵³ In addition to accusing the Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) Professor Albert Tevoedjre of supporting the rebels, they demand that the UN blue helmet soldiers disarm the *Forces Nouvelles*. Charles Blé Goudé gave the ONUCI contingent an ultimatum of 31 May to disarm all "rebels" or leave Côte d'Ivoire. The claim that ONUCI is responsible for disarmament is based on a wilful misreading of UN Security Council Resolution 1528 (point 6e), which calls on it, "To help the Government of National Reconciliation implement the National program for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

of the combatants (DDR) with special attention to the specific needs of women and children".⁵⁴

The campaign of disinformation undertaken by the Gbagbo government and popularised by the militia groups it organises has made the work of ONUCI far more difficult. The mission's approach has been to apply pressure privately, while publicly expressing support for the government. A member of ONUCI said, "We do not do our work out in the street". Gbagbo and those around him have consistently manipulated this method in their favour. The more Tévoedjré and his team express their respect for the president's status as an elected head of state, the more Gbagbo's supporters accuse ONUCI of representing the *Forces Nouvelles*.

Gbagbo also dares the presidents of neighbouring countries, many of whom are said to be exasperated, to criticise him in public. He counts on the unwritten rule that no African leader should challenge another's sovereignty lest he someday face the same problem. So far, he has won.

ONUCI move ahead forcefully with its plans to start radio broadcasts over its own frequency, in order to address the accusations of the "patriots" and other extremists head-on.⁵⁵ Quiet diplomacy has failed. Gbagbo has shown himself a masterful tactician, able to pit the constitution against Linas-Marcoussis, the National Assembly against the Government of National Reconciliation, and the militias against anyone identified as an enemy. The gentle approach will simply not work. ONUCI, in conjunction with ECOWAS, should take the lead in open diplomacy that challenges the stark Manichaean distinctions that fuel political rhetoric in Côte d'Ivoire. Enumerating the human right abuses perpetrated by the militias does not mean support for the *Forces Nouvelles*. Similarly, calling for a genuine engagement with Linas-Marcoussis does not equal an attempt to expel the president from office, but to address fundamental problems that must be dealt with either now or later.

The rhetorical machine mobilised by the FPI against the French and the UN is too powerful to be met with silence and resignation. The "strong message" delivered to all parties to the conflict on 23 June 2004 by the UN Security Council mission to West Africa will hopefully set the new tone. Moreover, the

⁵² "Suspension des décaissements de la Banque Mondiale - Le ministre Bohoun Bouabré prépare la riposte", *L'Inter*, 16 June 2004.

⁵³ The "*Femmes Patriotes*" are led by Geneviève Bro Grébé, former minister of sports in the FPI government that was dismantled prior to the creation of the Government of National Reconciliation.

⁵⁴ See text of UN Security Council Resolution 1528 in Appendix C.

⁵⁵ On 16 June 2004 the Conseil National de l'audiovisuel stated that it would consider the station a "pirate station".

opposition press is no less biased. This creates an important space for ONUCI to become one of the few credible, measured voices advocating that the G7 opposition parties rejoin the government, the *Forces Nouvelles* disarm, and the FPI discontinue its stalling tactics surrounding Linas-Marcoussis.

The military side of ONUCI also has an important role to play. It currently has just under half of its total 6,420-person staff deployed in Côte d'Ivoire and should aim for full deployment in July. The arrival of over 2,000 Bangladeshi troops should allow ONUCI to replace the French Licorne forces in many patrolling and other public functions, freeing the French to concentrate on a rapid-deployment function. Given the tensions surrounding the French and the Licorne presence, this should happen as soon as possible. Secondly, ONUCI should work with Licorne, FANCI and the armed forces of the *Forces Nouvelles* to reinstate the quadripartite meetings, which took place weekly in Bangolo regardless of political developments in Abidjan. They have been discontinued since the G7's departure from government, but Ivorian officers on all sides of the conflict expressed to ICG their readiness to resume meetings that seem to have been the basis for a willingness to compromise among the military cadres that far outstripped that of the politicians.⁵⁶ The commandant of a military base next to the *zone de confiance* said that he spoke daily with commanders on the other side by telephone. He said, "We [soldiers] are ready to finish the partition of the country, and could do it in a week. The only ones preventing us from doing so are the politicians in Abidjan".⁵⁷ Moving these meetings away from Bangolo might be considered, however, since that site has become highly volatile in the wake of recent killings.

E. THE WAR ECONOMY

An important part of the war economy has already been outlined above. Deals with arms dealers from Israel and Eastern Europe appear to be tied to both fraudulent financial scams and the hundreds of millions of dollars that disappear yearly from the national cocoa economy. Many of the same figures who have been accused of involvement in the 25-26

March killings, the death squads, and the organisation, training, and arming of the militias are also alleged to be involved in these financial arrangements, and would be open to prosecution on either front. It is important that the independent judicial mechanism that should follow up the eventual findings of the current commission of inquiry, or any future commission of inquiry that researches the human rights abuses committed by all sides to the conflict, include a team of specialists in the investigation of financial fraud and organised crime.

Militia demands to be included in DDR and threats to move off on their own as guns for hire if they are not properly taken care of by their "patrons" need to be taken seriously. The combination of money as motivation, the training and arming of militias, and the hateful rhetoric (anti-northerner, anti-foreigner, anti-French, anti-UN) is dangerous. It has been cultivated for so long that it risks creating an autonomous sphere of freelance violence that could soon look much more like Liberia than the "proper" civil war between two opponents that the Ivorian crisis is usually assumed to be. The national commission for DDR needs to take this dynamic into consideration and include militia members in the DDR process, something it has so far resisted.

If real security is to come back to Côte d'Ivoire, it will involve "putting weapons beyond use"⁵⁸ for all those who are now pursuing politics by other means. It makes no difference whether these actors are members of the armed forces, trained mercenaries, or members of militias. High-ranking members of several militias are now threatening to sever their ties with patrons whom some openly identify as high-ranking figures in the Gbagbo *Présidence*.⁵⁹ It is difficult to gauge where blackmail ends and true mutiny begins but the command and control problems described above also exist within militias. The embarrassing attack by FESCI militia members on several magistrates on 9 March 2004 was one example of "patriots" going further than their political patrons would have liked.⁶⁰ The failure to establish a

⁵⁶ A diplomat suggested that the political figures also needed some similar forum where, "they can get around a table together once a week and yell at each other". ICG interview, Abidjan, 3 June 2004.

⁵⁷ ICG interview near the *zone de confiance*, 20 May 2004.

⁵⁸ This phrase, used by a representative of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone section for coordinating DDR, emphasizes the inseparability of disarmament and the forms of social reintegration that offer ex-combatants viable, non-violent livelihoods.

⁵⁹ ICG interview with intelligence source, 4 June 2004. See also section below on "The Abidjan-Far West Link".

⁶⁰ "Intrusion de la FESCI au Palais de justice : Les avocats prêts à combattre la chienlit", *Le Libéral*, 16 March 2004. "Bastonnade des magistrats, mardi dernier: Les auteurs et commanditaires identifiés", *Le Jour*, 12 March 2004.

plan for disarming and reintegrating Ivorian militia members, would almost certainly assure the failure of the national commission's overall DDR program.⁶¹

III. DYNAMICS IN THE WEST

A. CONTINUING CROSS-BORDER INVOLVEMENT

If the situation in Abidjan is characterised by political violence under cover of an ethno-nationalist rhetoric about regional differences, the situation in the west shows more clearly the roots of those problems. The centre-west (around Gagnoa⁶²) and far west (from Guiglo down to Tabou) regions are the heart of the cocoa, coffee and timber sectors that account for some 40 per cent of the Ivorian economy. Complex interethnic and interregional relations have provided advantages for some groups, and the resulting resentments have in many cases simmered for decades. These have been exacerbated by both Abidjan's political manipulation and the involvement of foreign governments. Burkina Faso and Liberia were the two countries most involved in the Ivorian crisis from the beginning. Their citizens are present throughout the west and still represent a flashpoint.⁶³

In the past six months, the number of people killed in the west has probably surpassed the number killed in Abidjan on 25-26 March. However, because many of these killings have been clandestine, it is impossible to get an accurate count. They often involve two to ten deaths at a time and occur between people of differing ethnic and regional origins and also between Ivorians and non-Ivorian citizens.⁶⁴

There was profound involvement on both sides of the border with Liberia, especially as the then-Liberian President Charles Taylor was instrumental in forming the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO) rebel group that controlled the Man-Danané-Toulépleu region in early 2003. On the other side, the MODEL rebels in eastern Liberia were armed by and worked in close

⁶¹ International donors would have to increase funding accordingly for such an undertaking.

⁶² This is President Gbagbo's home area.

⁶³ These populations have quite different histories of their own in Côte d'Ivoire. The majority of Liberians have come from the neighbouring regions over the border, and have shared language, family links, and history. At the same time, many Liberians in the Ivorian west have been refugees. Burkinabés have come largely as plantation workers. Some arrived quite recently (especially in the far west) while other so-called Burkinabés are the second generation in their families to be born in Côte d'Ivoire.

⁶⁴ See ICG Report, *Côte d'Ivoire*, op. cit., for a discussion of cross-border dynamics with Liberia.

collaboration with the Gbagbo government and some of its satellite militias including the FLGO.⁶⁵

The cross-border dynamics continue but in diluted form. With the departure of Taylor into exile in Nigeria, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and MODEL rebels are no longer actually fighting, and are involved in a DDR process. There have been numerous reports of ex-MODEL fighters and their weapons coming across the border into Côte d'Ivoire, including consistent reports of Liberian weapons being exchanged for motorcycles.⁶⁶ There are two major border crossings between loyalist-held Côte d'Ivoire territory and Liberia, one at Pékani Barrage between Toulépleu and Toe Town, and the other between Harper and Tabou. The crossing at Pékani Barrage is patrolled on both sides by a handful of teenage boys in civilian clothes (one on the Ivorian side wore a black t-shirt with the words "*Jeunes Patriotes de Toulépleu: Bonne Année 2004*"). Ten kilometres to the north is a road that passes by a sawmill on the Liberian side. Both Liberians and Ivorians assured ICG there was no border control there. Given that such unpatrolled crossings range up and down the border and that less than one weapon is being turned in for every two demobilised combatants in the Liberian DDR program,⁶⁷ it appears likely that these claims are true. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and ONUCI should coordinate patrols of this border in collaboration with the Ivorian government, which should begin controlling its own border crossings.⁶⁸

There are at least three different economic prizes coveted by all players in the Ivorian-Liberian border region: gold, timber, and rubber. All are tied up in cross-border dynamics. Timber is being clear cut in eastern Liberia and western Côte d'Ivoire, often illegally, as described below. Artisanal gold mining,

also described below, has become an important occupation for young men in the region, many of them ex-combatants. The attack, said to be by English-speaking men, on the gold mining town of Yti (located next to Zouan Hounien, in the *zone de confiance* by the Liberian border) on the night of 6 to 7 June 2004, appears to have been an attempt to control this mine.

B. INTERGENERATIONAL CONFLICT AND XENOPHOBIA

Internal Ivorian dynamics preceded the Liberian incursion into Côte d'Ivoire's "Wild West" and continue to this day. While the Ivorian conflict partly follows the warlord logic that applies in neighbouring wars, some important factors set it apart. The most important of these are the development of the cocoa and coffee economy and the types of inter-communal tensions this has introduced. The massive cultivation of coffee and cocoa in the centre-west and far west has become the backbone of the economy. These crops were first successfully grown in the south east in the 1930s and 1940s but became more successful in the western part of the country. French colonial planters had some success at this time, but Ivorian peasant farmers soon surpassed them. From the 1930s, the French began bringing plantation workers from northern Côte d'Ivoire and neighbouring French colonies like Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso).

With independence, the new PDCI-RDA party ruled by Félix Houphouët-Boigny encouraged massive internal migrations to the west, largely from the Baoulé area in the centre of the country. By 1998, researchers found that only 22.4 per cent of rural inhabitants in the region next to Gagnoa were members of the Gban ethnic group that had originally settled the area (called autochthones). Baoulé migrants made up 33.2 per cent of the population, followed by non-Ivorian migrants (predominantly Burkinabé), at 31.7 per cent.⁶⁹ Northern Ivorian "Dioulas" were another 3.7 per cent. Autochthonous groups in the west thus often found themselves less than a third of the local population.

Massive migration from east and north offered the PDCI government two advantages. First, it was the

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ ICG interviews with diplomatic, intelligence, journalistic, and NGO sources, April-June 2004.

⁶⁷ As of 7 July 2004, 53,226 combatants had been disarmed (since December 2003). 17,620 weapons were turned in during this time, as well as 4,636,234 pieces of small arms ammunition (SAA) and 17,908 other pieces of ammunition including unexploded ordnance (UXO), rocket-propelled grenades, mortar shells and hand grenades. Phase 1 of the DDR process was from 7 - 17 December 2003; Phase 2: from 15 April 2004; and Phase 3 started 9 July 2004: UN sources, Dakar and Monrovia, July 2004.

⁶⁸ The recent deployment of Senegalese soldiers in the Harper area should help in this regard. UNMIL-ONUCI collaboration could be based on the model of existing border patrol collaboration between UNMIL and UNAMSIL along the Liberian-Sierra Leone border.

⁶⁹ Jean-Pierre Chauveau and Koffi Samuel Bobo, "La situation de guerre dans l'arrière villageoise: Un exemple dans le Centre-Ouest ivoirien", *Politique Africaine*, N°89, March 2003.

basis for the rapid increases in agricultural productivity that produced the "Ivorian miracle". Secondly, those migrants who benefited became the natural allies of the government and ensured that the one-party state would maintain its hold on local politics. The de facto electoral marginalisation of the autochthonous inhabitants⁷⁰ was an understandable source of rancour, and remains evident today in the tone of FPI politics that emerged from this region.

The socio-political tensions born of the policy of *mise en valeur*, in which the government granted land to anyone who put it to use, require a fuller discussion. Those tensions are a major ingredient in the politics of President Gbagbo's FPI party. While the acronym B.A.D., for Bété, Attié, Dida, is often used in Côte d'Ivoire to refer to the FPI's ethnic support base (with the Wê⁷¹ often mentioned as a fourth strongly pro-Gbagbo group), these groups have neither a homogenous culture nor any organic ethnic or religious links. What they share is resentment at exclusion from the political-economic boom presided over by the PDCI government in the 1960s and 1970s.

Their treatment as second-class citizens began in the colonial period, when, "the hiatus that existed between a potentially rich region and its inhabitants who were supposedly completely primitive, moreover hostile to [France's] 'civilising mission'", caused the colonial authorities to encourage and even to force northern Dioulas, "who lived in a savannah region unsuitable for quick exploitation, but who came from a world seemingly ruled by strong commercial interests, [to] migrate in large numbers toward the south and constitute an 'avant-garde of economic progress'."⁷²

The resentment at their treatment under both colonial and PDCI governments and the knowledge that Côte d'Ivoire's wealth grew out of their soil, but that they have not seen an equal share of that wealth, is a real factor in politics in the west. Opposition politicians

tend to play the issue down, knowing that it is the foundation of President Gbagbo's legitimacy in this region. The secretary general of the PDCI party, Alphonse Djédjé-Mady, asserted that land tenure was a purely juridical problem concerning the rights of a few non-Ivorian citizens and that the PDCI was in no way responsible for present tensions. "No one was forced to move there, and no one was forced to cede his land. These relations were purely voluntary, unlike those undertaken during the colonial period, when Burkinabé were imported first as forced labourers".⁷³ Even the RDR spokesman and director of cabinet, Bakongo Cissé, insisted, "There are real problems and false problems, and land tenure is a false problem". But when repeatedly challenged, he said: "It's true. This is a serious issue, and we have taken it too lightly".⁷⁴

Playing off these resentments, the FPI has reinvented the concept of "*Ivoirité*", pioneered by the PDCI to exclude Alassane Ouattara and his electoral base from Ivorian politics.⁷⁵ The FPI has adopted the anti-foreigner rhetoric,⁷⁶ and linked it to a second rhetoric of "reclamation" and "liberation" of the west's rich farmland by its autochthonous population. This combination has become the basis for a campaign of ethnic cleansing that has spawned a series of attacks and counter-attacks between those expelled and their former hosts.

As a political strategy, this rhetoric may continue to be popular among autochthonous populations in the west. In private, however, some of these westerners admit that it may be unrealistic.⁷⁷ Even with increased population in the region, there would not be enough workers to keep the plantations producing at full capacity if all the "strangers" left. In south western Côte d'Ivoire, like much of the West African forest belt, population density has been historically low. Before the arrival of plantation agriculture, farming of dry land rice and other crops was based on rotating fields, carved out of the forest, planted for one or two years, then left fallow for six to twenty years while other plots were cleared and

⁷⁰ The autochthonous groups of the west include the Bété, the Wê (or Guéré), the Dida and the Krou. They speak languages of the Kru family. Also autochthonous to the region are the Dan (or Yacouba) the Gouro and the Gban, who speak languages of the southern Mande family. There have been many migrations, conquests and shifts among these ostensible first settlers of what became the Ivorian west, but they certainly preceded the Baoulé, Dioula or Burkinabé migrants, who mostly arrived after 1940.

⁷¹ The Wê are called Krahn in Liberia and Guéré in Côte d'Ivoire.

⁷² Jean-Pierre Dozon, "L'étranger et l'allochtone en Côte d'Ivoire", *Le modèle ivoirien en question* (Paris, 1997).

⁷³ ICG interview, Abidjan, 22 April 2004.

⁷⁴ ICG interview, Abidjan, 19 April 2004.

⁷⁵ See ICG Report, *Côte d'Ivoire*, op. cit., and Bruno Losch et al., "Côte d'Ivoire, La tentation ethnonationaliste", special issue of *Politique Africaine*, N°78, Paris, 2000.

⁷⁶ See Dozon, op. cit., for an analysis of the 1990 presidential elections as the point at which the FPI recognised that it would be forced by electoral demographics to turn toward an ethnonationalist platform.

⁷⁷ ICG interviews, Abidjan and Guiglo, April-May 2004.

planted. In such systems, farmers often ran into labour bottlenecks, particularly during periods of sowing, weeding and harvesting. With abundant land, and no inputs such as fertilizer or insecticide, labour was the limiting factor on production. Rich families were those with many children and many clients, and most cultures in the region placed a high value -- sometimes referred to as "wealth-in-people" -- on welcoming and incorporating "strangers".⁷⁸

In such systems, anyone not born in a village is technically a "stranger", because rights to own or use land are typically shared among a small number of lineages considered to be autochthonous to the village. Thus, even a Bété man moving twenty or 30 kilometres from one Bété village to another would be required to find a *tuteur* (host) to sponsor him and arrange his entrée into the local community. Only 75 years ago, the mechanism for incorporating a stranger from twenty kilometres away and one from 2,000 kilometres away would have been essentially the same.

However, the situation has been transformed. Density has multiplied, as a result of population growth, internal migration and migration to Côte d'Ivoire from its poorer neighbours.⁷⁹ Cash crops have diminished the land available for food crops (many planters simply buy rice, plantains or manioc out of earnings from cash crops). As the economy has shrunk, high school and university-educated people have returned from the big towns and cities to their villages. Young men, especially, have in some cases brought with them the strong anti-foreigner rhetoric espoused by the politicians and newspapers of Abidjan.

An Ivorian academic observed, "Many of these young men are people who have not succeeded in Abidjan or in other towns. They dropped out of school or university or they finished but did not find good jobs".⁸⁰ Their primary options are either to leave Côte d'Ivoire for richer countries, usually in Western Europe or North America, or to return home. The same analyst remarked, "When they come back to their villages, they often see that their old fathers are poor while the strangers are rich. The

fathers have sold their land to the strangers, and so they have nothing to give to their sons. Perhaps a small plot of land, but that could not satisfy these educated young men. Since they have failed at becoming civil servants, they want to be planters, but not mediocre planters".

The tensions between autochthones and strangers have roots in disparities between autochthonous peasant farmers and ambitious strangers who have grown rich through the cocoa economy.⁸¹ However, these tensions do not necessarily lead to violence. Not every part of the west has managed the stranger-host relation in the same way, and this has had a lasting influence on the level of tension. In Dan (Yacouba) villages around Danané and Man, an expert on agricultural techniques described how Burkinabé *contractuels* (sharecroppers) are often taken on as workers and paid 40 per cent of the harvest for the work they invested. Another 40 per cent goes to the owner, and 20 per cent to the owner's sons.⁸² In the Wè and Bété regions, land has more often been sold outright, and tensions over its status are accordingly higher.⁸³

Returning educated youth have played a key role in encouraging and, according to several sources, even demanding that their elders reclaim this land.⁸⁴ Although tensions have always arisen around land tenure and land use problems, they have also been worked out over the years. As one man put it, "They are condemned to live together. They will find a way to work out their differences because they have to see each other every day. They have a traditional court proceeding, they pour out a libation of gin or

⁷⁸ See Caroline Bledsoe, *Women and Marriage Among the Kpelle* (Stanford, 1980).

⁷⁹ In the village for which figures were cited above, population grew from 170 in 1953 to 1,674 in 1998 --almost a tenfold increase in just 45 years. See Chauveau and Bobo, *op.cit.*

⁸⁰ ICG interview with sociologist, Abidjan, 18 April 2004.

⁸¹ One phrase commonly used by autochthonous hosts to describe their problematic relations with stranger-planters is, "It is I who gave him the land, but he doesn't even treat me with respect any more" ("*Je lui ai donné de la terre, mais il ne me regarde même plus*").

⁸² ICG interview with agronomist, Abidjan.

⁸³ Descriptions by humanitarian workers, diplomats and journalists indicate that the situation around Gagnoa is almost identical to that around Guiglo. As a civil society member noted, "I was at a meeting near Gagnoa where everyone from the village was gathered together. The Bété autochthones were asked, 'Did you sell your land to anyone here?' They responded 'No' in unison. Then an old Dioula man said, 'Yes, it's true. They don't sell the land, even though we buy it'". These ambiguities can also lead to a form of cheating, widely reported for the 2003-2004 harvest, through which Wè landowners are said to lead Burkinabé workers on, telling them they can continue to maintain their plantations, and then expelling them just before the harvest and claiming the fruits of their labour. ICG interview, 4 June 2004. See also Somini Sengupta, "Land Quarrels Unsettle Ivory Coast's Cocoa Belt", *The New York Times*, 26 May 2004.

⁸⁴ ICG interviews, April-June 2003.

break a cola nut together, and then they go on with their lives".⁸⁵

A concrete manifestation of this potential for compromise is indicated by the fact that increasing numbers of Wê *tuteurs* have been coming to the Temporary Displaced Persons Camp (CATD) in Guiglo to invite "their" Burkinabé back to their villages. In some cases, it is an invitation for permanent resettlement, and in others for day labour on the cocoa plantations.⁸⁶ According to some, educated youths have attempted to put an end to such amicable resolutions and increasingly work with politicians to block them. Sources cited several cases in which Burkinabé "invited" back to their villages had not been heard from for weeks and were feared to have been killed.⁸⁷ Another source indicated that several village chiefs in Bloléquin-Guiglo who refused to expel their Burkinabé inhabitants received visits from local authorities who pressured them to expel their strangers.⁸⁸

C. THE THIRD ASSISTANT TO THE MAYOR OF GUIGLO

The problems surrounding nationality, eligibility and land ownership highlighted in the Linas-Marcoussis Accords take on a different coloration when one leaves Abidjan. In the far west, they are tied up in resentments that correspond to differences in wealth. The FPI government has actively fuelled the fires of these divisions, and this tactic has led to considerable loss of life among not only the strangers, but also the autochthones, who have been attacked with increasing frequency, apparently by the now dispossessed strangers.⁸⁹ The divisive tactic of promoting interethnic strife through a rhetoric of land reclamation remains popular among many Wê and Bété peasants. It also provides a window into how the networks of political power, patronage, and illicit economic activity work in the provinces. The beneficiaries are the educated cadres, who form the links between Abidjan and their villages. Who are these people and what motivates them?

Perhaps the best known of all is M. Mao, the third assistant to the mayor of Guiglo. He is the President of the Association of Wê Chiefs, and has been called an FLGO warlord.⁹⁰ He is also a member of the Central Committee of the FPI.⁹¹ Although his title does not suggest that he might be influential, sources in both the west and Abidjan agree that he gives orders to all other elected or appointed government officials in the region around Guiglo.⁹² According to the same sources, Mao is the relay in a parallel chain of command that goes from the *Présidence* through him to the various militia forces (both Ivorian "patriots" and MODEL or other Liberian fighters) on the Guiglo-Toulépleu and Guiglo-Bangolo axes. One source close to the *Présidence* confirmed that Mao had daily phone contact with either former Minister of Defence Kadet Bertin or Minister of Civil Service and Employment Hubert Oulaï, who is from Troya, a village near Guiglo.

Mao is an almost mythical figure in the far west, and his militias patrol Guiglo town and neighbouring areas. ICG analysts saw them in Toulépleu and Guiglo. These militias have been blamed for murdering a Togolese citizen on 18-19 May 2004, and a Dioula taxi driver on 2 June, among others. The murder of the driver, left with his throat slit in the middle of a road in Guiglo, drew a strong reaction from some of the town's citizens. Militia members have been identified as former FLGO combatants, who rob and attack not only civilians, but even the army. A FANCI soldier said, "Unfortunately, in the face of these attacks, our chiefs say they can do nothing. We are told that we can't disarm them because they fought to defend the region, and they are the bodyguards of certain authorities in the town".⁹³

As this suggests, many feel themselves held hostage by the militias and their leaders. Moreover, while there is more support for the militias in Guiglo, they are becoming increasingly identified by the

⁸⁵ ICG interview with Ivorian journalist, Abidjan, 14 May 2004.

⁸⁶ ICG interview, Guiglo, 21 May 2004.

⁸⁷ ICG interviews, Abidjan, Guiglo, April-June 2004.

⁸⁸ ICG interview, Abidjan, 20 April 2004.

⁸⁹ Despite the fact that this is the assumption of the Ivorian security forces, the local population and expatriates interviewed by ICG, in the majority of cases there has been little proof offered as to the identity of the attackers.

⁹⁰ "Conflit jeunes 'patriotes'-Forces Licorne à l'ouest: Comment les émissaires de Gbagbo intoxiquent les populations", *Le Nouveau Réveil*, 15 June 2004.

⁹¹ ICG interview with diplomatic source, Abidjan, 13 May 2004.

⁹² ICG interviews with diplomats, humanitarian workers, and intelligence sources, April-June 2004.

⁹³ "Un transporteur égorgé, la ville paralysée", *24 Heures*, 3 June 2004.

population in Toulépleu as a hindrance to normal government.⁹⁴

Not all the local "patriots" in this region are thugs. Many saw combat in late 2002 through mid-2003 when much of the far west was contested territory. In towns like Toulépleu, which suffered greatly from attacks by mainly Liberian militias, it was young men who took up twelve-gauge shotguns and other small arms to push the rebels back. This accounts for part of the local reluctance to disarm them. These young men are still waiting for what they consider their just desserts and are growing increasingly impatient. In most cases, they claim they want to be integrated either into the army or the DDR program.⁹⁵ As with Abidjan militia members, it would be best for them to be disarmed within the national DDR program.

On 11 March 2004, the Abidjan press received visits from Bertrand Gnatoa, who described himself as the "commandant" of a militia group based in Gagnoa and called the Front for the Security of the Centre-West (FSCO).⁹⁶ He claimed that his 14,031 troops had been trained by the FANCI and announced that if the government (he specifically named Kadet Bertin) did not keep its "promise" (which he never identified), they would hold a massive sit-in at Cathedral St. Paul in Abidjan. Gnatoa said:

I tell you again that we have had military training. That means that if our own cadres [in the government] do not resolve our problem, we will be forced to prevent them from entering Gagnoa. We are here to protect the region, Côte d'Ivoire, and its president. But if his entourage does not take care of us, they will be barred from Gagnoa.⁹⁷

The problem of disgruntled militias in the west is exactly like that in Abidjan. They constitute a time bomb, and increasingly express their willingness to work for the highest bidder. One of the only possible means of avoiding their eventual dissolution into mercenary forces that might turn against their

erstwhile patrons has been to find another enemy, whose dispossession could also be made profitable. The recent move toward reclamation of land by western autochthones is just such a program, serving local politicians and educated youth, while occupying local militias with the ensuing violence.

Although the behaviour of the "patriots" is unpredictable and threatens to rebound against their patrons, much of it still is directed by clear signals from Abidjan, as relayed by FPI politicians in the provinces. A striking instance of incitement was witnessed in Gagnoa. In a Catholic church during Sunday mass, the priest had just given a sermon about unity, cooperation and solidarity. Immediately following, the mayor gave his own speech, focusing on the subject of solidarity raised by the priest. Baoulé, he said, did not work against Presidents Houphouët-Boigny or Bédié and their PDCI party. Dioulas also showed their solidarity to Alassane Ouattara and his RDR party. Only the Bété were lacking in solidarity, as exemplified by Alphonse Djédjé-Mady, the Secretary General of the PDCI. These betrayals, however, were temporary; they would be resolved in blood ("*Ça va finir dans le sang*").⁹⁸

It is talk like this that allowed police officer Théodore Séry Dago in October 2003 to believe that he could kill French journalist Jean Hélène with impunity.⁹⁹ It may also have been what motivated the FANCI soldier who shot and killed a French Licorne soldier in the *zone de confiance* on 25 June 2004. Unfortunately, many Africans have died in the same way for the same reasons, without much fanfare. All elected or appointed officials who engage in such public incitement to violence should be held accountable for murders like those described above. The numbers of individuals involved are limited, but all evidence indicates that they are knowingly promoting the high level of insecurity that exists in the west.

The FPI's attempt to capture the maximum possible votes in the West rests largely on the divisive practices described here. Its electoral strategy excludes any possibility of northern support. The remaining question is which way the Baoulé and

⁹⁴ ICG interviews with local population, NGO staff, Toulépleu and Guiglo, May 2004.

⁹⁵ See "Conflit jeunes 'patriotes'-Forces Licorne à l'ouest", op. cit., on demands by "patriots" for compensation.

⁹⁶ Despite this group's existence, there were still attacks on the village of Bouroumé on 4-5 March 2004.

⁹⁷ *L'Inter*, N°1754, 12 March 2004. See also press release from "Etat Major des Forces Spéciales du Front de Sécurité du Centre-Ouest", 9 April 2004.

⁹⁸ ICG interview, Abidjan, 4 June 2004. The source expressed his shock at such words in a church and said the priest had also been visibly shocked.

⁹⁹ In fact, it became one of the few killings to result in an arrest and conviction.

other Akan speaking populations in the centre and east of the country will go. This has been the traditional heartland of PDCI support, and for the moment, the party has thrown its lot in with the other opposition groups. The PDCI's collaboration with the *Forces Nouvelles* and three other opposition parties in the so-called G7 coalition is more a matter of opposing Gbagbo's FPI than of supporting the *Forces Nouvelles*. Both the Baoulé, located in the centre of Côte d'Ivoire, and the PDCI, politically between the FPI and the *Forces Nouvelles*, will play a crucial role in coming months. It is up to the PDCI, along with Prime Minister Seydou Diarra, to help bring all parties back to the Government of National Reconciliation, and to address the Linas-Marcoussis issues. These issues must be prioritised, so that those critical for the scheduled October 2005 elections -- namely questions of eligibility, citizenship, and disarmament -- can be resolved as soon as possible. In light of the complexity surrounding the land tenure issue described above, it should be revisited comprehensively after a new government has taken power following those elections.

D. LICORNE IN THE CROSSFIRE

Like French diplomats, the 4,000 French soldiers in Licorne are trapped. Low-level attacks on them have become commonplace again since late May 2004.¹⁰⁰ They are blocked from leaving their Bloléquin base, where on 22 May "patriots" threw rocks and verbally abused them. "Patriots" in Abidjan have regularly done the same at the 43rd Bima, the main French base in the region. When Gohitafla was attacked on 6-7 June, Licorne forces were immediately blamed for either aiding the "rebels" or not doing enough to save civilians.

The inability of the Licorne troops to protect civilians within the *zone de confiance* has been a source of bitter accusations against the French. The commander of a FANCI military base near the *zone de confiance* showed ICG analysts two bullets that, he said, originated from NATO and had been given to the rebels by the French. It was with such bullets, he alleged, that rebels were killing civilians. These killings are a source of major worry, and the French are somewhat handicapped by their short four-

month rotation schedule, which gives soldiers little time to get a feel for the local political climate.

The problems in the far west occur along two different axes: ethnic and national. Close to the Liberian border, in the areas of Toulépleu and Bin-Houyé, many problems oppose ethnic Dan against ethnic Wê.¹⁰¹ However, this area, where the Dan and Wê populations are intermixed, has now been almost entirely "cleansed". Licorne troops in Toulépleu told ICG that the town was homogenous, so there were no longer any problems.¹⁰² As one moves eastward along the Toulépleu-Guiglo axis, the conflict becomes primarily one between local autochthones and Burkinabé. This is the context of most recent fighting, both inside and just south of the *zone de confiance*. The area bounded by the towns of Bloléquin, Zou, Bangolo and Guiglo was identified by numerous humanitarian and diplomatic sources as the most volatile part of the west.¹⁰³ The clashes, mainly between Wê and Burkinabé, caused virtually all the latter to flee to Guiglo, where they have stayed in the CATD. In past months, however, an increasing number of the men among the some 6,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have started farming outside the camp, particularly in the Scio Forest Reserve. A source estimated these farmers numbered more than 300. The IDPs did not, according to the source, ask permission from the local autochthonous villagers. As it is a forest reserve, the latter no longer hold legal authority over the land. This has created tensions, as has a series of attacks on Wê villages.

In one case, Burkinabé and Senoufo *Dozo* (traditional hunters) were heading northward across the *zone de confiance*. Three were arrested for unknown reasons in the village of Diéouzon, on the way to Kouibly. The next day, another group of *Dozo* came to Diéouzon and killed four Wê villagers. This followed a series of back-and-forth killings in the village of Kahan, near Bangolo, in the *zone de confiance*. At least 35 people died in these attacks during December 2003 and January 2004. Many other attacks and threats of attacks throughout the small villages of this region have been fuelled by rhetoric originating

¹⁰⁰ They have occurred sporadically in the past, including a skirmish resulting from an early December attempt to cross the *zone de confiance* led by Lt. Zadi, mentioned above.

¹⁰¹ The Dan are called Gio in Liberia and Yacouba in Côte d'Ivoire.

¹⁰² ICG interviews, 19-20 May 2004. Within this ethnically "purified" zone, Liberian and Ivorian Wê intermix seemingly without problem. On both sides of the border between Liberia's Toe Town and Côte d'Ivoire's Toulépleu, all young men seem to speak both French and Liberian English.

¹⁰³ ICG interviews, April-May 2004.

among the cadres of Bloléquin and Guiglo, who talk of the need to "liberate" villages of their Burkinabé presence. This cleansing appears to motivate revenge attacks against the autochthonous populations. Both sorts of attacks have sent thousands fleeing to the nearest towns, especially Guiglo and Bangolo.

In the Guiglo area, several Ivorians claimed that Licorne forces were arming or otherwise helping Burkinabé attackers,¹⁰⁴ but ICG has found no supporting evidence. Given the isolated locations of some of the villages, it is hard to say whether French troops could stop the killings even if it were their top priority. However, the step taken after the Diéouzon killings of stripping civilians of their twelve-gauge hunting shotguns within the *zone de confiance* should undoubtedly continue throughout the region.

E. THE WAR ECONOMY

The western war economy is a coordinated cross-border affair. Wood, gold and rubber from Liberia move eastward toward Guiglo, where warlords and politicians have the opportunity to organise and profit from their further movement southward toward the ports. These same products originate in the forested zones of western Côte d'Ivoire. MODEL commanders like Colonel Flan, General Terry Gladio, and General Garang¹⁰⁵ operate parallel to Ivorian figures like M. Mao. On both sides of the border, there is strong evidence that former militia organisations like MODEL, FLGO and the "patriots" are reorienting toward these illicit economic activities.

In the Zwedru area of Liberia, UNMIL has imposed a fragile peace. Although there are reports of some checkpoints for shakedowns along the Ganta-Zwedru road, this route receives regular UNMIL patrols, and ICG analysts have not seen weapons carried openly. Still, the atmosphere is tense, and it is common to observe fistfights, screaming matches, or acts of casual violence.¹⁰⁶ These will hopefully diminish gradually as DDR progresses.

More worrying are reports of organised pillage that appear to be a continuation of wartime illegal practices. Several sources said artisanal gold mining is organised through secret recruitment of children, who are used as forced labourers in such camps as Bartel Jam, Double Bridge Area, and CVI. Each of these gold camps is reachable only by bush path and a seven to eight-hour walk from the nearest road. The gold transits through Côte d'Ivoire.¹⁰⁷

Identical operations, organised by FLGO and "patriotic" militias, seem to be underway in the west. Most artisanal mining here is said to take place on or near the banks of the Cavally River, including in Floleu and Bou-Zou. FANCI soldiers have prohibited local farmers from making rice fields near the mines, on pain of arrest.¹⁰⁸ This helps to explain the mysterious (and possibly faked) attack on the village of Ity, which purportedly took place on the same night (6-7 June 2004) as the attack on Gohitafla, attributed to *Forces Nouvelles*, some 270 kilometres away.

While the attack soon disappeared from notice, Ity is the site of the *Société des Mines d'Ity* (SMI) gold mine, partly French-owned. MPIGO militia controlled this region for part of late 2002-2003, then loyalist militias took it over as they and FANCI pushed the MPIGO northward. The mining company returned in November 2003, but has had to compete with militia members who have not only attacked its personnel but have also set up artisanal mining within the SMI concession using local village youths as workers. It was in the context of this tense situation that the "attack" took place. The local FANCI forces did not respond to the gunfire, and the militia members claimed to have pushed the "attackers" out.¹⁰⁹

Rubber is also exploited in this border region. Ex-MODEL combatants are presently tapping rubber in the forests of eastern Liberia and bringing it into Côte d'Ivoire to be processed and shipped.¹¹⁰ Another source indicated that this business is important enough that MODEL commanders have

¹⁰⁴ ICG interviews, 19-20 May 2004.

¹⁰⁵ ICG source, June 2004. An intelligence source indicates Garang died recently in Côte d'Ivoire.

¹⁰⁶ ICG analysts witnessed a MODEL commander in his pickup truck back up over a child's bike, almost crushing the child along with the bike. He looked at the damage he had caused, and then drove away.

¹⁰⁷ ICG interviews, Zwedru, 18-19 May 2004.

¹⁰⁸ ICG interviews with Man-based sources, Abidjan, 20-21 April 2004.

¹⁰⁹ "Attaque d'Ity: Des révélations troublantes", *Soir Info*, 16 June 2004. In wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, armed groups have very often pretended to attack a target or announced their intention of doing so purely in order to frighten people off, leaving militiamen free to loot property. The same may have occurred in Côte d'Ivoire.

¹¹⁰ ICG interview with diplomatic source, 4 April 2004.

begun fighting among themselves over it.¹¹¹ The logging industry, too, has long been identified as part of the regional war economy.¹¹² Sanctions against Liberian logging seem to be working only partly. While there are reports of some wood coming into Côte d'Ivoire across the border north of Toe Town, other reports indicate that Liberian loggers are clear-cutting timber in the area and leaving it in the forests to be shipped when sanctions are lifted. The recent decision not to maintain the sanctions is likely to jump-start the cross-border timber trade. On the Ivorian side, the timber business is booming. Militias are central to the operations, and as with gold and rubber, M. Mao is described as a central figure in this illicit economy. "Patriots" guard the Dahoua sawmill, and "the present cutting amounts to the organised pillage of the forest reserves. People who have lived here over the years say they have not seen trees of this size shipping out for decades".¹¹³

As with the intersection of militia activity, cocoa money, and arms purchases in Abidjan, it is clear that the present situation in the west serves the economic interests of both politicians and youth militia leaders. The rhetoric of reclaiming western territory allows a few farmers to recover plantations from those defined as strangers, but it also allows those involved in illicit economic activity to create a *cordon sanitaire* around the forests or mines. In the name of security, they claim the right to operate in secrecy, and the occasional gruesome murder or low-level attack on French forces reaffirms the need for a state of emergency. This situation probably could not have arisen if the local population did not have real grievances and resentments. Also, the militia activity was originally closer to the model of a civilian defence force¹¹⁴ than purely cynical racketeering. However, the balance has tipped so far in the direction of criminal economic extraction that it appears many of the continuing conflagrations are in fact orchestrated by the same figures who benefit from this war economy.

IV. DYNAMICS IN THE NORTH

A. A THREAT OF WIDER WAR

Since the end of 2002, it appears that President Gbagbo's strategy towards the north has been a passive but canny one of "*laissez pourrir*", in the words of a regional diplomat.¹¹⁵ By leaving the north to its own devices, the government has hoped that one of two things would happen: either internal divisions within the *Forces Nouvelles* would lead to their self-destruction, or economic strangulation would cause them to surrender. It looks like the first possibility has been narrowly avoided. Emergent schisms lay primarily along two lines: Liberians versus Ivorians, and pro-Soro versus pro-IB groups.¹¹⁶ It appears that the Liberians have progressively been brought into the *Forces Nouvelles* fold, expelled or killed.

The differences between Guillaume Soro, the *Forces Nouvelles* political leader, and IB, one of its top military leaders, have threatened to explode over the last months. IB's arrest with ten associates in Paris on 24 August 2003, on charges of planning a coup against the Government of National Reconciliation, has taken him out of the game. The balance of power has shifted decidedly toward Soro, who promoted Colonel Soumaïla Bakayoko, the military chief of staff, to general. Michel Gueu and Tuo Fozie, now sports and youth ministers respectively, present the most moderate face of their movement in Abidjan. The residual competition between pro-IB and pro-Soro camps may have ended on the night of 20-21 June 2004, when heavy fighting left fourteen dead in Korhogo and eight in Bouake, including Kassoum Bamba, a pro-IB *Forces Nouvelles* officer and the alleged leader of the attacks. It is likely that in these battles and the purges that most likely followed, Soro has eliminated the most obvious source of internal discord.

Gbagbo's attempts at economic strangulation are to some extent undercut by the interests of all the mid-level military and administrative figures who would lose much money if the passage of people and goods were truly cut off. An ICG mission in the south was stopped at sixteen roadblocks between Daloa and

¹¹¹ ICG interview, Zwedru, 18 May 2004.

¹¹² See "The Usual Suspects: Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone", Global Witness, March 2003.

¹¹³ ICG interview with European source, Guiglo, 21 May 2004.

¹¹⁴ Such as the Kamajors and other groups that emerged in Sierra Leone in reaction to attacks by RUF rebels.

¹¹⁵ Literally, "allowing [the situation] to rot". ICG interview, Dakar, 15 June 2004.

¹¹⁶ IB is the nickname of Ibrahim Coulibaly, a *Forces Nouvelles* military leader.

Abidjan. At six, only the taxi driver or his apprentice had to get out, show papers and pay a minimum of 500 CFA francs (\$0.90). At the other ten, all passengers were obliged to get out and show their papers. At each stop, various passengers (usually one to three) were singled out to pay between 500 and 2,000 CFA francs (\$0.90 to \$3.60). Averaging about 3,000 CFA francs (\$5.40) per stop times sixteen, the taxi driver and passengers paid some 50,000 CFA francs (\$90.00) in bribes for this relatively short ride on one of Côte d'Ivoire's most-travelled roads. Multiplying this figure by the hundreds of vehicles going in each direction, it is likely that the figure rises into the tens of millions of CFA francs per day (\$20,000 to \$100,000), along the Daloa-Abidjan axis alone. Similarly, a minibus driver told a source in June 2004 that in passing through *Forces Nouvelles*-controlled territory from the Burkinabé border at Niangoloko to Man in the west, he passed approximately 48 roadblocks and paid between 1000 and 2000 CFA francs (\$1.80 to \$3.60) at each.¹¹⁷ Both these cases involved passenger vehicles. Trucks carrying cargo pay much more. A diplomatic study found that trucks passing from Bouake to Korhogo paid 100,000 to 150,000 CFA francs (\$180 to \$270).

While goods continue to pass in each direction, there is unquestionably a decrease in economic activity in the north. "*Laissez pourrir*" is having its intended effect. Moreover, this may be felt as much or more in neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso as in northern Côte d'Ivoire. Insecurity in border areas has become endemic. Buses can no longer pass between Burkina Faso's second city, Bobo Dioulasso, and the Ivorian border at night without military escort. Banditry has also spilled over into Mali. A resident of the region estimated that 300 to 400 trucks per day crossed between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire at Manankoro before the rebellion, and now there are virtually none.

This does not, however, mean there is no traffic. Malian intelligence sources indicate that until the end of 2003, the flow of arms was southward, across Mali and into northern Côte d'Ivoire. For the past six months, it has shifted direction, evidence not only of trouble brewing in Mali's north, but also of a *Forces Nouvelles* need for cash. A recent report suggests the average price for a Kalashnikov on the Mali-Côte d'Ivoire border is \$70.¹¹⁸

This insecurity and the fact that ethnic cousins are perceived to be under attack in Côte d'Ivoire have had marked effects on ordinary citizens' opinions in both countries. While Presidents Touré of Mali and Compaoré of Burkina Faso have remained neutral, even conciliatory,¹¹⁹ many have begun to question this stance. Their interest is partly in supporting their compatriots, whom they perceive to be receiving the brunt of the abuse of the Gbagbo government, but it is also economic. Some regional leaders are reported to have said that "a second wave of returnees to our country is simply not an option".¹²⁰

The combination of lawlessness and the economic consequences of the crisis could draw Mali, Burkina Faso, or both into the war. Regional and international leaders need to pay close attention to this dynamic, which could turn the Côte d'Ivoire conflict into a regional war like that in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both Mali and Burkina Faso are watching closely to see if rumours that Guinea will become actively involved as a partner to the Gbagbo government are true.¹²¹ An armed attack from Guinea into *Forces Nouvelles* territory could be enough to draw both countries in. It is essential that ECOWAS bring to bear all possible pressure on the Gbagbo and Conté governments to avoid this possibility.

B. THE THREAT OF SECESSION

On 4 April 2004, Guillaume Soro toured *Forces Nouvelles*-held territory. In the wake of the 25-26 March killings and the departure of the opposition parties from the government, he said: "If the international community doesn't watch out, we are going to head off on our own ... If we are able to

¹¹⁹ President Touré attended the Mano River Union meeting in Conakry in late May 2004 along with the leaders of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (the three signatories to the Mano River Union), as well as Côte d'Ivoire's President Gbagbo. Touré pledged, along with the other heads of state, his support for the Gbagbo government against any illegitimate rebel group. While Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaoré has remained much quieter, several ICG sources indicated that he maintains his support of and links to the *Forces Nouvelles*.

¹²⁰ ICG interview with diplomatic source, Dakar, 15 June 2004.

¹²¹ See "Gbagbo chez Conté: Un assaut militaire se prépare depuis la Guinée", *24 Heures*, 3 May 2004, and "Comment Gbagbo se sert de Conté", *L'Intelligent d'Abidjan*, 2 May 2004. In the words of a source, "Lansana Conté doesn't know what to do with all the ex-LURD combatants now pouring back into Guinée Forestière. He was hoping they would all just go off and get killed, but now he has a big problem on his hands. Sending them into Côte d'Ivoire would solve this problem". ICG interview, Abidjan, 3 June 2004.

¹¹⁷ ICG source, 19 June 2004.

¹¹⁸ ICG source, 19 June 2004.

manage our own affairs, we don't need Abidjan".¹²² This was viewed by some as a genuine threat of secession and by others as a desperate attempt to draw a reaction. The difference in interpretation depended primarily on how the speaker assessed the economic health of the north. Is it viable on its own? The northern economy is based on a combination of agriculture and trade. Agriculture in the north includes cash crops, but also an emphasis on food crops. The north has become a de facto free trade zone. Despite the shakedown taxes at roadblocks, goods pass into the north from Abidjan and can be brought across the borders into Burkina Faso and Mali without customs duties.

The major cash crop is cotton. Several sources indicate that the current crop will be rather poor, though not a total washout, around 250,000 tons as opposed to almost 400,000 tons in 2002-2003.¹²³ According to a foreign expert on Côte d'Ivoire's export agriculture, the system of cotton purchase on credit has been seriously affected by instability and lack of banking structures. Rather than weeks, peasants had to wait many months for payment for their 2003 harvest. As a result, some did not plant cotton this year, and among those who did, few used fertilizer.

Parts of the *Forces Nouvelles* territory also grow Côte d'Ivoire's better-known crops. The area around Danané produces cocoa and that around Man substantial amounts of coffee. It appears that much is being exported through Guinea, though some transits through Burkina Faso. In 2003, Burkina Faso exported (through Togo and Ghana) 22,000 tons of cocoa -- the first time it had ever "produced" this crop.

The fact that the north was never as fully inserted into the Ivorian cash crop economy as some other parts of the country has helped it survive the partition. Manioc, corn and millet have always formed an important component of its agriculture, and farmers have traditionally been much less likely to focus exclusively on cash crop plantations, buying their food with the profits. Several diplomats

and humanitarian workers emphasise that because the north was relatively poor and isolated before the war, adapting to the current situation was easier. Still, this observation applies more to the areas around Korhogo, Ferkessedougou and Odiénne than Bouaké, which was economically and culturally as much a part of the south as the north before the war.

Although the banking system broke down with the robberies of the BCEAO banks in Man and then Bouaké,¹²⁴ people in the north continue to receive remittances from relatives living elsewhere via Western Union offices in Kadiana (Malian border crossing north of Korhogo) and Manankoro (north of Odiénne). The lack of functioning institutions has posed similar problems for the water and electricity companies (SODECI and CIE), which have no way of collecting bills and so have reduced service to the minimum. Some companies still operating in the north (i.e. Bouaké) pay these bills via certain non-governmental organisations.

The lack of a functioning government has seriously affected services. An NGO report indicates that around Man 48 per cent of schools are closed, 66 per cent of teaching posts are vacant, and only 28 per cent of children six to fourteen years old attend school. Volunteer teachers went unpaid in 2002-2003 and have been hesitant to work another year with no prospects. Another study found slightly better news in the Korhogo/Odiénne region, where 62 per cent of public school teachers still work and 41 per cent of school-age children attend school.

While hospitals in the north do not appear to have been looted, there is a serious lack of both personnel and supplies. There are no surgical facilities in the entire northern region except those provided by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), particularly at the University Hospital Centre at Bouaké. NGOs support the health services in Man and Korhogo, as they do in war-affected towns in the loyalist zone like Toulépleu, Guiglo, and Tabou. HIV/AIDS preoccupies the north, where a recent study of 25 people found 56 per cent were positive.¹²⁵

A recent survey of civilians in the Korhogo and Odiénne areas found most classed their personal security as "average". The large majority of complaints involved racketeering or theft/pillage,

¹²² "Sécession, bluff ou réalité", *Le Patriote*, 13 April 2004.

¹²³ "Côte d'Ivoire: Comment va l'économie?" *La Lettre du Continent*, N° 448, 3 June 2004. This article notes that at the same time that Ivorian cotton production has gone down, production in neighbouring countries has reached new records: 612,500 tons in Mali compared to 439,800 tonnes in 2002-2003, and 500,000 tons against 409,100 tons in 2002-2003 in Burkina Faso.

¹²⁴ See ICG Report, *Côte d'Ivoire*, op. cit.

¹²⁵ The number sampled was not statistically significant, but still worrying.

rather than violent crime. Many classified the overall and security situations as "not nearly as bad as you might think, and generally better than in the south".¹²⁶

It seems that the north could survive indefinitely but a number of factors are contributing to its gradual impoverishment. The most important are the lack of government health, judicial and education services, and the slowing (though not stoppage) of north-south trade. If local government and services do not start again within the coming year, the north will almost certainly begin a gradual slide toward the education, health, and income levels prevalent in Côte d'Ivoire's poorer neighbours such as Mali and Burkina Faso.

The ability of the ordinary inhabitants of the *Forces Nouvelles* territory to maintain an independent social and economic life has something to do with the fact that the north has long been the less developed half of Côte d'Ivoire. If people are poor now, it is likely that they were already poor before. However, the north is not culturally homogenous. There are increasing hints and murmurs that its society has fractures. In some areas around Korhogo, serious tensions exist between Senoufo autochthones and Maninka strangers, which roughly parallel those described in the far west. ICG sources have also reported serious tensions in the Odiénne area between Malinke who migrated in the last 50 years from Mali and Malinke who have lived in the region for generations, consider themselves Ivorian, and rejected the newcomers as they sought asylum.¹²⁷

V. CONCLUSION

The central problem in the Côte d'Ivoire crisis is that neither party to the conflict is operating in good faith. If President Gbagbo and the FPI party want the *Forces Nouvelles* disarmed and the country reunited, they will have to concede on nationality and eligibility. If Guillaume Soro and the *Forces Nouvelles* want those issues addressed, they will have to make concessions on disarming and rejoining the government. A certain degree of resistance can be expected in such negotiations, including accusations of atrocities, but one of the biggest problems is the existence of a state within a state created by the Gbagbo government.¹²⁸ This shadow state rests on three legs -- military, financial, and political -- each independent of the official state, and in some cases more powerful.

On the military side, President Gbagbo has created around him an edifice that may be stronger than either the ordinary FIANCI forces or the military wing of the *Forces Nouvelles*. Militia leaders Eugène Djué, Moussa Zeguen and Charles Groguhé claim to lead 100,000 men.¹²⁹ In Abidjan, there are at least two dozen other militia groups, including Blé Goudé's COJEP and the FESCI student militia. Outside Abidjan are organisations like the Gagnoa-based FSCO, which claims over 14,000 members, and the Guiglo-based FLGO. Even if only a fraction of the estimated 150,000 militia members in southern Côte d'Ivoire have received serious military training,¹³⁰ their sheer numbers surpass the 20,000-strong FIANCI, the 25,000 armed members of the *Forces Nouvelles*, or even the two combined. In far west towns, they circulate with weapons and openly flout the armed forces, and at major crossings from Liberia, like Pékani Barrage, it is militia members who control the border, with no Ivorian armed forces, customs or immigration officials present.

These structures operate alongside and in cooperation with autonomous units within the armed

¹²⁶ ICG interviews with diplomatic, humanitarian and intelligence sources, April-June 2004.

¹²⁷ ICG interview with diplomatic source, Dakar, 21 June 2004.

¹²⁸ "Tout sur le gouvernement parallèle de Gbagbo: Les principaux acteurs qui l'animent", *Soir Info*, 15 April 2004.

¹²⁹ "Les milices reprennent du service", *24 Heures*, 20 April 2004. Groguhé is the head of the ostensibly disbanded GPP, one of the most notorious militias in Abidjan.

¹³⁰ One source estimated 15,000 militia members in Abidjan had received such training, primarily from elements of the FIANCI and Israeli and Angolan mercenaries. ICG interview with diplomatic source, 12 June 2004.

forces, including the death squads,¹³¹ the BAE, and various praetorian guard units based at the presidential palace. In the simplest terms, President Gbagbo and those around him have guaranteed themselves a patchwork of independent forces (including massive armaments stockpiled at the *Présidence*, Mi24 attack helicopters flown by Ukrainian and Byelorussian mercenaries, and even drone aircraft)¹³² that could take on a hypothetical combined attack by a mutinous army and the *Forces Nouvelles*. This stark fact has obvious consequences for the October 2005 elections.

The combination of political stalling and the maintenance of a de facto state of emergency have opened numerous spaces for illicit economic gain. There have been scandals, including the disappearance of billions of CFA francs of European Union funds for AIDS reduction, and of 50 billion CFA francs (\$92.6 million) in war bonuses for FANCI soldiers. The major accusations point to the coffee-cocoa *filière*. The massive amounts of money skimmed from the world's biggest cocoa crop have always constituted a slush fund for the government, giving its leaders effective independence from the normal processes of raising and spending funds by state institutions. In the west, rubber, gold and timber fuel the lucrative cross-border economy that has been carved out and protected by armed militias.

Politically, Gbagbo's shadow state has been built around the trusted members of the FPI delegation to the National Assembly, including his wife, Simone, and President of the Assembly Mamadou Koulibaly. His shadow government includes such figures as two ex-defence ministers, Kadet Bertin and Lida Kouassi, and philosophy professor Alphonse Voho Sahi as "minister of communication".¹³³ The influence wielded by some of these figures has been disquieting to many on the Ivorian political scene since the Linas-Marcoussis Accords were signed.

This informal structure raises the question whether or not the figures named to the Government of National Reconciliation exercise any real power. President Gbagbo's firing on 18 May 2004 of ministers Guillaume Soro, Youssouf Soumahoro,

and Patrick Achi pitted the constitution against Linas-Marcoussis once again. He said he had the requisite authority while his opponents denied it. In any case, relations between Gbagbo and Soro and Gbagbo and Achi were already tense because of the ministers' claims that he had stripped them of effective power by circumventing them with various appointees and the shadow government.

Diplomatic engagement with Côte d'Ivoire needs to take into account that these three elements of parallel governance reinforce each other. The current state of neither peace nor war provides specific opportunities to those involved. Despite the government's use of legalistic and even conciliatory language at crucial moments, this parallel system rests on a foundation of criminal activity, ranging from extrajudicial killings to illegal exploitation of natural resources to financial fraud. Until the financial motivation for maintaining the impasse is addressed, there is little hope that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire will change, or even that elections will take place in October 2005.

Dakar/Brussels, 12 July 2004


¹³¹ They have been the subject of reports by both the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the French government.

¹³² ICG intelligence source, Abidjan, 20 April 2004.

¹³³ "Tout sur le gouvernement parallèle de Gbagbo: Les principaux acteurs qui l'animent", *Soir Info*, 15 April 2004.

APPENDIX A

MAP OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE



APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

BAD	Bété, Attié, Dida is often used in Côte d'Ivoire to refer to the FPI's ethnic support base.
BAE	<i>Brigade anti-émeutes</i> -- Anti-riot police force. This brigade was created by the Ivorian government to control attempts at insurrection. Sent with the FANCI to clean up the city of Man in December 2002, it was accused of indiscriminate killing and other major abuses.
BCC	<i>Bourse de Café et Cacao</i> -- Coffee and Cocoa Exchange. It sets the annual price per kilogram for both coffee and cocoa.
CAA	<i>Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement</i> -- Autonomous Funds for Depreciation.
CAISTAB	<i>Caisse de Stabilisation</i> -- Stabilisation Funds. Dissolved in 1999, the CAISTAB was ostensibly meant to support cocoa prices for Ivorian planters. It was also famously the black box of slush funds for the PDCI governments under Houphouët and Konan Bédié.
CIE	<i>Compagnie Ivoirienne d'Electricité</i> -- Ivoirian electricity company.
CATD	<i>Camp d'Accueil Temporaire pour Déplacés</i> -- Temporary Displaced Persons Camp.
COJEP	<i>Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes Patriotes</i> -- the Pan-African Congress of Young Patriots.
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration program.
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States.
FANCI	<i>Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire</i> , the national army of Côte d'Ivoire, loyal to President Gbagbo in the Ivorian crisis.
FDPCC	<i>Fonds du Développement des activités de Production du Café et Cacao</i> -- Funds for the development of productive activities for coffee and cocoa.
FESCI	<i>Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire</i> -- Federation of University and Secondary School Students of Côte d'Ivoire. It is a very active student movement created in April 1990. Serge Kuyo is the Secretary General, elected during the 4 th Congress of the Students' Union held on 12 May 1993.
FLGO	<i>Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest</i> -- Liberation Forces of the Far West. A militia recruited by President Gbagbo, it has fought alongside MODEL inside Liberia.
FLN	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i> -- National Liberation Front. It is led by Moussa Touré. After it was disbanded, the GPP was recreated as the <i>Front de Libération Nationale</i> .
FN	<i>Forces Nouvelles</i> . The name taken by the three ex-rebel movements from the Ivorian north: the MPCI, MJP, and MPIGO.
FPI	<i>Front Populaire Ivoirien</i> -- Ivorian Popular Front. President Laurent Gbagbo's party.
FRC	<i>Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle de la filière café-cacao</i> -- Funds for the regulation and control of the coffee-cocoa marketing board.
FSCO	<i>Front pour la Sécurité du Centre-Ouest</i> -- Front for the Security of the Centre-West. It led by Bertrand Gnatoa, who claims to have 14,031 troops.
GP	<i>Garde Présidentielle</i> -- Presidential Guard.
GPP	<i>Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix</i> -- Patriotic Group for Peace. It comprises a half dozen militias that sprang up in southern Côte d'Ivoire beginning in September 2002.
GSP	<i>Groupement de la Sécurité Présidentielle</i> -- Presidential Security Forces.

ICC	International Criminal Court.
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons.
IMF	International Monetary Fund.
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, a rebel group opposed to Charles Taylor's government and created in early 1999 in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
MJP	<i>Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix</i> -- Movement for Justice and Peace. One of two rebel groups that emerged in western Côte d'Ivoire on 28 November 2002, two months after the beginning of the Ivorian conflict. It received support from President Taylor and especially from the northern-based Ivorian rebel group, <i>Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire</i> (MPCI).
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia, a rebel group whose formation was announced in March 2003 and composed of veteran anti-Taylor fighters, refugees and political asylum seekers predominantly based in Côte d'Ivoire since Liberia's civil war in the 1990s. It gains much of its financing from the Krahn ethnic diaspora in the U.S., is allied to the government of President Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d'Ivoire, and sought the overthrow of then-President Taylor in Liberia.
MPCI	<i>Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire</i> -- Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire -- the first rebel group formed in Côte d'Ivoire in September 2002. It is mainly seen as a northern-based movement with strong links to Burkina Faso.
MPIGO	<i>Mouvement Patriotique du Grand Ouest</i> -- Patriotic Movement of the Far West. It is the second rebel group that emerged in western Côte d'Ivoire in late November 2002. Its initial operations were heavily coordinated and influenced by President Taylor's top commanders.
MSF	<i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i> .
NCOs	Non-commissioned Officers.
ONUCI	<i>Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire</i> -- United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Its mandate started on 4 April 2004.
PDCI	<i>Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire</i> -- Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire. Together with RDA (below), it formed the state party during the rule of President Houphouët-Boigny.
RCI	<i>République de Côte d'Ivoire</i> -- Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.
RDA	<i>Rassemblement Démocratique Africain</i> -- African Democratic Rally. Founded in Bamako in 1946, this French West Africa-wide political party was involved in the process of decolonisation, including the abolition of colonial forced labour. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the head of the Ivorian RDA section, folded the party into his PDCI after independence, and continued to draw on its prestige as the party of decolonisation throughout his career.
RDR	<i>Rassemblement des Républicains</i> -- Rally of Republicains. It is a major opposition party led by Alassane Ouattara. Gbagbo's security forces have suppressed this party, which they accuse of having masterminded the 2002 attempted coup and supporting the rebellion.
RUF	Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, the main rebel group in Sierra Leone's civil war.
SCAC	<i>Service de Coopération et d'Action Culturelle</i> -- The French Embassy's Service of Cooperation and Cultural Action.
SMI	<i>Société des Mines d'Ity</i> -- Ity Mines Company.
SODECI	<i>Société de Distribution d'Eau de la Côte d'Ivoire</i> -- Ivorian Water Company.
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia.
UPLTCI	<i>Union pour la Libération Totale de la Côte d'Ivoire</i> -- Union for Total Liberation of Côte d'Ivoire -- organised by Eugène Djué. He is directly involved in the creation of urban militias.

APPENDIX C

TEXT OF LINAS-MARCOUSSIS ACCORDS

1. At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, a Round Table of the Ivorian political forces met in Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003. It brought together the following parties: FPI, MFA, MJP, MPCI, MPIGO, PDCI-RDA, PIT, RDR, UDCY and UDPCI. The conference was chaired by Mr. Pierre MAZEAUD, assisted by Judge Keba Mbaye, former Prime Minister Seydou Diarra and facilitators appointed by the UN, the African Union and ECOWAS.

Each delegation gave its analysis of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and made proposals aimed at restoring confidence and overcoming the crisis. The vision shown by delegations enabled the Round Table to bring the positions together and arrive at the consensus described below, in which all elements - principles and annexes - have the same status:

2. The Round Table welcomes the cease-fire made possible and guaranteed by the deployment of ECOWAS forces supported by French forces, and demands strict compliance with it. The Round Table calls on all parties immediately to put a stop to all exactions and consecrate the peace. It calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners.

The Round Table reiterates the need to maintain the territorial integrity of Côte d'Ivoire and respect for its institutions and to restore the authority of the State. It recalls its commitment to the principle of democratic accession to and exercise of power. To this end it agrees as follows:

- a) A Government of National Reconciliation will be set up immediately after the conclusion of the Paris Conference to ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring the administration and public services and rebuilding the country. It will implement the appended Round Table program which includes, in particular, provisions in the constitutional, legislative and regulatory spheres.
- b) It will prepare an electoral timetable with a view to holding credible and transparent elections and set dates for them.
- c) The Government of National Reconciliation will be led by a consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a candidate.
- d) This government will be made up of representatives appointed by each of the Ivorian delegations taking part in the Round Table. In assigning Ministries a balance will be struck among the parties throughout the term of office of the government.
- e) To discharge its duties the government will have executive powers in accordance with the delegation of authority provided for in the Constitution. The political parties represented in the National Assembly which took part in the Round Table undertake to guarantee the support of their Members of Parliament for the implementation of the government's programme.
- f) The Government of National Reconciliation will, immediately upon taking office, attend to rebuilding an army committed to the values of integrity and republican morality. The government will restructure the defence and security forces and may, for this purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers and in particular the assistance offered by France.

g) In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the Government of National Reconciliation will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders.

h) The Government of National Reconciliation will seek the help of ECOWAS, France and the United Nations to arrange for their forces to guarantee these operations.

i) The Government of National Reconciliation will take the necessary steps to ensure release and amnesty for all military personnel being held on charges of threatening State security and will extend this measure to soldiers living in exile.

3. The Round Table decides to set up a committee to monitor implementation of the Paris Agreements on Côte d'Ivoire in charge of ensuring compliance with commitments made. This committee will report to national, regional and international authorities all cases of obstruction of the Agreements and failure to apply them, to ensure that appropriate remedies are implemented.

The Round Table recommends to the Conference of Heads of State that the monitoring committee be set up in Abidjan and made up of representatives of the countries and organizations called on to guarantee implementation of the Paris Agreements, and in particular:

- the representative of the European Union,
- the representative of the Commission of the African Union,
- the representative of the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS,
- the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who will co-ordinate UN bodies,
- the representative of the International Francophone Organization,
- the representatives of the IMF and the World Bank,
- a representative of the G8 countries,
- the representative of France.

4. The Round Table calls on the French government, ECOWAS and the international community to provide for the security of the persons who took part in it and if need be for that of the members of the Government of National Reconciliation until such time as the latter is in a position to fully perform this task.
5. The Round Table pays tribute to the mediation provided by ECOWAS and to the endeavours of the African Union and the UN, and thanks France for its role in organizing this meeting and achieving this consensus.

Done at Linas-Marcoussis, 23 January 2003

FOR THE FPI
Pascal AFFI N'GUESSAN

FOR THE MFA
Innocent KOBENA ANAKY

FOR THE MJP
Gaspard DELI

FOR THE MPC
Guillaume SORO

FOR THE MPIGO
Felix DOH

FOR THE PDCI-RDA
Henri KONAN BEDIE

FOR THE PIT
Francis WODIE

FOR THE RDR
Alassane Dramane OUATTARA

FOR THE UDCY
Theodore MEL EG

FOR THE UDPCI
Paul AKOTO YAO

THE CHAIRMAN
Pierre MAZEAUD

APPENDIX D

TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1528

United Nations S/RES/1528 (2004)

Security Council Distr.: General

27 February 2004

04-25320 (E)

Resolution 1528 (2004)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4918th meeting, on 27 February 2004

The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 1464 (2003) of 4 February 2003, 1479 (2003) of 13 May 2003, 1498 (2003) of 4 August 2003, 1514 (2003) of 13 November 2003, 1527 (2004) of 4 February 2004, and the statements by its President on Côte d'Ivoire,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire, and *recalling* the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Recalling that it endorsed the agreement signed by the Ivorian political forces in Linas-Marcoussis on 24 January 2003 (S/2003/99) (the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) approved by the Conference of Heads of States on Côte d'Ivoire, held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003,

Taking note with satisfaction of the recent progress, in particular the return of the Forces Nouvelles to the Government, the agreement reached on the implementation of the programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the talks between the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire and the Forces nouvelles,

Considering that the Ivorian parties have made the progress called for by the Secretary-General towards the steps mentioned in paragraph 86 of his report on Côte d'Ivoire of 6 January 2004 (S/2004/3), as confirmed to the Council on 4 February 2004, and *encouraging* the Ivorian parties to continue their efforts in that direction, *Calling* on the parties and the Government of National Reconciliation to take all necessary steps to prevent further violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and to put an end to impunity, *Reaffirming also* its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1379 (2001) and 1460 (2003) on children in armed conflicts as well as its resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts,

Welcoming and *encouraging* efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Deeply concerned by the deteriorating economic situation in Côte d'Ivoire and its serious impact on the subregion as a whole,

Welcoming the commitment of the African Union in supporting the process of national reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire,

Recalling its full support for the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and France to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict,

and *welcoming*, in particular, the effective action taken by the ECOWAS forces in order to stabilize the country,

Taking note of the message addressed to the Security Council on 10 November 2003 by the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, in which he requested the transformation of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) into a peacekeeping operation,

Taking note of the request made by ECOWAS to the Security Council on 24 November 2003 to establish a peace keeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire,

Noting that lasting stability in Côte d'Ivoire will depend on peace in the subregion, especially in Liberia, and *emphasizing* the importance of cooperation among the countries of the subregion to this end, as well as the need for coordination of the efforts of the United Nations Missions in the subregion to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire of 6 January 2004 (S/2004/3 and addenda 1 and 2),

Taking note of the letter of the President of the General Assembly of 8 January 2004 (S/2004/100) addressed to the President of the Security Council,

Aware of the persistent challenges to the stability of Côte d'Ivoire and

determining that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to establish the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) for an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 2004,

and *requests* the Secretary-General to transfer authority from MINUCI and the ECOWAS forces to UNOCI on that date,

and *decides* therefore to renew the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) until 4 April 2004;

2. *Decides* that UNOCI will comprise, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and corrections component, a military strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations personnel, including 200 military observers and 120 staff officers, and up to 350 civilian police officers, as required to perform the mandated tasks described in the following paragraph 6;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to encourage the United Nations missions in West Africa to share logistic and administrative support, to the extent possible, without prejudicing their operational capabilities with respect to their mandates, in order to maximize effectiveness and minimize the cost of the missions;

4. *Requests* UNOCI to carry out its mandate in close liaison with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, including especially in the prevention of movements of arms and combatants across shared borders and the implementation of disarmament and demobilization programmes;

5. *Reaffirms* its strong support for the Secretary-General's Special Representative and *approves* his full authority for the coordination and conduct of all the activities of the United Nations system in Côte d'Ivoire;

6. *Decides* that the mandate of UNOCI, in coordination with the French forces authorized in paragraph 16 below, shall be the following:

Monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups

(a) To observe and monitor the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, and investigate violations of the ceasefire,

(b) To liaise with the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) and the military elements of the Forces Nouvelles in order to promote, in coordination with the French forces, the re-establishment of trust between all the Ivorian forces involved, as stated in its resolution 1479 (2003),

(c) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in monitoring the borders, with particular attention to the situation of Liberian refugees and to the movement of combatants,

Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement

(d) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and to ensure the security of their cantonment sites,

(e) To help the Government of National Reconciliation implement the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the combatants (DDR), with special attention to the specific needs of women and children,

(f) To coordinate closely with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign ex-combatants, with special attention to the specific needs of women and children, in support of the efforts of the Government of National Reconciliation and in cooperation with the Governments concerned, relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations and donor nations,

(g) To ensure that the programmes mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f) take into account the need for a regional approach,

(h) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military materiel handed over by the former combatants and to secure, neutralize or destroy such materiel,

Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians

(i) To protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, provide the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of National Reconciliation, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment,

(j) To support, in coordination with the Ivorian authorities, the provision of security for the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation,

Support for humanitarian assistance

(k) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions,

Support for the implementation of the peace process

(l) To facilitate, in cooperation with ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire,

(m) To provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation, with the assistance of ECOWAS and other international partners, to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the presidential election,

Assistance in the field of human rights

(n) To contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and girls, and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help ending impunity,

Public information

(o) To promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI among local communities and the parties, through an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a United Nations radio broadcasting capability,

Law and order

(p) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire, and to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services,

(q) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d'Ivoire,

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give special attention to the gender and child-protection components within the staff of UNOCI;

8. *Authorizes* UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the Government of National Reconciliation to conclude a status-of-force agreement within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the safety of United Nations and

associated personnel, and *notes* that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

10. *Stresses* the importance of the complete and unconditional implementation of the measures provided for under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and *demand*s that the parties fulfil their obligations under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement so that, in particular, the forthcoming Presidential election can be held in 2005 in accordance with the constitutional deadlines;

11. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of UNOCI, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel as well as associated personnel throughout the territory of Côte d'Ivoire;

12. *Reaffirms*, in particular, the need for the Government of National Reconciliation to undertake the complete and immediate implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, including the disbanding of all armed groups, in particular the militias, the curbing of all kinds of disruptive street protests, especially of the various youth groups, and the restructuring of the armed forces and the internal security services;

13. *Urges* the international community to continue considering how it might help further economic development in Côte d'Ivoire with a view to achieving longterm stability in Côte d'Ivoire and the whole subregion;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the implementation of the mandate of UNOCI, and to report to it in this regard every three months, including a review of the troop level with a view to a phasing down in light of the progress achieved on the ground and the remaining tasks to be fulfilled;

15. *Decides* to renew until 4 April 2004 the authorization given to the French forces and ECOWAS forces through its resolution 1527 (2004);

16. *Authorizes* for a period of 12 months from 4 April 2004 the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities, and in particular to:

- Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces,
- Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security may be threatened,
- Intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI,
- Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units;

17. *Requests* France to continue to report to it periodically on all aspects of its mandate in Côte d'Ivoire;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. ICG also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a 12-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.icg.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board -- which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media -- is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates seventeen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Osh, Pretoria, Pristina, Quito, Sarajevo, Skopje and Tbilisi) with analysts working in over 40 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents. In Africa, those countries include Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia and the Andean region.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: the Australian Agency for International Development, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Foreign Office, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, the Luxembourgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the New Zealand Agency for International Development, the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan), the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fund, the United States Institute of Peace and the Fundação Oriente.

July 2004

APPENDIX F

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ON AFRICA SINCE 2001

AFRICA

ALGERIA*

The Civil Concord: A Peace Initiative Wasted, Africa Report N°31, 9 July 2001 (also available in French)

Algeria's Economy: A Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence, Africa Report N°36, 26 October 2001 (also available in French)

CENTRAL AFRICA

From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001

Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New Negotiating Framework, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001 (also available in French)

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001 (also available in French)

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Burundi: 100 Days to Put the Peace Process Back on Track, Africa Report N°33, 14 August 2001 (also available in French)

"Consensual Democracy" in Post Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, Africa Report N°34, 9 October 2001

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game of Bluff? Africa Report N°37, 16 November 2001 (also available in French)

Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Prevent Further War, Africa Report N°38, 14 December 2001

Rwanda/Uganda: A Dangerous War of Nerves, Africa Briefing, 21 December 2001

Storm Clouds over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Recast the Congolese Peace Process, Africa Report N°38, 14 May 2002 (also available in French)

Burundi: After Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning the Peace, Africa Report N°46, 24 May 2002 (also available in French)

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Countdown, Africa Report N°50, 1 August 2002 (also available in French)

The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire Negotiations, Africa Briefing, 6 August 2002

Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalisation, Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002 (also available in French)

The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict, Africa Report N°56, 24 January 2003

A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi, Africa Report N°57, 21 February 2003

Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: a New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration, Africa Report N°63, 23 May 2003 (also available in French)

Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, Africa Report N°64, 13 June 2003

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Time for Pragmatism, Africa Report N°69, 26 September 2003

Refugees and Displaced Persons in Burundi -- Defusing the Land Time-Bomb, Africa Report N°70, 7 October 2003 (only available in French)

Réfugiés et Déplacés Burundais: Construire d'urgence un Consensus sur le Rapatriement et la Réinstallation, Africa Briefing, 2 December 2003

Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004

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