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REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 194th meeting held on 15 June 2009, Council reviewed developments in Somalia on the basis of the report I presented on the situation in that country [PSC/PR/2(CXCIV)]. Council adopted communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CXCIV), in which it, among others, decided to renew the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for a period of seven months, beginning from 17 June 2009.

2. The present report provides an update on the developments that have taken place in Somalia since June 2009. It concludes with observations and recommended actions on the way forward, including the renewal of AMISOM mandate for a further period of 12 months, starting from 17 January 2010.

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

3. During the period under review, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has continued to experience many challenges, mainly as a result of the continued attacks by armed extremists groups, supported by foreign elements. In addition to the continued insecurity in most parts of Somalia, the TFG also faces the challenges of weak capacity of security and public sector institutions, delays in articulating and implementing a clear political roadmap, clan divisions and other internal problems within the Government, lack of resources for the provision of basic services, and inadequate organization and coordination of sufficient and continued partner support.

4. In mid-June 2009, and as a result of the increased threat from the foreign-backed extremists, President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed declared a state of emergency and called on the international community to provide urgent military assistance to prevent the fall of the Government. In response to this appeal, the TFG received the strong political support of neighbouring States and the wider international community, including the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the United Nations, the European Union (EU) and the United States, all of whom strongly condemned the violent attempts to remove the legitimate Government of Somalia.

5. Mention should be made here of the communiqué issued by the 33rd extraordinary session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, held in Addis Ababa on 10 July 2009; the press statement issued by Council at its 198th meeting held on 21 July 2009 and decision Assembly/AU/Dec.252(XIII) on the report on the activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, adopted by the Assembly of the Union at its 13th ordinary session held in Sirte, Libya, from 1 to 3 July 2009; and the presidential statement issued by the United Nations Security Council on 9 July 2009. In particular, IGAD and the AU reiterated their calls for the imposition of sanctions on individuals and entities considered to be spoilers of the Djibouti Peace Process and the enforcement of measures to block the flow of arms to the Somali insurgents through the country's airports and seaports.

6. Since Council's meeting of 15 June 2009, the Government has continued to pursue dialogue and reconciliation among the Somali people, through influential clan elders, clerics, and traditional leaders, including the Hawiye Cultural and Unity Council. President Sharif Ahmed has publicly pronounced his Government's readiness to enter into dialogue with elements of the armed opposition, and remains open to talks with hard-line elements of the Islamist insurgency who commit to renouncing and ending violence. It would be recalled that, earlier this year, the President established a Committee on Peace, Security and Reconciliation, through which the TFG has met with various leaders to press for a cessation of hostilities, an expansion of the political process and the promotion of national reconciliation. Despite these peace overtures, some extremist leaders in Al Shabaab and Hisbul Islam remain intransigent and have continued to perpetrate violence against the Government and people of Somalia and AMISOM.

7. The TFG has, however, not been deterred by the negative response of the extremists. The Government has sought to strengthen its domestic support and to reach out to moderate groups within the country, including Al Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), which signed a cooperation agreement with the Government on 21 June 2009. Even though challenges remain in the implementation of that Agreement, it nevertheless demonstrates the willingness of the TFG to broaden the space for dialogue and reconciliation and to reach out to other groups still outside the Djibouti Peace Process. Council will recall that the AU, IGAD, the International Contact Group on Somalia and other international stakeholders have continuously reiterated that the Djibouti Process currently remains the only framework for dialogue and reconciliation and as such is open to all Somalis to participate.

8. Internally, despite the precarious security situation, both the TFG and the expanded Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) have taken some positive steps to rebuild functioning state institutions in Mogadishu. The Government has held regular cabinet meetings, established revenue collection mechanisms, signed trade and cooperation agreements with neighbouring and other friendly countries, established an anti-corruption commission, approved Sharia law implementation, and begun the reorganization of its security forces. In June 2009, the TFG signed an agreement with Pricewaterhouse Coopers, a reputable accounting firm, to manage donor funds in order to increase its credibility and accountability in the use of public resources. At its 33rd ordinary session held in Djibouti, on 7 and 8 December 2009, the IGAD Council of Ministers acknowledged the efforts of the TFG to work closely with partner countries and organizations in a transparent and accountable manner, and noted the national budget approved by the TFG for July – December 2009 and January – December 2010.

9. In August 2009, Prime Minister Ali Sharmarke carried out a cabinet reshuffle. The objective was to address some of the weaknesses noted in the first Cabinet established in February 2009, including clan imbalances and discontent, lack of performance or commitment from some Ministers, and discontent among the main partners (former TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia/Islamic Courts Union - ARS/ICU). Additional steps were also taken to revive Government initiatives and to bolster its performance. The Cabinet ministries were clustered into five broad sectors (Security, Economy and Governance, Religion and Justice, Communication and Information, and Foreign Relations) to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

10. President Sharif continued his visits abroad during the reporting period with visits to the United States, Kuwait and Yemen. At the UN General Assembly in September 2009, he outlined the Government's priority areas, namely, improving security, broadening dialogue and expanding reconciliation, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population. While in the United States, the President also held meetings with Somalis in the diaspora.

11. The High Level Committee (HLC) was re-launched during the reporting period. It met on 23 October 2009 in Nairobi, Kenya, in a new format bringing together the TFG and the International Community, including AMISOM, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and partners. The HLC met again on 15 December 2009, ahead of the meeting of the ICG on Somalia in Jeddah, and discussed areas of cooperation between the TFG and the international community, including security, governance, justice and reconciliation.

12. In July 2009, the European Council decided to step up the EU's engagement for promoting peace and development in Somalia. To this end, the Council studied possibilities for the EU to contribute to international efforts, including in the security field, it being understood that further EU support to the Somali security sector should be part of a larger and coherent framework involving close EU cooperation with the AU, the UN and other relevant partners, in particular the US. On 17 November 2009, the European Council approved a Crisis Management Concept on a possible ESDP mission to contribute to the training of TFG Security Forces, and requested further planning work, without prejudice to any future decisions on a possible ESDP action.

13. On 17 December 2009, the International Contact Group on Somalia, of which the AU is a member, held its 16th meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. During the meeting, the TFG presented its concept papers on security, political outreach and reconciliation, reconstruction and development, and transitional tasks, and sought the support of the international community in implementing these. The meeting reiterated its support for the TFG and hailed its commitment to continue its outreach efforts to all groups willing to cooperate and ready to renounce violence, and encouraged the TFG to continue to expand its efforts. The meeting also called on the international community to offer practical and, where possible, direct support to the TFG in order to provide it with the opportunity to demonstrate that it can deliver on urgent tasks and be held accountable.

III. SUPPORT AND CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE TFG

14. The TFG has been faced with many complex challenges in its efforts at implementing the Djibouti Peace Agreement, among which is the re-building of state institutions and the Government's capacity to deliver basic social services to the people. For the last two decades, Somalia has been in a civil conflict that has led to the collapse of its state institutions and social fabric. In pursuance of its mandate to support the TFG, AMISOM, UNPOS and IGAD jointly convened a Capacity Building conference in Nairobi, on 14 and 15 July 2009. This meeting, which was attended by representatives of 31 countries and 11 International organizations, agreed on priority areas of capacity building for the TFG, focusing on the security sector institutions, and began the process of coordinating donor resources for specific training and capacity building support to Somalia.

15. AMISOM, UNPOS, IGAD and other representatives of the international community have been working together with the TFG in the Joint Security Committee (JSC), established under the Djibouti Peace Agreement, to transform the TFG security forces, including the police, into well-structured, professional and properly coordinated national institutions. Re-launched in Mogadishu on 25 July 2009, the JSC has a mandate to coordinate international community efforts with the TFG in rebuilding the Somali security sector institutions. I am pleased to report to Council that, as directed by the Consultative Meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the Troop Contributing Countries to AMISOM, the AU, UN and partners, a cell has been established within AMISOM to address, in coordination with all stakeholders, training of TFG forces with respect to the selection, training, reintegration, maintaining and sustenance of the forces.

16. Efforts towards the reform of the security sector in Somalia have also started with a Security Sector Assessment that was undertaken by the AU, UNPOS, EU and the United States Government. A technical workshop convened by UNPOS and the US Government took place in Naivasha, Kenya, in October 2009, to review the report of the Assessment and make recommendations to the TFG and international community for adoption through the JSC. Eleven key proposals advanced by participants from the four technical working groups (Military, Police, Intelligence, and Judiciary) were forwarded to the JSC for consideration at a special session of the JSC on 12 October 2009, in Nairobi. Among the key decisions taken by the JSC was the approval of a harmonized training programme for the new Somali security force.

17. Arising out of the Djibouti Agreement, which provides for the establishment of a 10,000 strong Somali National Security Force, AMISOM is further tasked, in line with its mandate, to support the training, mentoring and subsequent sustenance of the Force. AMISOM, besides training and mentoring support, has therefore been engaged in supporting the TFG forces in payment of monthly stipends, feeding, transportation and other sundry allowances. This support, with the generous contribution of the Italian Government through the Italian-African Peace Facility (IAPF), is based on the Memorandum of Understanding signed in March 2009 between the African Union and the TFG relating to the payment of salaries and allowances to the Somali national Security Forces, which stipulates payment of \$100 as salary, \$50 for food, \$15 for welfare (medical) and \$10 as management costs.

18. In order to ensure transparency and accountability in the payment of these allowances to the TFG forces, the AU has entered into an agreement with *CFC Stanbic Bank*, Kenya, which has a wealth of experience in banking services delivery in conflict countries. The AU maintains a special account with the bank for the management of the Italian Government contribution and, at the instruction of the AU, the bank makes payments to the beneficiary TFG security forces personnel directly through its Somalia agent, *Al Amaal*, which has a presence in over 100 branch locations across Somalia. Payments are overseen by the Management Committee composed of officials from both TFG and AMISOM as stipulated in the AU-TFG MoU signed in March 2009. The Central Bank of Somalia has endorsed the partnership between the AU and both *CFC Stanbic Bank* and *Al Amaal* in carrying out this payments to the TFG security forces.

19. Despite certain security and logistical challenges, the AU has successfully effected payments of stipends to over 3,000 elements of the Somalia national security forces over the last five months, thus contributing substantially in sustaining the force, ensuring their morale remains high, reducing defections and ultimately contributing to the ability of the force to provide much needed security to the TFG.

IV. SANCTIONS AGAINST SPOILERS

20. Council will recall that, at its 190th meeting held on 22 May 2009, it considered the situation in Somalia in light of the outcome of the 33rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on the situation in Somalia, held in Addis Ababa on 20 May 2009. Council requested the United Nations Security Council, in line with the relevant provisions of the IGAD communiqué, to take immediate measures, including the imposition of a no-fly zone and blockade of sea ports, to prevent the entry of foreign elements into Somalia, as well as flights and shipments carrying weapons and ammunitions to armed groups inside Somalia which are carrying out attacks against the TFG, the civilian population and AMISOM. Council further called on the Security Council to impose sanctions against all those foreign actors, both within and outside the region, especially Eritrea, who are providing support to the armed groups engaged in destabilization activities in Somalia, through attacks against the TFG, the civilian population and AMISOM, as well as against all the Somali individuals and entities working towards undermining the peace and reconciliation efforts and regional stability.

21. This position of Council was reiterated in subsequent decisions and statements of the AU, including during the Sirte Summit, and IGAD. In its presidential statement of 9 July 2009, the Security Council took note of the decision of the Sirte Summit, expressed its deep concern regarding the support provided to the armed groups undermining the peace and reconciliation in Somalia and regional stability, and stated that it would consider expeditiously what action to take against any party undermining the Djibouti Peace Process, based on all available evidence, including that submitted by the Monitoring Group and the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 751(1992). In July, the United Nations Monitoring Group submitted, for the Sanctions Committee's consideration, the first list of entities and individuals, including senior officials in the Eritrean Government, currently violating the United Nations arms embargo as stipulated in Security Council resolution 1844.

22. It is against this background that, on 23 December 2009, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1907 (2009), to impose sanctions on Eritrea for, among others, providing political, financial and logistical support to armed groups engaged in undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia and regional stability. These sanctions include an arms embargo, as well as travel restrictions and asset freeze against but not limited to the Eritrean political and military leadership. The list of the concerned individuals and entities will be designated by the Somalia Sanctions Committee.

V. SECURITY SITUATION

23. The overall security situation in Somalia remains unstable, volatile and challenging. In the Banadir region, which includes AMISOM's area of deployment, insurgents continue to launch random attacks against the TFG forces and the AMISOM forces in the capital Mogadishu. The insurgents have continued to plan and employ the use of vehicular and human-borne suicide attacks, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and mortar and sniper attacks against the TFG and AMISOM positions and convoys.

24. On 17 September 2009, insurgents launched a suicide attack on AMISOM Force Headquarters and Dyncorp office within the vicinity of the Aden Abdulle International Airport, Mogadishu. The attack was carried out while a high level TFG and AMISOM security meeting was taking place. Twenty people (4 Somalis, 4 Ugandans and 12 Burundians), including the outgoing Deputy Force Commander of AMISOM, Major General Juvenal Niyoyinguruza, were killed in the attack. Forty other persons were injured, with twenty six evacuated to Nairobi, Kenya, for treatment. In a communiqué issued the same day, I condemned in the strongest terms possible this terrorist attack.

25. I reiterated my appreciation and that of the AU as a whole to AMISOM personnel for their courage and dedication, and paid tribute to the Governments of Burundi and Uganda for their unflinching commitment to the promotion of peace in Somalia. I stressed the need for renewed efforts by the region, Africa and the international community as a whole, to provide increased support to the TFG and to AMISOM, to isolate and take effective sanctions against all spoilers, and to further the quest for peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

25. In October 2009, AMISOM forces foiled several assassination attempts against the leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). The insurgents planned to assassinate parliamentarians en masse, as well as the President, by launching mortar attacks during a parliamentary session and at an aircraft transporting President Sheikh Sharif into the Aden Abdulle International Airport, Mogadishu.

26. On 3 December 2009, a suicide bomber targeted a Medical School graduation ceremony at the Shamo hotel in Mogadishu, killing twenty-five people, including three TFG Ministers, and wounding several others, including Government officials, parents, relatives and friends of the graduating students and others in attendance to celebrate with the graduands. Although Al Shabaab denied carrying out this despicable act, the TFG found evidence that they were responsible for this terrorist attack. In response, I issued a communiqué strongly condemning the attack, stressing that such an inhumane and cowardly act aimed at stalling the peace process by intimidating and blackmailing the people of Somalia, the Somalia TFG and the international community will not deter the resolve and determination of the African Union to support the TFG in their quest for peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

27. Divisions between Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam groups, as well as within each group remain, despite numerous attempts to patch up their differences and present a common front publicly. Al Shabaab fighters continue to hunt down Hizbul Islam commanders in

different regions of Somalia, resulting in assassination attempts against several Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam leaders. The divisions between Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam are not only ideological, but are also closely linked to the fight for control of the lucrative port city of Kismayo in the Lower Jubba region.

28. In the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions, criminal violence and sporadic clashes continue between Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam fighters. In the Middle and Lower Jubba regions, the security situation remains tense as both Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam continue to mobilize their forces. In the Gedo, Bay and Bakool, which is under the control of Al Shabaab and foreign fighters, Al Shabaab has shut down numerous radio stations, closed the offices of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and obstructed the delivery of humanitarian services. The leaders of Al Shabaab in Baidoa have also threatened to invade Puntland and Somaliland, which they accuse of not imposing strict Sharia Law. In the Hiraan and Galgaduud regions, the situation remains unpredictable. TFG allied forces and insurgents continue to clash for the control of the strategic town of Beletweyne. In Galgaduud, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa continues to establish its authority, although some parts of the region still suffer from clan-based rivalries and banditry.

29. In Puntland, the security situation remains stable despite numerous threats from Al-Shabaab and acts of banditry. Security in Galkacyo, on the border between Puntland and South Central Somalia, remains a concern due to assassinations of senior Government officials and several other killings that have taken place in the region in spite of Government efforts to replace the old administration and increase security.

30. In Somaliland, the situation is stable as the region nears presidential elections. There are concerns, however, that the delay in setting a date for the election might create tensions between the opposition and the ruling party despite the political and security progress achieved in recent months. Attempts by Al-Shabaab leaders to establish cells in Somaliland have been thwarted. Furthermore, tensions have increased in the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) after Puntland President Abdirahman Farole declared that Puntland would retake the region. The issue of the SCC has the potential to ignite a conflict between Puntland and Somaliland. It is further complicated by SCC leaders and elites' decision to seek the status of an autonomous state.

31. I would like to report that the Commission has been engaged with the authorities and opposition in Somaliland. My former Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. Nicolas Bwakira, visited Somaliland on two occasions in September and October 2009, and held consultations with a wide range of political actors and traditional leaders with a view to ensuring that the region remains relatively peaceful and calm, specially in view of the fact any disruptions to the stability in the region would compound the already dire situation in south central Somalia.

32. During the period under review, the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia has continued to be of concern. On 30 November 2009, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1897(2009), through which it extended the mandate for the states and regional organisations that have the capacity to fight piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia up to December 2010. There are currently two regional organisations (NATO

conducting operation Ocean Shield, and EU conducting operation ATALANTA), one Coalition of the Willing (the Combined Maritime Force – CMF), and a number of individual countries, including Russia, China, India and Japan with their respective task forces, totalling some 49 countries, acting in the Horn of Africa and Somali Basin. At its 33rd ordinary session, the IGAD Council of Ministers underlined that piracy was only a symptom of the larger problem of security in Somalia and has become a source of increased crimes in and around Somalia, besides contributing to the strengthening of terrorists and extremists forces. Many statements made by the Commission's senior officials to the press stressed the same point and advocated for a holistic and efficient international response to the phenomenon in line with efforts aimed at resolving the Somali crisis as a whole.

VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND SUPPORT TO LOCAL POPULATION

33. The humanitarian situation throughout Somalia has remained grave and continues to deteriorate due to insecurity occasioning the disruption of humanitarian intervention. In particular, Al Shabaab has prevented the return of UN and other humanitarian agencies to areas under their control, insisting on the signing of Memorandum of Understanding and the payment of registration fees of thousands of United States dollars. Drought, flooding and increased displacements arising from insecurity and a significant drop in funding the 2009 Somalia Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), with \$512 million of the required \$851 received by end of November 2009, have impacted on humanitarian action in the country.

34. In fulfilling its mandate to facilitate humanitarian assistance in Somalia, AMISOM works closely with OCHA-Somalia, UNICEF-Somalia, UNHCR and other agencies. Consultative meetings between AMISOM and these humanitarian agencies are constantly held to establish coordination mechanisms through the sharing of information on humanitarian issues. These engagements are also aimed at finding ways to mitigate the dire situation of the civilian population, enhance bilateral cooperation between the Mission and these agencies, and identify flexible mechanisms to address the issue of women and children, refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups.

35. I am pleased to report to Council that, beyond facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, AMISOM is engaged in supporting people in Mogadishu through the provision of basic services such as water, medicines, shelter and food. At the AMISOM Levels 1 and 2 medical facilities, an average of 12, 000 Somali civilians, TFG troops and officials receive free medical support on a monthly basis. I would like to express my appreciation to the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom and Thailand for their generous provision of medicines which have been utilized for this purpose. I also call on our partners to support this initiative with regular and dedicated supplies of medicines, sundries, consumables and necessary equipment in order to ensure that our medical facilities are well replenished to meet the medical needs of the Somalia population in AMISOM areas of deployment.

36. AMISOM is also engaged with some local authorities and local community leaders in Mogadishu to ensure effective delivery of social services and to begin discussions on the re-establishment of governance structures at the local level in order to facilitate more effective and broader provision of portable water, medicines and food. AMISOM has also developed

plans to work with local communities, civil society groups, women, youth in the AMISOM area of control to jointly identify Quick Impact Projects for implementation in the areas of health, education, provision of water and temporary shelter for IDPs.

VII. AMISOM DEPLOYMENT, FORCE GENERATION AND SUPPORT BY AU PARTNERS

37. Council will note that the generation of additional troops for AMISOM has remained a priority of the African Union in its efforts to achieve peace and stability in Somalia, and the Commission continues to encourage Member States that have pledged troops to AMISOM to honour their promise and deploy urgently in order to enable AMISOM reach its authorized strength.

38. Council will recall also that AMISOM has been entrusted with additional responsibility to adequately train, mentor and ensure the sustenance and retention of the Somali Security Forces in order for it to assume primary and greater responsibility for the security of Somalia. This additional responsibility against the background of the inability to generate forces to the mandated strength has stretched AMISOM beyond reasonable limits. Operational limitations in the areas of maritime and air capabilities further compound the situation.

39. AMISOM presence in the Mission Area was boosted in August 2009 by the deployment of an additional battalion of 850 Burundian troops. The current troop strength of AMISOM has now reached 5,268, comprising of three battalions each from Uganda and Burundi. This increased troop level, however, still falls short of the authorized troop strength of 8,000. During a visit to Djibouti in October 2009 by my former Special Representative, the Government of Djibouti reaffirmed its commitment to deploy a contingent (450 troops) to AMISOM, in addition to providing personnel for interpretation and translation services to the Mission. Furthermore, both Burundi and Uganda have pledged one additional battalion each; the Uganda battalion is scheduled to be deployed from March 2010, with support from the US Government. Efforts are being made to source equipment for the pledged Burundian battalion.

40. Since the last meeting of Council, the Commission has convened three consultative meetings of AMISOM TCCs and partners in Addis Ababa, on 20 July, 2 November and 14 December 2009, respectively. These meetings provided an opportunity to review the situation in Somalia and issues relating to the deployment and operations of AMISOM. Regarding the specific question of AMISOM's mandate and Rules of Engagement (RoE), the TCCs representatives concurred with the view that the mandate was robust and sufficiently flexible, and welcomed the process of updating the RoE initiated by the Commission. It was further noted that, in order to effectively implement AMISOM's mandate, the Mission requires additional troops and equipment, as well as air and maritime capabilities. In the meantime, the need to give further impetus to the recruitment and training of Somali Security Forces, in order to cope effectively with the security situation, was emphasized.

41. As Council is aware, the AMISOM police component, once fully deployed, will have a total strength of 270, to train, mentor and monitor the Somali Police. Six (6) out of the seven (7) senior leadership team were deployed in Mogadishu on 16 June 2009, but were

evacuated following the suicide bombings of 17 September 2009 at the AMISOM Force Headquarters.

42. Police officers from Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda have been selected and are ready to be deployed into the mission. A phased plan has been prepared for the deployment of the 270 AMISOM Police Officers to Mogadishu, out of 610 who have been selected. The first batch of 34 Police Officers is expected to deploy to Mogadishu by January 2010 to perform their tasks under the mandate of AMISOM. AMISOM intends to commence refresher training for the Somali Police Force during the first quarter of 2010.

43. The Somali Police needs additional support in the critical areas of reform, recapitalization, re-equipment and funding to restore and enhance its confidence, as well as operational, administrative, managerial and training capacity. In this regard, the Police Component of AMISOM has outlined the following priorities to achieve its objectives: Initial Basic Constable Training, In-service Training, Officer Cadet Training, Initial Basic and NCO Leadership Training, Senior Commanders Training and Strategic Training. The AMISOM Police is also assisting the Somali Police, in coordination with key stakeholders, to develop suitable policies for recruitment, selection, vetting, registration and certification. The Police component of the Mission is also assisting the Somali Police to develop appropriate and adequate strategies to respond to the current policing environment in Somalia, especially as it affects public order reassurance and the reduction of fear of armed violent crime. I am pleased to report to Council that AMISOM Police conducted an assessment of the Train-the-Trainers Course offered by the Ugandan Police Force to 70 Somali Police Trainers, as part of capacity building and ensuring local ownership of the training process. A team of AMISOM Police, Somali Police and UN Police experts completed formulating an internationally accepted training curriculum and syllabus for initial recruit training course for the Somali Police. The harmonization of curriculum and syllabus for other categories of training is on-going. In order to ensure that there is standardized training for the Somali Police Force, the AU Police in coordination with key stakeholders will ensure that all training will be conducted based on this curriculum and syllabus notwithstanding where such training is carried out.

44. As part of measures to encourage troop generation and sustained deployment, AMISOM, with support of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), based in Durban, South Africa, organized a Confidence Building Workshop in Kampala, Uganda on the 2 – 3 December 2009. The aim of the workshop was to explore ways in which AMISOM can increase public confidence in the activities undertaken by the Mission in support of its mandate in such a manner as to highlight the contributions of AMISOM to the restoration of peace, security and development to Somalia.

45. The workshop, which brought together journalists and representatives of civil society organisations in Somalia, Kenya and AMISOM current (Burundi and Uganda) and potential TCCs (Nigeria, Ghana and Malawi), also had in attendance relevant staff members from AMISOM, the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission and the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA).

46. At the end of the workshop, the participants noted that they had become better informed on the roles, responsibilities and contribution of AMISOM to the peace process in Somalia. They also indicated that, having a better appreciation of AMISOM, they were now better placed to ensure through their respective media and platforms as civil society organizations, that public opinion in Somalia, in the current and potential TCCs and indeed, globally regarding AMISOM, is positive, objectively formed and constantly projected.

47. Following UN Security Council resolution 1863 (2009), the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was established in Nairobi, to implement the logistical support package to AMISOM. Since its establishment in April 2009, the UNSOA has rolled out logistical support to AMISOM amounting to USD 210 million from UN assessed contributions in the following areas: public information, rations, CITS (secure communication), POL (petrol, oil & lubricants), and aviation support for Medical Evacuation. AMISOM has also received training in logistic matters. UNSOA is also expected to start work on the building of the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu by erecting hard-walled secure office and residential accommodation for the civilian, police and military personnel of the mission.

48. The AMISOM Trust Fund is also managed by UNSOA. To date, about \$25 million has been received in the Trust Fund account. The Trust Fund Governance Mechanism has been established by AMISOM and the priority needs of AMISOM for the utilization of the funds in the Trust Fund have been forwarded to UNSOA for implementation. While UNSOA has begun reimbursements to TCCs for Contingent Owned Equipment, funding of AMISOM needs in the following areas has yet to be effected: AMISOM Police, force and personnel protection equipment, training and capacity building, medicals, public information, community outreach projects and operations.

49. Council would recall that, at the Brussels Pledging Conference in April 2009, a total of US\$213 million was pledged by donors (US\$160 million for AMISOM, US\$53 million for Somali security institutions). As at December 2009, actual cash disbursed totaled US\$78,059,935. A breakdown of that amount shows that the AMISOM Trust Fund managed by UNSOA holds US\$25,064,693. The Somali Security Institutions Trust Fund managed by UNPOS holds US\$850,957. UNDP holds US\$8,635,284 and the Government of Somalia accounts for US\$3,340,000. The African Union has also directly received US\$16,612,000. In-kind and logistical support to AMISOM TCCs, through Third Party contractors, totals US\$23,560,000. Outstanding contributions amount to \$126,919,377.

50. The realization of the funds pledged in Brussels by donors has been challenging. This has negatively affected the operations of both AMISOM and the TFG. Also, AMISOM has not been able to adequately access and utilize the funds that have so far been contributed because most of these funds are either earmarked or have certain caveats attached to them. As such, the Mission has been unable to meet many critical needs and obligations, including the payment of AMISOM troop allowances and reimbursements of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for lethal equipment deployed in the mission area.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

51. Despite the challenging security environment, I am glad to observe that the TFG has taken steps to move the process forward. In this regard, international community support to the TFG in every respect is essential in bolstering the ability of the TFG to remain focused, as we move into the next phase of the transition period. International community support to the TFG must be targeted and coordinated for the rebuilding of the security sector institutions in order to allow them play their role of securing the Somali state, while allowing the political leadership focus energies necessary for taking the transition to successful completion in 2011. I, therefore, appeal to all those who have pledged support to the TFG to speedily meet their obligations by disbursing their pledges and implementing their planned support accordingly. In particular, I reiterate that it is essential that all training and capacity building support be coordinated through the Cell established in AMISOM and the JSC, so that all available resources are maximized for the sustenance and retention of TFG forces.

52. While the TFG has demonstrated its commitment to expanding the scope of dialogue and reconciliation with a view to bringing into the Djibouti process all Somalis who have demonstrated the will to renounce violence, it is critical for the international community to demonstrate to the armed insurgency that the era of impunity, flagrant abuse of human rights, violations of the rights of women and children and wanton destruction of the lives and properties of ordinary, innocent and peace loving Somalis will not go on forever. The international community must demonstrate to the leadership of Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam that there will be a day of reckoning for them and that justice will be recompensed to them for all the deaths, misery and suffering they have brought upon innocent civilians in Somalia. I condemn in the strongest terms possible the continued employment of terrorist actions of suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, forced displacements of civilians and the shelling of residential areas by the armed insurgency. These acts constitute crimes against humanity. In this respect, the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1907 (2009) is a significant and welcomed development. It is my sincere hope that all concerned would from now on desist from actions aimed at undermining the search for peace, security and reconciliation in Somalia.

53. I commend the efforts of all humanitarian agencies and workers in Somalia who continue to risk their lives in order to ensure that the suffering of our Somali brothers and sisters is mitigated. I strongly condemn the actions of Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam who continue to deny the suffering civilian population much needed access to humanitarian assistance and aid. I urge Member States to join other members of the international community and donors by donating generously to the 2010 Somalia Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) in order to guarantee that humanitarian agencies in Somalia are well positioned to adequately address the humanitarian needs.

54. Support to AMISOM has not been optimal and, considering the precarious operating environment, I call upon all our partners to ensure optimal, sustained, predictable and guaranteed funding support to enable the AU meet its obligations in reimbursements to AMISOM TCCs for troop allowances and their equipment deployed in the Mission. I am particularly concerned because delays in reimbursing the TCCs for allowances to troops and

inability to pay for lethal equipment in an environment as insecure as Somalia has adversely impacted on the Commission's troop generation efforts to bring AMISOM to the authorized strength. It is important to stress that unless there is more predictable, reliable and timely resources made available to the AU, we may be unable to ensure the enhancement and sustenance of the Mission as so greatly required under the prevailing political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic contexts in Somalia.

55. I want to express my appreciation to all members of staff of AMISOM and in particular our gallant soldiers from Burundi and Uganda who continue to display the utmost levels of professionalism and dedication to the service of humanity in the discharge of their duties in the very difficult operating environment of Mogadishu. The commitment of AMISOM personnel to Somalia peace process is exemplified by the fact that their morale remains high despite the fact that a number of them have paid the ultimate sacrifice in the discharge of their duties. That AMISOM has lost over 60 personnel since its deployment speaks volume of the challenging environment in which the Mission is operating, as compared to other situations, including Darfur, and the dedication of the staff of the Mission. I would like, at this juncture, to pay a well deserved tribute to all our soldiers, notably the former Deputy Force Commander, Maj Gen Juvenal Niyoyinguruza, who lost their lives in various attacks against AMISOM in 2009.

56. I want to register my appreciation to Ambassador Nicolas Bwakira for his service, devotion and commitment to the Somalia peace process during the two years he served as my Special Representative for Somalia. Amb. Bwakira ably represented me and served Africa illustriously, and I wish him more fruitful years in the service of our continent. I seize this opportunity to request all Somalis, Member States, partners and the international community at large to extend their support and cooperation to Ambassador Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra as he assumes the office of my Special Representative for Somalia and Head of Mission, AMISOM.

57. The current mandate of AMISOM as renewed by Council at its 194th meeting expires on 17 January 2010. In view of the achievements recorded by AMISOM in supporting the advancement of peace and stability in Somalia, I recommend that Council renews the mandate of AMISOM for a 12 month period in order to enable it continue to implement its mandate and tasks as set out in the outcome of the 169th meeting of Council held on 27 January 2007 and the additional responsibilities entrusted to the Mission arising from the Djibouti Agreement.

58. It is the Commission's intention, in the coming weeks, to initiate an in-depth reflection on the situation in Somalia, to take stock of the efforts undertaken to-date, and assess the level of support received from the international community, with the view of identifying the appropriate additional measures needed to further the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia. Clearly, such a reflection is needed to enable us consolidate the progress achieved and enhance the prospects of bringing to a definite end the conflict that is afflicting Somalia for nearly two decades now.

59. This reflection is also necessary to bring all interested international actors and stakeholders to a broader and deeper awareness of the far-reaching stakes and the magnitude of the risks inherent to the evolving situation in Somalia. The enormous task of building and deploying AMISOM, while assisting in endowing Somalia with the much-needed security and other law-enforcement agencies, is an exceptional endeavour in every respect, given the lack of resources and the prevailing hostile environment. The Year 2010 should be actively taken advantage of to consolidate the gains made in 2009 and, more importantly, to develop a bolder strategic vision of all that is required to substantially promote the agenda for peace, security and reconciliation, with the support of the world community.