

**A REPORT ON A VOTERS' ROLL  
OBSERVATION CONDUCTED IN ZIMBABWE**

**ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK (ZESN)**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Executive summary</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Findings from the study</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Recommendations to ZEC</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>Recommendations to Government</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Recommendations to political parties and civil society</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>Recommendations to the international community</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>Objectives of the research</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>Definition of terms</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>2. Legal /administrative framework for voter registration in Zimbabwe</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>2.1 Registration as a voter</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>2.2 Transfer from a constituency</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>2.3 Objections by Constituency Registrars</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>2.4 Loopholes in the legal framework</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>3. Methodology</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>3.1 Legal/Administrative Analysis</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>3.2 Computer Test – External Consistency (Limited Sample of 102 Wards)</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>3.3 Field Test 1: ‘List-to-People’</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>3.4 Field Test 2: ‘People-to-List’</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>3.5 Limitations and Challenges</b> .....	<b>19</b>
<b>4. Findings</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>4.1 The State of Voter Registration in Zimbabwe</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>4.2 Accuracy of the Voters` Roll</b> .....	<b>30</b>
<b>4.3 Completeness of the Voters` Roll</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>5. Assessment of the voter registration process in Zimbabwe</b> .....	<b>40</b>
<b>6. Conclusions and Recommendations</b> .....	<b>42</b>
<b>6.1 Establish a new voters` roll for Zimbabweans</b> .....	<b>42</b>
<b>6.2 Voter education campaigns</b> .....	<b>43</b>
<b>6.3 Requirements for voters to register</b> .....	<b>44</b>
<b>6.4 Registration of voters and maintenance of the voters` roll</b> .....	<b>44</b>
<b>6.5 Autonomy of ZEC</b> .....	<b>44</b>
<b>6.6 Accessibility of the voters` roll</b> .....	<b>45</b>
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>45</b>
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>46</b>
<b>Appendices</b> .....	<b>47</b>
<b>Appendix 1 Sample for List-to-people Field Test</b> .....	<b>47</b>
<b>Appendix 2: Sample for people-to-list field test</b> .....	<b>48</b>
<b>Appendix 3: Lists of sampled wards</b> .....	<b>49</b>

## LIST OF FIGURES

<b>FIGURE 1: Voter Registration in Zimbabwe by Province (2008, 2010)</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>FIGURE 2: Voter Registration by Province and Gender</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>FIGURE 3: Voter Registration by Age</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>FIGURE 4: Registered voters aged 71+ by Province</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>FIGURE 5: Registered Voters by Gender (People-to-List)</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>FIGURE 6: Voting by Province</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>FIGURE 7: Registered Voters` Residential Status</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>FIGURES 8: Voters Residing on Given Addresses by Province</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>FIGURE 9: Ghost Voters by Province</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>FIGURE 10: Incorrect Record of Voters` Addresses by Province</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>FIGURE 11: Non-transference from the Voter`s Roll after Migrating from Constituency, by Province</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>FIGURE 12: Correct Record of Voters` Date of Birth, by Province</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>FIGURE 13: Eligibility to Vote</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>FIGURE 14: Voters` Name Appearing in Voters` Roll</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>FIGURE 15: Registered Voters` Name Appearing in Voters` Roll, by Province</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>FIGURE 16: Assessment of Registration Process</b>	<b>41</b>

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

In April 2010, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a civic organisation whose main goal is to promote democratic elections in Zimbabwe, embarked on a Voters' Roll Audit (VRA) to assess the quality of the voters' roll in Zimbabwe. The research project sought to test the accuracy, currency and completeness of the voters' roll and make recommendations for a clean-up of the roll.

Voter registration is the principal means to determine those eligible to vote and those ineligible to vote. Thus a flawed voters' roll can disenfranchise eligible voters and allow ineligible voters to vote. International law requires fairness in voter registration in order ensure that all eligible citizens can be registered to vote.

Observation of the voters' roll was conducted using three tests -- a computer test, a list-to-people field test and a people-to-list test. In the computer tests, a number of variables were selected such as age, gender and number of voters in 2008 compared to 2010. In the two field tests conducted, the currency, completeness and accuracy of the voters' roll were ascertained by confirming the identity, national registration number, date of birth and address of the voter. A systematic analysis of data obtained from these tests provides critical information about the quality of the voters that can inform efforts to improve the voter registration in Zimbabwe.

### **Findings from the study**

#### ***Accuracy of the voters' roll***

- The list-to-people test revealed that 41% of registered voters are no longer residing at the address in the voters' roll.
- 97% of respondents have not transferred to reflect the change in residential address against 3% who transferred to new wards.
- 57% of voters had no knowledge of how to transfer from the voters' roll.
- 93% of entries in the voters' roll were accurately entered and 7% of entries had errors, mainly on name, sex, date of birth and identity numbers.
- 99% of voters had their identity number captured correctly.

#### ***Completeness of the voters' roll***

- There was a 6.35% increase in the number of registered voters between 2008 and 2010.
- More males (52%) were registered compared to females, who constituted 48% of the registered population. Yet population statistics for Zimbabwe indicate that women constitute 52 per cent of the population.

- The computer test showed that only 18% of those registered are youths aged between 18-30.
- 49% of respondents did not appear on the voters' roll against 51% who appeared. However, ZESN is cautious with this finding as there was no electronic database to confirm if the persons were absent elsewhere in the voters' roll. This figure could also be explained by the migratory nature of Zimbabweans.
- 95% of voters had used voter registration drives to register as voters.
- 98% of respondents had national identity cards and 2% did not.

### ***Currency of the voters' roll***

- The list-to-people test showed that 27% of voters registered in the voters' roll were deceased.
- The computer test revealed 2344 people born between 1901 and 1909, therefore aged between 101 and 110 years old. It also revealed nine people born between 1890 and 1900 (aged between 111 and 120 years).

### ***The voter registration process***

- 94% of voters expressed satisfaction with the voter registration process.
- 94% of respondents felt that providing proof of residence was not a difficult task, with urban provinces --mainly Harare (29%) and Bulawayo voters (14 %) -- expressing difficulties in obtaining proof of residence.
- The study revealed that rural provinces have higher voter turnout than urban provinces.

## **Recommendations to ZEC**

Given the findings from the voters' roll observation, ZESN makes the following recommendations to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) as the body that supervises the voter registration function of the Registrar-General of Voters.

- Draw up a new voters' roll in Zimbabwe which will go a long way in improving the currency, accuracy and completeness of the voters' roll. The process should be transparent and inclusive to ensure that all eligible persons are registered;

- Strengthen the advisory committee on voter registration, which comprises of members of political parties, CSOs, academia, voter registration experts and voter registration information communication technology (ICT) experts, to act as a sounding board for ZEC;
- Increase transparency of the voter registration processes such as deletion from the voters' roll as the process is currently out of public scrutiny and the criteria for deletion is left to the discretion of the Constituency-Registrars;
- Voter education drives to inform citizens on the procedures for registration, transferring, objections, making claims and deletion of dead voters;
- Voter education should also include information on how relatives can help the Registrar with objections and deletions of their deceased relatives from the voters' roll;
- Continuous maintenance of the voters' roll is important to ensure that voters that have become ineligible to vote, for example by death, are removed in order to prevent over inflating the voters' roll;
- Encourage ZEC to display the voters' roll to make it easier for citizens to make objections on the retention of certain names in the voters' roll;
- Requirements such as proof of residence need to be reviewed, especially for urban voters and young voters who find it difficult to produce proof of residence;
- The voters' roll should be accessible and readily available for inspection to the public to increase transparency and confidence in the voters' roll.

## **Recommendations to Government**

- Voter registration must, in its entirety, be integrated into one office of ZEC and ZEC should have total control of voter registration and maintenance of the voters' roll to ensure greater accountability for its state;
- Ensure the funding of ZEC is adequate for voter registration and voter education that relates to voter registration;
- Prioritise young people in the issuance of the national identity card to increase the numbers of young people who register as voters;
- Review the requirement for proof of residence requirement as it can be a barrier to the youths and other urban dwellers without a stable residence.

## **Recommendations to political parties and civil society**

- Encourage citizens to continually check their registration status;
- Increase education programmes on the importance of voter registration;
- Monitor the registration updating process and pay special attention to relocated voters, deceased voters and unregistered voters;
- Improve youth participation through programmes that enhance youth participation in electoral processes such as voter registration.

## **Recommendations to the international community**

Voter registration exercises are resource intensive and ZESN urges the international community to fund and provide resources as well as technical support to ZEC on voter registration and maintenance of the voters' roll.



# 1. INTRODUCTION

In democratic polities, voting is the supreme act of citizen participation in politics and its processes. In fact, voting is one of the 'procedural minima' of democracy. Granted there are numerous ways and methods of participation but voting is easily the most visible and one of the most effective methods of 'speaking truth to power.' The importance of elections in a democracy is seen through the opportunity citizens have to pick leaders of their choice to represent them in governance structures.

Alexander Hamilton (1962), observed that "A share in the sovereignty of the state, which is exercised by the citizens at large in voting at elections, is one of the most important rights of the subject, and in a republic ought to stand foremost in the estimation of the law." It is in the interest of all citizens to have legitimate leadership, recognised by both the regional and international bodies. Equally important to note is that such legitimacy is a product of a free and fair election, judged through diverse benchmarks principal among them the political environment; access to the media; freedom of movement and association; and *quality* of the voter's roll as provided for in the many regional and international protocols that govern the conduct of elections such as the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines that Govern the Conduct of Elections.

International standards for voter registration stipulate that the voter register must be comprehensive, inclusive, accurate and up to date and that the process must be fully transparent.<sup>1</sup> The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) has repeatedly affirmed this, noting that a comprehensive, accurate and credible voters' register is a prerequisite for free and fair elections. Regrettably, the quality of the country's voters' roll has for long remained problematic. Analysis of the voters' roll has unearthed many irregularities, including duplicate voters and dead voters. Whilst it is mandatory to continuously update the voters' roll to accommodate new entries, delete dead persons, change of names, surnames and addresses, such a crucial exercise has not been meticulously undertaken in Zimbabwe.

In 2008, the number of registered voters amounted to 5 571 950 and scientific evidence from the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU)<sup>2</sup> revealed that despite the average life expectancy in Zimbabwe of 44.77 years, 74 021 people aged 100 years or more were on the country's electoral roll at the time of the 2008 elections. RAU also discovered 182 564 cases of identity numbers and personal details being duplicated in two or more constituencies, despite the Registrar General's claim that such duplication is impossible. While acknowledging that a small amount of duplication could have occurred due to migration between constituencies in urban areas, two thirds of the cases of duplication were in rural areas, and this does not reflect typical migration patterns. Furthermore, persons who have died must be removed from the voters' roll. As the Registrar-General of Voters also keeps the register of deaths, it being a legal requirement that all deaths are reported and entered into a register of deaths, it is thus a simple task to ascertain which voters have died and these names should be removed from the roll. By law, a Constituency Registrar must remove any person from the voters' roll that he has

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<sup>1</sup> International IDEA (2002) International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework for Elections, IDEA, Stockholm.

<sup>2</sup> RAU Preliminary Report on the Audit of the Voters' Roll: "2013 Vision-Seeing Double and the Dead"

sufficient reason to believe is dead. Granted, some deaths are not officially reported and recorded but even those that are continue to occupy pride of place in the voters' roll, and presumably vote from their permanent resting places.

In related evidence, a Movement for Democratic Change Member of Parliament for Masvingo Urban, Tongai Matutu, shocked Parliament when he produced evidence that the voters' roll used in the 2008 national elections had names of hundreds of dead people and infants who had been registered to vote<sup>3</sup>. A total of 503 dead people appeared in the voters' roll. The same voters' roll had 144 202 people aged 90 years and above and 115 voters below the age of 18 years (the legal voting age). The youngest was observed to be one year old! Startlingly, all the 503 dead people had a similar date of birth -- 1 January 1901. The MP explained that such anomalies showed "the extent to which the voters' roll should represent the graveyard".

As a civic organisation whose main goal is to promote democratic elections in Zimbabwe, ZESN embarked on a Voters' Roll Audit (VRA) to assess the quality of the voters' roll in Zimbabwe with the ultimate objective of promoting the creation of a legal framework and election culture conducive to free and fair elections, thereby promoting citizen participation in democratic processes.

In assessing the quality of the voters' roll, ZESN paid attention to the following benchmarks:

**Only the names of people who are eligible to vote should be on the voters' roll:** are there any names on the voters' roll of people who are not eligible to vote or who do not exist? The name should appear once.

**The names of all people who are eligible to vote and who registered to vote should be on the voters' roll:** are there names missing from the voters' roll of people who are eligible to vote and who registered to vote?

**Information about each person on the voters' roll should be accurate and up to date:** is the correct information recorded for each person on the voters' roll?

**An election's legitimacy depends in part on the extent to which citizens participate, ideally all the information should be accurate but in the end it is enough if the information is sufficiently correct to allow the right person to vote:** what percentage of people eligible to vote is on the voters' roll? Is there under registration of some sections of the population, such as the youth and women?<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> NewZimbabwe.com. 19 Nov 2009

<sup>4</sup> The benchmarks were adapted from: R.L Klein and P. Merloe (2001) Building Confidence in Voter Registration Processes: An NDI Monitoring Guide for Political Parties and Civic Organisations, NDI, Washington.

## Objectives of the research

The objectives of the research were:

- To evaluate the quality of the voters' roll by focussing specifically on accuracy, currency and completeness of the voters' roll;
- To identify problems and challenges on the voters' registration;
- To promote broad public confidence on the quality of the voters' roll; and
- To recommend reforms for voter registration processes in Zimbabwe.

## Definition of terms

- **Accuracy:** the rate of error in entering data on the individual voter -- that is -- name, date of birth, sex and address.
- **Completeness:** the proportion of eligible voters included on the voters' roll
- **Currency:** whether the information on the voters' roll is updated, for example through transfers for those who have moved to a new location and deletions for those who are deceased.
- **A voters' roll:** is a list of names of all persons who are eligible to vote in a particular election

## **2. LEGAL /ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR VOTER REGISTRATION IN ZIMBABWE**

Voter registration in Zimbabwe is provided for in the Electoral Act Chapter 2:11 in section 17A of the Act. The Act provides for registration, transfer, objections and deletions from the voters' roll. The registration of voters is conducted on a continuous basis to ensure that the voters' roll is up to date. For one to qualify to register as a voter, they must be 18 years old, resident in Zimbabwe and a Zimbabwean citizen. The voters' roll contains details on the voters' first names and last name, their national registration number, place of residence and any other information that may be deemed necessary by the Registrar-General of Voters. Voter registration in Zimbabwe serves a number of purposes which include: guaranteeing that people legally entitled to vote can do so. It also prohibits ineligible people from voting and prevents people from voting more than once.

The registration of voters is done by the Registrar-General of Voters under the direction and control of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. The law stipulates that the voters' roll shall be kept by the Commission and maintained by the Commission. This is problematic given that the registration of voters, maintenance and updating is done by the Registrar-General of Voters, who assigns responsibilities to Constituency-Registrars in the Zimbabwe's various constituencies. This situation creates problems regarding accountability of issues in the voters' roll.

The law states that the voters' roll is a public document and open to inspection by the public. But in reality, accessing the voters' roll is a challenge as individuals and organisations that try to do so are viewed with suspicion. The voters' roll is closely guarded by the Registrar-General of Voters and is not treated as the public document that it should be. While the Registrar-General is able to provide hard copies of the voters' roll, interested stakeholders are not able to access an electronic copy. Access is also affected by the relatively high cost despite provisions in the law stipulating that purchase of the voters' roll should not exceed its production costs.

### **2.1 Registration as a voter**

The law provides that for one to register as a voter, they present at the relevant offices -- that is the Constituency Registrar -- and may produce proof of residence and their national identity document. They complete the necessary documents and receive a certificate of registration. However, while the law stipulates that proof of residence **may** be presented, it is not cast in stone and there is need to exercise flexibility to enable people to register as voters.

In urban areas especially, where proof of residence in the form of a water or electricity bill in the voter's name has not been easy for some voters to obtain, this has presented problems for individuals wishing to register to vote. These requirements are cumbersome for urban populations' particularly young people and people who live in rented accommodation. The burden of proof is greater for urban dwellers than for the rural population where a letter from the Kraal head is sufficient proof of residence.

## 2.2 Transfer from a constituency

Citizens are entitled to register as voters or to transfer their registration from one constituency to another if they have changed residency. The law also provides for procedures for voters to transfer from one constituency to another if they have moved residence. Thus, when a voter moves residence from one constituency to another, they can be transferred on presentation of the necessary documentation

## 2.3 Objections by Constituency Registrars

The Constituency-Registrar can make objections to the names in the voters' roll if he/she has reason to believe that the voter is not entitled to be on the voters' roll; that the voter has been disqualified; or should not be registered in that constituency. At issue has been the lack of transparency regarding objections and there have been fears that they have been handled in a partisan manner. The process is not open to public scrutiny and people that were labelled "aliens", especially those not of Zimbabwean origin from Malawi and Zambia, have had their rights to vote rescinded. The objections have to be published and notices sent to the voter's residence. The processes are complex for the ordinary voter to follow, especially in between election years when people are not too worried about their voter registration status.

In addition to objections, the Constituency Registrars also have powers to remove names from the voters' roll on disqualification, death or absence for 12 months or more. A voter can be removed from the roll if the Constituency-Registrar believes that he/she has left Zimbabwe with the intention of residing permanently outside the country. However, the law is not clear on the exact criteria that will be used to prove these conditions. Its application can therefore be subjective, leaving room for names to be arbitrarily removed from the voters' roll or left in the roll thereby inflating it with voters no longer resident in that constituency. Constituency Registrars are also empowered to remove duplicated names from the roll. In addition, voters can object to the retention of a name on the voters' roll provided they follow the stipulated procedures, make clear the grounds for objection in writing and pay the prescribed fee.

## 2.4 Loopholes in the legal framework

There are a number of loopholes in the legal framework in the registration and deletion of voters from the roll which may disenfranchise some voters. While the law stipulates that a voter **may** present proof of residence and the national registration card, in practice, proof of residence has been demanded without flexibility, especially for urban dwellers, thus increasing the burden of registration on the voter. These demands have prevented legitimate voter registration. Proof of residence is also discriminatory for people who are homeless but would like to vote. A similar situation is faced by transient and internally displaced individuals who lack a stable permanent home address and are therefore unable to vote.

Further, the deletion process is not transparent and while the law provides modalities for the deletions, they can be abused and some voters maliciously removed from the voters' roll. The fact that deletion process is at the discretion of the Constituency-Registrar with little input from the citizens opens it to abuse. The lack of transparency in the deletion

processes raises concern that the responsible agencies may remove the names of people expected to vote in a certain way, for example, young people.

The issue of “Aliens” is lacking in clarity on the criterion of who fits within this category. Some citizens have found themselves unable to vote despite being registered because their national identity cards had an “alien” category.

Thus is it important to strike a balance between provisions that enable ease of voter registration while also reducing irregularities in registration. While there is inadequate research on the impact of voter registration laws on voter turnout there is evidence that the voter registration policy has an impact on who can vote and who is deemed ineligible.<sup>5</sup> Hence the voter registration law needs to increase citizens participation and at the same time discourage fraudulent activities. The purpose of Zimbabwe’s voter registration framework is to allow eligible voters an opportunity to vote and this value should permeate all voter registration processes including deletions and objections.


In conclusion, in theory the voter registration framework in Zimbabwe provides room for eligible voters to register to vote, especially those who meet the criteria such as proof of residence. But for those lacking a stable permanent home, the residency requirement can be discriminatory. In addition, the fact that deletions are done at the discretion of the Constituency Registrar opens room for manipulation of the voters’ roll.

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<sup>5</sup> Info-refuge, 2005, Illinois Voter Registration Policy: An Analysis, <http://www.inforefuge.com/illinois-voter-registration-policy>.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

The Voters' Roll Audit (VRA) employed a number of tests to examine the quality of Zimbabwe's voters' roll. ZESN employed three tests -- a computer test, and two field tests ('People-to-List' and 'List-to People') -- on the voters' roll between May and July 2010. Data collection was cognizant of the fact that no voters' roll is perfect, but when it includes virtually all of the currently eligible voters, contains relatively few duplicate names or names of ineligible individuals, and is generally error-free, it greatly enhances the credibility of the overall electoral process and can build confidence in the electoral process prior to election day. The voters' roll is not a static list as people die every day, more people become eligible to vote as they turn 18 years old and people relocate to new areas. The methods used to collect data for the study sought to test mainly the *accuracy, currency and completeness* of the voters' roll.



*An illustration of the tests used*

Given that it was only possible to secure a voter's roll for one province at a time from the Registrar-Voters Office, the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) decided upon an incremental approach for conducting the VRA. Rather than waiting to receive all voters' rolls from the country's ten administrative provinces and either to secure or produce an electronic data version of the voters' roll, ZESN began by conducting a study of the voters' roll for Harare Province only, followed by studies of the remaining provinces once their respective voters' rolls were secured.

#### 3.1 Legal/administrative analysis

As part of the VRA, ZESN conducted a legal/administrative analysis of the voter registration framework. This helped identify challenges to the voter registration process. In particular, the analysis focuses on: barriers to new registration and transfer registration; the opportunity for multiple or fake registration; and the impediments to deregistration of individuals who are no longer eligible to vote (in particular those who have died).

#### 3.2 Computer test – external consistency (Limited Sample of 102 Wards)

A limited computer test for external consistency was conducted. The test compared the demographic characteristics of the voters' roll with external data sources – such as past voters' roll or a census. If ZESN had access to an electronic version of the voters' roll, then a comprehensive computer test for the entire country could have been conducted for external

consistency. Given that the voters' roll is currently only available in a hard copy format, an initial computer test for external consistency was conducted for a representative random sample of 102 out of the total 1,958 wards.

To ensure representativeness, wards were first stratified by province and urbanization<sup>6</sup> and weighted by number of registered voters according to the 2008 Delimitations Report<sup>7</sup>. Random selection from within each stratum follows after stratification. Detailed information on the 102 sampled wards is available in Appendix 3. Wards were selected for sampling because registered voters can vote anywhere within a ward and hence the ward is the smallest geographic unit in which each unit (i.e. ward in this case) has a unique list of registered voters.

For each of the 102 sampled wards, ZESN managed to determine:

1. The total number of registered voters for 2008 and 2010;
2. The percentage of voters by gender; and
3. The percentage of voters by age<sup>8</sup>.

### ***Limitations of the methodology***

The test was limited as ZESN was not able to secure an electronic copy of the voters' roll, which would allow for a comprehensive computer test. However, a manual test was conducted on the variable, which explains the limited wards (102) that were sampled for this test. Findings however reveal to a large extent the problems inherent in the voters' roll as they were randomly sampled to reflect the geo-political nature of Zimbabwe's voters' roll.

### **3.3 Field Test 1: 'List-to-People'**

In addition to the computer test, a 'List-to-People' field test was conducted. Research assistants were university graduates with a background in social sciences and experience in field research. They were trained in the two methods of collecting data on the voters' roll and pilot tests on the two methodologies. A de-briefing session was conducted to assess the problems they had encountered in the field and how these could be mitigated. Supervision was provided for each field team with quality control provided by the team leaders.

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6. Urbanization is defined by the ward's local government structure. Those wards located within Rural District Councils (RDCs) are classified as rural while those located within municipalities, town councils or local boards are classified as urban.
  7. Since the entire voters' roll is not currently available from the Office of the Registrar General, it was not possible to use the current distribution of registered voters for the basis of stratifying the sample. While the 2008 Delimitations Report has some errors and inconsistencies, it does provide the number of registered voters by ward. If it were possible to acquire the entire current voters' roll in its electronic data format, then its distribution of registered voters could have been used for stratification purposes.
  8. Age will be recoded into groups generally corresponding with those used by the census, but clearly identifying those individuals included in the voters' roll who are below the legal age to vote, which is 18 years.



The List-to-People method involved selecting names at random from the voters' roll and then sending out Research Assistants to locate the selected individuals and to confirm their existence and the accuracy of his/her registration information. The List-to-People therefore helped to identify the degree to which the voters' roll is bloated with the names of fictitious, deceased or ineligible voters.

Due to the challenges explained below, a resultant of the political environment, a limited sample size of 513 individuals was randomly selected from within the representative random sample of 102 wards – 13 people more than the initial sample of 500. While this produced a larger margin of error (+/-4.3 at 95% confidence interval), it was hoped that this would also result in higher response rates, thus increasing confidence in the accuracy of the findings. The attached list of sampled wards (Appendix 3) provides the distribution of sampled names by ward for the List-to-People field test. Further, only 513 respondents were sampled due to the resource intensive nature of the methodology, which included three visits to find the selected respondents.

Since ZESN managed to acquire only a hard copy of the voters' roll, individual names were therefore identified by first randomly selecting a page of the voters' roll and then randomly selecting a name on the selected page. A minimum of three attempts were made to locate the person associated with each name. A List-to-People Form is found in Appendix 1 to show tracking efforts to locate each person associated with names selected at random from the voters' roll.

### ***Limitations of the method***

This method is resource intensive and involved revisiting the same place at least three times until it had been verified whether the person in the voters' roll exists. In addition, as the names were randomly selected prior to going into the field, a number of respondents were suspicious as to why they had been selected. Given the political dynamics in Zimbabwe, respondents were ill at ease with research assistants, which affected some of the responses provided. The absence of an electronic copy of the voters' roll also limited the search for duplicated names.

### **3.4 Field test 2: 'People-to-List'**

A 'People-to-List' field test was conducted. These involved selecting individuals at random (borrowing from the well tested methodologies employed by the Afrobarometer) and then determining if those individuals are listed in the voters' roll and if so, whether the information is correct. This field test helped to identify individuals who believed they were registered, but whose names are missing from the voters' roll or listed in the wrong place.

It seemed easier to conduct the 'People-to-List' field test than the 'List-to-People' field test and hence a larger sample size of 1976 individuals was used. This produced provincial sample sizes of at least 100, with lesser margins of error (+-2.2 at 95% confidence level). It is therefore possible to analyze the findings for the country as a whole and by province.

A specific checklist was used for the People-to-List field test (see Appendix 2)

### ***Limitations of the method***

While this test was one of the simplest to conduct, the major limitation was the absence of an electronic copy to verify the total absence of the person in the voters' roll. While the person randomly selected in a ward could not have been found in that particular ward, ZESN had no way of verifying if this person was not registered in another ward as the electronic database to check was not available for the study.

### ***The sampling frame for the research***

The table below provides details on how the sample for the study was drawn. Sampling was based on the data from the delimitation report published in 2008.

<b>Table 1: Distribution of Registered Voters and Sampled Wards by Province and Urbanization (n=102)</b>									
<b>Province</b>	<b>Registered Voters</b>			<b>Sampled Wards</b>					
	<b>Percentage</b>			<b>Number</b>			<b>Percentage</b>		
	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Total</b>
Bulawayo	5.6%	0.0%	5.6%	6	0	6	5.9%	0.0%	5.9%
Harare	13.7%	0.0%	13.7%	13	0	13	12.7%	0.0%	12.7%
Manicaland	1.6%	11.1%	12.6%	2	11	13	2.0%	10.8%	12.7%
Mashonaland Central	0.3%	8.4%	8.7%	1	8	9	1.0%	7.8%	8.8%
Mashonaland East	0.6%	10.5%	11.1%	1	11	12	1.0%	10.8%	11.8%
Mashonaland West	2.2%	8.2%	10.4%	2	8	10	2.0%	7.8%	9.8%
Masvingo	0.8%	11.7%	12.5%	1	12	13	1.0%	11.8%	12.7%
Matabeleland North	0.5%	5.6%	6.2%	1	6	7	1.0%	5.9%	6.9%
Matabeleland South	0.3%	5.8%	6.1%	1	6	7	1.0%	5.9%	6.9%
Midlands	3.0%	10.1%	13.2%	2	10	12	2.0%	9.8%	11.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>71.4%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>29.4%</b>	<b>70.6%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: 2008 Delimitations Report

Note: Percentages may not add due to rounding.

### 3.5 Limitations and Challenges

In its quest to deliver an empirically-driven and scientific voters' roll audit, ZESN faced a number of constraints. Although they did not affect the quality of the data, they posed some difficulties in the data collection exercise. These included:

- (i) Inaccessibility of an electronic copy of the voter's roll.

The computer test was conducted manually as ZESN did not have an electronic copy of the voters' roll. Therefore, there were only a few variables that could be manually tested. As a result, the organisation was unable to estimate the frequency of duplicate records in the voters' roll. Further, it seriously limited the ability to conduct computer tests for external consistency. With an electronic data copy of the entire voters' roll it is possible to determine national demographic patterns for the entire country (rather than a sample of wards) not only down to the ward level, but also the block level (the smallest enumeration unit employed by the Registrar General of Voters). This would provide a much greater detail of information on the character of the voters' roll.

- (ii) Disbursement of hard copies of the voters' roll from the Registrar-General of Voters

Copies of the ten provincial voters' rolls were released in stages. Hence, ZESN decided upon an incremental approach for conducting the voter registration audit. Rather than waiting to receive all the ten copies, provincial fieldwork commenced immediately upon receipt of respective voters' rolls. Fieldwork was therefore staggered. Ideally, the exercise should have been conducted concurrently across the ten provinces. This would allow just one data set from each of the two fieldwork exercises, thereby simplifying the data analysis exercise

(iii) Locating voters: List-to-People

As findings will reveal, it was extremely difficult to locate voters who had migrated to new locations. Consequently, this reduced the actual sample size of respondents from the List-to-People survey. The methodology itself, though proven to be the best under ideal conditions, was problematic in implementation as location of individuals was not a straightforward task. As a result, a lot of time was expended in locating these respondents.

(iv) Political intimidation

Rural and farming areas presented the largest challenge for researchers in data collection. Some urban areas were also problematic and this could be explained by the polarized nature of the fragile political environment and the suspicion that any politically-related discussion arouses. While researchers observed all protocol, that is, seeking permission from the Chiefs and Headmen for the areas they visited, the survey recorded incidents of intimidation during the data collection exercise. For example, data was collected when the Select Committee of Parliament on the New Constitution (COPAC) outreach teams had begun collecting people's views. When the voters' roll audit researchers arrived in Mashonaland West, they were mistaken for COPAC and chased out of Chinhoyi with the warning that COPAC people were not wanted as there was no need for a new constitution.

In Midlands, a team of researchers had to leave quickly as one of their was burnt and were warned that worse could happen if they remained in the area. Manicaland also proved challenging as entry into the selected wards was made impossible by the community gate keepers who insisted they needed to know everyone who entered their village despite prior observation of protocol with the village Chief and Headman. Researchers attempting to secure interviews in newly resettled areas were told in some instances that this is a ZANU PF area and you are not welcome". In other areas, some youths chased researchers away and threatened to stone their vehicles.

The pattern of intimidation aimed at researchers was most notable in areas that had experienced the most election related violence in 2008 and which had been labelled as "hot spots", such as Mashonaland East, Central and West as well as Manicaland.

Intimidation of researchers was primarily experienced in rural areas. While some citizens wanted to participate, they feared reprisals after the researchers had left. According to one researcher, in Mashonaland East a woman begged them to remove their car which was parked near her house saying the researchers "would create trouble for her after they left". On visiting a school in Mashonaland Central province, researchers were informed by the school authority that they had bad experiences from the 2008 June elections and did not wish to discuss election-related issues. As such, in the highly

sensitive areas, researchers had to employ a lot of tact and sensitivity. As expected, given the highly polarised political environment in Zimbabwe, the List-to-People test was not an easy exercise since it involved researchers going to people's homes and asking them to show their identity documents. The People-to-List methodology, on the other hand, was easier to implement.

(v) Missing data

The absence of data effectively reduced the total sample size for analysis. This data includes the total voters who were listed on the voters' roll but who could not be physically identified. For example, an assessment of whether the sampled voter from the voters' rolls "currently reside at the given address" reveals a total of 5% missing data. The 5% comes from a total of 24 people who could not be physically located in the field. Hence, this indirectly reduces the sample size to 489 people against the 513 listed voters from the voters' roll.

## 4. FINDINGS

### 4.1 The state of voter registration in Zimbabwe


#### 4.1.1 Computer test findings

Voter registration is the basic requirement for eligibility to participate in an election. Despite the limitations of the process – including rather onerous requirements and procedures to register as a voter – the computer test revealed crucial findings in assessing the quality of the voters` roll in Zimbabwe. Using 102 wards of the 1958 wards in Zimbabwe, a comparison of registered voters between 2008 and 2010 revealed a significant increase in total registered voters from 372 373 to 396 021, reflecting a 6.35% increase. Slightly more males (52%) than females (48%) had registered as voters in 2010. Such a finding is a culmination of stringent voter registration measures (like providing proof of residence), that mostly affect women due to the dominant patriarchal society, hence impinging on their active participation in such democratic processes.

##### 4.1.1.1 Voter Registration Demographics

Provincially, Harare had the highest number of registered voters (22%) in 2010, a slight decline compared to 23% in 2008. Bulawayo follows with (16%), Mashonaland East (12%) and Manicaland (11%) of the total registered voters in Zimbabwe. Figure 1 reveals the provincial distribution of registered voters for 2008 and 2010. The computer test process reveals no major difference in proportional representation of registered voters across the different provinces. Any difference that appears is quite insignificant with a disparity of only 1%. However, the five provinces of Harare, Bulawayo, Mashonaland West, Manicaland and Matabeleland South witnessed a decrease in registered voters, whilst the other five provinces -- Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central, Midlands, Matabeleland North and Masvingo registered an increase. The smaller proportional difference is a clear indication that the pattern and geographical spread of voter registration in Zimbabwe has remained stable for the two periods.


**FIGURE 1: Voter Registration in Zimbabwe by Province (2008, 2010)**



It is notable that a province like Bulawayo, representing only 6% of the national population, comes second, with 16% of registered voters in Zimbabwe. This may be a reflection of an increase in registered voters in urban areas.


Distribution by gender (see Fig. 2) reveals more registered males (25%) than females (19%) in Harare province, 17% and 16% in Bulawayo and 4% and 3% in Matabeleland North respectively. The remaining six provinces have more female registered voters than males. This is an indication that more males are registered in urban areas than rural since Harare and Bulawayo are mainly urban. Bulawayo is purely urban, Harare has 99% of its population residing in urban Harare and 1% in rural Harare.

**FIGURE 2: Voter Registration by Province and Gender**



Further assessments by age (see Fig. 3) presents an anomaly, where the voters` roll has nine people born between 1890 and 1899, i.e. are aged between 111-120 years. The voters` roll also reveals a total of 2344 people born between 1900 and 1909, therefore aged between 101-110 years. Figure 3 reveals the age distribution from the computer test exercise.


**FIGURE 3: Voter Registration by Age**



In aggregate, and in respect of the 71-90 year-olds and the 91+ year-olds, the audit shows a total of 9% or 32 901 of registered voters who are aged 71+. Such findings fly against the demographics in Zimbabwe, with a life expectancy now at 45.77<sup>9</sup> years. The 32 901 figure underestimates the total national voters` roll population of people aged 71+ and as such the audit findings are from a small sample size of only 102 wards.

A plurality of the 71+ year-olds was recorded in Mashonaland East (16%), Manicaland (14%), Bulawayo and Midlands (13% each), whilst only a few from this generation were recorded in Matabeleland South (5%) and Matabeleland North (3%) (see Fig. 4 below). Such findings are inconsistent with the age distribution of the national population, where only an estimated 3.9% of Zimbabweans are aged 65+<sup>10</sup>. Going by this, the proportion of the 71+ year olds should even be smaller. This is unlikely where Zimbabwe`s average life expectancy is only estimated at 45.77 years. This may however reflect the grave consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic whose impact has mainly been felt within the reproductive age population group.

**FIGURE 4: Registered voters aged 71+ by Province**



Of concern is the representation of the youth (18-30 years). Despite Zimbabwe`s population being young, only 18% of voters in the youth category were identified as registered voters in the computer test. This may reflect a loss of active interest in participating in national elections in Zimbabwe. Writing on South African youths` participation in democratic processes, the Citizen Journalism in Africa<sup>11</sup> (CJR), explains that low levels of youth participation in democratic politics,

<sup>9</sup>2010, Projected life expectancy for Zimbabweans: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA World FactSheet), August 2010

<sup>10</sup> CIA World Factsheet, August 2010 (Projected Figures)

<sup>11</sup> CJR, 19 May 2009 "Do youth and young people express their opinions in national elections?"



particularly elections, are not uniquely a South African phenomenon but a common and increasingly worrisome feature even in the so called 'mature' democracies. The writer notes that low levels of participation were even more prevalent in developing countries.

A study of youth participation conducted in Western Europe revealed low voter turnout amongst the youth compared to the elderly. Two alternative explanations were given for this: (a) the life-cycle explanation and (b) the generational explanation. The study recognises that participation in politics requires certain social resources that are mostly acquired as people grow older. These include familiarity with parties, candidates, political and electoral processes -- that is, issues of political competence and political literacy. Hence, as people grow older, they tend to become more attached to parties and to internalise ideologies more deeply, thus becoming more integrated and more experienced. This in turn increases their voter turnout. Further, a ZESN 2008 Pre-Election Update<sup>12</sup> highlights the difficulties faced by youths in acquiring proof of residence, as one major stumbling block to voter registration.<sup>13</sup> In some instances, youths have been denied access to registration by partisan agents, on allegations of allegiance to opposition parties, especially MDC-T.<sup>14 15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Pre- election Update, No 5: 6 February-11 March 2008

<sup>13</sup> ZESN, Post Election Assessment, Press Statement, March 12, 2002, <http://apic.igc.org/docs02/zim/0203htm>.

<sup>14</sup> The Standard, The Pros and Cons of Voter Registration Methodologies, 9 January 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/2010011110487/html>

<sup>15</sup> ZESN (2008) Report on the Zimbabwe 29 March Harmonised Election and 27 June Run-Off, ZESN publications, Harare.


## 4.1.2 Findings from the People-to-List

### 4.1.2.1 Voter registration

Since one of the major objectives from the people-to-list methodology was to assess the status of voter registration in Zimbabwe, in addition to gauging the quality of the voters' roll, this section presents the findings on the state of voter registration in Zimbabwe.

From a sample size of 1976 people, 82% of the respondents reported having been registered to participate in the national and local elections in Zimbabwe, whilst 18% of eligible voters had not taken the necessary steps to register as voters. According to the computer test findings, there is no significant gender gap in registration: slightly more males (83%) are registered voters than females (81%). However, slightly more females (19%) are not registered voters as compared to 17% of their male counterparts (see Fig. 5).

**FIGURE 5: Registered Voters by Gender (People-to-List)**



Generationally, the findings reveal a negative relationship between age and voter registration. There are more older people registered to vote than the younger Zimbabweans. Although the proportion of registered youth voters exceeds half, the findings reveal fewer youths registered as voters than is the case with the older people. Thus, only 53% of the youth (18-30 years) were registered voters against 94% middle aged (31-50) and 97% old aged (51+). Although it makes sense that the older adults have had more time and opportunities to register, it is disturbing that there be such a low voter registration up-take rate among the future leaders of the country.

Whilst the above findings corroborate the computer test findings, analysis by province from the People-to-List is at variance with the computer test findings. Matabeleland North with the least voters under the computer test is highly represented with just above nine in ten (91%) registered voters. Mashonaland Central had 86% of its electorate

registered; Masvingo 85%; Bulawayo 84%; Matabeleland South and Manicaland 83%. Harare records 77% registered voters, the second lowest in terms of representation after Mashonaland West (76%).

Since the national identity cards are part of the vital documentation required for registration, the study also sought to find out whether respondents had these documents. Almost all (98%) had identity cards. Analysis by gender reveals that more females (3%) did not have identity cards than 1% of males. Conversely, more males (99%) had identity cards as compared to 97% females. A notable age disparity reveals that all of the old aged had identity cards as compared to 99% of the middle aged and 95% of the youth.

Further analysis reveals that 83% of the respondents with identity cards were registered voters whilst 17% were not registered. Understandably, three quarters (74%) of the respondents without identity cards were not registered, whilst 26% were registered voters. The other 26% may have used other identity documentation such as a passport or lost their identity cards after they were registered. On the whole, one can not underestimate the importance of a national identity card as a requirement to participate in elections. Unfortunately, the 74% of unregistered voters who may have been willing to participate in elections failed to do so in the absence of the required documentation for registration. Fortunately this is a small proportion.

#### **4.1.2.2 Voting**

... In a modern mass democracy the ultimate political decisions concern not what the rulers shall do but who the rulers shall be. Determining who shall rule through periodic elections of public officials' remains the sovereign people's weapon-of-last-resort for influencing what government does.<sup>16</sup>

Voting is a crucial component of citizen participation in a democratic society; it is "the great act of mass participation in a democracy", according to two prominent Political Scientists<sup>17</sup>. At the turn of the last century, the celebrated constitutional scholar, James Bryce had already directly linked voting with democracy: "... Democracy really means nothing more or less than the rule of the whole people expressing their sovereign will by their votes".<sup>18</sup> But it is not possible for people to express their "sovereign will" via the ballot box if the voters' register is in shambles or if the voters do not go out to cast their vote.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Austin Rainey, *Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain*, Madison, Wisk. University of Wisconsin Press, 1965, vii.

<sup>17</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, 145.

<sup>18</sup> James Bryce, 1921, vii.

<sup>19</sup> ZESN (2008) Report on the Zimbabwe 29 March Harmonised Election and 27 June Run-Off, ZESN Publications, Harare.

With 82% registered voters<sup>20</sup> -- a commendable number by international standards – in Zimbabwe where voter registration is not compulsory, what proportion of this group found their way into the voting booth? The findings show that up to two thirds (68%)<sup>21</sup> of the respondents claimed to have voted in the last election (March 2008 election) against 32% who had not (Table 1). This is despite the fact that a significant proportion of Zimbabweans (82%) are registered voters. The volatile political environment manifesting in intense political violence has deterred most Zimbabweans from participating in elections. But, in some instances, participation is coerced through fear. A classic example is the run-off June 2008 elections when most Zimbabweans who voted did so only to stain their fingers with the indelible ink as a form of protection from political violence meted out in an operation christened “*Operation chigunwe chakatsvuka here*” (operation is your finger red).

**TABLE 1: Voting by Gender and Age**

	Overall (%)	Gender (%)		Age (%)		
		Male	Female	18-30Yrs	31-50Yrs	51+Yrs
<b>Yes</b>	68	71	67	41	76	89
<b>No</b>	32	29	33	59	24	11

The study also shows a wide generational gap which is particularly evident between the youth on one hand and the older generations. While 89% of older Zimbabweans aged 51+ and 76% of middle aged Zimbabweans had voted in the 2008 elections, only 41% of the youth participated although they constitute close to a third (31%) of the sample. Several reasons could account for this low participation rate, including the fact that some had not yet reached voting age at the time. Notwithstanding this, such a generational gap clearly requires remedial interventions. Equally expected, the study revealed a small gender gap, with more males (71%) than females (67%) having participated in the 2008 elections.<sup>22</sup>

Provincially, there are some differences that do not seem to follow a particular pattern in terms of voter turnout. However, urban provinces like Harare (63%) and Bulawayo (67%) are in the lower half of the ten provinces while Manicaland and Matabeleland South are in the upper half – see Figure 6. If there is any pattern at all, it is that most of the provinces with higher turnout are mainly rural, perhaps accounted for by the fact that it was mostly in rural areas where people were


<sup>20</sup> In a survey conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) in April/May 2007, just over two thirds (68%) of the respondents reported that they were registered voters with many more rural voters (73%) than urban ones (61%) claiming to be registered to vote.

<sup>21</sup> In comparison, in the Afrobarometer survey conducted in May 2009, 61% claimed to have voted in the March 2008 elections, a turnout that dropped to 43% in the June 2008 presidential run-off election. See *Summary of Results: Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Zimbabwe*, compiled by the Mass Public Opinion Institute, Harare, 12-13.

<sup>22</sup> These findings are in sync with findings from a study done by Mass public opinion in 2009.

forced to participate in the 2008 elections; rural residents were threatened with having their houses burned unless they cast their votes “wisely”<sup>23</sup>.

**FIGURE 6: Voting by Province**



<sup>23</sup> Voter intimidation marks Zimbabwe elections: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com>

## 4.2 Accuracy of the Voters` Roll


### 4.2.1 Location/Addresses

A verification exercise using the List-to-People method to confirm the accuracy of the voters` roll regarding voters` addresses showed that 99% of the addresses existed, whilst 1% did not. Provincially, Harare had the highest residential error rate with 4% of the cases where researchers failed to identify residential area addresses listed in the voters` roll. Masvingo recorded 2%, whilst the remaining eight provinces, did not register such a problem.

An assessment of the recording of addresses in the voters` roll revealed that 97% of the respondents` addresses were correctly entered against 3% which were not. Further breakdown exposed that 6% of Mashonaland West voters had their addresses incorrectly captured, Midlands had 4%, Masvingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland Central provinces registered 3% each. Analysis by gender revealed that more females (4%) than males (1%) had their addresses incorrectly recorded on the voters` roll. Conversely, more males (86%) than females (71%) had a correct record of addresses on the voters` roll.<sup>24</sup> In terms of age, the data reveals no differences on recording of addresses on the voters` roll as 76% of the youth`s addresses were correctly captured, as was the case with 75% of the middle aged and elders.

With high mobility levels amongst Zimbabwe, some accounted for by economic push factors, whilst some are politically driven, such as Operation *Murambatsvina*/Restore Order, a continuous updating of the voters` roll is mandatory in Zimbabwe. The VRA therefore sought to determine the level of accuracy of the voters` roll by assessing whether the registered voters were still residing at the addresses recorded on the voters` roll. Findings revealed that 41% of the registered voters were no longer resident at the address given on the voters` roll, whilst 55% were still to be found at their original places. Four percent of the cases were inconclusive (see Fig. 7).

**FIGURE 7: Registered Voters` Residential Status**




*Question: Does the individual currently reside at the given address?*

<sup>24</sup> The remainder (13% for males and 25% for females) was accounted by missing data. Missing data- appears on all the variables and accounts for voters who were listed on the voters` roll but could not be physically identified.

The absence of a well updated voter’s roll – a major concern to the electorate – is widespread. Except for two provinces, Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North, all the eight provinces registered an obsolete voters’ roll. Harare recorded the highest proportion (71%) of persons no longer residing at addresses given in the voters’ roll; Mashonaland West recorded 58%, Bulawayo 55% and Manicaland 46% as indicated in Figure 8. More than 80% of the voters from Matabeleland provinces were resident at the addresses recorded on the voters’ roll, specifically 82% from Matabeleland North and 86% in Matabeleland South.

**FIGURES 8: Voters Residing on Given Addresses by Province**



*Figures exclude the inconclusive statistics*

Analysis by age shows higher mobility amongst the youth than the older generations. In this regard, 59% of youths had moved from the addresses recorded in the voters’ roll against 41% among the middle aged and 31% of the old aged. The older generation are more fixed than the youth, suggesting that a focus on residential update of the voters’ roll must be targeted at the youths.


The findings also suggest that updating the voters’ roll is not just a government obligation but also lies with voters themselves. However, the inaccessibility of the registration sites for most rural voters and the onerous procedures of effecting the necessary changes have deterred most Zimbabweans from undertaking the initiative to amend their personal information on the voters’ roll. Consequently, the voters’ roll does not meet the benchmarks of what makes a high-quality voters’ roll. Many have also failed to vote since individuals can only cast votes within their respective wards and constituencies.

Several factors were highlighted that account for the lack of correspondence between some voters' roll addresses and the actual voters' addresses. Findings reveal that a majority (53%) had relocated to other places, 27% were deceased, 19% had never stayed at the address on the voters' roll while 2% were in institutions (1% in prison, 1% in hospitals).

#### 4.2.2 Ghost voters

Analysis of ghost voters (voters who are either non-existent, underage or deceased) by province exposed the highest proportion of ghost voters (86%) as 'residents' in Matabeleland South, followed by Mashonaland East (46%), Bulawayo (35%) and Masvingo (31%) (see Fig. 9).

**FIGURE 9: Ghost Voters by Province**



Figures will not add to 100% because of exclusion of other responses e.g. "Never lived at this address, Persons in hospitals and Persons in prison". Analysis for the excluded cases are given below

Migration cases were mainly recorded in Mashonaland Central (82%), Mashonaland West (65%), Matabeleland North (57%) and Masvingo (56%).

An assessment of the effect of age on migration portrays a similar cause as indicated earlier. The impact of youth mobility comes out strongly, with 83% of the youth having migrated to a different place as compared to 64% of the middle aged and 27% among the old aged. None amongst the youth recorded deaths as a factor explaining the mismatch in address, whilst a fifth of the middle aged and 46% of the old aged appearing on the voters' roll were dead. All these changes are not effected on the voters' roll. The voters' register takes no cognisance of population dynamics. The presence of more aged ghost voters is a clear reflection of an inherent problem in the voters' roll which has been accumulating over time. Broadly, the two reasons explained above (deaths and migration) account for the majority of ghost voters in the national




voters' roll. Therefore, a fresh voter registration exercise should target such crucial areas, whilst also focussing on age specific dynamics.

Overall, the presence of close to a third of registered voters who are ghost voters, revealed by the List-to-People audit, remains a concern. This is a clear indication that no serious efforts have been taken to update and cleanse the national voters' roll of persons that should not be in the roll. This is a perennial problem that has worsened over the period of Zimbabwe's decade-long economic and political crisis. ZESN notes that an inflated roll containing either duplicate names, names of dead or migrated persons is vulnerable to electoral fraud. Such a voters' roll leads to a false and increased ballot count through ballot stuffing, multiple voting or manipulation of the figures on returns.

Incorrect recording of place of residence for voters, explained by 19% of the voters (individuals had never stayed at the given address), is clearly evident across provinces. Harare recorded the highest address error rate where 30% of the listed voters had never lived at the addresses recorded in the voters' roll. Matabeleland North registered 29%, Manicaland 26%, Midlands 23%, Mashonaland West and Bulawayo 18% each, and Masvingo 6% (see Fig. 10).

**FIGURE 10: Incorrect Record of Voters' Addresses by Province**




*Figures will not add to 100% because of exclusion of other responses, "The individual is deceased and the individual has moved to a different address". The analysis for this has been explained above.*

The question arises -- if voters had never stayed at the addresses recorded on the voters' roll, who then supplied such fictional addresses? There is the possibility that the voters may have relocated in the distant past, possibly before their neighbours were resident in the areas and were therefore not known by the neighbours. However, the existence of falsified data, emanating from registration of ghost voters can not be discounted. False names of non-existent voters could have simply been recorded in the voters' roll with false addresses for purposes of double voting and other rigging intentions.

The People-to-List survey also specifically assessed whether people had migrated to other places since the last election, i.e. since 2008. Overall, 12% had changed addresses against 88%. A follow-up question to verify whether respondents had transferred from the voters` roll, exposed startling results. An overwhelming majority (97%) had not bothered to effect the necessary changes on the voters` roll against only 3% who had. This translates to 11.64% of the total registered voters. Such a trend is evenly spread across the ten provinces, although Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central and Masvingo registered the highest figures with 99% acrosss the three provinces failing to effect corrections on the voters` roll (see Figure 11). In the capital, Harare, 94% of the voters had not changed addresses. The fact of the matter is that people cannot be bothered to re-register on the voters` roll, perhaps because the bureaucratic procedures involved act as a deterrent.

**FIGURE 11: Non-transference from the Voter`s Roll after Migrating from Constituency, by Province**



A generational disaggregation reveals that more youth (99%) and the old aged (98%) who had moved to new places had not transferred from the the voters` roll in comparison to 96% middle aged voters. A gender analysis shows no gender disparity: 3% of male voters took the necessary steps to update their personal information on the voters` roll as did 2% of their female counterparts.

Such a common problem has had far-reaching implications with some voters` being denied the permission to vote during election period since voters can only vote in their respective electoral wards. For various reasons, whilst it remains advisable for civic-minded voters to transfer to their applicable voter`s roll in their new wards, many have remained apathetic only to be denied voting on election day. In addition, the registration requirements should be made easier so as to allow voters to constantly update their personal information on the voters` roll.

But this raises the question of whether Zimbabweans aware of and knowledgeable about the necessary steps to take in updating their particulars on the voters` roll. The People-to-List findings reveal that a sizable majority (57%) had no knowledge of the necessary steps to take when transferring from one ward to another, whilst only 43% had the relevant knowledge. This suggests that ignorance drives the low transfer rate and this also exposes the laxity and inefficiency of the relevant agency in charge of the voter registration process. ZEC, working with together with civic organisations must inform voters about the requirements for updating their information on the voters` roll.

#### **4.2.3 Personal identity - name spelling**

A painstaking exercise was done to scrutinise the authenticity of voters` personal information on the voters` roll. Information from the voters` roll and information from people`s national identity cards was compared. Using the List-to-People test, an assessment of whether the names of voters were correctly spelt out revealed that in 93% of the cases (against 7%), names were correctly spelt (see Table 2). Across gender lines, more female names (96%) were correctly spelt against 91% male names. Provincially, Mashonaland West recorded the highest spelling error rate with 11% of voters having their names incorrectly spelt, followed by Manicaland (10%), Matabeleland South (9%), Bulawayo (8%), Midlands and Mashonaland Central (7% each), and Harare and Matabeleland North (5% each). All sampled voters from Masvingo and Mashonaland East had their names correctly spelt. An analysis by age reveals that more youths (10%) had incorrect name spellings against 7% middle aged and 6% old aged.

**TABLE 2: Correct Record of Names on Voters` Roll by Gender and Age**

	Overall (%)	Gender (%)		Age (%)		
		Male	Female	18-30Yrs	31-50Yrs	51+Yrs
<b>Yes</b>	93	91	96	90	93	94
<b>No</b>	7	9	5	10	7	6

In the same vein, the People-to-List audit assessed whether potential voters` surnames had changed since the 2008 election. Almost all respondents (98%) had not changed their surnames. A follow-up question to the tiny 2% who had changed names would further aid in ascertaining whether the respondents had taken the move to effect the changes on the voters` roll. The need for voters to effect the necessary changes can never be overemphasised. Unfortunately, most people are reluctant to re-register, despite the fact that they will still expect to vote in the next election. As a consequence, most people fail to exercise their democratic right to vote.

#### 4.2.4 Personal Identity – National Identity Number


The study also verified the correspondence between the voter's identity numbers (IDs) and that on the voters' roll. Virtually all voters (99%) had their ID correctly captured in the voters' roll against 1% with incorrect ID numbers. On this score, the voters' roll was accurate and this is commended. Across provinces, with the exception of Mashonaland West (11%), Mashonaland East (4%) and Matabeleland South (2%), all voters residing in the other seven provinces had their ID numbers correctly captured in the voters' roll. Analysis by age reveals few discrepancies on the 51+ years with 3% having their ID numbers incorrectly documented in the voters' roll. The other two age groups had nothing amiss. A gender perspective reveals less variability; 99% males' ID correctly captured in the voters' roll against 98% of the females.

#### 4.2.5 Personal Identity - Date of birth

An assessment of date of birth shows that 93% of the voters had their date of birth correctly captured against 7% of the voters with incorrect records of date of birth. Provincially, Mashonaland West recorded the highest errors with 22% of the voters having incorrect date of birth entries; Harare registered 16% voters with incorrect date of birth entries; Manicaland 15%; Mashonaland Central 12%; Midlands 8%; Matabeleland North 5%; and Matabeleland South 3%. Voters' roll from Bulawayo, Mashonaland East and Masvingo provinces had correct records of date of birth for their respective voters (see Fig. 12).

Analysis by gender and age reveal no significant differences across these two demographic variables. For example, 93% of males had their ID number correctly recorded, the same proportion for females.

**FIGURE 12: Correct Record of Voters' Date of Birth, by Province**



## 4.2.6 Gender

Records of voters' sex reveal that only 1% of the sampled voters had their sex category incorrectly captured against 99%, again reflecting accuracy in recording this demographic dimension. The record of voters' sex has not been previously identified as one of the voters' roll's inadequacies. The only incorrect recordings of the sex of voters were identified in the Midlands where 4% voters had been incorrectly entered in the voters' roll. All voters from the other nine provinces had correct sex entries. A focus on age dynamics also demonstrates correct entries for all voters' sex for the youth and the middle aged, whilst for the old aged only 1% had incorrect sex entry.


## 4.3 Completeness of the voters' roll

### 4.3.1 The eligibility of registered voters to vote

Apart from testing the quality of the voters' roll in terms of a correct record of voters' personal identity information (correct name, identity number, date of birth, gender and address), equally important was to assess whether the voters' roll is populated by people who are in fact entitled to vote. In other words, are all registered voters eligible to participate in national elections in the country? Further, are all entries justifiable in view of allegations that some of the registered voters may not have themselves taken the initiative to register, but may have been registered by other people?

The List-to-People revealed that from the verifiable voters (n=195) from the survey, all registered voters were eligible to vote (99.6%). This is another commendable achievement of the registration agency. The only exception is Matabeleland South, with 2% of the voters ineligible to vote due to citizenship status. However, a follow-up question on registration reveals that despite their eligibility to vote, 95% acknowledged having personally taken the initiative to register but 5% claimed that they had in fact *not registered to vote* (see Fig. 13). The crucial question is: who then had registered the 5%, if indeed they had not taken the initiative to register themselves?

FIGURE 13: Eligibility to Vote




Whilst the research did not have enough evidence for assessing the fear factor, the VRA suggests that there may be some motives regarding these anomalies. The mysteriously registered voters will probably never turn out to vote in any election but there is a good chance that someone will vote on their behalf. It is interesting to note that virtually all the mysteriously registered voters are female and from among the older generations. The existence of such names opens floodgates for double or repeated voting and ballot stuffing, thus diminishing the credibility of elections in Zimbabwe.

**4.3.2 Are names of registered voters actually in the voters` roll?**

Since the VRA sought to assess the quality and completeness of the voter`s roll, a final test from the People-to-List audit exposes disturbing findings. Almost half (49%) registered voters` names were missing in the voters` roll, whilst only 51% appeared on the voters` list. While this finding was established in the research, ZESN errs on the side of caution as this may be caused by limitations cited earlier regarding failure to access an electronic copy of the voters` roll to verify if the voter was in fact registered in another ward. Thus, while this statistic is worrisome, it is not conclusive on the completeness of the voters` roll due to the inadequacies. Besides the limitation mentioned, there is a possibility that some people who registered to vote may have been omitted from the voters` roll for various reasons.

**FIGURE 14: Voters` Name Appearing in Voters` Roll**




The People-to-List survey shows a positive relationship between age and registration status. More of the older generations (71% of the old aged and 58% of the middle aged), found their names on the voters` list while only 25% were registered voters. This generational variable may be due to partisanship in Zimbabwe, which has a generational tinge and could also be interpreted as manipulation by those in control of the registration process to exclude the youth who are

perceived as supporting a different ideology. Therefore, parties that depend on the older generation benefit while those who rely on the younger generation are disadvantaged.

A slender gender disparity is also apparent, with more female names (52%) appearing on the voter’s roll against 50% of males. Provincially, Harare had the largest voters’ registration error, with 67% of eligible voters “erroneously” not appearing on the voters’ roll as revealed in Figure 15, where only 33% of those registered appeared on the voters’ roll. Matabeleland South registered the least errors, with 71% registered voters appearing on the voters’ roll, followed by Matabeleland North with 61% and Mashonaland Central with 58%. The absence in the voters’ roll may be explained by mobility of people in urban areas versus the permanence of rural dwellers. Some voters may have relocated and when randomly selected may no longer have been in the ward in which they registered to vote.

**FIGURE 15: Registered Voters’ Name Appearing in Voters’ Roll, by Province**



**4.3.3 Overall record of voters’ personal information**

The List-to-People survey displays the following gaps on the current voters’ roll:

- 7% respondents with incorrect name spelling
- 7% with incorrect date of birth

- 1% with incorrect identity card numbers
- 1% with incorrect record of sex specification,

## **5. ASSESSMENT OF THE VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE**

Diverse electoral systems have different requirements for voter registration. In some countries, voter registration is state initiated and in others it is citizen initiated with various processes attendant to each method. Where citizens have to register, the registration procedures can present serious disincentives to the prospective voters. The study sought to assess the process from the voters' perspective.

In Zimbabwe, voter registration constitutes the irreplaceable qualifier for voting in elections. The government conducts voter registration exercises but introduces voter registration drives towards the elections to encourage eligible persons to register as well as inspect the voters' roll. Many Zimbabweans have complained about the inaccessibility of voter registration sites and taking voter registration drives to the voters has been strongly recommended despite its own challenges. The study sought to find out voters' perceptions on these initiatives.

Findings from the List-to-People show that 95% of the registered voters had used the registration programmes, against 5% who had not. However, the People-to-List reveals lesser proportions with 79% saying they used these registration programmes against 21% who had not. The latter statistics from the People-to-List approach can be taken as more realistic, judging from the lesser sensitivities aroused by the People-to-List methodology among respondents. In an environment of entrenched polarisation, any research that seeks to physically identify people from a list will naturally create apprehension among respondents. Therefore, the List-to-People method may have resulted in resistance from respondents, some of whom may have provided deceptive responses just to get the researchers to leave their premises. The question "How did you select me" was continuously posed to researchers by some respondents who could not easily come to terms with the methodology and the ultimate purpose of the voters' roll audit.


A follow-up on the registration process reveals that 94% of the voters were on the whole satisfied with the registration process, with seven in ten (69%) extolling the registration process (saying, the process is "very easy") and 25% describing it as "relatively easy". Two percent had encountered some of the difficulties associated with registration, whilst 1% thought the process "very difficult" (see Fig. 16).<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> The MPOI survey conducted in April/May 2007 (referred to above) found that exactly two thirds were satisfied with the voter registration process in Zimbabwe but one in seven (14%) were not. The other 20% were undecided.



**FIGURE 16: Assessment of Registration Process**



Provincially, there is universal agreement that the registration process is “relatively easy”. However, the exceptions are voters from Mashonaland provinces: Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Masvingo and Midlands, where all voters reported on the registration process as effortless. Matabeleland registered 94% voters supporting this judgement, Matabeleland North (89%), Mashonaland Central (96%), Harare (84%) and lastly Bulawayo, with the least representation (75%). Overall, 16% of voters in Harare viewed the voter registration exercise as relatively difficult and 6% voters from Manicaland complained about the extreme difficulties voters face when undertaking registration.

A gender analysis reveals equal proportions of males and females (94%) saying the voter registration process is not a laborious one, whilst 2% across the gender divide believe that the process is difficult and 4% assessing the process as ‘average’. Analysis by age reveals more youths (6%) finding the registration process tedious, against 4% among the old aged voters.

On the issue of providing proof of residence, a big majority (94%) said this was not an onerous requirement whilst 4% lamented the difficulties they face in providing proof of residence. Provincially, a similar picture is repeated. Harare (29%), Bulawayo (14%) and Manicaland voters indicated difficulties in providing proof of residence whilst in some provinces, nearly all voters viewed this as easy. There is also no gender gap on this: 94% of the females and 95% males affirmed the position.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The rationale for conducting the study was to assess the quality of the voters' roll against the benchmarks of accuracy, completeness and currency. The study showed a 6.35% increase in the number of voters from 2008-2010. Findings show that the voters' roll is satisfactory on accuracy at over 93%. However, on a number of benchmarks, such as comprehensiveness, the voters' roll fails to meet the challenge as the computer test shows that only 18% of voters are in the age range of 18-30 despite Zimbabwe being a country boasting a large demography of young population. Twenty-seven percent of entries in the voters' roll constitute dead voters who should be cleared from the voters' roll. The research revealed that 41% of voters no longer reside at the address in the voters' roll and 97% of the respondents have not transferred to reflect the change in their residential status. Findings show that 95 per cent of registered voters had registered during voter registration drives.

Given the research findings, a number of recommendations are suggested to deal with problematic issues in the voters' roll.

### 6.1 Establish a new voters' roll for Zimbabweans

The Government, through ZEC, should necessarily initiate the process of creating a new voters' roll for Zimbabwe. To this extent, this Report agrees entirely with the conclusion reached by RAU that:

*The current state of the voters' rolls indicates that piecemeal repair is neither desirable nor practical. A re-registration process for the entire country before the next general election by an independent electoral specialist -- is not only feasible but would be an important step towards ensuring democratic, universally acceptable and procedurally transparent elections in Zimbabwe.<sup>26</sup>*

Given the problems raised with the voters' roll, ZESN advocates for a fresh registration of voters which would culminate in a new voters' roll. This will allow for the elimination of many anomalies, principally the existence of multiple entries, exclusion of the youths and ghost voters. Admittedly, this will be an expensive exercise that calls for resourcing of ZEC to capacitate it to undertake this mammoth task. It is the primary though not sole responsibility of Government to mobilise the requisite resources for the exercise. Evidence suggests there is good will within international organisations and bodies such as the United Nations which have technical expertise and resources to provide assistance to ZEC on voter registration.

Decentralisation of the exercise will also be necessary in order to reach out to all four corners of the country. Above all, the programme should be done in a transparent manner. In the past, allegations have been levelled against the Registrar

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<sup>26</sup> RAU, "2013 Vision - Seeing Double and the Dead: A Preliminary Audit of Zimbabwe's Voters' Roll, Harare, October 2009, 25.

of Voters of partisan voter registration concentrating in ZANU-PF strongholds. Civil society and media oversight could provide the transparency and inclusivity.

The Audit also recognises and acknowledges the Inclusive Government's proposed electoral reforms to move away from ward-based voting to polling station-based balloting and therefore the compilation and production of a polling station-specific voters' roll in replacement of the ward based voters' roll. These proposed reforms come amidst concerns by Zimbabwe's major political parties that double voting took place in the 2008 elections. If enacted into law, the reforms would mean that voters would only be allowed to vote at the polling stations where their names appear on the voters' roll. The current system allows registered voters to cast their ballot at any of the several polling stations located in the ward. As this is entirely a fresh registration of voters, education campaigns for community sensitisation and mobilisation should be conducted prior to the exercise so as to allow a smooth transition from the ward-based to polling station-specific voters' roll. ZESN also urges stakeholders to put in place mechanisms (such as having an impartial police and increase the capacity of ZEC to deal with issues of political violence) to protect voters from being barred from voting on election day and retributive violence after voting as polling station-based voters' roll increases the visibility of voters, thereby increasing the potential for violence.

Some observers have expressed grave concern that in electoral violence-ridden Zimbabwe, polling station-based rather than ward-based voting could actually worsen post-election violence as it would be easier for perpetrators to identify and isolate 'deviant' villages considered to have voted 'inappropriately.' A solution to this problem would be to introduce ward based counting. This is an area where the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and National Integration could play an active role in creating an enabling pre- and post-election environment largely free of fear and aggression.

## **6.2 Voter education campaigns**

Voter education is critical in the overall electoral process; it is a powerful tool in creating or moulding critical and civic-minded citizens. Yet in Zimbabwe, voter education campaigns are limited and those that are conducted are carried out more on an ad-hoc than systematic and continuous basis. For instance, in the MPOI April/May 2007 survey referred to earlier, 68% of respondents had never received voter/civic education. The survey further revealed that 87% of those who had received voter education said they had benefited from it. In addition, 88% of those who had received voter education said it must be a continuous and not seasonal exercise. This clearly shows that there is huge but unsatisfied demand for voter education.

Currently, the law provides that only ZEC can undertake this function. Yet complementing its efforts with civic organisations would reduce the burden. Non-governmental organisations can only provide voter education if ZEC grants them approval and this has not been easily forthcoming. Voter education should particularly target the youth, especially in terms of voter registration. In addition, voter education should address issues of personal civic responsibility, where voters are taught to take an active role in updating their personal information in cases where migration has taken place; where

there has been change of voters' surnames; initiating deletions of deceased relatives; and how to make claims and objections to the voters' roll.

### **6.3 Requirements for voters to register**

Proof of residence is one of the requirements for voter registration and many voters, especially the young and lodgers in urban areas, struggle to obtain proof of residence. ZEC should consider alternative identification evidence e.g. an affidavit or vouchsafing by community leaders such as school heads or other local notables. Although such arrangements can be abused in the process, ZEC can surely put in place control and monitoring mechanisms to prevent such abuses rather than disenfranchising prospective voters.

If registration requirements are made easier, this could allow voters to constantly update their personal information on the voters' roll. Consequently, this would help in mitigating problems associated with youth apathy.

### **6.4 Registration of voters and maintenance of the voters' roll**

ZEC and the Registrar-General's Office still share some functions such as the registration of voters and the compilation of the voters' roll. Such an arrangement results in divided accountability as each of the two agencies can easily pass the buck and/or cast blame on the other for poor performance. Voter registration in its entirety must be integrated in one office, that is, in ZEC.

### **6.5 Autonomy of ZEC**

To rehabilitate the credibility and dignity of the ballot, ZEC should operate autonomously. ZEC is a constitutional agency that, theoretically, is independent and, under Constitutional Amendment No. 19, is one of the horizontal Commissions now appointed on the recommendations of Parliament. The new ZEC was appointed earlier this year but is yet to be fully resourced to increase effectiveness and efficiency. In practice, ZEC has serious shortcomings, not least a lack of financial independence and the necessary resources.<sup>27</sup> In many respects, ZEC is a nascent body with only about one third of its permanent positions filled. Temporary workers have conventionally been recruited out of the public sector to complement their staff in election periods. ZEC is not irredeemable but would require independence from the Ministry of Justice and considerable technical strengthening before Zimbabwe would possess an independent and professional electoral body. It also needs to consciously work to exorcise its past image as a partisan agency that advances partisan interests.

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<sup>27</sup> ZEC Commissioner Bessie Nhandara conceded as much in July 2010: "We are facing challenges because we don't have the tools for the job," quoted in "More confusion over Zim next polls", *ZimOnline*, 26 July 2010: <http://www.zimonline.co.za/ArticleID=6234>

## 6.6 Accessibility of the voters' roll

For purposes of accountability and transparency, the voters' roll should be readily available for inspection by voters and for assessment by political parties, interested organisations and the public. ZEC has consistently failed to release the electronic copies of the voters' roll to civil society and even to contesting parties. This is despite the fact that under the draconian Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), access to the electronic copy of the voters' roll can be obtained by applying to the Registrar-General, who is obligated to reply within 30 days of receiving the request. RAU tried this route to no avail. ZESN also failed to acquire an electronic copy. Only hard copies have been made available, which are also charged at a deterrent price. This has effectively served as cloak to conceal the present unsatisfactory state of the voters list. An open access policy would allow for more rigorous scrutiny of the voters' roll and would ensure that ZEC is above board. Other countries, such as South Africa, have increased access by making their voter register available on CD, Internet and SMS, if other countries can do it, Zimbabwe can also increase accessibility of the voters' roll to its citizens.

## Conclusion

The Voters' Roll Observation, unearthed a number of irregularities in the country's voters' roll, a finding that is entirely consistent with previous findings by independent researchers. Given this cumulative evidence, one major conclusion can be drawn -- that Zimbabwe needs a new voters' roll. Conducting the referendum or general elections using a voters' roll which does not inspire confidence of stakeholders, such as political parties and citizens, will reduce the credibility of electoral processes. ZEC itself has recently been candid enough to acknowledge the gravity of the problem and said that it needs at least a year to clean up the existing voters' roll: "At the moment, dead people are still on the voters' roll. We will need 12 months to clear out the old voters' roll"<sup>28</sup>.

A new and clean voters' roll will go a long way in increasing the credibility of electoral processes in Zimbabwe. Such a voters' roll will ensure that people eligible to vote will be included and remove persons that should not be on the list. An accurate and current voters' roll will ensure that all Zimbabweans are able to exercise their democratic right to vote in future elections, more so as the constitution referendum and general elections rapidly approach.

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<sup>28</sup> ZEC Commissioner Bessie Nhandara quoted in Ibid.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1 Sample for List-to-people Field Test

Distribution of Registered Voters and Sampled Names for the List-to-People Field Test by Province and Urbanization (n=497)									
Province	Registered Voters			Sampled Names					
	Percentage			Number			Percentage		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Bulawayo	5.6%	0.0%	5.6%	28	0	28	5.6%	0.0%	5.6%
Harare	13.7%	0.0%	13.7%	66	0	66	13.3%	0.0%	13.3%
Manicaland	1.6%	11.1%	12.6%	8	54	62	1.6%	10.9%	12.5%
Mashonaland Central	0.3%	8.4%	8.7%	1	42	43	0.2%	8.5%	8.7%
Mashonaland East	0.6%	10.5%	11.1%	3	54	57	0.6%	10.9%	11.5%
Mashonaland West	2.2%	8.2%	10.4%	11	40	51	2.2%	8.0%	10.3%
Masvingo	0.8%	11.7%	12.5%	4	58	62	0.8%	11.7%	12.5%
Matabeleland North	0.5%	5.6%	6.2%	3	28	31	0.6%	5.6%	6.2%
Matabeleland South	0.3%	5.8%	6.1%	2	29	31	0.4%	5.8%	6.2%
Midlands	3.0%	10.1%	13.2%	15	51	66	3.0%	10.3%	13.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>71.4%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>356</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>28.4%</b>	<b>71.6%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

*Note: Percentages may not add up due to rounding.*

## Appendix 2: Sample for people-to-list field test

Distribution of Registered Voters and Sampled Individuals for the People-to-List Field Test by Province and Urbanization (n=2,000)									
Province	Registered Voters			Sampled Individuals					
	Percentage			Number			Percentage		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Bulawayo	5.6%	0.0%	5.6%	112	0	112	5.6%	0.0%	5.6%
Harare	13.7%	0.0%	13.7%	274	0	274	13.7%	0.0%	13.7%
Manicaland	1.6%	11.1%	12.6%	32	222	254	1.6%	11.1%	12.7%
Mashonaland Central	0.3%	8.4%	8.7%	5	169	174	0.3%	8.5%	8.7%
Mashonaland East	0.6%	10.5%	11.1%	12	208	220	0.6%	10.4%	11.0%
Mashonaland West	2.2%	8.2%	10.4%	44	164	208	2.2%	8.2%	10.4%
Masvingo	0.8%	11.7%	12.5%	15	234	249	0.8%	11.7%	12.5%
Matabeleland North	0.5%	5.6%	6.2%	10	113	123	0.5%	5.7%	6.2%
Matabeleland South	0.3%	5.8%	6.1%	7	114	121	0.4%	5.7%	6.1%
Midlands	3.0%	10.1%	13.2%	61	204	265	3.1%	10.2%	13.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>71.4%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>572</b>	<b>1,428</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>71.4%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Note: Percentages may not add up due to rounding



### Appendix 3: Lists of sampled wards

List of Sampled Wards with Sample Sizes for List-to-People and People-to-List Field Tests										
Ward	Local Government	Constituency	Province	Registered Voters	List-to-People Sample	People-to-List Sample				
						Number	Y M	O M	YF	OF
4	Bulawayo Municipality	Bulawayo East	Bulawayo	11,173	4	17	5	4	4	4
8	Bulawayo Municipality	Makokoba	Bulawayo	16,260	6	25	6	6	6	7
9	Bulawayo Municipality	Pelendaba	Bulawayo	16,153	6	25	6	7	6	6
16	Bulawayo Municipality	Luveve	Bulawayo	10,000	4	15	4	3	4	4
22	Bulawayo Municipality	Nkulumane	Bulawayo	10,012	4	15	4	4	4	3
23	Bulawayo Municipality	Nkulumane	Bulawayo	10,056	4	15	3	4	4	4
12	Chitungwiza Municipality	Zengeza East	Harare	4,752	2 (10)	10	3	2	3	2
13	Chitungwiza Municipality	Zengeza East	Harare	3,973	2 (8)	8	2	2	2	2
16	Chitungwiza Municipality	Zengeza East	Harare	6,541	3 (14)	14	3	4	3	4
25	Chitungwiza Municipality	Chitungwiza North	Harare	3,716	2 (8)	8	2	2	2	2
1	Epworth Local Board	Epworth	Harare	5,619	3 (12)	12	3	3	3	3
7	Epworth Local Board	Epworth	Harare	6,669	3 (14)	14	4	3	4	3
4	Harare Municipality	Mbare	Harare	11,633	6 (24)	24	6	6	6	6
11	Harare Municipality	Southerton	Harare	12,737	7 (26)	27	7	7	6	7
13	Harare	Southerton	Harare	10,509	5 (22)	22	5	6	6	5

List of Sampled Wards with Sample Sizes for List-to-People and People-to-List Field Tests

Ward	Local Government	Constituency	Province	Registered Voters	List-to-People Sample	People-to-List Sample				
						Number	Y M	O M	YF	OF
	Municipality									
14	Harare Municipality	Kambuzumba	Harare	15,703	8 (33)	33	8	8	8	9
32	Harare Municipality	Glen View South	Harare	16,113	8 (34)	34	9	8	9	8
33	Harare Municipality	Budiriro	Harare	19,620	10 (41)	41	11	10	10	10
35	Harare Municipality	Mufakose	Harare	12,833	7 (27)	27	6	7	7	7
3	Chipinge Town Council	Chipinge Central	Manicaland	1,117	3	14	3	4	3	4
15	Mutare Municipality	Dangamvura -Chikanga	Manicaland	1,146	5	18	5	4	5	4
3	Buhera RDC	Buhera West	Manicaland	3,228	6	25	6	7	6	6
4	Buhera RDC	Buhera West	Manicaland	2,940	6	23	6	5	6	6
16	Buhera RDC	Buhera Central	Manicaland	3,605	7	28	7	7	7	7
5	Chipinge RDC	Chipinge West	Manicaland	3,045	6	24	6	6	6	6
8	Chipinge RDC	Chipinge Central	Manicaland	3,726	7	29	7	8	7	7
33	Makoni RDC	Makoni South	Manicaland	1,102	2	9	2	2	2	3

List of Sampled Wards with Sample Sizes for List-to-People and People-to-List Field Tests

Ward	Local Government	Constituency	Province	Registered Voters	List-to-People Sample	People-to-List Sample				
						Number	Y M	O M	YF	OF
7	Mutare RDC	Mutare South	Manicaland	1,742	3	14	4	3	4	3
27	Mutare RDC	Mutare South	Manicaland	2,173	4	17	4	5	4	4
30	Mutare RDC	Mutare West	Manicaland	2,819	5	22	6	5	5	6
23	Mutasa RDC	Mutasa South	Manicaland	2,020	4	16	4	4	4	4
30	Mutasa RDC	Mutasa North	Manicaland	1,956	4	15	3	4	4	4
1	Bindura Municipality	Bindura North	Mashonaland Central	1,837	1	5	2	1	1	1
2	Chaminuka RDC	Shamva North	Mashonaland Central	1,211	2	10	2	3	3	2
11	Chaminuka RDC	Shamva South	Mashonaland Central	2,559	6	22	6	5	5	6
11	Guruve RDC	Guruve South	Mashonaland Central	3,534	8	31	8	8	8	7
2	Mazowe RDC	Mazowe North	Mashonaland Central	2,560	6	22	5	6	5	6
35	Mazowe RDC	Mazowe West	Mashonaland Central	1,586	3	14	4	3	4	3
4	Muzarabani RDC	Muzarabani North	Mashonaland Central	2,483	5	22	5	6	5	6
4	Pfura RDC	Mt. Darwin North	Mashonaland Central	2,812	6	25	6	6	7	6
31	Pfura RDC	Mt. Darwin North	Mashonaland Central	2,623	6	23	6	6	5	6
5	Marondera Municipality	Marondera Central	Mashonaland East	2,095	3	12	3	3	3	3

List of Sampled Wards with Sample Sizes for List-to-People and People-to-List Field Tests

Ward	Local Government	Constituency	Province	Registered Voters	List-to-People Sample	People-to-List Sample				
						Number	Y M	O M	YF	OF
14	Goromonzi RDC	Goromonzi North	Mashonaland East	3,926	5	20	5	5	5	5
23	Goromonzi RDC	Goromonzi South	Mashonaland East	782	1	4	1	1	1	1
3	Mudzi RDC	Mudzi North	Mashonaland East	4,995	7	26	7	6	7	6
15	Mudzi RDC	Mudzi South	Mashonaland East	4,973	7	26	6	7	6	7
8	Murewa RDC	Murewa North	Mashonaland East	4,343	6	23	6	5	6	6
16	Murewa RDC	Murewa North	Mashonaland East	3,415	4	18	4	5	5	4
30	Murewa RDC	Murewa North	Mashonaland East	3,130	4	16	4	4	4	4
17	Mutoko RDC	Mutoko East	Mashonaland East	3,734	5	19	5	5	4	5
26	Mutoko RDC	Mutoko South	Mashonaland East	3,132	4	16	4	4	4	4
29	Mutoko RDC	Mutoko South	Mashonaland East	5,031	7	26	6	7	7	6
12	Wedza RDC	Wedza South	Mashonaland East	2,762	4	14	4	3	3	4
8	Chinhoyi Municipality	Chinhoyi	Mashonaland West	3,554	8	31	7	8	8	8

List of Sampled Wards with Sample Sizes for List-to-People and People-to-List Field Tests

Ward	Local Government	Constituency	Province	Registered Voters	List-to-People Sample	People-to-List Sample				
						Number	Y M	O M	YF	OF
6	Kariba Municipality	Kariba	Mashonaland West	1,428	3	13	4	3	3	3
1	Chegutu RDC	Mhondoro-Mubaira	Mashonaland West	3,594	5	19	4	5	5	5
16	Chegutu RDC	Chegutu East	Mashonaland West	972	1	5	2	1	1	1
13	Hurungwe RDC	Magunje	Mashonaland West	8,725	11	46	11	12	12	11
7	Mhondoro-Ngezi RDC	Mhondoro-Ngezi	Mashonaland West	1,489	2	8	2	2	2	2
13	Mhondoro-Ngezi	Muzvezve	Mashonaland West	7,083	9	37	9	9	9	10
1	Zvimba RDC	Zvimba West	Mashonaland West	2,355	3	12	3	3	3	3
19	Zvimba RDC	Zvimba South	Mashonaland West	4,080	5	21	6	5	5	5
25	Zvimba RDC	Zvimba East	Mashonaland West	3,051	4	16	4	4	4	4
10	Masvingo Municipality	Masvingo Urban	Masvingo	1,214	4	15	3	4	4	4
29	Bikita RDC	Bikita South	Masvingo	1,091	2	6	2	1	1	2
3	Chiredzi RDC	Chiredzi East	Masvingo	2,402	3	14	3	4	4	3
10	Chiredzi RDC	Chiredzi South	Masvingo	4,135	6	23	6	6	5	6
11	Chiredzi RDC	Chiredzi South	Masvingo	6,198	9	35	9	8	9	9
2	Chiredzi RDC	Chiredzi South	Masvingo	1,967	7	29	7	8	7	7
32	Chiredzi	Chiredzi	Masvingo	3,217	5	18	5	4	5	4

List of Sampled Wards with Sample Sizes for List-to-People and People-to-List Field Tests

Ward	Local Government	Constituency	Province	Registered Voters	List-to-People Sample	People-to-List Sample				
						Number	Y M	O M	YF	OF
	RDC	North								
23	Chivi RDC	Chivi South	Masvingo	3,182	4	18	4	5	4	5
26	Chivi RDC	Chivi South	Masvingo	4,868	7	27	7	6	7	7
14	Gutu RDC	Gutu East	Masvingo	1,703	2	10	2	3	3	2
34	Gutu RDC	Gutu Central	Masvingo	2,307	3	13	4	3	3	3
30	Masvingo RDC	Masvingo South	Masvingo	3,478	5	20	5	5	5	5
19	Zaka RDC	Zaka Central	Masvingo	3,706	5	21	5	5	5	6
5	Hwange Town Council	Hwange Central	Matabeleland North	846	3	10	2	3	3	2
25	Binga RDC	Binga South	Matabeleland North	961	2	8	2	2	2	2
17	Bubi RDC	Bubi	Matabeleland North	939	2	8	2	2	2	2
17	Hwange RDC	Hwange East	Matabeleland North	2,051	4	17	5	4	4	4
25	Nkayi RDC	Nkayi South	Matabeleland North	1,658	3	14	3	4	3	4

List of Sampled Wards with Sample Sizes for List-to-People and People-to-List Field Tests

Ward	Local Government	Constituency	Province	Registered Voters	List-to-People Sample	People-to-List Sample				
						Number	Y M	O M	YF	OF
2	Umguza RDC	Umguza	Matabeleland North	5,653	12	48	12	12	12	12
3	Umguza RDC	Bubi	Matabeleland North	2,179	5	18	5	4	5	4
1	Gwanda Town Council	Gwanda Central	Matabeleland South	400	2	7	1	2	2	2
3	Bulilima RDC	Bulilima East	Matabeleland South	3,164	5	21	6	5	5	5
21	Bulilima RDC	Bulilima East	Matabeleland South	3,335	6	22	5	6	5	6
3	Gwanda RDC	Gwanda North	Matabeleland South	2,028	3	13	3	3	4	3
13	Gwanda RDC	Gwanda Central	Matabeleland South	3,997	7	26	7	6	7	6
5	Insiza RDC	Insiza South	Matabeleland South	2,332	4	15	4	4	3	4
2	Matobo RDC	Matobo South	Matabeleland South	2,632	4	17	4	4	5	4
9	Gweru Municipality	Mkoba	Midlands	4,492	10	41	11	10	10	10
2	Zvishavane Town Council	Zvishavane-Runde	Midlands	2,173	5	20	5	5	5	5
11	Gokwe North RDC	Gokwe-Nembudziya	Midlands	4,507	8	32	8	8	8	8
35	Gokwe North RDC	Gokwe-Chireya	Midlands	3,111	5	22	5	6	5	6
21	Gokwe South RDC	Gokwe-Kana	Midlands	4,973	9	35	8	9	9	9
2	Mberengwa RDC	Mberengwa North	Midlands	3,039	5	21	5	5	6	5
5	Takawira	Chirumanzu	Midlands	2,086	4	15	4	4	3	4

List of Sampled Wards with Sample Sizes for List-to-People and People-to-List Field Tests

Ward	Local Government	Constituency	Province	Registered Voters	List-to-People Sample	People-to-List Sample				
						Number	Y M	O M	YF	OF
	RDC									
7	Takawira RDC	Chirumanzu	Midlands	1,733	3	12	3	3	3	3
11	Tongogara RDC	Shurugwi South	Midlands	2,792	5	20	5	5	5	5
18	Tongogara RDC	Shurugwi North	Midlands	2,334	4	16	4	4	4	4
10	Vungu RDC	Chiwundura	Midlands	1,685	3	12	3	3	3	3
7	Zibagwe RDC	Zhombe	Midlands	2,728	5	19	5	4	5	5

Note: Numbers in parentheses under List-to-People Sample are the number of names to be included in the oversample for Harare province.

Note: YM = Younger Male (18 to 29); OM = Older Male (30 or older); YF = Younger Female (18 to 29) and OF = Older Female (30 or older).

Source: 2008 Delimitations Report