

## Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia

### I. OVERVIEW

Turkey is the newest country to intervene in Somalia and its involvement has produced some positive results. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's courageous visit to Mogadishu in August 2011 at the height of the famine and his decision to open an embassy gave fresh impetus to efforts to establish lasting peace. Widespread Somali gratitude for Turkish humanitarian endeavours and the country's status as a Muslim and democratic state established Turkey as a welcome partner. Ankara has signalled it is in for the long haul. However, it must tread prudently, eschew unilateralism and learn lessons to avoid another failed international intervention. Over twenty years, many states and entities have tried to bring relief and secure peace in Somalia, often leaving behind a situation messier than that which they found. Ankara must appreciate it alone cannot solve the country's many challenges, but must secure the support and cooperation of both the Somali people and international community. Trying to go solo could backfire, hamper ongoing efforts and lose the immense good-will it has accumulated.

Turkey's presence on the ground is relatively small, but because of its timely famine relief and the apparent strength of its commitment, as well as Somalis' gratitude, its contribution is seen as colossal. In addition to its embassy, there are about a dozen governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a limited presence on the ground working in Mogadishu. But Somalis' dream of a quick and comprehensive recovery has created great expectations in the regions that are not receiving Turkish assistance, particularly because of their highly visible activities in Mogadishu. Yet, besides generous diplomatic and political support, its means are modest and its material support to Somalia will probably remain limited. If the Somali people's high expectations are not moderated and if Ankara is unable to expand its relief and development aid to peaceful regions outside Mogadishu, the Turkey-Somalia partnership could be strained or quickly transformed into a relationship beset by resentment.

Vocal Somali criticism of the two conferences (civil society and government) held in Istanbul from late May to early June 2012 should serve as an important reminder about the volatility of and multiple fault lines in Somali politics. Somalia's main political actors backpedalled on

clear political understandings they had with Ankara (such as the traditional elders' planned trip to Istanbul to participate in the civil society gathering) and openly criticised and confronted their host on seemingly benign issues. Turkey overcame these unexpected impediments because of diplomatic insights gained from its on-the-ground presence and support from international partners. It should use its new experience to build consensus and improve external coordination if its intervention is to be effective.

As a new Somali government is established, Turkey is expected to, and can, play an important role in helping stabilise and develop the war-ravaged country. In order to play a major and sustained role in Somalia, Ankara should:

- ❑ lay out a public, clear and realistic long-term strategy for its Somalia policy, backed by secure funding and an increase in the number of specialists in both Mogadishu and Ankara dedicated to its efforts in Somalia, and in particular build up its knowledge of Somalia and coordinate with other countries and international agencies active in the country;
- ❑ remain impartial in internal politics and avoid being manipulated by Somali politicians long experienced in outwitting foreign newcomers;
- ❑ expand targeted assistance to peaceful regions outside of Mogadishu;
- ❑ prioritise institution building and knowledge transfer, including investing in the return of educated diaspora Somalis;
- ❑ help with political party development, constitutional reform and the creation of accountable institutions;
- ❑ take a more active role in UN peacebuilding efforts;
- ❑ manage Somali expectations of how much assistance it can provide;
- ❑ establish a standardised and transparent bidding process for contracts and subcontracts to avoid empowering predatory businesspeople;
- ❑ offer mediation expertise and financial assistance to peace and reconciliation efforts;
- ❑ stop being indifferent to the endemic Somali corruption and tie diplomatic and development assistance to

- upholding the rule of law and establishing accountable and effective institutions;
- ❑ provide more support to AMISOM and integrate security assistance within existing international mechanisms, rather than embarking on a parallel and duplicate process;
  - ❑ help Somalia create a professional, decentralised police force, which, rather than external forces such as AMISOM, will be responsible for the consolidation of peace and security;
  - ❑ coordinate with other countries and international agencies to prevent overlap and ensure aid is provided strategically;
  - ❑ ensure Turkish businesspeople operating in Somalia neither exploit vulnerable Somalis nor are exploited by Somali elite; and
  - ❑ support the Joint Financial Management Board agreed to at the London and Istanbul conferences to ensure that government revenue and international assistance is used appropriately and efficiently.

This briefing outlines Turkey's ongoing operations and achievements so far. As Somalia enters a new and uncertain post-transition phase, Ankara may likely face obstacles and will run into the country's complicated political and security environment in delivering on numerous expectations as its honeymoon with Somalis ends. To avoid this, the briefing suggests practical steps to make the Turkish-Somalia cooperation sustainable and mutually beneficial.

## II. TURKEY'S ARRIVAL IN SOMALIA

Turkey's humanitarian action is particularly welcome, because it comes after two decades of political turmoil and acute vulnerability. Somalis place much of the blame for the state's continued crisis on external involvement, particularly on Ethiopia, the country's historical enemy.<sup>1</sup> Up

<sup>1</sup> I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali* (Athens, 2002), pp. 231-232. Both countries harboured the other's armed opposition groups (then rebel leaders Meles Zenawi, the late Ethiopian prime minister, and Isaias Afewerki, the Eritrean president, were both based in Mogadishu for some time) and the rebel groups that toppled the Somali government in 1991 operated from Ethiopia. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have armed feuding Somali warlords for their own geopolitical purposes. See reports of the panel of experts and the monitoring group on Somalia, as well as the monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea, at [www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml](http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml). Regional states also tried to influence Somali peace conferences. For example, Ethiopia dominated the 2004 Mbagathi peace conference in Kenya and manipulated the Somali delegation of parliamentarians, the president and prime minister. See Crisis

to now, Turkey's intervention is seen differently by most Somalis. Its humanitarian motives are not questioned, and as a relatively developed Muslim state, it is seen as a country to emulate, rather than an external power to be feared. Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed stated that unlike some Arabs, who characterise the Ottoman rule as colonisation, Somali memories of this era are positive.<sup>2</sup>

### A. HISTORICAL TIES

Turkish-Somali relations date back to the sixteenth century when the Ottomans came to Somalis' aid fending off Ethiopian and Portuguese expeditionary forces.<sup>3</sup> By the seventeenth century Somali coastal towns were controlled by local sultanates with nominal links to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>4</sup> Contemporary Turkey-Somalia relations began with the opening of the Somali Embassy in Ankara in 1979 and in May 1993 Lieutenant General Çevik Bir was appointed force commander of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II.<sup>5</sup> During Somalia's civil war, some Turkish

Group Africa Report N°88, *Somalia: Continuation of War By Other Means?*, 21 December 2004. After the Islamic Courts Union took control of Mogadishu in June 2006 and subsequently much of south and central Somalia, Addis Ababa invaded in December 2006 and re-imposed the first TFG of Abdullahi Yusuf, and sparked an insurgency that led to the growth of Al-Shabaab.

<sup>2</sup> Crisis Group interview, President Sheikh Sharif, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012. The president also maintained that the traditional donors were "jealous" of all the good-will and attention Turkey had generated in Mogadishu.

<sup>3</sup> I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali*, op. cit., p. 26. Current Somali and Turkish leaders cherish these historical ties. "Somalia and Turkey have profound historical relations dating back to the Middle Ages and the ties between the Adal Sultanate [based in the port of Zeila, near the present-day Djibouti] and the Ottoman Empire going back to the 16th century... Turkey has recently revived this relationship in a very unique way and the people of Somalia are ever indebted...". Dr Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, "Opening Statement", Istanbul II Conference, 31 May-1 June 2012. "You are home, Turkey is your motherland, sixteenth century Ahmed Gurey fought occupying forces with Ottoman support". "Opening Remarks by Foreign Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu", Somali Civil Society Gathering, Istanbul, 27 May 2012.

<sup>4</sup> I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali*, op. cit., p. 33. Somalia's 19th century anti-colonial fighter Sayid Mohammed Abdulle Hassan's emissary signed a pact that put his anti-colonial Darwish movement under the Ottoman Sultan's nominal authority. Aw Jaamac Cumar Ciise, *Taariikhdiid Daraawiishtaiyo Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xasan [The History of Dervishes and Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan]* (Mogadishu, 1976), pp. 241-245.

<sup>5</sup> The general was not particularly popular with Somalis in Mogadishu, since he commanded the forces that tried to capture Somali National Alliance militia leader General Mohamed Farah

organisations such as the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) provided assistance through partners.<sup>6</sup>

During twelve years of transitional government, official contact was limited. Prime Minister Erdoğan and the late President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed met on the sidelines of the 29-30 January 2007 African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa. The prime minister invited a Somali delegation to present the government's needs to Ankara – a proposal that was not pursued.<sup>7</sup> Though the former Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed visited Turkey three times before Erdoğan visited Somalia,<sup>8</sup> Turkey's involvement with Mogadishu was not different from other countries' containment and humanitarian support strategies.<sup>9</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey and its new elite have become more interested in Muslim countries of the former Ottoman Empire, as well as the rest of Africa.<sup>10</sup> The intersection of businesses seeking export markets, geopolitical interests, geographical proximity and shared cultural, religious and historical links made Somalia a natural can-

didate for Turkey's attention.<sup>11</sup> The 2011 famine that peaked during Ramadan galvanised Turkish society, making Somalia a major focus of its aid programs and foreign policy agenda. Aside from genuine humanitarian motives, aid to Somalia also was presented to demonstrate the prime minister's Justice and Development Party (AKP) was different, that it stood by Muslim brethren (unlike previous secular governments) and could assume some of the Ottoman mantle.

During the famine, Turkey and other Muslim countries provided unprecedented support. Prime Minister Erdoğan, accompanied by his family and more than 200 political, business and cultural elite flew to Mogadishu in August 2011. On 22 September 2011, Erdoğan allocated half of his UN General Assembly speech to Somalia, speaking passionately about the suffering of its people and how Turkey intended to play a leadership role in resolving the crisis.<sup>12</sup> A year later in closed-door meetings with Somali civil society leaders and traditional elders, Turkey's passionate talk about Somalia continued as Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu told them, "our destiny is tied to the destiny of the Somali people ... this is a strategic choice".<sup>13</sup>

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Aideed, which led to the shooting down of two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters in October 1993.

<sup>6</sup> Crisis Group interview, Istanbul, 18 May 2012.

<sup>7</sup> Crisis Group interview, Abdurizak Adan, chief of staff of President Abdullahi Yusuf, Nairobi, May 2012.

<sup>8</sup> Former President Sharif's wives and children reportedly live in Ankara.

<sup>9</sup> Turkey contributed \$1 million to the Brussels donor conference for Somalia in April 2009 and provided twenty scholarships in 2010-2011. It also co-hosted the Istanbul I conference on Somalia in May 2010 with the UN and signed a bilateral treaty with Somalia including on military cooperation. "Relations between Turkey and Somalia", foreign ministry, at [www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-somalia.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-somalia.en.mfa). Between August 2009 and September 2010, the Turkish navy led the multinational antipiracy task force known as Combined Task Force (CTF-151). "Republic of Korea turns over command of CTF-151 to Turkey", 1 September 2010, at [www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2010/CMF052.html](http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2010/CMF052.html).

<sup>10</sup> This was part of the Turkish strategy of "opening up to Africa" launched in 1998. Crisis Group interview, Levent Baştürk, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETAV), Ankara, 16 May 2012. Often the spearhead of growing Turkish ties are Turkish schools, especially those linked to the Gülen movement founded by Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish thinker and former Imam who left Turkey for the U.S., officially for health reasons in 1999, but actually due to accusations of subversive activities against the Turkish state (he was cleared all charges in 2008). The Gülen movement is not only a religiously inspired network; it is involved in business, education, the media, arts and charities (the movement created the NGO Kimse Yok Mu). Gülen has set up schools in more than 70 states, including in 34 African countries. Gabrielle Angey, "Turkish Islam in Africa: a Study of the Gülen Movement in Kenya", *Mambo! 2012*, vol. 10, no. 3, (Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, May 2012), pp. 1-2.

## B. TURKEY'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Put in perspective, Turkey's presence on the ground is not huge; at present it is no more than a footprint. However, because of the timely famine relief, Turkish sympathy and Somalis' gratitude, Ankara's contribution is seen as unprecedented. There are about a dozen governmental and humanitarian organisations working in Mogadishu. None

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<sup>11</sup> For example, a company came to Hargeisa, Somaliland, several years ago to help construct a factory plant, diversified to import spaghetti and now works as a land developer, building and selling high quality villas. Crisis Group interview, Ankara, 16 May 2012. By 2010 some business transactions reached \$1 million in revenue. Toprak, a pharmaceutical company, shipped one million boxes of medicine to Somalia in 2011 and its Somali partner asked to be its distributor in the East and Horn of Africa regions. Crisis Group interview, Feray Akin, Director of International Markets, Toprak Pharmaceutical Company, Istanbul, 14 May 2012.

<sup>12</sup> "No one can speak of peace, justice and civilization in the world if the outcry rising from Somalia is left unheard. ... We have collected a donation of about \$300 million within the last two months. ... We also organized an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul and the amount of pledges made on this occasion exceeded \$350 million. ... It is our greatest wish that the leadership demonstrated by Turkey in this direction will set an example for the entire international community". "Address by Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey to the general debate of the 66th session of the UN General Assembly", New York, 22 September 2012.

<sup>13</sup> "Opening Remarks", Somali Civil Society Gathering, Istanbul, 27 May 2012.

have more than a few Turkish staff members. The most visible organisation is *Kızılay* (Turkish Red Crescent), which arrived in August 2011.<sup>14</sup> Its biggest project is a camp for 15,000 internally displaced people (IDPs), with a health facility, mosque and soccer field. In May 2012, *Kızılay* had ten Turkish staff in Mogadishu, helped by 250 local employees.<sup>15</sup>

The Turkish government tries to coordinate aid through the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA).<sup>16</sup> It also implements a bilateral development agreement between the Somali and Turkish governments. In June 2012, it had a single Turkish staff member in Somalia, aided by about twenty local employees.<sup>17</sup> TIKA's financed projects in Mogadishu include: drilling twenty boreholes, fencing and rehabilitating parts of Mogadishu airport, and restoring some government buildings. It also started rehabilitating Digfer Hospital and 33km of roads in Mogadishu.<sup>18</sup>

Other Turkish government agencies providing humanitarian assistance include the health ministry and the religious affairs directorate in the prime minister's office (known as Diyanet). Since August 2011, the health ministry has sent seven teams each comprising some 40 volunteer doctors and medical practitioners, operating in three field hospitals.<sup>19</sup> Diyanet, which has ten staff in Somalia, provided scholarships to 615 students and sent 300 tons of food to Somalia. It also distributed copies of the Quran and sent 40 Imams and twenty teachers to Turkey for training and seminars.

Turkish NGOs active in Somalia include IHH and Kimse Yok Mu (KYM, "Is Anybody Out There").<sup>20</sup> IHH started working in Somalia fifteen years ago, in cooperation with local partners.<sup>21</sup> In addition to famine relief, IHH has provided free cataract eye surgery for about 10,000 people, rehabilitated fourteen mosques, drilled 370 water wells, distributed free Qurans, relocated 1,500 IDPs and sponsored 3,100 orphans.<sup>22</sup> IHH, in partnership with the Qatari Red Crescent, also sent 10,000 tons of emergency aid and it planned to open in Mogadishu a primary, intermediate and secondary school for 1,500 students in July 2012.<sup>23</sup>

KYM began its Somalia operations in August and delivered about 23 tons of emergency aid. It is present in seven IDP camps in Mogadishu where it provides food, medical services and tents.<sup>24</sup> A total of fifteen KYM doctors have visited Somalia and as of May 2012, six doctors are present in the country. The organisation also provides directly or through partners 350 scholarships, 100 wheelchairs, 1,400 meals for prisoners, vocational training for 30 women, circumcision for 2,000 boys. The construction of a sixty-bed hospital is also planned.<sup>25</sup>

Other, smaller NGOs include Helping Hands, which has about twenty volunteers in Somalia at any given time. It provided 75 scholarships, including medical students, nurses and three Somali doctors (for specialisation in paediatric medicine). It also paired 400 Somali families with Turkish families, distributed dried food, provided equipment and medicine to a national eye centre and is in the process of establishing a children's hospital.<sup>26</sup> Another is the Nile Organization, an NGO focused on education and staffed by ten Turkish expatriates. The group currently manages a high school in Mogadishu with 120 students and nine Turkish teachers. It also sponsored some 600 Somali students: 234 are enrolled in 25 different Turkish universities; 284 are high school students; and 100 are studying in Egypt and Sudan.<sup>27</sup> Bilal Çelik, Nile Organization's chairman, is

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<sup>14</sup> During the famine appeal, *Kızılay* raised 111 million Turkish lira (about \$60 million), more than the 65 and 58 million lira collected for the 2005 earthquake and 2010 floods in Pakistan respectively. Crisis group email correspondence, Deniz Şölen, coordinator, governance and international relations, *Kızılay*, 20 July 2012.

<sup>15</sup> Crisis Group interview, head of *Kızılay*'s Mogadishu operations, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012.

<sup>16</sup> The agency began its operations in September 2011.

<sup>17</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, Somali TIKA employee, 11 June 2012. TIKA, possibly uncomfortable admitting it had only a single employee on the ground, says it believes that "the less you spend for your staff, the more you can allocate to the needs of people in need of support". Crisis Group email correspondence, Somali TIKA employee, 11 June 2012.

<sup>18</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, Somali TIKA employee, Mogadishu, 11 June 2012.

<sup>19</sup> According to Dr Mussa Temel, physician and head of the field hospitals, by May 2012 approximately 1,200 patients were seen daily, about 1,000 operated on, and some 150 metric tons of medicine distributed. Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012.

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<sup>20</sup> "Turkish relief organization receives 'Outstanding Service Medal' in Somalia", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly* (online), 11 August 2012.

<sup>21</sup> IHH's local Somali partner is Zamzam foundation.

<sup>22</sup> Crisis Group interview, IHH representative, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012.

<sup>23</sup> IHH also has been constructing a 10,000 square metres orphanage complex for 1,500 children in Mogadishu, at an estimated cost of \$2.5 million. "Turkish charity constructs an orphanage complex in Somalia", Anadolu Agency, 15 September 2012.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> "Africa Campaign", Kimse Yok Mu, 15 July 2012.

<sup>26</sup> Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012.

<sup>27</sup> It secured a 49-year lease for two schools in the capital – Benadir secondary school and polytechnic institute – and said it secured \$30 million for the renovation of another six schools, including two in Somaliland.

also chair of the Somali-Turkish Businessmen's Association and Turkish Airlines' Somalia representative.<sup>28</sup>

### III. FROM HONEYMOON TO REALPOLITIK

The Istanbul II International Conference on Somalia, from 31 May to 1 June 2012, and the companion Somali civil society gathering, held from 26 May to 31 May, served as Turkey's formal induction to the rough and tumble of Somali politics. Co-hosted with the UN, this was the last major international gathering before the end of the TFG's mandate in August. In addition to regional and international actors, all organised Somali political groupings, including the six roadmap signatories,<sup>29</sup> as well as business leaders and delegates from Somaliland and the small region of Ximan and Xeeb, attended.<sup>30</sup>

Although the events failed to change Somalia's overall political trajectory, the Turkish government judged it as successful. First, its proposals<sup>31</sup> were more or less reflected in the final communiqués.<sup>32</sup> Second, by bringing all major

political groupings on board, Ankara established its credentials as an important player in Somali affairs. By assembling over 300 civil society representatives, including all 135 traditional elders<sup>33</sup> over TFG leaders' objections, Turkey also demonstrated its independence in navigating Somalia's troubled waters. More importantly, Ankara enhanced its image as not only an ally of politicians but also civil society and ordinary people.<sup>34</sup>

The attempt to empower and invigorate civil society caused unease among the roadmap signatories, who hitherto have monopolised transitional politics. The regions of Puntland and Galmudug, as well as Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), which have not received much Turkish aid, denounced the civil society gathering and threatened to boycott the international conference.<sup>35</sup> Even the TFG, which projected itself as extremely close to Ankara, joined the bandwagon and openly criticised the civil society conference and by extension its sponsor, Turkey.<sup>36</sup>

Politicians' fears were not misplaced because the civil society gathering called for opening the constitution drafting process, establishing a second chamber of parliament for the elders (instead of for federal states) and an enlarged parliament.<sup>37</sup> All of these recommendations were contrary to the signatories' plans and particularly the Puntland president's core demands, which included his region's representation in the parliament's second chamber.<sup>38</sup> As a result, President Abdirahman Sheikh Mohamud Farole used his Istanbul II speech to decry not only civil society pronounce-

<sup>28</sup> Crisis Group observations, Mogadishu, May 2012.

<sup>29</sup> When the TFG was unable to complete its transitional tasks by August 2011, the international community agreed to a one year extension, but required that it accept a detailed framework and timeline for establishing a new government. The "roadmap to end the transition" was signed on 6 September 2011 by six Somali politicians (the former TFG president and prime minister, speaker of parliament, two regional presidents and a representative from the armed Sufi group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a) and the UN envoy. See "Statement on Adoption of the Roadmap", 6 September 2011, at <http://unpos.unmissions.org>. These "signatories" become the managers of the transition and tried to manipulate the process to stay in power.

<sup>30</sup> Titled "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015", the first day of the conference was allotted to public-private partnerships discussions on resilience, water, energy and roads (a continuation of the 2010 Istanbul I conference). The second day focused on political matters and was attended by heads of state and senior representatives of 57 countries and eleven international and regional organisations.

<sup>31</sup> In a pre-conference concept note, it proposed a new UN peacebuilding mission, a role for Turkey in security sector reform, called for more resources for Somalia's security forces and a greater focus on institution building.

<sup>32</sup> Civil society groups proposed the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) be converted into a hybrid UN peacekeeping force that included additional troops from Muslim countries. The international conference "took note of the proposal for the establishment of a new 'Rebuilding and Restructuring Fund for the Somali Security Sector' initiated by Turkey to offer additional support to the Somali security forces", but did not allocate money, and further noted the "need to adjust international support to the political structures in Somalia and called on the UN to review the shape of its future engagement in Somalia". See

"The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia Final Declaration", 1 June 2012, at [www.mfa.gov.tr/the-second-istanbul-conference-on-somalia\\_-final-declaration\\_-1-june-2012\\_-istanbul.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-second-istanbul-conference-on-somalia_-final-declaration_-1-june-2012_-istanbul.en.mfa); and "The Istanbul Gathering of the Somali Civil Society Final Communiqué", 30 May 2012, at <http://somalikonferansi.mfa.gov.tr/the-istanbul-gathering-of-the-somali-civil-society-communique.en.mfa>.

<sup>33</sup> The traditional elders selected both the 825 delegates to the National Constituent Assembly that approved the provisional constitution and the 275 members of the new parliament.

<sup>34</sup> The Turkish foreign minister opened the civil society gathering and gave a passionate speech with heavy references to the historical bond between the two peoples.

<sup>35</sup> "Puntland, Galmudug and ASWJ reject the Istanbul Conference", *Mustaqbal Radio*, 28 May 2012.

<sup>36</sup> "TFG Constitution Minister disapproves Istanbul Pre-Conference", press statement, *Garowe Online*, 28 May 2012.

<sup>37</sup> The then-draft provisional constitution called for a two-chamber parliament, with the upper house representing yet-to-be-determined federal states. The elders countered by calling for an upper house comprised of traditional elders, much like the case in Somaliland. "The Istanbul Gathering of the Somali Civil Society Final Communiqué", *op. cit.*

<sup>38</sup> Currently, the upper house is shelved and the parliament consists of 275 members in the "House of the People".

ments but also their credentials.<sup>39</sup> Notwithstanding his strong stance, elders were emboldened. They referred to themselves as legal representatives of the Somali people, since the signatories had “illegally dismissed the parliament”,<sup>40</sup> and in a letter to the UN envoy to Somalia they demanded the enlargement of the parliament (from 225 to 275). The signatories were forced to concede on 24 July 2012.<sup>41</sup>

## A. THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S VIEW

Turkey's intervention provided welcome humanitarian relief, but more importantly for the TFG, its assistance came largely without conditions, bolstered the increasingly unpopular transitional federal institutions (TFIs)<sup>42</sup> and its leadership,<sup>43</sup> and gave convenient counterweight to Western pressure for reform.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> The president said: “As we are aware, delegations from Puntland and Galmudug raised serious concerns about the way the Somali civil society meeting in Istanbul was organized, managed and mandated ... it is important to emphasize that the participants of the recently concluded ‘civil society meeting’ here in Istanbul have been purposefully selected by interest groups and are therefore unrepresentative of Somali civil society. That meeting's four recommendations, which were unacceptable, include: 1) re-visiting federalism for Somalia; 2) enlarging the Lower House of Somali Parliament from 225 to 275 seats; 3) expanding the controversial and divisive 4.5 clan formula into a new ‘5 clan formula’; and 4) distorting the role of the Somali Federal Parliament's Upper House”. “Statement by the President of Puntland State of Somalia H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamad (Farole)”, Garowe Online, 1 June 2012.

<sup>40</sup> Traditional Elders letter to Ambassador Mahiga, 24 June 2012, on file with Crisis Group. After a parliamentary revolt against Speaker Sharif Hassan, who continued to receive the support of the other roadmap signatories and the international community, he refused to reconvene parliament.

<sup>41</sup> “UN special envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Mahiga says coming parliamentarians extended”, Hiiraan Online, 24 July 2012.

<sup>42</sup> The former TFG president and his prime minister repeatedly visited Ankara and were warmly received.

<sup>43</sup> Somalis were growing increasingly critical of the TFG's performance, and the roadmap to end the transition was seen by civil society groups and the diaspora as the unfair and exclusive purview of the six roadmap signatories, who dominated the process. An open letter signed by 85 prominent figures including a former president and prime minister charged that the Garowe Principles (one of several roadmap documents) “empowered few individuals at the expense of state institutions”. “An open letter concerning the Garowe Principles”, Hiiraan Online, 31 December 2011.

<sup>44</sup> A number of Western countries were pushing for fundamental governance reform and opposed TFG leaders' various plans to extend their terms in office. Italy went so far as to present a controversial non-paper calling for a caretaker administration

## 1. In praise of Turkey

Somali leaders praise Turkey's humanitarian campaign for not linking aid to reforms. Former Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali asserted that the difference with other countries is that Turkey understands the best way to assist is to have a tangible presence on the ground, which he called “the Turkish model”.<sup>45</sup> He objected to traditional donors questioning Turkish intentions and efforts and thinks Western suspicion and apprehension are misplaced.<sup>46</sup>

Turkish engagement with the TFG also was welcome support for the embattled and heavily criticised government. The prime minister argued, Turkey is doing exactly what Somalia needs – providing political, diplomatic, moral and institutional support to the government, regions and citizens, including a promise to open regional development offices in Puntland and Somaliland,<sup>47</sup> overhaul the Somali security apparatus, and provide management experts for Somali ministries. “More importantly”, the prime minister said, “Turkey's visible presence on the ground ended the isolation of Somalia and the stigma of the country being designated as a no-go zone”.<sup>48</sup> Ibrahim Habeb Nur, the former vice chairman of the parliament's foreign relations committee, said Erdoğan had sent a strong message to the international community by not only coming, but also bringing his family along. He called Turkey a “God-sent country whose support will be taught in Somali schools for generations to come”.<sup>49</sup>

Turkey's engagement with local officials also bolsters their relevance and influence. For example, the previously insignificant education ministry – because it lacked resources – became much more important thanks to its involvement in allocating Turkish scholarships.<sup>50</sup> According to the former deputy education minister, Abdulkadir Mohamed Barre, Turkey's direct engagement with the TFG also encouraged

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led by a non-Somali UN official. “Italian Non-Paper to End the Somalia Transition”, 1 January 2012, on file with Crisis Group.

<sup>45</sup> Crisis Group interview, former Prime Minister Abdiweli, Mogadishu, 29 April 2012; Nairobi, 8 July 2012. According to him, the “Turkish model” is the combined diplomatic, development and humanitarian support delivered by Turkey that no other country has matched. See also “Somalia grateful for Turkey's contributions”, Anadolu Agency, 4 July 2012.

<sup>46</sup> Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 29 April 2012. Former President Sheikh Sharif believes traditional donors were jealous, because Turkey “created an international buzz”. Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 29 April 2012.

<sup>47</sup> This includes a planned solar plant in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

<sup>48</sup> Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 29 April 2012.

<sup>49</sup> Crisis Group interview, Ibrahim Habeb Nur, on board a flight from Mogadishu to Nairobi, 2 May 2012.

<sup>50</sup> The quality of the scholarships also stood out. Students taken to Turkey were provided full support, whereas other countries only offered tuition waivers.

other organisations to become involved, including the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the European Union (EU) who are now cooperating with the education ministry.<sup>51</sup> The thankful minister stated Turkey's scholarships contribute to peace efforts, and claims the hope and hype generated by the scholarships program attracted the interest of Al-Shabaab associates and sympathisers who came forward for scholarships.<sup>52</sup>

TFG leaders use their relations with Turkey to deflect Western criticism. While Western ambassadors in Nairobi are often tough interlocutors,<sup>53</sup> the TFG president stated that Turkey treats him as a president of a brotherly country and rolls out the red carpet.<sup>54</sup> He took advantage of warm Turkish relations to advance the TFG's agenda and his political standing. In early 2012, ahead of the end of his government's mandate on 20 August, and keen to play a major role after this date, the president was convinced that the UK was pushing for a weaker successor to the TFG,<sup>55</sup> and for the creation of a Joint Financial Management Board (JFMB, consisting of the TFG and Western donors, particularly the UK, U.S., and EU, and the World Bank) to manage all the government's finances.<sup>56</sup> He enlisted the help of Turkey, Ethiopia,<sup>57</sup> Uganda and South Africa to defer the establishment of the JFMB and called to make the end of the transition process more inclusive.<sup>58</sup>

Turkey did try to make the process more inclusive, but with mixed results. Prior to the Istanbul II conference on Somalia, from 31 May to 1 June 2012, the roadmap signatories<sup>59</sup> were pressured to transfer the authority to select the National Constituent Assembly and the new members of parliament to the traditional elders.<sup>60</sup> Ankara also invited over 300 Somali civil society representatives, including all the traditional leaders, to Istanbul for a separate meeting.<sup>61</sup> Less progressively, at the TFG's insistence the Istanbul II final declaration only called for the establishment of a "mutual accountability regime built around the proposed Joint Financial Management Board".<sup>62</sup> The JFMB's implementation was again postponed until after the end of the TFG's mandate, and the roadmap process was never inclusive.<sup>63</sup>

## 2. TFG criticism

There has been some criticism within the TFG about how Turkey does business and how some Somali officials handle the Turkey file. For expediency Turkish officials tend to work closely with the president's office, which rightly or wrongly creates a perception of bias.<sup>64</sup> Turkey

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it would make the roadmap process credible and inclusive. The London conference was thus forced to postpone the establishment of the JFMB and give the TFG and roadmap signatories another 100 days (until the June Istanbul II conference) to deliver a credible end of the transition plan and make the roadmap process more inclusive.

<sup>59</sup> The signatories to the "Somalia End of Transition Roadmap" of 6 September 2011 have largely dominated the negotiations around ending the TFG's mandate, on 20 August 2012, and regarding the form and selection of the new government.

<sup>60</sup> Because of concerns about manipulation by the roadmap signatories, the international community and civil society organisations insisted that traditional elders should instead nominate delegates to the National Constituent Assembly, which would discuss and approve the draft provisional constitution and members of the new parliament.

<sup>61</sup> Turkey made its intentions to invite the civil society to Istanbul known as early as April. In a press conference and luncheon attended by 200 Somali civil society leaders in Mogadishu, the Turkish ambassador to Somalia said: "This conference will not just be about you but it will be for you. Unlike the previous conference, [the] Istanbul conference will not be participated [in] just by the politicians but civil society as well. We want [the] international community to hear the voice of grassroots organizations of Somalia". "Statement by Dr. Kani Torun, the Turkish ambassador to Somalia", Mareeg ([www.mareeg.com](http://www.mareeg.com)), 2 April 2012.

<sup>62</sup> "The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia Final Communiqué", 1 June 2012.

<sup>63</sup> "Does the end of transition in Somalia mean keeping the status quo?", Hiiraan Online, 9 August 2012.

<sup>64</sup> The Turkish ambassador to Somalia, Kani Torun, denies he favours the president, saying "Sheikh Sharif is not my relative ... if he is selected, that is alright, if another person is selected,

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<sup>51</sup> Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 30 April 2012. The EU has provided books and helped train teachers, but this was done through the UN agencies such as UNICEF and international NGOs which worked with local groups and education umbrella organisations.

<sup>52</sup> Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 30 April 2012.

<sup>53</sup> Richard Lough, "Interview – EU envoy talks tough to Somali leaders", Reuters, 8 February 2012.

<sup>54</sup> Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 29 April 2012. President Sharif has visited Turkey four times. Turkish ambassador to Somalia stated, "we treat him like a president because he is the president of Somalia". Crisis Group interview, Ambassador Kani Torun, Nairobi, 4 May 2012.

<sup>55</sup> A leaked draft communiqué for the February 2012 London conference contained clauses later dropped from the final communiqué that read, "we agreed that in August the functions of government should pass to a caretaker authority until the constitutional discussions are concluded", "Leaked draft communiqué for London conference", Hiiraan Online, 16 February 2012.

<sup>56</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, senior TFG diplomat based in the United Arab Emirates, 27 July 2012.

<sup>57</sup> Ethiopia's capture of Baidoa, a strategic Al-Shabaab stronghold, a day before the London conference, was meant to underscore the relevance of regional actors and the TFG. Crisis Group interview, senior TFG official, June 2012. Even though Ethiopia is Somalia's traditional rival, politicians often use its influence and support to further their own agendas.

<sup>58</sup> Crisis Group interview, senior Somali official, Mogadishu, May 2012. The TFG insisted the proposed JFMB should scrutinise both TFG and donor finances and promised its friends that

was seen by all TFG institutions and by many Somalis as a big brother, but they were much closer to, and interacted most with, the president who was instrumental in the relationship. The former planning and international cooperation minister, Abdullahi Godah Barre, complained that instead of helping institutions and working with the government, Turkey “gets into politics”.<sup>65</sup> He further claimed that Turkish organisations and diplomats ignore the prime minister and his cabinet and work mostly with the presidency. The minister contended that they are supporting the president so that he could “comeback or get an extension”.<sup>66</sup> The former constitution, federalism and reconciliation minister, Abdurahman Hosh, issued a public rebuke criticising Turkey’s handling of the civil society gathering, which he claimed undermined the TFG.<sup>67</sup>

Some of this appears to be concerns about influence, access to money and fears of being left out in the cold. For example, despite being the biggest and most visible recipient of Turkish aid, the education ministry’s director general, Muse Farah Hayd, expressed frustration that Turkish organisations bypassed his ministry when they designed and implemented the scholarship program. Through the normal process, the Turkish education ministry or other scholarship issuing entities pass bursaries to the Somali foreign ministry or embassy, which then transfers them to the education ministry.<sup>68</sup> Hayd stated that Turkish NGOs such as Nile and KYM, as well as Diyanet, identify students, test them and send them off to Turkey, and the ministry “is not happy but we cannot complain ... this is chaos”.<sup>69</sup>

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that is also alright”. Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012. Diplomats also downplay any rift with the government and fault miscommunication and lack of coordination as the causes of some mutual frustrations. To overcome the coordination challenge, the prime minister and Turkish ambassador agreed to create a six-person joint coordination committee.

<sup>65</sup> Crisis Group interview, Minister Abdullahi Godah Barre, Mogadishu, 28 April 2012.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. During the selection of the new parliamentarians, as well as the early days of the presidential campaign, the Turkish ambassador was away from Mogadishu, a move possibly intended to avoid suspicion of interference. President Sharif lost the election to an outsider.

<sup>67</sup> “TFG Constitution Minister disapproves Istanbul Pre-Conference”, op. cit.

<sup>68</sup> Crisis Group interview, Istanbul, 30 May 2012. Somali students complained that they paid thousands of dollars in bribes to apply for the scholarships. Turkish NGOs were also very bitter about the alleged fraud. Crisis Group interviews, Somali and Turkish interlocutors, Istanbul, 18 May 2012.

<sup>69</sup> Crisis Group interview, education ministry officers, Mogadishu, 30 April 2012. In spite of his frustrations, the director general felt that complaining about Turkey “this early” would smack of ingratitude and risk alienating the donor.

The education ministry also criticised the unilateral change by the office of the Turkish prime minister in how students should apply for scholarships. They no longer do so in person and have to apply online, as do other international students.<sup>70</sup> However, an adjustment as small as the automation of the application process could drastically affect the overall scholarship opportunities for Somalis as both internet access and language related impediments might hamper some applicants.

## B. THE VIEWS OF SOMALI REGIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Since 2011, Ankara has showcased its diplomatic and financial clout in Mogadishu. The visit of the Turkish prime minister, the establishment of an embassy, the implementation of various humanitarian and developmental projects, as well as the inauguration of regular Turkish Airlines flights, highlighted the many benefits of its presence. Such concentrated aid has, however, amplified the expectations of Somalia’s other underdeveloped regions. The calls for equitable sharing of Turkish aid are intensifying. Yet, aside from generous diplomatic and political support, Ankara’s means are modest and its material support to Somalia will remain limited.

### 1. The regions

Almost all Somali leaders praise Ankara’s arrival and involvement, but are also critical that its humanitarian and development efforts, as well as political engagement, have mostly been limited to Mogadishu. Its main concerns are security and access.<sup>71</sup> So far, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ),<sup>72</sup> Galmudug and Ximan and Xeeb local administrations blame the TFG leaders for monopolising Turkish aid.

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<sup>70</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, Ahmed Aidid Ibrahim, Somali education, culture and higher education minister, 22 July 2012. In July 2012 students were directed to the website [www.trscholarships.org](http://www.trscholarships.org). Turkey had to make this adjustment because the previous method was vulnerable to fraud and manipulation through bribery.

<sup>71</sup> In one of the first Turkish visits to relatively stable Puntland TIKa representatives were attacked by an armed militia as they drove from Garowe, the capital, to Galkayo. TIKa’s head of East African operations was shot in the foot, but most were unscathed. “Puntland police arrest gunmen who fired on Turkish delegation”, Garowe Online, 2 October 2012.

<sup>72</sup> Crisis Group interview, Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud Yusuf “Libaax”, ASWJ leader, Nairobi, 22 June 2012. He did not hide his frustration. “We see them [the Turks] in Mogadishu and hear about them, but we never meet with them”, adding that the territory ASWJ controls “is safer than the TFG controlled territories and the need is bigger in these devastated areas, but they have not come yet”.



This is beginning to change, however. At the Istanbul II conference, Puntland President Abdirahman Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud "Farole" said: "We request the international community, particularly the Turkish government, to give full consideration to realities on the ground and to not create a new misbalance in Somalia, which could deepen underlying grievances, and potentially lead to new conflict and new fragmentation".<sup>73</sup> He only reluctantly participated in the Istanbul II conference, and used his speech to also strongly criticise the outcome of the civil society conference.

Other regions have mixed sentiments about Turkey's role. The president of Galmudug Regional State,<sup>74</sup> Mohamed Ahmed Alin, believes the Turkish involvement and its intention are very positive, but raised concerns that Mogadishu and Bosaso (Puntland) disproportionately benefit.<sup>75</sup> President Alin believes TFG officials are not allotting Turkish assistance equitably, and told aid organisations in the presence of two TFG ministers that they should "not assume they [the TFG] represent us".<sup>76</sup> The president of the central Somalia region of Ximan and Xeeb State, Mohamed A. Aden "Tiicey", echoed similar concerns when he stated that Somalia lacked a big brother and advocate and "Turkey is a perfect fit", but TFG ineptitude and corruption meant his region did not get its share of development aid.<sup>77</sup>

Ankara should note that the concern of the regions and non-TFG entities is not merely financial. In the past political leaders' (and by extension clans') alignments with foreign entities has had real impact on the intra-Somalia balance of power and affected the fortunes of political forces and clans. Turkey cannot sustain its current Mogadishu-centric assistance without antagonising other regional stakeholders and political (local) actors.<sup>78</sup> Neither

is it in a position to quickly venture into other regions for security, financial or logistical reasons; hence the need to mitigate perceptions and mutually manage expectations.

## 2. Civil society

Civil society representatives subscribe to the prevailing buoyant views on Turkey's role, although they suggested some local power brokers took advantage of naive organisations.<sup>79</sup> Abdullahi Ahmed Shirwa, former head of Somalia's Disaster Management Agency said, "unlike the typical faceless donor", Turkey instituted a better outreach strategy and distributed aid directly to intended recipients.<sup>80</sup> Turkish NGOs also provided a welcome boost to the economy, they bought food from the locals and rented residential and office spaces.<sup>81</sup> A prominent civil society leader and now president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, sees Turkey's intervention "as a paradigm shift", arguing that unlike previous approaches to assistance driven by Western NGOs and Islamic relief organisations, the Turkish way involves both NGOs and government delivering humanitarian aid.<sup>82</sup> Using third-party implementing agencies, Western donors have spent "multimillion dollars, but the impact is not seen on the ground, and [the donors] do not know if their aid reached the intended recipients."<sup>83</sup> The Turks are systematically visible".<sup>84</sup>

<sup>73</sup> He also added: "Misbalanced economic development in Somalia is one of the root causes that led to the state collapse of 1991 ... Our solemn recommendation to Somalia's international partners is to benefit from the lessons of history and to avoid creating a new misbalance in Somalia". "Statement by the President of Puntland State of Somalia H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud (Farole)", op. cit.

<sup>74</sup> In early August 2012, two rival politicians claimed they were elected president of Galmudug. Somalia's roadmap signatories assigned the issue to the TFG president and speaker to resolve.

<sup>75</sup> His administration reportedly received only two trucks of Turkish aid. Crisis Group interview, Galmudug President Mohamed Ahmed Alin, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012. Even though Mogadishu gets the bulk of Turkish assistance, Alin specifically mentioned Bosaso to imply that Prime Minister Abdiweli, who hails from Puntland, is also unfairly directing assistance to his constituents.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Crisis Group interview, Ximan and Xeeb President Mohamed A. Aden "Tiicey", Mogadishu, 2 May 2012.

<sup>78</sup> Turkey seems to have recognised this, and TIKA's Head of East African Operations, Mustafa Hashimi Pulat, led a delega-

tion to meet with Puntland President Farole and his various ministries in Garowe, in early October. TIKA promised to build airports, roads, and upgrade education and health facilities in Puntland. "Somalia: Turkish officials meet with Puntland President", Garowe Online, 1 October 2012. A delegation from the prime minister's office also visited the Somaliland education ministry in Hargeisa to implement education projects and assess other urgent needs. "Education minister meets Turkish delegation", Somaliland Press (online), 29 September 2012.

<sup>79</sup> Crisis Group interview, Abdulahi A. Shirwa, 1 May 2012. The Disaster Management Agency (DMA) was supposed to be the Turkish relief organisations' counterpart, but the Turks did not work with the DMA and rather relied on facilitators, some of whom later proved to be very difficult to work with. Also see footnote 89.

<sup>80</sup> Crisis Group interview, Abdulahi A. Shirwa, 1 May 2012.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Crisis Group interview, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, on board flight from Mogadishu to Nairobi, 2 May 2012. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected president of Somalia on 10 September 2012.

<sup>83</sup> Anecdotally, many Somalis believe that much of the international community's and particularly Western donors' aid has been wasted and mismanaged in the past two decades by implementing international NGOs and UN aid agencies operating from Nairobi, hence the TFG's insistence that donor money be included in the JFMB's mandate.

<sup>84</sup> Crisis Group interview, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, on board flight from Mogadishu to Nairobi, 2 May 2012. Hassan also noted that Turkey's arrival discredited claims that Mogadishu

Traditional leaders agree, Malaaq (traditional chief) Ibrahim Moallim Ali recalls past Turkish help to Somalia, stating Ankara has “done now what was expected of [it]”<sup>85</sup>. Mohamud Ugas Ahmed Ugas Mohamed sees Turkey’s role in Somalia as “1,000 per cent positive”, claiming “no one has done for Somalia in the past 21 years, what the Turks were able to provide in less than a year”<sup>86</sup>. Suldan (chief) Warsame Ibrahim Aliyow Ibrow adds that Somalia will have a “different face ... if Turkey continues two to three years what they are doing now”<sup>87</sup>.

Initially some Somali facilitators and officers reportedly sought to take advantage of aid workers.<sup>88</sup> For example, a facilitator was said to have insisted that a NGO repay him \$200,000 for “services” he provided, including security, a dispute that forced the TFG to repeatedly intervene.<sup>89</sup> The aid organisation decided to implement projects independently.

Civil society complained about the TFG’s allocation of national assets to the Turkish government not “on the basis of rules and regulations, but emotions”<sup>90</sup>. Examples referenced were the dormitories of the national university and the polytechnic institute, which were both given to Turkish NGOs. According to civil society representatives, these are private organisations and the government should have given NGOs such as Nile Organization land so they could build schools, but should not have doled out national infrastructure.<sup>91</sup> The government also gave Turkey the old port and the strategic land adjacent to it for its future embassy.<sup>92</sup>

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was not safe. Turkish aid organisations have encountered few security problems and “they drive the ambulances and the water tanks and make sure the bread reaches the needy persons”.

<sup>85</sup> Crisis Group interview, Istanbul, 2 June 2012. The Malaaq and 134 other traditional elders participated in the Istanbul civil society gathering.

<sup>86</sup> Crisis Group interview, Istanbul, 2 June 2012.

<sup>87</sup> Crisis Group interview, Istanbul, 2 June 2012.

<sup>88</sup> The president’s office had paired Turkish aid organisations with Somali facilitators. Crisis Group observations, Mogadishu, April 2012; Crisis Group interviews, Turkish NGOs staff members, Mogadishu, April 2012; Istanbul, 18 May 2012; former head of Somali Disaster Management Agency, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012.

<sup>89</sup> Crisis Group interviews, April 2012; August 2012. The NGO abandoned the proposed hospital and school site, because someone fired on its Somali workers. Both TFG security forces and politicians intervened, to no avail. The NGO apparently gave the man \$100,000, which he asserted he had paid to the clans and individuals claiming the land.

<sup>90</sup> Crisis Group interview, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, on board flight from Mogadishu to Nairobi, 2 May 2012.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> This infuriates former parliamentarians. Crisis Group interviews, Mogadishu, March 2012. The prime minister insisted “that giving the land was the right thing to do and the benefit

#### IV. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS

Some countries hold strong views on Turkey’s arrival.<sup>93</sup> The initial reaction was ambivalent, even suspicious, but some actors were impressed by its engagement.<sup>94</sup> Two oft-used descriptions were Turkish “adventurism” and “naïveté” for the speed with which it established presence in Somalia.<sup>95</sup> The bold, on the ground and hands-on Turkish relief efforts put Nairobi-based international organisations on the defensive after maintaining for two decades that Mogadishu was too unsafe for their operations. Widespread diversion and mismanagement of international NGOs and UN agencies’ aid by local implementing partners further contributed to the unflattering comparison between the Turks and traditional donors.<sup>96</sup>

Turkey lacks deep knowledge of Somali politics. Some international aid workers accuse it of making questionable arrangements<sup>97</sup> with power brokers in Mogadishu, without truly considering the consequences.<sup>98</sup> The euphoric Somali embrace also increased regional and international unease. Turkey’s decision to begin its engagement by openly criticising veteran Western states that stood by Somalia for two decades, when it had not itself played an active role, irritated traditional external actors.<sup>99</sup> AU military commit-

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outweighs the cost”. Crisis Group interview, former Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Mogadishu, 28 April 2012.

<sup>93</sup> Turkey wants to train the Somali military, and apparently the U.S. and Ethiopia are not happy about this. Crisis Group interview, senior diplomat, Brussels, 11 May 2012. AMISOM also maintains it wants to lead on security sector reform. Crisis Group interview, Nairobi, 7 August 2012.

<sup>94</sup> Laura Heaton, “Saving Somalia”, *Foreign Policy Magazine*, 15 February 2012.

<sup>95</sup> Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and international officials, Nairobi, September 2011-May 2012.

<sup>96</sup> For more on diversions, see Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), UNSC S/2012/544, 13 July 2012, pp. 26-27; Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance with resolution 1916 (2010), UNSC S/2011/443, 18 July 2011, pp. 66-67; Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia submitted in accordance with resolution 1853 (2008), UNSC S/2010/91, 10 March 2010, pp. 60-66.

<sup>97</sup> For example, security for Turkish NGOs was provided by private militias rather than government soldiers, and their office premises, residences and other procurements were obtained through informal arrangements. This benefited shadowy power brokers.

<sup>98</sup> “Torn between frustration and envy, one aid worker in Nairobi said Turkey had ‘cut all the corners we cannot cut’, but that its achievements were making others look like fools”. Richard Lough, “Insight: Turkey tries out soft power on Somalia”, Reuters, 3 June 2012.

<sup>99</sup> Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and UN officials, January-July 2012.

ment and the EU and U.S. financial contributions, including financing the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), vastly exceed Turkey's support.<sup>100</sup> A prominent Somali media outlet argued that Turkey is oblivious or conveniently ignored the fact that AMISOM troops paid in blood to create a safe environment conducive for its arrival.<sup>101</sup>

It was only on 6 August 2012, a year after Turkey's arrival, that its representatives first participated in the Joint Security Committee (JSC),<sup>102</sup> where the Somali authorities and the international community coordinate security sector support.<sup>103</sup> Officials from Turkey's military and police informed the committee that Ankara established a Trust Fund with \$5 million for security sector support. After expressing gratitude, the committee reminded the officials that AMISOM is mandated by the UN Security Council to "coordinate all activity through the JSC and Technical Working Groups",<sup>104</sup> a diplomatic way of telling the Turks to toe the line.

The huge socio-economic challenges, strategic interests and security threats emanating from Somalia – in the form of piracy, terrorism and refugee flows – affect regional and Western countries more than Turkey. It is therefore unlikely that any of these actors will allow Turkey to dominate the international community's Somalia policy. Yet, Turkish leaders have invested personal pres-

tige and national political capital and may find it difficult to walk away from its prominent role. Ankara's modest investment has increased its international profile and soft power,<sup>105</sup> but any unilateralism could harm international coordination and the policy coherence necessary for building a stable and peaceful Somalia. Even with Somalia's appreciation and eagerness to collaborate with Turkey, Ankara cannot fix the country alone; neither can it outflank established actors who have invested significant strategic interests and developed considerable understanding of Somalia and its leaders.

## V. WHAT DOES TURKEY WANT?

There is no doubt that humanitarian considerations were the initial drivers for Turkey's intervention during the famine,<sup>106</sup> as articulated by Prime Minister Erdoğan after his Mogadishu trip.<sup>107</sup> Its humanitarian operations were enthusiastically welcomed.<sup>108</sup> Religious affinity and untainted past ties smoothed Turkey's arrival and made it uncontroversial [for both Somalia and Turkey]. Its involvement is an extension and expression of Ankara's new foreign policy orientation. As with several eye-catching AKP policies towards fellow Muslim countries, domestic

<sup>100</sup> Depending on who is considered a Western donor the number greatly fluctuates, but U.S., EU Commission and the UK humanitarian support in 2011 alone was \$372 million. If the rest of Europe, Australia and Canada are included, the amount equals \$721 million. U.S., EU and UK assistance to AMISOM from 2007-2011 was \$1.8 billion dollars, excluding their large share of UN assessed contributions. "Somalia: International financing investments", Global Humanitarian Assistance, 21 February 2012.

<sup>101</sup> "The battered Somali people and the national media seem to be awestricken with the Mogadishu visit of Turkish Prime Minister and streams of other international dignitaries ... What we however need is to pause for a moment and ask ourselves: how was it possible for so many prominent international dignitaries to visit and bring hope to Somalia? ... The answer brings to the forefront the often forgotten yet real heroes of Somalia – the AMISOM forces particularly Ugandan and Burundi contingents who secured the vital national installations such as the Mogadishu airport". "AMISOM's invaluable contribution to Somalia", Hiraan Online, 3 September 2012.

<sup>102</sup> "Communiqué of the 14th meeting of the Joint Security Committee", Mogadishu, 6 August 2012.

<sup>103</sup> JSC was created after the TFG and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia rebels (led by Sheikh Sharif) signed a peace pact and established a national unity government. See "Joint Security Committee: Draft terms of reference", August 2009, at <http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/090800%20TOR%20JSC%20Final.pdf>.

<sup>104</sup> "Communiqué of the 14th meeting of the Joint Security Committee", op. cit.

<sup>105</sup> Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Mogadishu led other world leaders to do the same. Matthew Gullo, "Turkey's Somalia Adventure: The Quest for Soft Power and Regional Recognition", Research Turkey: Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey, June 2012, p. 4.

<sup>106</sup> This position was repeated consistently. Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ said, "we want Somalia to be in peace ... we do not have any political or economic agenda". Crisis Group interview, Ankara, 16 May 2012. "For us, this is a humanitarian issue. We want Somalia to get out of this crisis". Crisis Group interview, Sedef Yavuzalp, deputy director general for East Africa, foreign ministry, Ankara, 17 May 2012. "The prime minister led the campaign raising the Somalia file ... the whole country was mobilised. ... We started a purely humanitarian agenda ... we have no historical baggage and no hidden agenda". Crisis Group interview, Ibrahim Kalın, chief foreign policy adviser to the prime minister, Ankara, 16 May 2012.

<sup>107</sup> Prime Minister Erdoğan wrote, "the tears that are now running from Somalia's golden sands into the Indian Ocean must stop. ... I am confident that our common heritage as human beings will motivate us to ease the suffering of Somalia", "Tears of Somalia", *Foreign Policy*, 10 October 2011.

<sup>108</sup> "Minnesota Somali Americans extend warm welcome to Deputy Ambassador Söylemez and ATAA", press release, Assembly of Turkish American Associations, 8 May 2012; and Turkish Justice and Development Party, "Somali diaspora living in the Netherlands presented a plaque for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and thanked the Turkish government for its efforts in aid to Somalia", press release, 4 September 2011.

political motivations doubtless also played a strong role.<sup>109</sup> But business interests are also an important factor of the equation, and Turkey needs to be cautious to avoid doing more harm than good or being manipulated.

### A. TURKEY'S AMBITIONS IN SOMALIA

Prior to the Istanbul II conference, Turkey announced it would expand its Somalia activities beyond humanitarian support. Ankara proclaimed it wanted to help the country and play a leading role in three critical areas: political stewardship in the post-August political dispensation (in the form of a new UN mission); security sector reform; and reconstruction and economic development operations, an area where it has a head start.<sup>110</sup> The Istanbul II conference enhanced Turkey's role in Somalia, at least symbolically as both the Somali attendance and final outcomes illustrate.<sup>111</sup> After the event, it was reported that Turkey was offered a seat in an exclusive, informal Somalia contact group consisting of the U.S., EU and Ethiopia. However, top U.S. officials allegedly initially talked tough, essentially telling Turkey to stay clear of security leadership as they are "new to Somalia".<sup>112</sup> A Turkish diplomat quipped afterwards, "they are telling us we are new to Somalia when we were dealing with Somalis before Columbus founded America".<sup>113</sup>

Yet, Turkey is new to modern-day Somalia and risks being used by political groupings to further their own agendas. For example, the roadmap signatories have used Turkey's good intentions to avoid or defer political concessions –

such as accepting the JFMB and making the roadmap process more inclusive – that they are unwilling to make.<sup>114</sup>

### B. BUSINESS INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND THE ANATOLIAN TIGERS

Describing the depth of Turkey's all-encompassing interests in Africa, *Le Monde Diplomatique* declared, "Turkey moves into Africa".<sup>115</sup> Ankara designated 2005 as the "Year of Africa"<sup>116</sup> and trade relationships with the continent tripled between 2003 and 2009, netting over \$9 billion worth of exports to Africa.<sup>117</sup> According to the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), an umbrella for Turkish business associations, exports to Africa for the fiscal year 2011 increased to \$10 billion.<sup>118</sup> African leaders generally supported Ankara's bid to secure a seat at the UN Security Council; out of the 53 African countries, 51 voted for Turkey.

Turkey's socio-economic transformation has altered the country's elite composition in the past four decades, placing in the forefront conservative, provincial-based leaders with new business interests and ethics.<sup>119</sup> These business elites commonly known as the "Anatolian Tigers", because they come from the Anatolian provinces and not the Istanbul establishment, new religiously motivated civil society and humanitarian groups such as IHH and KYM, as well as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), coalesced to create what some call a neo-Ottoman inter-

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<sup>109</sup> "Somalia ... was at least partially part of the efforts to use foreign policy for domestic power building/fortification. That [Erdoğan's visit] was after the [June 2011] elections does not alter my view since everything is now geared towards [presidential elections in 2014]". Crisis Group email correspondence, Soli Özel, Turkish international relations expert, 4 September 2012.

<sup>110</sup> "Food For Thought Covering the Post-August 2012 and 2013 Period in Somalia: Concept Note", Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN, 3 May 2012; "Turkey, Somalia sign agreement to open regional development offices", Azerbaijan News Network, 2 June 2012.

<sup>111</sup> All Somali groups attended the conference. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also praised Turkey's role, noting "Turkey has an impressive track record of working with Somalis. Turkey's diplomats are in Mogadishu. Turkey has built roads, hospitals and schools ... giving hope and help". "Opening remarks at Istanbul II Conference on Somalia", UN News Centre, 1 June 2012.

<sup>112</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Somali scholar, Istanbul, 1 June 2012; EU diplomat, Brussels, 4 May 2012.

<sup>113</sup> Crisis Group observations, Istanbul, Nairobi, June 2012.

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<sup>114</sup> Senior Somali politicians admitted that they used Turkey in their negotiating tactics, telling the international community, "If you don't want to help us with this issue, we will ask the Turks". Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, April 2012. The Turkish ambassador was aware of this bluffing. Crisis Group interview, Nairobi, May 2012.

<sup>115</sup> "Turkey moves to Africa", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 2011.

<sup>116</sup> "Speech by His Excellency President Abdullah Gül on the occasion of the opening session of the First Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit", Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 19 August 2008.

<sup>117</sup> "Turkey-Africa relations", Mustafa Günay, secretary general, Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), Chatham House transcript, 14 April 2011.

<sup>118</sup> "Turkey Africa trade to yield 350 mln in one day", TUSKON, 16 December 2011. Exports to Africa in 2011 still made up less than 8 per cent of Turkey's total exports of \$135 billion. "Africa Regional Information", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, 1 February 2012.

<sup>119</sup> Crisis Group interview, Levent Baştürk, Ankara, 16 May 2012. "Turkish people have no hope in Europe, we turned our face to Africa, Caucasus and Arabia, we have seen the figures". Crisis Group interview, Özgür Erpolat, Ortadoğu Group, Ankara, 16 May 2012.

national relations orientation.<sup>120</sup> Analysts, however, maintain that the new elite are not turning their back on Europe but rather want to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy that places Turkey at “the Western end of the Eastern world and the Eastern end of the Western world”.<sup>121</sup>

Despite inherent vulnerabilities, Turkish businessmen are eager to penetrate the Somali market and play a lead role in reconstruction and economic development. Mustafa Emre Çakır, business development manager with the Ortadoğu Group, an engineering construction organisation, elucidated how intertwined are the manoeuvrings of the Turkish business, political and civil society leaders. Explaining why so many Turkish entrepreneurs are eyeing opportunities in Somalia, he said, “many people are going there. I heard people saying the prime minister went there, let us go”.<sup>122</sup> Elsewhere, Turkish industry leaders steered their politicians to Africa. As an executive explained, Turkish Airlines “did not have to go to Kigali” (one of the new African destinations for the airline), but “businesspeople set the ball rolling”<sup>123</sup> and many of them went there with the first flight. Prime Minister Erdoğan echoed the important role the new business elite play, declaring Turkey grows on the shoulder of “patriotic Anatolian tigers”.<sup>124</sup> Mustafa Çakır summed up Turkey’s advantage in the market by proclaiming: “In Africa, the Turkish brand is better than the Chinese and cheaper than the European.”<sup>125</sup>

### C. WHAT TURKEY SHOULD DO

Ankara has yet to establish a comprehensive cooperation framework with all Somali authorities and other international stakeholders. Furthermore, many Somali groups have begun to openly question and exhibit dissatisfaction with some of its policy decisions. However, the security situation has drastically improved and there is a new government. Such change could present opportunities for a better coordination between Somalis and Turkey, as well as An-

kara and other members of the international community.<sup>126</sup> Additional countries and international organisations will establish a more robust presence on the ground. To avoid duplication and working at cross-purposes effective coordination is vital. How Ankara adjusts to these changes, coordinates with other actors and meets the expectations of the Somali people will determine the end result of Turkey’s Somalia operations over the new government’s next four years.

Turkey has established a strong rapport with a wide range of opinion makers within Somali society. To tackle endemic corruption, its good offices could be utilised to establish the donor-backed and much-delayed Joint Financial Management Board (JFMB).<sup>127</sup> Ankara should make clear to Somalia’s political leaders that international financial support is indispensable for their country’s recovery and that such assistance will only come when effective public finance management is in place. It could also help Somali officials understand the need to build national financial institutions by embedding international experts, an offer it has already made to the TFG.<sup>128</sup> Turkey should also join the board of the proposed JFMB.

Turkey’s overemphasis on the humanitarian aspects of its intervention<sup>129</sup> may be counterproductive in the long run. It is true that Turkey was initially inspired by genuine humanitarian considerations; nevertheless, it has broader interests. Businesspeople are not afraid to admit their motivation is economic and part of a wider expansion into Africa. Being transparent about multi-layered interests could dampen unattainable Somali expectations, avert avoidable misunderstandings and encourage transparent and mutually beneficial interactions.

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<sup>120</sup> Neo-Ottomanism is referred to as Turkey’s perceived or real intention to become the centre or the leader of the Muslim countries that made up the Ottoman empire. “Davutoğlu: Neo-Ottoman label result of uneasiness with Turkey’s power”, *Today’s Zaman*, 28 August 2011.

<sup>121</sup> Crisis Group interview, Levent Baştürk, Ankara, 16 May 2012.

<sup>122</sup> Crisis Group interview, Ankara, 16 May 2012; “Somalia sees recovery with new Turkish investments”, *Today’s Zaman*, 8 April 2012.

<sup>123</sup> Crisis Group interview, Özgür Erpolat, Ortadoğu Group, Ankara, 16 May 2012. Turkish Airlines commenced its three times a week flight to Kigali on 15 May 2012, less than a month after President Paul Kagame’s trip to Istanbul wooing investors.

<sup>124</sup> “Turkey grows on shoulders of ‘patriotic Anatolian tigers’”, *Today’s Zaman*, 1 April 2012.

<sup>125</sup> Crisis Group interview, Ankara, 16 May 2012.

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<sup>126</sup> The first media statement from Turkey on the occasion of the new elections seems to suggest that Ankara understands the need for coordination and continued international support. “We call on the international community to take further interest in and assist Somalia in line with the priorities of the new democratic administration”. See “Press release regarding the presidential elections in Somalia”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 September 2012.

<sup>127</sup> A recent World Bank and UN monitoring group report documented rampant corruption. “World Bank Summary of Financial Diagnostic Assessment of ‘Audit Investigative Financial Report 2009-10’”, 30 May 2012; and “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)”, S/2012/544, 13 July 2012.

<sup>128</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Turkish ambassador to Somalia, Mogadishu, April 2012; Nairobi, May 2012; Ankara, June 2012.

<sup>129</sup> Turkish political figures put a lot of emphasis on the humanitarian and overall benevolent nature of the Turkish involvement whereas businesspeople and analysts speak of the economic and strategic aspects of the relationship.

Politically, it will be essential that Turkey remains impartial in Somali politics, but its expertise running an effective, modern state could be extremely helpful in the construction of more effective, transparent and accountable political institutions. Providing support to political party development, constitutional reform, and the establishment of more efficient and corruption-free ministries will greatly improve governance in Somalia. While in the past Turkey has remained quiet on issues such as corruption, it should no longer ignore this serious and debilitating problem, as it is called upon to support the growth of sustainable national institutions.

The newly elected president has also made national unity one of his top four priorities, along with engaging with segments of Al-Shabaab.<sup>130</sup> Turkey should support these negotiations, and work to be a broader player in UN peacebuilding efforts.<sup>131</sup> Turkey has established a good relationship with the leadership in Hargeisa, beginning with the visit of the Turkish ambassador, a pledge to open a development liaison office in the capital city, and the invitation of Somaliland to the Istanbul Conference. There have even been reports that Turkey tried to establish a line of communication with segments of Al-Shabaab earlier this year.<sup>132</sup> These relationships and the good-will that Turkey has acquired make it an ideal candidate to play a larger role in future mediation efforts. The newly elected government will have to embark on an ambitious campaign of reuniting the Somali people and obtaining buy-in from

the country's autonomous units,<sup>133</sup> many of which have received little or no TFG support over the past eight years. Mogadishu will need a trusted partner in this endeavour.

On the security front, Turkey has already signed two bilateral treaties with the Somali government, including a military cooperation pact.<sup>134</sup> Just days after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's inauguration, Somalia's army chief of staff, General Abdulkadir Sheikh Ali Dini, and eleven other former generals arrived in Turkey, for seven days of meetings with their Turkish counterparts to discuss the rebuilding of the army.<sup>135</sup> Soon thereafter, the Somali National Security Agency's chief visited Ankara for a series of high-level consultations.<sup>136</sup> While security assistance is welcome, this could create friction, further resentment and competition, especially with AMISOM, which has the lead role in the implementation of Somalia's National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP).<sup>137</sup> Even if there is no direct competition, uncoordinated assistance is at least inefficient and at worst counterproductive, ultimately undermining state building efforts.<sup>138</sup>

The Turkish resurgence in Africa, and particularly in Somalia, comes after close to a century of absence in, and indifference towards, Africa and the Middle East. The gap that exists between Turkey's intentions and capacity is apparent in the lack of Turkish experts on these regions.

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<sup>130</sup> On 20 and 21 June 2012, the leaders of Somaliland and Somalia met in London, marking their first face-to-face meeting in twenty years, and culminating in an eight-point Chevening House Declaration. The discussions continued a week later on 28 June in Dubai where Somaliland President Ahmed Mahmoud Silanyo and Somali President Sheikh Sharif signed the Dubai Declaration. Afterwards, Silanyo postponed their next meeting until a permanent governing structure was in place in Mogadishu. Days after Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's election, he expressed his intention to resume discussions as soon as possible and stated: "Although I am all for unity, Somaliland's sovereignty should not be belittled thus forced to rejoin the south but enticed through friendly means". In an interview with Al Jazeera, the president expressed his willingness to talk to Al-Shabaab elements that would commit to a peaceful settlement. See "President Hassan of Somalia ready for Somaliland talks resumption", *Somaliland Sun*, 16 September 2012; and "Somalia leader outlines concerns", Al Jazeera, 16 September 2012.

<sup>131</sup> With the inauguration of the new government, the role of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) will drastically change. In his most recent report, the Secretary-General initiated a review, due by the end of 2012 that seeks to propose a mandate for the next stabilisation and peacebuilding phase. "Report of the Secretary General on Somalia", S/2012/643, 22 August 2012.

<sup>132</sup> Abdihakim Aynte, "Turkey's Increasing Role in Somalia: An Emerging Donor?", Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 22 March 2012.

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<sup>133</sup> Puntland in particular, could pose challenge for Hassan Sheikh's new government. Empowered by their prominent role in the roadmap process, Puntland President Farole made several strong statements in the final stages of the transition, culminating in a subtle threat of secession if the wrong candidate was elected in September. "If such elements are elected through unfair practices, Puntland State reserves the right to decide its own destiny, in accordance with provisions of the Puntland Constitution". See "Puntland warns against manipulation of presidential election", Press Release, Garowe Online, 8 September 2012.

<sup>134</sup> "Turkey, Somalia sign military training pact", *People's Daily* (online), 23 May 2010.

<sup>135</sup> Crisis Group interviews with Somali diplomats; Mogadishu, Nairobi and Ankara, 21 September 2012.

<sup>136</sup> Crisis Group email correspondence, senior NSA official, 1 October 2012. The National Security Agency (NSA) is the government's intelligence service and has its own troops and special operations forces.

<sup>137</sup> The NSSP is a comprehensive national stabilisation and security sector reform program as well as a component of the end-of-transition roadmap. AMISOM, in addition to the TFG and UNPOS, is a co-chair and is the most important pillar since it does most of the fighting, as well as training of Somali soldiers. See AMISOM Mandate, at <http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate>.

<sup>138</sup> "In pictures: Turkey begins training Somali forces", *Somaliland Press* (online), 4 July 2012. AU officials consider Turkey's training of Somali police as duplication because AMISOM is already doing that. Crisis Group interview, Nairobi, 7 August 2012.

According to a Turkish diplomat, the entire diplomatic corps has about five Arabic-speaking experts,<sup>139</sup> and Turkey's embassy in Somalia consists of only two diplomats, both new to Somalia.<sup>140</sup> With limited expertise, Turkey has a lot of catching up to do and faces considerable risks if it plunges alone into Somalia's complex and unpredictable political and security environment. Much like the U.S. learned in the early 1990s, good intentions alone cannot protect against manipulation by Somali politicians and can lead to catastrophic mistakes.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Somalis of all walks of life refer to Turkey's arrival as a miracle and Godsend. But that honeymoon is ending. The famine's back has been broken and Al-Shabaab has been pushed out of the capital – although it is still a serious threat. Now comes the hard part of consolidating the peace and rebuilding the state. Turkey faces incredibly high Somali expectations that will lead to disappointment unless well managed. In addition, some Somalis will continue to try to take advantage of Ankara's good-will and limited knowledge of its clan dynamics and complex politics. Ankara should be under no illusion that it can continue working solo in Somalia. International actors that have traditionally played the lead role in Somalia are joining Turkey on the ground in Mogadishu. It will need to coordinate its efforts with others to achieve a durable peace in Somalia, because the alternative – poor coordination – will be exploited by Somali politicians, leading to unnecessary duplication and the waste of limited and badly needed resources. Traditional actors also need to understand that Turkey wants to play a leadership role, which most Somalis seem to want, at least for now.

**Nairobi/Istanbul/Brussels, 8 October 2012**

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<sup>139</sup> Crisis Group interview, Ankara, 15 May 2012.

<sup>140</sup> Crisis Group observation, Mogadishu, April 2012.

## APPENDIX A

### MAP OF SOMALIA





## APPENDIX B

### ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org). Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group's international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices or representation in 34 locations: Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujumbura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington DC. Crisis Group currently covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in

Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.

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**October 2012**

## APPENDIX C

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