

# Policy and Management Insights

NO.5 DECEMBER 2013



## A QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP? Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2014

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ECDPM's annual Challenges Paper seeks to identify important debates that can be expected in the coming year and beyond and to sketch the backdrop against which these will unfold. The aim is not to predict outcomes, but to situate debates that concern Africa-EU relations so as to facilitate as wide a stakeholder engagement as possible.

### Introduction

For many observers of Africa-EU relations, the focus of 2014 might well be the last concerted efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as the preparation of a new post-2015 international development framework. But 2014 is also the year of the 4th Africa-EU Summit, a once in three years opportunity for high-level political dialogue that neither continent can really afford to miss.

This 4<sup>th</sup> Summit should ideally look beyond development cooperation to address how the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) can better manage their relations and collaborate on global challenges. At the same time, the Summit, scheduled for April 2014, takes place during a period of major European and African institutional change, which may detract from focusing on a limited agenda. In the EU there are European parliamentary elections and the appointment of new political leadership. On the African side, the AU is still coming to terms with the changes brought in by AU Commission (AUC) President Dlamini-Zuma since she was appointed two years ago. More prosaically, 2014 is also the first year of the EU's 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the AU's 3<sup>rd</sup> Strategic Plan, as well as the AU "Year of Agriculture and Food Security".

However, as the Africa-EU Summit approaches, little may appear to have changed since last year. Both sides are still tentative about spelling out their

respective interests. Strategic priorities are ambiguous, and doubts remain about the real value of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The dialogue is also shaky, there have been no joint Ministerial Troika meetings since 2010 and, although the two Commission presidents have met, other senior figures such as the EU's foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, have shown little interest. The biggest challenge is thus really for senior political figures, one on either side to take ownership and provide the joint leadership to make the process work. Africa's 54 countries and the EU's 28 Member States need to show commitment and the political will to listen, understand and cooperate, but leadership needs to come from the continental institutions.

As other strategic partners make their mark in Africa, the Africa-EU partnership cannot afford a continued lack of political traction or the attendant sense of drift and limited credibility. The 2014 Summit can provide stakeholders on both continents a platform to initiate realistic and viable action and *'bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through closer economic cooperation and the promotion of inclusive and sustainable development'*.<sup>1</sup> Thus, 2014 offers an opportunity to finally realise the stated purpose of the 2007 JAES, and move away from an aid-centric donor-beneficiary relationship and take it to a strategic level with strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation. Seven years after the JAES was adopted at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon, new trends are becoming clearer on both continents, making it possible to adjust approaches and policies.

Preparations for the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit have been dogged by arguments that have developed between the two continental partners, particularly over the lack of progress on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations and differences over the International Criminal Court (ICC). These issues cannot be avoided but must be resolved in time if they are not to overshadow the Summit.

The current paper pinpoints challenges for Africa-EU relations in several areas: EU institutions and development cooperation; cooperation on key issues such as food security, peace and security and migration; and economic concerns including regional integration. The paper then looks at the AU-EU partnership of the future and considers the post-2015 development framework. It concludes by suggesting three priority items for the agenda of the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit.

Today's urgent need to reconfigure the partnership is in particular brought home by two major shifts in Africa-EU relations. The first is Africa's growing assertiveness, which is manifest in the way African countries relate to the rest of the world and in the continent's increasing independence in developing its own agendas and frameworks. The second is Europe's adjustment to harsher times, as it rebalances its social and economic commitments in a bid to remain relevant in the global environment.

## Clarifying objectives in Africa

In 2013 the AU celebrated the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the original Organisation of African Unity (OAU). AU Heads of State and Government adopted a declaration affirming their determination to *'build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena'*.<sup>2</sup> The AU Commission developed its 3rd Strategic Plan (2014-2017)<sup>3</sup> and started to map out a new vision statement, Agenda 2063, for the next 50 years.

These documents restate existing pan-African and "African renaissance" objectives, while also calling for a new, bolder and more efficient approach to managing African development, though in line with established strategic documents.<sup>4</sup> Equally, in the AUC, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma has, since her arrival, also sought to improve internal management and coordination and the adoption of a more results-oriented approach to achieve this vision.<sup>5</sup> The coming year is likely to bring further confirmation of this paradigm shift in AU thinking towards a *'focus on impacts and outcomes rather just on activities'*.<sup>6</sup>

To achieve its vision, the AU has reviewed and expanded its strategic partnerships, creating a more competitive and complex context for Africa-EU relations.<sup>7</sup> Key partners such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea are increasingly attracted by Africa's economic growth and greater macroeconomic and political stability. They are engaging with Africa on its priorities in summits and meetings such as the Africa-South America Summit, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the Africa-India Ministers of Trade meeting and the BRICS Summit. These events have been well-covered by the African media, underlining the opportunity offered by the 2014 Africa-EU Summit to demonstrate the EU's solid track record and willingness to match the emerging economies' people-to-people style of diplomacy.

Yet, African institutions are also looking into alternative sources of financing for

their plans. The AU has established a high-level panel<sup>8</sup> on the issue and the African Development Bank (AfDB) is also contributing to new thinking on financing mechanisms in particular for infrastructure.<sup>9</sup> What is radically different from former approaches such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) framework adopted in 2001, which tried to engage countries outside the continent, is that this time Africa is looking to itself for financing opportunities.

## Continuity and change in Europe

Although weakened by the financial crisis, Europe remains a crucial partner for Africa. The EU has so far managed to save the euro and preserve the stability of its own integration project, and 2014 may, in some respects, be a turning point. Yet the European Parliament elections in June will be the first opportunity for citizens across the Union to express their views on the handling of the crisis. Election dynamics and outcomes will undoubtedly impact Europe's global role and relations with Africa, though established policy directions and priorities will provide a counterbalance and ensure a degree of continuity.

The EU continues to be Africa's biggest single trading partner and its largest donor.<sup>10</sup> In the five years from 2007 to 2012, it provided some €24 billion in official development assistance (ODA) for Africa.<sup>11</sup> While an increasing number of African states no longer depend on these funds, they remain vital for some of the continent's poorest countries. So while the partnership certainly needs to evolve, some aspects also need to be sustained and renewed.

One reason for Europe's declining influence in favour of more dynamic emerging powers is their perceived commonality of past experiences and interests, which brings Africa closer to them than to Europe. Africa-Europe relations may have a more difficult history, but for a mutually beneficial partnership, dialogue has to be open, frank and strong enough to tackle even delicate and contentious issues.

For the EU, a major challenge is to reconcile values and interests in its policies and external action. Europe is known for its

strong discourses on democracy and governance. Yet too often this value-driven EU agenda is perceived as clashing with the way it pursues its security and economic interests, which can undermine the Union's credibility.<sup>12</sup> There is also a general need for more coherence in the EU's overall external action. Ideally, Europe's different instruments should provide mutually reinforcing support to policy and political objectives, avoiding duplication and disruption. This is for instance a key concern in Europe's often ambiguous responses to the security-development nexus, and it also has implications for other areas of cooperation, such as trade, migration, justice and human rights.<sup>13</sup>

## 1. Reconfiguring the partnership

On both sides of the Mediterranean there is a general sense of disappointing progress in the priority areas of the JAES.<sup>14</sup> This urgently needs to be turned around. For instance, two emerging dynamics in Africa could be better harnessed as opportunities for building a more effective African-EU partnership.

The first is the rise of South-South cooperation, which enables African leaders to be more selective in the relations they maintain with the EU.<sup>15</sup> The latest United Nations (UN) Human Development Report, *The Rise of the South*, estimates that by 2020, the joint GDP of Brazil, China and India will overtake the combined economies of the UK, the USA, France, Canada, Italy and Germany.<sup>16</sup> Yet the mere presence of other actors says little about the quality of cooperation, nor does economic growth necessarily translate into job creation and prosperity on the ground. There is therefore still ample opportunity for Africa-EU relations to focus on areas that both consider essential.

The second factor is African leaders' wish to promote industrialisation, something which Europe has not prioritised in its development assistance in the past. Africa is increasingly portrayed as the next frontier for global economic growth with the ability to rely on and benefit from its own resources and successfully pursue far-reaching plans to build infrastructure and industrialise.<sup>17</sup> These create huge scope for

<p><b>October</b></p> <p><b>UN 6th High-level Dialogue on Financing for Development</b>, New York (7-8 Oct.)</p> <p><b>4th "Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation" Steering Committee Meeting</b>, Washington (10-11 Oct.)</p> <p><b>ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Trade Committee</b>, Brussels (11 Oct.)</p> <p><b>2nd UN Development Cooperation Forum on "Development Cooperation in a Post-2015 Era: Sustainable Development for All"</b>, Montreux (24-25 Oct.)</p>	<p><b>November</b></p> <p><b>UN Climate Change Conference</b>, Warsaw (11-22 Nov.)</p> <p><b>26th ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly</b>, Addis Ababa (23-27 Nov.)</p> <p><b>UN Open Working Group (OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals 5th Session</b>, New York (25-27 Nov.)</p> <p><b>European Development Days "A decent life for all by 2030"</b>, Brussels (26-27 Nov.)</p>	<p><b>December</b></p> <p><b>UN Expert Committee on Sustainable Development Financing (SDF) 2nd meeting</b>, New York (2-6 Dec.)</p> <p><b>WTO 9th Ministerial Conference</b>, Bali (3-6 Dec.)</p> <p><b>UN OWG on Sustainable Development Goals 6th Session</b>, New York (9-13 Dec.)</p> <p><b>European Council including on CSDP</b>, Brussels (19-20 Dec.)</p>	<p><b>General Events</b></p> <p><b>AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security</b></p> <p><b>Latvia adopts the Euro</b></p> <p><b>South Africa Presidential and National Assembly Elections</b></p> <p><b>Algeria Presidential Elections</b></p> <p><b>Malawi Presidential and Parliamentary Elections</b></p>
<b>2013</b>			<b>2014</b>

Europe-Africa cooperation that could have a transformative impact on the continent, so Europe needs to engage. Some of Africa's most pressing concerns may well arise in areas where the EU has a comparative advantage. Moreover, as Africa and Europe face increasingly similar or complementary challenges, newly relevant partnerships may emerge. For instance, the youthfulness of Africa's population just as Europe's ages, could be a positive force for change in a stronger EU-Africa partnership. Providing, of course, that young African people can be equipped with skills and opportunities<sup>8</sup> and European states can find the vision and leadership to see migration not as a threat to be managed, but rather as an opportunity to be grasped.

### The Africa-EU Summit

Continuing high-level political involvement will be important for the Summit. Yet a focussed dialogue alone will not be enough to realise the goals.<sup>9</sup> Concrete follow-up will be essential, particularly in light of the changes in EU institutions in 2014. These changes mean that the Summit will bring together the AUC leadership with the outgoing leadership of the EC, the Council and European External Action Service (EEAS). The first half of 2014 and the Summit therefore represent a last chance for parties familiar with one another to pin down political agreements and clarify understandings. It will thus be all the more important for the Summit to reach clear conclusions for which both sides can be held accountable, even after the EU leadership changes.

Various meetings were held in 2013 to prepare for the Summit and find common ground. At year's end, further progress was still expected on the future priorities for the JAES. Learning from the past, it will be critical to emphasise depth over breadth, to make the JAES more effective and visible. Open and solid reflections before the Summit are required if decisions at the event are to be grounded on a realistic and forward-looking assessment of what the partnership can and cannot deliver. At the same time, this process of fixing and clarifying joint priorities in areas where the partnership can add value should not lead to setting aside more difficult yet pressing issues such as the EPAs and the ICC.

### Obstacles along the road

The negotiations on the EPAs have become too protracted and fraught and, as a result, increasingly a political rather than simply a technical trade issue. If not resolved they are likely to strain the climate and monopolise attention before and during the upcoming Summit.<sup>20</sup> To overcome their differences, European and African stakeholders will have to be explicit about their objectives and interests on trade, investment and security and then be willing to look for political compromises in areas where their views differ.<sup>21</sup>

The EPAs mean however that 2014 will be a major turning point for the trade relationship between Europe and Africa. The EC has set a deadline for the 1 October 2014 for negotiating regions to conclude, sign and start implementing their respective agreements. If the EPAs are not finalised well before that deadline, ideally in early 2014 prior to the Summit, some major African countries will lose some or all of their preferential access to the European market. More importantly, this risk of serious trade disruption might lead some countries to split from their regional grouping and agree individual trade deals with the EU. Failure to identify compromises in the talks on these regional free trade agreements is therefore one issue that could derail the Africa-EU Summit. African Trade Ministers have already called for the EPAs to be on the Summit Agenda.<sup>22</sup> To move forward, political leaders would have to assess the costs of failure to conclude regional EPAs for both Africa and Africa-EU relations before the deadline, and ideally before the Summit, and take a political decision to translate the willingness to succeed into concrete trade proposals and commitments.

Most of the states that have ratified the Rome Statute on the ICC are from Europe and the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Group,<sup>23</sup> yet differences have emerged between the European and African groups over the number of African cases handled by the Court and the indictment of sitting heads of state which, it is argued, can have a negative effect on peace and security. Progress achieved<sup>24</sup> at the last Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute in

November 2013 is a sign however that open dialogue and mutual engagement are key. The divergences have nonetheless underlined how differently states often relate to the links between security and justice, and how this influences priorities on national and regional stability on the one hand and ensuring justice and tackling impunity on the other. African and European states clearly need to maintain the dialogue in this area rather than just avoid the subject.

### Strategic interests and shared responsibilities

Africa-EU relations have generally been characterised by good intentions but limited explicit recognition of each other's strategic interests and shared responsibilities. To get beyond this, African and European stakeholders need to be clearer about their priorities and expectations and take responsibility together. A two-step approach to prioritisation could steer the stakeholders towards a dynamic and balanced partnership that accommodates their different interests. The first step would be to focus on a set of issues where there is traction, that is, issues of interest to both partners, which benefit from clear leadership, and where action has and will continue to be taken even if leadership and institutions change. Second, that list needs to be narrowed down by identifying the specific areas where the Africa-EU partnership has a clear added value.

Relations have to be adapted to new contexts, needs and expectations as well. Many countries in Africa, and also more widely in the ACP Group of States that benefits from the European Development Fund (EDF), are committed to breaking their dependency on aid, and they are fast attracting the interest of other global players besides the EU.<sup>25</sup> Engaging with new actors not only increases the bargaining power of African or the ACP Group *vis-à-vis* the EU, it also draws attention to their priorities and raises global awareness about challenges requiring shared responsibility, such as climate change, renewable energy and natural resources management. In 2014, the ACP Group will organise consultations in four African regions on the future

January / February

**New MFF 2014-2020 & 11th EDF comes into effect** (1 Jan.)

**New GSP & CAP comes into effect** (1 Jan.)

**AU Commission's Strategic Plan 2014-2017 begins** (1 Jan.)

**UN OWG on Sustainable Development Goals 7th Session**, New York (6-10 Jan.)

**World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2014 on "The Reshaping of the World: Consequences for Society, Politics and Business"**, Davos (22-25 Jan.)

**22nd AU Assembly**, Addis Ababa (24-31 Jan.)

**UN OWG on Sustainable Development Goals 8th Session**, New York (3-7 Feb.)

**ACP-EU JPA Regional Meeting, East Africa**, Mauritius (12-14 Feb.)

March

**UN Expert Committee on Sustainable Development Financing (SDF) 3rd meeting**, New York (3-7 Mar.)

**ACP-EU JPA**, Strasbourg (15-19 Mar.)

**3rd UN Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) on "Accountable and effective development cooperation in a post-2015 era"**, Berlin (20-21 Mar.)

**7th AU-ECA Joint Annual Meetings on "Industrialization for Sustainable and Inclusive Development in Africa"**, Abuja (27 Mar. - 1 Apr.)

April

**World Economic Forum on Latin America**, Panama City (1-3 Apr.)

**4th Africa-EU Summit**, Brussels (2-3 Apr.)

**1st High-level Meeting on the "Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation"**, Mexico City (15-16 Apr.)

**Expected end of EAC-COMESA-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area negotiations** (by end of Apr.)



Greek EU Presidency

2014

of the Group beyond 2020 when the Cotonou Agreement comes to an end. These consultations, which will review the mandate of the Group, also provide African countries with another important opportunity to put their interests on the table and indicate what future relationship they want with the EU.<sup>26</sup>

### The Pan-African Programme

The financing of the JAES has been contentious from the start. Europe's move to create a dedicated Pan-African Program (PAP) was therefore an encouraging step forward.<sup>27</sup> The EU's new budget, starting in 2014, allots some € 845 million to this financial envelope dedicated to the JAES.<sup>28</sup> However, in the absence of well functioning JAES institutions, it is not yet clear how these funds will be managed jointly with African stakeholders and indeed whether their use will be well aligned with JAES priorities. The ability of the PAP to deliver on the partnership thus depends on the effective reform of the JAES itself. Equally while it is valuable to have this EU financial contribution it would be good to also have co-financing from the African side if the joint character of the JAES is to be respected and a renewed slide into a traditional donor-recipient relationship avoided. The management of the JAES thus needs to be resolved quickly, so that a functional mechanism is established to ensure that PAP funds can be programmed in line with jointly agreed priorities. The programming of other EU budget funds already started in 2013, so EU Commission officials will be keen to programme the PAP funds as soon as possible. If this is still needed the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit would be an important moment to finalise the PAP management arrangements and the year ahead will show if it is really able to buttress the priorities and principles of the Africa-EU partnership.

## 2. Renewing EU external action

As indicated, 2014 is one of the EU's periodic years of major institutional renewal. European Parliament elections are scheduled for May. A new College of Commissioners will be appointed and there will be a change of political

leadership at the EEAS and the European Council. This year also marks the start of a new seven-year budget cycle, the 2014-2020 MFF, and a number of major policy changes will take effect. The future role of Europe in the world and its relations with Africa will be affected by the outcome of all these changes.

### New leadership: Change of the guard in the EU institutions

The process will start with the European Parliament elections on 22-25 May 2014. EU citizens will elect their representatives from pan-European political parties.<sup>29</sup> These will be the first elections since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which widened the European Parliament's budgetary powers and gave it more influence on the choice of EU leadership. For the first time, voters will indirectly choose the next President of the EC. The European Council, taking into account the results of the elections, will propose a candidate to Parliament from among those nominated by European political parties.<sup>30</sup> The Parliament will then elect the Commission President by majority vote at its first plenary session, 14-17 July.<sup>31</sup>

The Commission President takes office six months after the European Parliament elections. This alignment of Parliament and Commission processes, formalised in the Maastricht Treaty, is intended to encourage closer ties. In September 2014, parliamentary committees will hold hearings for each of the candidate Commissioners, which the President will select during the summer. The one exception is the new High Representative for Foreign Policy and Vice President (HRVP) of the Commission to replace Catherine Ashton who has made it clear she will stand down. The HRVP will be appointed at the same time, but by the EU Member States in the European Council albeit with the agreement of the President of the Commission. In October 2014 the European Parliament will confirm the entire new Commission, including the new HRVP. The new Commission will take office on 1 November 2014. Finally the EU Member States are responsible for appointing the new President of the European Council, to replace Herman van Rompuy, who reaches the end of his second and last term on 1 December 2014.<sup>32</sup>

Leadership of the EU institutions is crucial and will matter well beyond the 2014 elections. The coherence of EU external action is at stake, as it requires strong political drive and guidance. A major question is whether the European elections can create a new sense of direction for Europe's future and dynamism and enthusiasm for ambitious progress. A step change in the political debate could have dramatic consequences for the EU's foreign policy, external action and development commitments. Yet, some have expressed concern that 2014 could equally well mark a threshold in an intensifying decline in Europe's international influence and its role as a promoter of development.

This process has implications for the upcoming Summit and for future Africa-EU relations. Not only will the new African leadership under Dlamini-Zuma be confronting an outgoing European leadership at the April Summit. An "end of term" syndrome is also likely to slow work processes. In practical terms, the EC will stop taking decisions as soon as its new President is appointed in July 2014. It will be up to the new leadership to determine how high Africa is on the agenda in coming years and the place of development policy in the new set of EU external action priorities. In effect, the European follow-up to the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit will be for the new political leadership, which will not have been present at the event. In the latter part of 2014, as the new EU Commission settles in, the AU may therefore well seek to rearticulate to the new EU leadership what it wants from the partnership.

### New budget: The EU's 2014-2020 financial framework

On 2 December 2013, after protracted negotiations with the European Parliament, the EU Council adopted the EU's 2014-2020 MFF.<sup>33</sup> The framework, accompanied by a range of related policy papers, translates the EU's medium-term priorities into financial commitments. It also constitutes the basis for annual budgetary exercises, as it sets a maximum amount that the EU may spend each year in different policy areas. An overall ceiling of €1.1 trillion in current prices (equivalent

**May** OECD Forum 2014 on "Resilient Economies for Inclusive Societies", Paris (5-6 May)

World Economic Forum on Africa "Forging Inclusive Growth, Creating Jobs", Abuja (7-9 May)

UN Expert Committee on Sustainable Development Financing (SDF) 4th meeting, New York (12-16 May)

European Parliament Elections (22-25 May)

OECD Council Meeting at Ministerial Level on "Jobs, Equality and Trust", Paris (29-30 May)

African Economic Outlook 2014 on "Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialisation"

**June / July** 40th G8 Summit, Sochi (4-5 Jun.)

4th Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) on "Global dialogue on the future of development cooperation in the post-2015 era", New York (date tbc)

39th Session of the ACP-EU Joint Council of Ministers Meeting, Brussels (date tbc)

7th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and EU Political and Security Committee (EUPSC), Addis Ababa (date tbc)

AfDB Development Report 2013 on "Leveraging Regional Integration for Inclusive Growth" (date tbc)

2014 EU Accountability Report (date tbc)


23rd AU Assembly, Addis Ababa (date tbc)



Italian EU Presidency



**FIGURE 1 - EU BUDGET PER HEADING 2014-2020 (current prices)**



has two overarching priorities: (i) human rights, democracy and governance and (ii) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. The *Agenda* particularly highlights work in the area of food security and sustainable energy in least-developed and low-income countries and encourages the use of new modalities such as the blending of grants and loans.

The ideas outlined in the *Agenda for Change* will be reflected in the use of aid funds under the EDF and the DCI. One of the key principles is “differentiation”, which entails that the EU will allocate a greater proportion of funds to countries and regions where it believes aid can have the greatest impact, such as least-developed countries (LDCs) and fragile states. Other countries may no longer be eligible for geographic grant aid from the DCI. Instead, they can expect new forms of partnership with the EU, and they may continue to receive some funds from the EU’s thematic and regional programmes.

Preparatory work to implement the *Agenda* started in 2013, so 2014 should see completion of the process from policy to programming and implementation. In late 2013, EU institutions were in the final stages of deciding how much EU aid will go to each partner country, and what will be done with this aid through national, regional and multiannual indicative programmes (NIPs/RIPs and MIPs). EU institutions and EU delegations will be adapting their practices and capacities to implement the new strategic directions and manage the *Agenda* rollout as the new budget comes into force in January 2014. A new set of results measurement and reporting tools will be tested in 2014, making the coming year an important one for enhancing the effectiveness of EU development assistance.

**New policies II: Changing donor strategies**

In keeping with EU-level policy changes, some Member-State donors are changing their own policies as well, in particular to encourage more private-sector involvement in development work and to provide incentives for foreign investment. In March 2013, the UK’s Secretary of State for International Development, Justine

in 2011 prices: €960 billion)<sup>34</sup> was approved, allocated under five headings (*Figure 1*). The upcoming budget is 3.5% less than the previous one, and includes key reprioritisations and new proposals.<sup>35</sup> With it, the EU seeks to promote growth and employment in Europe. There are new initiatives to help young Europeans find jobs and to assist small and medium enterprises in accessing much-needed funds for investment.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, the new budget seeks to encourage more environment friendly agriculture and to anchor a green consciousness within Europe. Mitigation measures to address climate change are expected to represent at least 20% of spending in the 2014-2020 period. The budget also allocates increased funds to research and innovation, education and training.

The EU’s budget for external relations was kept steady, with €66.3 billion allocated under the “Global Europe” heading

including the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI, €19.7 billion). Parallel to the budget and covering the same period, EU Member States and ACP countries agreed on the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF, the financial protocol of the Cotonou Agreement. This adds a further €30.5 billion in development assistance (*figure 2*). The development funds in the MFF and the EDF are accompanied by a new development policy framework, the *Agenda for Change*.

**New policies I: The Agenda for Change**

The *Agenda for Change* is an aid reform strategy that introduces significant changes to European development cooperation. The policy framework aims to increase the effectiveness of EU development assistance by focusing on priority countries and sectors, adapting tools and practices to these new priorities, and working with new stakeholders. It

Month	2014	2015
August / September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UN Expert Committee on Sustainable Development Financing (SDF) 5th meeting, New York (4-8 Aug.)</li> <li>UN Expert Committee on Sustainable Development Financing Report</li> <li>2014 EuropeAid Annual Report</li> <li>UN OWG to prepare a proposal on SDGs for the 69th UN GA</li> </ul>	
October	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deadline for the completion of EPAs (1 Oct.)</li> <li>ACP-EU JPA Regional Meeting, Central Africa (Week 44)</li> <li>End of current EU Commission’s term of office (31 Oct.)</li> </ul>	
November / December	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New Commission takes office (1 Nov.)</li> <li>G20 Summit, Brisbane (15-16 Nov.)</li> <li>ACP-EU JPA, Vanuatu (29 Nov. - 3 Dec.)</li> <li>New High Representative of the EEAS (1 Dec.)</li> <li>UNFCCC COP 20, Lima (1-12 Dec.)</li> </ul>	
General Events / January		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reformed CAP fully in force (1 Jan.)</li> <li>69th UN GA, New York (16-29 Sep.)</li> <li>UN Special Event on 2015 (date tbc)</li> <li>UN Financing for Development Conference (date tbc)</li> </ul>

**FIGURE 2 - HEADING IV OF THE EU BUDGET 2014-2020 — INSTRUMENTS OVER €1 BN AND WITH RELEVANCE FOR AFRICA NOTED**

Programme	Amount	Share of Heading IV	Description
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	€19.7 bn	30%	Geographic programmes (60%) for non-ACP developing countries and thematic programmes for: - global public goods (€ 5.1 bn): environment, sustainable energy, human development, food security and migration; - supporting civil society organisations and local authorities (€ 1.9 bn) and; - Pan-African Programme (€ 0.845 bn).
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)	€15.4 bn	23%	Democratic transition, market economy, sustainable development and other common interests, including in 5 North African states.
Pre-Accession Instrument (IPA)	€11.7 bn	18%	Economic/ political reforms in EU pre-accession countries through financial and technical assistance.
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	€2.1 bn	3.5%	Activities Petersberg tasks (humanitarian tasks and rescue of nationals, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, etc.).
Instrument for Stability (IFS)	€2.1 bn	3.5%	Response in situations of emerging or ongoing crisis.
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	€2.3 bn	2%	Human rights and democratisation in all third countries, including African states.
Guaranteed Fund for external actions	€1.2 bn	2%	Defaults on loans and loan guarantees granted directly to third countries or for projects in third countries.
Partnership Instrument	€0.955 bn	1%	Policy dialogue, market access and opportunities for European companies and enhance EU visibility globally in partnership with developed countries (including global players) and those countries graduating from bilateral development assistance.
<b>TOTAL HEADING IV</b>	<b>€66.3 bn</b>		

**OUTSIDE HEADING IV AND THE BUDGET: THE EDF**

11th European Development Fund	Amount	Share of EDF-11	Funding streams
Funding for African, Caribbean and Pacific states and regional organisations	€29.1 bn	95%	Composed of national and regional programmes (€24.4 bn), funding for intra-ACP and inter-regional cooperation (€ 3.6 bn) and funds for the European Investment Bank's investment facility (€1.1 bn).
Funding for Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)	€0.37 bn	1%	Composed of territorial and regional programmes (€0.36 bn) and €0.005 bn to the EIB to finance interest-rate subsidies and technical assistance
<b>TOTAL 11th EDF</b>	<b>€30.5 bn (including administration €1.1 bn 4%)</b>		
<b>TOTAL EU AID 2014-2020</b>	<b>€96.8 bn</b>		

All amounts in current prices, retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/figures/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/figures/index_en.cfm) and <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:210:0001:0014:EN:PDF>

\*The final breakdown of programmes funded through the DCI is still to approved by the European Parliament in January 2014. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201312/20131204ATT75464/20131204ATT75464EN.pdf>

Greening<sup>37</sup> announced three priorities for development: lowering barriers to trade and investment, promoting entrepreneurs and business people in developing countries, and *'thirdly and critically... greater investment by business, and I want to see UK companies joining the development push'*.

She is not alone among European donors. In April 2013, the Netherlands launched its policy, *A World to Gain*,<sup>38</sup> defining three types of relationships to be pursued: "aid relationships", guided by altruism for fragile and post-conflict states; "trade relationships" with other wealthy countries, following Dutch commercial interests; and an in-between category called "transition relationships", which link aid with commercial policies and are guided by "enlightened self-interest". Both Ireland and Denmark recently adopted similar approaches in their respective Africa strategies.<sup>39</sup> The out-going German government, in its 2013 Development Policy

White Paper, states its commitment *'to strengthening the linkage between foreign trade and development cooperation'* and prioritises German business playing a stronger role in official development cooperation.<sup>40</sup>

The full implications for 2014 remain to be seen. A tighter link between development cooperation, on the one hand, and trade and investment, on the other, clearly signals an increasing role for private-sector engagement. This will likely be accompanied by a move away from grant aid towards blending of grants and loans, economic partnerships and shared responsibility.

#### New policies III: the GSP, EPAs and the CAP

The 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2014 signals the entry into force of revisions to two policies that affect Africa-EU relations: the EU's Generalised

Scheme of Preferences (GSP), under which developing country exporters face lower duties on exports to the EU, and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which affects the price of the EU's food exports. Later in the year, on 1 October 2014, those EPAs that have been concluded will enter into force.

The GSP is a core element of EU's trade strategy towards developing countries. The new GSP for 2014, marks a turning point in EU's unilateral preferences in that it significantly reduces the number of beneficiaries so as to focus on those countries "who are the most in need", that is, LDCs and lower-middle income countries. This implies that other developing countries, classified as upper-middle income by The World Bank, will have to enter into reciprocal trade negotiations if they want to access EU market on preferential terms.

For Africa, it is important to assess the opportunities the new GSP provides against the uncertainty of the outcome of the EPA negotiations. A number of African countries are now considered as upper-middle income countries. Should these countries not conclude EPAs and start implementing them by 1 October 2014, they will have no preferential access to the European market. In addition to the market disruption in the EU that they will then face, the other challenge will be the related impact for their regional integration processes, if those countries that belong to a customs union, decide to sign an EPA alone anyway without the LDCs of their region. This risk exists in West Africa, in the East African Community and in the Southern Africa region,<sup>41</sup> although so far regional solidarity has been maintained.

European institutions reached political agreement on the CAP reform in June 2013.<sup>42</sup> Transitional measures<sup>43</sup> will start in January 2014, with the main changes being applied a year later, in January 2015.<sup>44</sup> While traditionally a contentious subject in discussions between the EU and the developing world, this CAP reform provoked little attention for development concerns. It has, however, been called *'a deeply disappointing reform for the environment'*.<sup>45</sup> Despite calls from civil society,<sup>46</sup> the 2014-2020 CAP will sustain the remaining export subsidies for dairy and poultry products, while watering down greening measures to make EU farmers more environmentally accountable for the support they receive.<sup>47</sup> The ACP Group was dismayed by the decision to abolish EU sugar quotas in 2017, though this date was a compromise between the Group's proposal of 2020 and EU sugar users' demand to scrap sugar quotas in 2015.<sup>48</sup> Despite proposals by the European Parliament's Development Committee, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) decided against calling for a mechanism to monitor the CAP's impact on developing countries in their plenary session. In effect, this decision goes against the European Council's May 2012 call for a more evidence-based approach to improve monitoring, implementation and follow-up for policy coherence for development (PCD).<sup>49</sup>

### 3. Moving beyond aid to international cooperation

Relations between the EU and Africa already cover a wide range of topics and go well beyond traditional development cooperation, as is evident from the broad scope of the JAES. If the Africa-EU relationship is not to lose its richness and degree of sophistication it is important this continues. Yet it is equally important for the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit to focus on a few key topics if it is to produce concrete results and move the relationship forward. This section reviews a number of areas where

Africa and the EU have common interests and considers whether they should feature on the Summit agenda.

#### Cooperation on transparency in international financial flows

The Africa Progress Panel led by Kofi Annan estimated in its 2013 report<sup>50</sup> that Africa loses twice as much in illicit financial flows as it receives in international aid. In short, Africa is not a net debtor to the world, but a net creditor. The EU could and should take the global lead to stem flows of illicit capital through greater transparency. In a proposed update to its anti-money laundering directive,<sup>51</sup> the EC has suggested that companies be required to maintain a record of the identity of 'those who stand behind the company in reality'. This is a necessary first step, but not enough, as law enforcement agencies will then still have to approach companies directly for the information to uncover any wrongdoing. The EU could vastly increase the benefits if ownership information was made publicly available instead.

In a further initiative, the EU has put forward an action plan to combat tax evasion and tax fraud.<sup>52</sup> As such, the EU is among the first to recognise that aggressive tax planning is as unacceptable as tax evasion. The G8 Summit in the UK in June 2013 took a similar initiative on transparency, tax systems and greater accountability.<sup>53</sup> Significant progress can be made in this area in 2014 if the EU legislative proposals can be agreed upon. Failure to approve such legislation would send a disappointing message and seriously set back discussions on these issues. At the European level, however, all decisions on taxation are subject to unanimous approval, so all Member States will need to agree to any measures adopted.<sup>54</sup> Agreement on the reform of the 2003 EU Savings Tax Directive would address major loopholes in the legislation. Greater transparency on international financial flows is in the interest of both the EU and Africa, as it should help authorities to increase tax revenue, which would be a major boon in these times of austerity budgets and falling ODA.

#### Food security: A year of visibility for the CAADP

The United Nations has declared 2014 the "UN Year of Family Farming" and the AU has named it the "Year of Agriculture and Food Security". The international attention drawn by these superlatives could create momentum for enhanced cooperation on agricultural development and food security in Africa. Featuring food security at the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit could further raise visibility and awareness.

Food security has gradually returned to centre stage in African and international


cooperation in recent years. But challenges remain in terms of policy directions and the agricultural model set to prevail. Unresolved policy dilemmas on land reform, seed certification and harmonisation are likely to hamper reforms and investment programmes of African countries and others. Policy choices by public and private decision-makers on what agricultural model to promote have been polarised by divisive debates about the benefits of large-scale industrialised farming versus smallholder and family farming. In 2014, the new dynamism injected into international processes on food security could help all stakeholders at international, regional and national level move away from purely ideological clashes and engage in frank dialogue to make evidence-based choices, recognising that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions and that site-specific, diverse and complementary approaches will be required to promote food security.

Looking at the African case, the biggest challenge is perhaps to achieve much bolder progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), an African owned and led initiative to boost agricultural productivity and strengthen food security on the continent. Established in Maputo in 2003, as the agricultural component of the NEPAD, CAADP has raised overall awareness of the centrality of agriculture for African economic growth and food security. In several countries, this is leading to more inclusive policymaking and enhanced investment by governments, the private sector and development partners. However, according to many observers, CAADP so far remains mostly a policy process, with slow implementation and as yet little impact on the ground, especially when seen from the national level and the perspective of rural entrepreneurs.<sup>55</sup>

To achieve CAADP's goals, African governments have agreed to allocate 10% of their national budgets to agriculture and raise agricultural productivity by at least 6%. This budgetary target has not been met so far, as public spending on agriculture now averages about 5.3%<sup>56</sup> (figure 3). Furthermore, few ministries of finance and planning include CAADP among their priority budget allocations or in their aid dialogue with donors. Countries and regions are still far from meeting the productivity target too.<sup>57</sup>

Ten years after spelling out their political commitment, it is time for African countries to step up the rate of progress. The AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security provides a useful platform for publicising CAADP and revamping the programme for a stronger results-orientation. Although agriculture is not one of the eight partnerships of the JAES, the EU has supported CAADP for many years. In May 2013, the European

FIGURE 3 - SHARE OF GOVERNMENTS' PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE BY REGION (%)



Foreign Affairs Council endorsed the much-awaited EU Food and Nutrition Security Implementation Plan, which is part of the EU's long-term policy response to the international food crisis of 2007-2008. It stipulates priorities in the area of food and nutrition security, and links EU support for CAADP to other EU humanitarian and development aid efforts.

Ultimately the real challenge is to broaden Europe-Africa dialogue and cooperation in this area beyond the traditional donor-beneficiary approach, so the EU and AU can act together for the food and nutrition security of both continents. The 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Summit is an opportunity to put food security at the heart of the partnership, not only as political priority, but also as a pivotal undertaking relevant to the whole sustainable development endeavour. The outcomes of international processes in 2014 could be linked to long-term policy choices, on which the two Unions could work together as equal partners to achieve mutual benefits. Making the Summit one of the official milestones of the AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security could only enhance the political and symbolic significance of a new approach to Europe-Africa relations.

### Peace, security and development

Since the 1990s, African and international efforts have substantially reduced conflict and violence on the African continent. However, as was evident in 2013, inter-alia in Mali, Nairobi and the Central African Republic (CAR), Africa and the international community still face multiple threats and disruptive forces. Fragility, understood as the interaction between armed conflict, interpersonal violence, chronic poverty, socio-economic inequalities and weak governance,<sup>58</sup> will persist in a great number of African countries in the coming decades, despite the expected economic growth rates of 5% to 6%.<sup>59</sup>

The AU-EU partnership has been particularly strong in promoting peace and security. Intensified engagement in tackling conflicts in Africa is one of the most tangible achievements of the partnership. Yet the responses to recent crises in Mali and the CAR, but also Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and Libya, also created new dynamics in the way the AU and the EU cooperate to achieve peace and security on the continent. The strong military involvement of France served as a reality check as neither the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) nor the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) emerged as the principal security actor. Instead hybrid models of cooperation have been used with involvement of both sides emphasising once again that security threats are not just an African problem but rather a joint challenge, requiring a joint response.<sup>60</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Summit presents an opportunity to mutually review both partners' priorities and interests, to strengthen commitment and agreement at the highest political level, and to provide strategic guidance and guarantee long-term engagement.

Beyond the Summit, other events in 2014 will impact future AU-EU interactions on peace and security. Changes of leadership at the top of Europe's institutions will determine the orientation of future external action policies. The EU, so far, has opted for regional frameworks to tackle instability and crises in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.<sup>61</sup> Will that approach be continued? As the EU finalises programming for its next funding cycle, another question is the extent to which programmes will be aligned with the security-development nexus. The Commission and the High Representative issued a Communication on the "comprehensive approach" on 11<sup>th</sup> December 2013. This offered guidance on the application of the whole range of EU external action instruments in a specific

context. The challenge in 2014 will be to make this approach operational.

The European Council of December 2013 will be a milestone for the EU CSDP, as it is the first EU summit discussing security and defence since 2008. Following this, it will be interesting to see whether the EU's new leaders bring forward a more ambitious and assertive CSDP or are held hostage by political constraints and defence budget cuts. Greater clarity on the role of the CSDP would increase Europe's clout on the international stage. The EU's comparative advantage seems to be positioning itself in a niche between hard security and long-term development, drawing from its own experience as a peace-building project.<sup>62</sup>

### APSA: No cause for complacency

The Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security was created in 2007 as part of the wider JAES to support the APSA, an African-owned framework set up in 2002 to promote peace and security on the continent. The APSA has made a real difference in tackling conflicts on the continent, and EU-AU cooperation on this is today seen as the most successful partnership under the JAES. This achievement, however, is counterbalanced by several challenges.

The AU and EU have injected substantial financial and human resources in building up the APSA. Much has been achieved since 2004, when the EU's African Peace Facility (APF) was established to support peace-support operations upon request by the AU and subsequently developed to cover overall support to APSA. Despite this the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management remains constrained. The lack of effective APSA responses to the Mali or CAR crises and the reliance on French forces are a disappointing reminder of these limitations.

A continuing challenge is to make good on the slogan, "African solutions to African problems". The EU is still the APSA's largest funder, through the AU and regional economic communities. Funding from the EDF is channelled through the APF and has exceeded €1 billion to date. EU Member States have also contributed support directly. African stakeholders, however, are increasingly calling on their own governments to take more ownership of the APSA and its African-led peace-support operations. This extends to new initiatives as well, such as the African Solidarity Initiative, which is an AU-led instrument to support post-conflict reconstruction and development using own resources.

As a framework for peace and security in the continent, APSA also needs to focus beyond crisis management, on the linkages between post-conflict, reconstruction and development. The priority in 2014 is for



both parties to remain committed, while rebalancing investments on longer-term peacebuilding and statebuilding activities. This goes along with the need to broaden the dialogue to encompass conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction, all of which require political engagement at the highest level in Europe and in Africa.

## North Africa

Africa-EU dialogue on peace and security has been less easy when it comes to North Africa. This raises a number of key issues that should be on the table at the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit. The AU and EU have reacted quite differently to the political instability that shook the region in recent years. From the start, the AU steadily opposed military action in Libya and condemned the events in Egypt as a coup. The AU Constitutive Act (Art. 30) provides for the suspension of governments that come to power through unconstitutional means, thereby limiting the scope of the APSA to intervene in support of popular uprisings.

The Libya case, furthermore, tested the authority and credibility of the AU as a peace and security broker on the continent. Differences of opinion within the AU emerged on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, approving the no-fly zone over Libya and authorising all necessary force to protect civilians. And the Arab “label” put on the awakening hampered AU ownership and its capacity to take the lead.<sup>63</sup>

The APSA was created at a time when the focus was on traditional concepts of armed violence and intra-state conflict rather than popular uprisings. With today’s emerging transnational threats, there is a clear need to also take terrorism and international crime into account. The Africa-EU partnership in support of the APSA should probably do more to counter these new threats.

A key lesson from the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia is that security needs to be defined in broader terms. The events in North Africa have shaken the thinking of the AU on peace and security and forced it to revisit the underlying causes of conflict, notably poor governance or the lack of development. It is for this reason that efforts are currently being made to strengthen the linkages between the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA).

The Arab Spring started in December 2010, just a month after the last Africa-EU Summit, in Tripoli. This 4<sup>th</sup> Summit will be the first opportunity for the leadership of both continents to reflect on these upheavals and draw lessons together. Being open about their respective interests and priorities, seeking to resolve differences and identifying common ground will help both

parties focus the partnership and agree on joint ways forward.

## Working with fragility: The New Deal

Global poverty has been substantially diminished in the past 20 years. However, projections suggest that while most poor today are in middle-income countries, poverty will become increasingly concentrated in low income and fragile states, mostly in Africa.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, while some countries move into the middle-income group, fragility will persist in a number of others. These will require continued support focused on long-term processes to achieve more resilience.

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States has become an internationally accepted framework for addressing fragility. Created in 2011 at the initiative of a group of self-defined fragile countries, “the g7+”, and a number of concerned donors, the New Deal promotes local ownership and country-specific trajectories in donor support strategies. Priorities are formulated jointly with the beneficiary countries, in line with five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. By the end of 2013, substantial progress had been achieved in implementing the New Deal. Five countries conducted participatory fragility assessments. Somalia had formalised its New Deal Compact and a South Sudan Compact is expected to follow. Moreover, other countries, such as Sierra Leone, have incorporated elements of the New Deal into their national development strategies.

A key challenge in 2014 will be to ensure that implementation processes continue to be aligned with the principles of the New Deal, while working through and dovetailing with existing planning and coordination processes. g7+ countries have to be vigilant that they invest in developing highly context-specific strategies, with realistic timeframes and broad-based political ownership, for making progress towards the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. The New Deal has the potential to be a real game changer in the way development is conducted in fragile states, if its principles are indeed put fully into practice. There is also much coherence between the EU’s new budget support modality or ‘State Building Contracts’ and the New Deal, particularly its statebuilding goals. The real challenge will be to carry the spirit of the New Deal through to the implementation stage.<sup>65</sup>

## Migration

In 2013, more than 30,000 irregular migrants crossed the Mediterranean seeking asylum and greater economic security in Europe.<sup>66</sup> The Lampedusa tragedy, in which more than 350 refugees were drowned, put the media spotlight on

the inadequacy of current mechanisms to deal with migration in both countries of origin and reception. Questions were asked about who is responsible for protecting migrants and what role should be played by continental organisations such as the EU and AU. The issue is probably one of the most fraught currently on the agenda of Africa-EU relations and will inevitably come up at the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit.

In May 2013, the EC proposed a common EU position taking a migrant-centred approach. However, the views of European countries remained highly fragmented<sup>67</sup> with most politicians wary of engaging in a balanced, evidence-based discussion on migration given the strong emotions the topic often provokes. In the immediate aftermath of the Lampedusa disaster, EU leaders gathered to discuss the way forward, but no consensus was reached on EU-wide actions to be taken to limit casualties at sea and secure migrant routes.<sup>68</sup> As a result, the Union was criticised for putting border security before the lives of migrants.<sup>69</sup> Protection of human rights continues to be a pressing concern in the everyday challenge of managing the EU’s external borders.

The EU also faces internal challenges in dealing with regular migration and the rights of migrants in destination countries. In June 2014, the European Council will discuss asylum and migration issues from a broader and longer term policy perspective. It is expected to formulate strategic guidelines for further legislative and operational planning of initiatives in the area of freedom, security and justice. Unfortunately this comes after the Africa-EU Summit, and yet adjustments to EU migration policies will be needed if there is to be real engagement on this issue with Africa where the topic is approached more from a mobility and employment angle.<sup>70</sup> Discriminatory and exclusionary policies not only undermine diplomatic ties, they have side effects on other areas of cooperation as well.

The JAES Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) offers a framework to ensure that cooperation in this area contributes to sustainable development. The partnership builds on two pillars: (i) regular dialogue and (ii) identifying and implementing concrete initiatives. Cooperation addresses the interlinked challenges of support for the mobility of students and scholars while managing migratory flows, including tackling irregular migration and human trafficking. The current action plan was adopted at the last Africa-EU Summit and set priorities for 2011-2013. Many of the concrete actions set out in the plan were implemented. However, intra-African mobility, asylum and international protection for refugees, and better cooperation on human trafficking remain objectives for the future.<sup>71</sup> With

the action plan expiring in 2013, progress was reviewed in June and a new action plan for 2014-2016 was formulated which is expected to be approved at the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit.

At the broader international level there are calls to include migration in the post-2015 international development framework. The 4<sup>th</sup> Summit provides an opportunity to find common AU-EU positions on how this might be done. Moreover, it could offer a forum for exploring synergies between the JAES Partnership on Migration and other migration dialogue processes, such as the Rabat Process, an EU-funded cooperation framework for countries concerned with the “West African” migratory route.

### Economic transformation and regional integration

The major challenge for most African countries is to translate the positive high growth performance of the last decade into inclusive and sustainable development that creates decent jobs for the growing numbers of young Africans. In 2013, African leaders were urged to adopt policies to lay down the foundations of an inclusive and sustainable economic transformation agenda and policy makers are expected to put commitments into action in 2014. Discussion on the post-2015 agenda will offer opportunities to mobilise international support for this effort, with attempts to not only deliver through the private sector but also engage it in policy design, but there is also a lot that can be done in this area in the framework of Africa-EU relations.

The 7<sup>th</sup> Joint AU Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance and Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, to be held in late March 2014 in Abuja, just before the Africa-EU Summit, will be on the theme *Industrialisation for Sustainable and Inclusive Development in Africa*. Ministers will be called upon to agree concrete proposals to catalyse implementation of the *Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA)* and increase action to advance Africa’s industrial development agenda and diversify their economies away from excessive reliance on extractive and commodity sectors. In the same vein, the African Development Bank’s annual meetings to be held in Kigali in May, will launch its flagship report with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and UNDP, the African Economic Outlook on the theme *Global Value Chains and Africa’s Industrialisation*.

Regional integration will continue to be the priority of African countries in 2014, as highlighted by the AfDB’s next African Development Report 2013 to be released in May/June 2014 under the title *Leveraging Regional Integration for Inclusive Growth*.<sup>72</sup>

In Eastern and Southern Africa, agreement on the EAC-COMESA-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), an ambitious trade agreement intended to overcome the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships of countries, is expected by the end of April 2014.<sup>73</sup> Negotiations are focusing on narrowing down the currently wide divergences among member countries, in particular regarding rules of origins.

Equally, in West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Heads of States agreed to apply the Common External Tariff (CET) as of 1 January 2015.<sup>74</sup> Efforts to meet the requirements of the CET by removing the many remaining trade barriers will have to be completed in 2014. This should allow it to become a full-fledged customs union, a significant achievement in its ambitious integration agenda.<sup>75</sup> Another challenge is to further promote regional integration by means of a possible formation of a second major block, following the TFTA model, combining ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEN-SAD and UMA.<sup>76</sup> Having agreed on an action plan in April 2013, these economic communities will, from January 2014 on, begin harmonising programmes and activities with those of their sub-regional organisations, such as the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).<sup>77</sup> The October 2014 deadline for the conclusion of the EPAs will have a decisive implication on regional integration dynamics. Failure to reach regional agreements is likely to have long lasting negative effects, should some countries break away from the regional position to maintain their preferences on the European market and would undoubtedly further sour relations between Africa and Europe including at the Summit.<sup>78</sup>

## 4. The Future Partnership

### The post-2015 development framework


While Africa-EU relations have an important agenda of their own, the post-2015 debate is an opportunity that both continents have a strong interest in and should seek to use as it will affect many of the global challenges they both face. Moreover, acting together they could have a decisive influence on the outcome.

Work on the post-2015 development framework has begun and will gain momentum in 2014. There are two parallel streams. The first is the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG). The second is the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (SDF). The OWG will have its eighth and final session 3-7 February 2014, while the SDF Committee will complete its work in August 2014. The outputs of these two streams will be synthesised in a report in late 2014 to feed into the post-2015 debate, although negotiations will start at the 69<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly in September 2014.

Agreement on the substance of the new framework remains crucial. At a special event in September 2013 the General Assembly already agreed to merge the MDGs and sustainable development goals (SDGs) into one concise and appealing list. Practical ways to do this will need to be found in 2014, mainly by the OWG as part of its goal-setting groundwork.

In addition it will take much behind the scenes diplomatic effort to bring the positions on goals and on resources together before the negotiations, as there

**FIGURE 4 - OVERVIEW OF TOTAL FINANCIAL FLOWS AND TAX REVENUES TO AFRICA FOR 2001-13**



**FIGURE 5 - POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK**

TOPIC	AFRICA'S EMERGING POSITION (1)	EU'S EMERGING POSITION (2)
<b>Sustainable development</b>	(i) Structural economic transformation and inclusive growth	(ii) Integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental)
<b>Drivers for economic growth</b>	(ii) Decisive role of innovation, technology transfer and R&D, by means of enhanced technological capacities	(v) Fostering economic growth and job creation, including by engaging with the private sector
<b>Social transformation</b>	(iii) Human development related to poverty eradication, education and human capital development; universal and equitable access to quality health care; gender equality and women's empowerment; population dynamics; disaster risk reduction; and access to decent shelter	(i) Focus on poverty within a broad, comprehensive and sustainable vision of development
<b>Financing for development and policy coherence</b>	(iv) Financing and partnerships are as important as specific goals and targets (v) Focus on development enablers, encompassing the domestic, continental and global enabling environments for development	(vi) Improved development financing and policy coherence for development
<b>Process towards a post-2015 development framework</b>	<i>An inclusive process for all countries with strong global partnerships and strong African commitment to the process (*)</i>	(iii) An inclusive process, with strong involvement of poor countries and civil society
<b>Nature of the post-2015 development framework</b>	<i>One universal set of goals applicable to all countries (**)</i>	(iv) One universal framework that is relevant to all countries and with responsibilities for all

Source: (1) UNDG (2013), *A Million Voices: The World We Want; A Sustainable Future with Dignity for All*. (September). New York: United Nations Development Group.; (2) EC (2013), *A Decent Life for All*. (February). Brussels: European Commission.; (\*) President of Liberia Johnson Sirleaf (2013), *Opening Panel Speech at the European Development Days, Brussels*; and (\*\*) AU Commission Chairperson Dlamini-Zuma (2013), *Opening Panel Speech at the European Development Days, Brussels*.

are many views to contend with. Getting this dialogue started is probably the most urgent challenge for 2014, for the EU and AU as well as for other actors. The 4<sup>th</sup> Summit could provide an opportunity for the AU and EU to arrive at common positions on this agenda. Internally, the EU will also have to decide how far it is prepared to go. EU citizens, Member States and institutions need to consider whether they are ready to tackle the challenges taken up in this ambitious post-2015 development agenda though the EU has already been making some efforts in this direction.<sup>79</sup> The emerging agenda is far more political than the original MDGs.

### Financing for development

Financing the post-2015 development framework remains a major concern. In establishing the SDF Committee, the UN General Assembly recognised the need for mobilisation of significant resources from a variety of sources and effective use of funding.<sup>80</sup> Having held its first session in late September and its second in early December 2013, there are three working sessions left for the coming year. The work is based on the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and the 2008 Doha Declaration on Financing for Development and divided into three clusters:<sup>81</sup> (i) financing, (ii) mobilisation and effective use of resources and (iii) institutional arrangements, policy coherence and governance issues. The Committee has been criticised for the lack of access for civil society organisations to the process.<sup>82</sup> 2014 is likely to see a more inclusive approach, giving civil

society groups opportunities for active participation in the work.

The global discussion on financing for development taking place in 2014 touches on several areas that the Africa-EU Summit might usefully review though, at the same time, it needs to avoid the trap of just talking about finance for development. First, as foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittance flows continue to play an important role in Africa, the leaders at the Summit might discuss how they can help create an enabling business and policy environment for the best use of these resources to stimulate economic transformation. Second, as ODA has traditionally been an important part of the relationship<sup>83</sup> and EU ODA levels have been falling, the partners may wish to discuss how the aid still available can be used to best effect. Finally, as African countries are keen to further improve their domestic resource mobilisation (figure 4), discussions could focus on how the EU might best support these efforts.

A side event on development cooperation and domestic resource mobilisation, hosted by Nigeria during the UN General Assembly in September 2013, aimed to raise awareness of issues related to taxation and illicit financial flows.<sup>84</sup> Participants also considered how these issues might feed into the post-2015 development framework and sought ideas on how the Global Partnership could help tackle these issues at its next high-level meeting in Mexico (15-16 April 2014). EU Member States, in particular, have a task here in actively supporting EU

initiatives towards greater transparency and effectively combatting tax evasion and tax fraud.

### AU-EU positions on the post-2015 framework

As with many UN negotiations, a major part will be played by groups of states coming together to push their common positions. Regional organisations, like the EU and the AU, as well as other groups, such as the ACP or the G77, are developing positions as well. This takes time and requires discipline and flexibility. Conducting internal discussions against the backdrop of a constantly moving international debate is a major challenge. The Africa-EU Summit offers a unique opportunity for Africa and Europe to develop a joint position, to work together to influence the post-2015 development agenda, and to push through common goals, as African and European opinions do not seem far apart. Backing for such a joint position could probably also be extended to include the ACP Group at the Joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers scheduled for June 2014.

Although the AU common position has not been published at the time of writing, the UN has held a series of global consultations on the topic.<sup>85</sup> Consultations in Africa suggested that the continent would have at least five key priorities (Figure 5),<sup>86</sup> while African leaders have also expressed some of their ideas in public fora. In May 2013, the AU established a high level committee<sup>87</sup> to formulate proposals and it is expected to conclude its position at the AU Assembly

in January 2014.<sup>88</sup> Consultations in Europe came up with some six priorities.<sup>89</sup> These are also displayed in Figure 5 (second column), though final agreement on the European position, too, will only be reached in 2014.

Comparing both positions in Figure 5, it is clear they match to a great extent so formulating a joint position at the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit on the substance of the framework, as well as on process aspects should not be difficult. Particularly in areas such as social transformation, financing for development, policy coherence and sustainability, there seems to be an overlapping perception of what the post-2015 development agenda should include. A challenge for 2014 will be to make African-EU voices heard in the consultations and agenda-setting. There are various entry points to do so in the working schedules of both the OWG and the SDF Committee. Further, informal dialogues and meetings during 2014 will provide opportunities to exchange views. Africa and Europe cannot afford to be less committed to a strong, universal and sustainable post-2015 framework than they were to the MDGs, and during the upcoming year they also need to continue to work on the MDG unfinished business, as the Liberian President recently stressed in Brussels.<sup>90</sup>

### Conclusion: The Africa-EU Summit and beyond

Africa-EU relations face numerous, complex challenges in 2014. Many observers have therefore called for a prioritisation of certain areas of cooperation. But this is easier said than done. A negotiation process that involves the interests of 82 countries and two continental institutions will inevitably find it difficult to agree on a short list of priorities. But as we look at the Africa-EU partnership in 2014, it is obvious that prioritisation is no longer a choice but a political necessity if the 4<sup>th</sup> Summit is to be a success and bring the partnership renewed dynamism. But in addition to a well-prioritised and limited agenda for the Summit, the AU and EU need, finally, to resolve the question of the leadership of the process. A high-level political champion for Europe-Africa relations is needed on both continents if the process is to gain momentum and achieve agreed objectives. Without two such leaders working closely together it is unlikely real progress will be made.

Careful reflection needs to precede the April 2014 Africa-EU Summit to ensure that the discussions are grounded on a realistic assessment of what the partnership can and cannot deliver. It is not necessary to cover every aspect of the JAES, nor should the discussions focus only on the JAES and avoid other topical issues that may have more

political traction. Assuming the EPA and ICC issues can be resolved before April 2014 and in an effort to focus the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Summit on a limited selection of topics, our discussion here suggests a strong case for focusing the agenda on the following three points: (i) the consequences of the Arab Spring for Africa-EU cooperation including on migration, (ii) food security and CAADP to mark the AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security and (iii) developing a joint EU-AU position on the goals and the financing of the post-2015 international development framework.

#### LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific	FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
AEO	African Economic Outlook	GSP	Generalised System of Preferences (WTO)
AfDB	African Development Bank	HRVP	High Representative for Foreign Policy and Vice President
AGA	African Governance Architecture	ICC	International Criminal Court of Justice
AIDA	Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa	JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
APF	African Peace Facility	LDCs	Least Developed Countries
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
AU	African Union	MEPs	Members of the European Parliament
AUC	African Union Commission	MFF	Multiannual financial framework (EU)
BRICS	Countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa	MIP	Multiannual Indicative Programme
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme	MME	Migration, Mobility and Employment
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy (EU)	NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU)
CAR	Central African Republic	NIP	National Indicative Programme
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa	OAU	Organisation of African Unity
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States	ODA	Official Development Assistance
CET	Common External Tariff	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	OWG	Open Working Group
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)	PAP	Pan-African Programme
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument	PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
DEVCO	Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid (Directorate General of the EC)	RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
EAC	East African Community	SADC	Southern African Development Community
EC	European Commission	SDF	Sustainable Development Financing
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa (UN)	SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	TFTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
EDF	European Development Fund	UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
EEAS	European External Action Service	UN	United Nations
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
EU	European Union	WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	WTO	World Trade Organisation



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*For further information on Africa-Europe relations please visit this ECDPM co-ordinated blog bringing together voices from both Africa and Europe:*

<http://www.africaeu2014.blogspot.nl/>



\*Acknowledgements: This paper is an ECDPM wide effort. The Challenges Team is grateful for blogs, comments, feedback and inputs received from a great number of colleagues and would like to thank everyone involved for their valuable support. Any opinions and errors remain those of the authors.

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