



2018

IBRAHIM FORUM
REPORT

**PUBLIC
SERVICE
IN AFRICA**

MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION



Only three countries - Libya, Mauritius and Tunisia, have at least one doctor per 1,000 people

In sub-Saharan Africa, government expenditure ranges from almost 36% of GDP in South Sudan to less than 5% in Chad

Cairo's population is larger than each of the 36 least populous countries on the continent

Sub-Saharan Africa has the second smallest public health expenditure of all regions, far below the world average. Between 2009 and 2014, sub-Saharan Africa's public health expenditure as a % of GDP fell by more than 15%

Five out of the ten African countries with the largest public health expenditures as a % of total government expenditure are also among the ten countries with the highest share of external financing of their total health expenditure

Citizens' dissatisfaction with how their government is addressing educational and health needs has grown over the last decade

Approximately 60% of jobs in Africa are considered vulnerable, with only 19% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa covered by social insurance

In Egypt, Liberia, Morocco, and Sudan, more than 40% of the population have difficulties to obtain medical treatment

Public employees in Africa represent less than 12% of total employment, less than half the average level in Europe & Central Asia

In Kasai Central and Kasai Provinces (DRC), 27% of the health workers listed as salary recipients in the electronic payroll system were "ghost workers"

The rapid spread of Ebola in West Africa was exacerbated by weak health systems and poor hygiene and sanitation practices

In a continent where more than 40% of the population is under 15 years old, progress in Education has almost come to a stop over the last five years

Personal Safety is the most deteriorated of the 14 sub-categories in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, over the past decade

More than 50% of people in 36 countries reported difficulties to obtain assistance from the courts

Libya and South Sudan allocate the lowest share of the public budget on health on the continent, but also have two of the ten largest military expenditures as a share of GDP

More than 60% of primary school students dropped out in Madagascar, Mozambique and Rwanda in 2012

The fewer Human Resources in Primary Schools, the higher the 'Primary school dropout rate'

In 2017, the African average for youth unemployment (13.6%) is more than twice that of adults

In 2018, the 20 biggest cities of the continent manage populations bigger than many countries

Since 1990, sub-national administrative units in 25 African countries have increased by at least 20%, amongst these Guinea from 14 to 341, Niger from 35 to 256, South Africa from 53 to 284

Filling the void left by public services, private security, private education, and private health are rising exponentially, with the risk of widening inequalities on the continent

One fifth of Africa's ODA goes to health, almost half being allocated to population policies including HIV/AIDS control

In sub-Saharan Africa, the average for private health expenditure is 57.4%, more than twice the level of Europe & Central Asia

In Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Uganda, private health expenditure level is higher than 70%

The sub-Saharan African average of primary education pupils enrolled in private institutions in 2014 was 11.4%, higher than in any other region other than Latin America & the Caribbean

Cost of public employees as a % of government expenditure varies widely on the continent from 7.4% to 56.2%


Mauritius is the only country where civil servants are appointed and evaluated entirely based on professional criteria, according to Global Integrity

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1.1 Current delivery in contemporary Africa

1.1.1 PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: BELOW GLOBAL AVERAGE

I. General government expenditure: below the global average


General government final consumption expenditure (2016)	% of GDP	Total (constant 2010 billion \$)	Annual growth (%)
Europe & Central Asia	19.8	4,518.9	1.8
Middle East & North Africa	19.3	554.7	-4.4
Latin America & the Caribbean	16.8	937.0	0.4
East Asia & Pacific	16.2	3,334.5	4.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	16.1	228.2	2.7
North America	14.9	2,787.3	1.1
South Asia	11.2	318.7	18.5
World	17.1	12,676.0	2.5

Source: World Bank

In 2016, general government expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa amounted to an average of 16.1% of the region's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), slightly below the global average of 17.1% and only above North America and South Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa's public expenditure annual growth rate, at +2.7%, is still far below East Asia & Pacific (+4.8%), and the impressive South Asia's figures (+18.5%).


At country level, however, disparities are large, ranging from 35.8% to 4.4% of GDP (Chad). South Sudan – a five-year-old country in 2016 – displays the largest general government expenditure, followed by Lesotho (34.9%) and Mozambique (28.2%). The three countries with the largest annual general government expenditure growth in 2016, are Central African Republic (CAR) (+24.5%), Sierra Leone (+17.9%) and Mali (+14.7%). These are all conflict or post-conflict countries, thus benefiting from budgetary support from the donor community.

African countries: general government final consumption expenditure, % of GDP (2016)



Source: World Bank

II. Safety and security expenditure: the lowest of all regions



Source: SIPRI

Africa is the region with the smallest military expenditure, having allocated a total of \$39.2 billion in 2016, for a population of more than 1.2 billion. This is equivalent to 2.3% of the world's public military expenditure, for 16.4% of the world's population. Africa is followed by the Middle East, which in its latest data year allocated to defence a budget 4.5 times higher, for a population of 379.2 million*.

* SIPRI groups the Middle East as Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (excluding Iraq to avoid skewing the regional military expenditure data).

Selected African countries: military expenditure higher than African and global averages, % of GDP (2016)


Libya*	7.8	Mali	3.2
Congo	7.0	Sudan	3.1
Algeria	6.7	Chad	2.6
Mauritania	4.1	Zimbabwe	2.6
Namibia	3.9	Guinea	2.5
Botswana	3.7	Tunisia	2.3
South Sudan	3.7	Burundi	2.3
Angola	3.7	Africa	2.1
Morocco	3.2	World	2.2

In 2016, the African continent allocated on average 2.1% of its GDP to defence. This is slightly below the global average of 2.2%. The sixteen African countries selected, not all of them in open crisis, are above the global and African averages (2.2% and 2.1%, respectively).

Africa's security situation has led to a sharp increase in the continent's total military expenditure over the last ten years, with 2016 expenditure +47.7% higher than in 2007. However, in recent years, subdued oil and key commodity prices have resulted in falls in defence spending. From 2014 to 2016, defence budgets decreased by -6.9% in Africa.

*All the values refer to 2016, except for Libya whose last data year is 2014
Source: SIPRI

III. Public health expenditure: a concerning decline from an already low level

Public health expenditure, % of GDP (2007-2014)


In 2014, the latest available data year, sub-Saharan Africa spent on average 2.3% of its GDP on public health expenditure, a decline of -15.1% compared to its largest decennial budget in 2009 (2.7%). The region has the second smallest public health expenditure globally, only ahead of South Asia and is far below the world average of 6.0%.

In the latest data years for which regional averages were available for the world and sub-Saharan Africa (2011 and 2010, respectively), while the global average of public health expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure was 15.7%, sub-Saharan Africa's average was 11.9%. In 2014, the latest data year for which there is country-level data, the ten African countries with the highest public expenditure on health were Burundi, CAR, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tunisia, all of them spending 13.2% of their total government expenditure at least. Five out of the ten African countries with the largest public health expenditure – Burundi, CAR, Ethiopia, Gambia and Malawi – are also among the ten countries with the highest share of external financing of their total health expenditure. Four countries - Cameroon, Eritrea, Libya and South Sudan - spent less than 4.0% of their public budget on health in 2014.

The 2001 Abuja target

In 2001 in Abuja, African Union (AU) member states pledged to increase government funding for health to at least 15.0% of their annual budget. More than ten years later, in 2014, only four countries - Malawi, Swaziland, Ethiopia and Gambia - have met the Abuja target, spending more than 15.0% of their annual budget on health (16.8%, 16.6%, 15.7% and 15.3%, respectively).

With only \$98.2 per capita, the 2014 sub-Saharan African average per capita health expenditure in current \$ is more than ten times lower than the global average of \$1,058.5. The ten African countries that spend the most are Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and Tunisia, all of them spending more than \$300.0 per capita on health. The three countries that spent less than \$20.0 per capita in 2014 are CAR, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Madagascar.


Selected African countries: top ten largest public health expenditures, % of total government expenditure (2014)

Source: World Bank

Top ten countries	Public health expenditure, % of total government expenditure (2014)	External resources for health, % of total health expenditure (2014)
Malawi	16.8	73.8
Swaziland	16.6	21.7
Ethiopia	15.7	41.7
Gambia	15.3	64.9
South Africa	14.2	1.8
CAR	14.2	45.7
Tunisia	14.2	0.3
Djibouti	14.1	9.9
Namibia	13.9	8.0
Burundi	13.2	50.3

● Countries with the highest public expenditure on health that are also among the ten countries with the highest share of external financing of their total health expenditure

IV. Education expenditure: above global average, but far from enough to match the demographic surge



The 2002 Global Partnership for Education (GPE)

The GPE is a multi-stakeholder partnership and funding platform that aims to strengthen education systems in developing countries, bringing together governments, donors, international organisations, civil society, teacher organisations, the private sector and foundations.

GPE's main goal is to meet Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4: "Achieve inclusive, equitable quality education for all by 2030."

GPE's last Financing Conference (Dakar 2018) raised \$2.3 billion in commitments to finance access to quality education. As part of the agreement, recipient countries must commit to push their education expenditure to at least 20.0% of their national budget.

Sub-Saharan African countries allocated on average 16.6% of their total government expenditure to education in 2013 (last year of aggregated data available), above the global average (14.1%) and more than Europe & Central Asia, North America and South Asia.

In the latest data year available (2013-2015), the countries with the highest share of education expenditure were: Zimbabwe (30.0%), Ethiopia (27.0%), Swaziland (24.9%), Senegal (24.8%), Niger (21.7%),

Malawi (21.6%), Côte d'Ivoire (21.2%) and Ghana (21.0%). All eight countries are already above the 2018 GPE target of spending at least 20.0% of the national budget on education.

At the other end of the spectrum, South Sudan (2.6%), Gambia (10.3%), Gabon (11.4%), Mauritania (11.4%) and Uganda (11.7%) allocate the lowest share. Of these, Mauritania and South Sudan also have two of the ten largest military expenditures as a share of GDP.

V. Social protection expenditure: below other regions, especially for older persons

African countries invest in public social protection less than in other regions.

For persons of working age, the five countries with the largest social expenditure budgets range from 3.4% (Tunisia) to 1.5% (Morocco) of GDP. In Europe, the five countries with the largest expenditure budgets range from 6.9% (Belgium) to 6.1% (Sweden) of GDP, and in Latin America & the Caribbean from 5.1% (Argentina) to 2.5% (Bolivia) of GDP.

For children, the five African countries with the largest expenditure budgets range from 2.8% (Madagascar) to 0.4% (Benin) of GDP. In Europe, albeit a region with an ageing population and fewer children,

the five countries with the largest expenditure budgets range from 3.8% (United Kingdom (UK)) to 3.6% (Luxembourg) of GDP. In Latin America & the Caribbean, the five largest budgets range from 1.7% (Chile) to 0.6% (Brazil) of GDP.

For older persons, the five African countries with the largest expenditure budgets range from 5.6% (Algeria) to 3.0% (Egypt and Morocco) of GDP. In Latin America & the Caribbean, the five countries with the largest expenditure budgets range from 9.6% (Brazil) to 5.7% (Costa Rica) of GDP. In Europe, they range from 17.5% (Greece) to 14.0% (Austria) of GDP.

Selected African countries: public social protection expenditure for persons of working age, % of GDP

Five countries with largest budgets	% of GDP	Latest data year
Tunisia	3.4	2010
Angola	2.7	2015
Cabo Verde	1.9	2010
Seychelles	1.8	2015
Morocco	1.5	2010

Five countries with smallest budgets	% of GDP	Latest data year
Togo	0.0	2009
Zambia	0.0	2015
Tanzania	0.0	2010
São Tomé & Príncipe	0.0	2013
Kenya	0.1	2010

Selected African countries: public social protection expenditure for children, % of GDP

Five countries with largest budgets	% of GDP	Latest data year
Madagascar	2.8	2015
South Africa	1.6	2016
Botswana	0.6	2009
Namibia	0.5	2015
Benin	0.4	2010

Five countries with smallest budgets	% of GDP	Latest data year
Gambia	0.0	2003
Nigeria	0.0	2004
Swaziland	0.0	2010
Tanzania	0.0	2010
Burkina Faso	0.0	2015

Selected African countries: public social protection expenditure for older persons, % of GDP

Five countries with largest budgets	% of GDP	Latest data year
Algeria	5.6	2016
Tunisia	5.2	2015
Mauritius	4.5	2013-2015
South Africa	3.4	2014/2015
Egypt*	3.0	2010

* Morocco also spends 3.0% of GDP

Five countries with smallest budgets	% of GDP	Latest data year
São Tomé & Príncipe	0.1	2013
Liberia	0.2	2010
Chad	0.2	2010
Eritrea	0.3	2001
Sierra Leone	0.3	2014

If the percentage of GDP appears the same for more than one country, differences may exist beyond the 1st decimal place

Source: ILO

1.1.2 PERFORMANCE OVER THE LAST DECADE: NO TIME FOR COMPLACENCY

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG): a tool to assess governance and public service delivery

Built on 100 indicators produced by 36 independent institutional and expert sources, the IIAG assesses the ability of each of the 54 countries of the continent to deliver a common basket of public goods and services, organised under four equally weighted dimensions, *Safety & Rule of Law, Participation & Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity and Human Development*, which together comprise *Overall Governance*. Providing data from 2000-2016, the Index is the most robust and up-to-date dashboard of the state of public governance in every African country.

I. Overall Governance: progress, but slackening

The last edition of the IIAG, published in November 2017, reveals that the continent's *Overall Governance* trajectory remains positive on average, but in recent years has moved at a slower pace.

In 2016 the continent achieved its highest *Overall Governance* score to date (50.8 out of 100.0). Over the last ten years (2007-2016), 40 African countries have improved in *Overall Governance*, and over the last five years (2012-2016) 18 of these – a third of the continent's countries and home to 58% of Africa's citizens – such as Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria and Senegal, have even managed to accelerate their progress.

However, over the same period, Africa's annual average rate of progress has slowed. Of the 40 countries improving during the last decade, more than half (22) have either done so at a slower pace in the last five years (e.g. Ethiopia and Rwanda) or registered decline (e.g. Angola, Cameroon and Mauritius). Furthermore, eight of the 12 countries registering decline over the past decade are showing no signs of turning things around, with scores decreasing at an even

faster rate over the second half of the decade. This group includes Botswana, Ghana, Libya and Mozambique.

Increased spending does not necessarily mean better governance

Analysis shows no relation between an increased expenditure and better governance performance.

Of the ten countries with the largest general government expenditure (as a percentage of GDP), only Namibia and Seychelles rank in the top ten in *Overall Governance* in the IIAG in 2016. South Sudan, whose government expenditure (35.8%) is the largest in 2016, is ranked 53rd out of 54 countries in *Overall Governance*, while Equatorial Guinea, with the fourth largest government expenditure (27.3%), is ranked 46th.

Selected African countries: top & bottom ten general government expenditure, & Overall Governance (2016)

Ten countries with largest expenditure	General government final consumption expenditure, % of GDP (2016)	IIAG Overall Governance score/100.0 (2016)	IIAG Overall Governance rank/54 (2016)
South Sudan	35.8	20.2	53
Lesotho	34.9	58.2	15
Mozambique	28.2	52.2	23
Equatorial Guinea	27.3	36.8	46
Seychelles	26.3	73.4	2
Namibia	24.9	71.2	5
Zimbabwe	24.9	45.4	40
Burkina Faso	23.2	53.7	21
Swaziland	22.3	48.9	34
Burundi	21.5	39.9	44

Ten countries with lowest expenditure	General government final consumption expenditure, % of GDP (2016)	IIAG Overall Governance score/100.0 (2016)	IIAG Overall Governance rank/54 (2016)
Chad	4.4	35.2	47
Sudan	5.3	32.5	50
Nigeria	5.9	48.1	35
CAR	7.3	30.5	51
Somalia	7.5	11.6	54
Uganda	7.5	56.5	19
Ethiopia	9.7	47.7	36
Madagascar	9.9	49.3	32
Egypt	11.4	49.4	31
Côte d'Ivoire	11.5	54.2	20

II. Safety and security: still deteriorating

The 2017 IIAG highlights concerning results in the *Safety & Rule of Law* category. It is the only governance dimension showing an African average deterioration over the last decade, even though the pace of decline appears to be abating from 2012 onwards.

The sub-categories *Personal Safety* and *National Security* are the two most deteriorated sub-categories (out of 14) of the IIAG over the past decade.




Even though from 2012 onwards the rate of decline of *Personal Safety* has been more than two times slower than during the whole decade, it remains one of Africa's most deteriorated sub-categories. The slowing deterioration is mainly driven by an improvement of the indicator *Police Services* and a slowdown of the deterioration registered by *Social Unrest* and *Safety of the Person*.

However, the levels of *Human Trafficking*, *Crime* and *Political Violence* keep undermining the safety of African citizens.

Meanwhile, the continental average score for *National Security* has registered a concerning deterioration over the past few years, declining at more than double the pace from 2012 than over the past decade.

However, despite these declining crime results, the Afrobarometer variable 'How often felt unsafe walking in neighbourhood' results show that almost two thirds (62.4%) of the African citizens surveyed in 2014/2015 never felt unsafe (while 37.4% of respondents felt unsafe at least once or more). At the country level, there is a high degree of variation.



Military expenditure and national security: a weak link

Defence expenditure may not be strictly linked to a country's safety and security situation. For the ten countries with the largest military expenditure as a percentage of total government spending, the IAG *National Security* sub-category scores range from 32.3 to 100.0.

Selected African countries: top ten largest military expenditures, % of total government expenditure (2016)

Top ten countries	Military expenditure, % of government spending (2016)	IAG <i>National Security</i> /100.0 (2016)
Sudan	24.7	32.3
Congo	16.5	75.4
Algeria	15.4	79.4
Chad	15.4	71.9
Mali	11.4	74.2
Angola	10.9	87.2
Libya	10.8*	48.9
Morocco	10.6	81.3
Botswana	10.3	100.0
Guinea	10.1	89.2

* All the values refer to 2016, except for Libya's military expenditure whose last data year is 2014
Sources: SIPRI, MIF


III. Justice: on track at last?

According to the 2017 IAG results, from 2013 onwards, the African average for *Rule of Law* has bounced back from a negative trend to reach the same score as ten years ago. This mainly resulted from a speedy improvement of the judicial system on the continent, with indicators such as *Judicial Independence* and *Judicial Process* showing increasing improvement.

According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) indicator 'Access to justice', the countries where citizens enjoy a more secure and effective access to justice are Benin, Botswana and Tunisia, while DRC, Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan are the worst performers. Less than half (25 out of 54) of African countries score above the 2016 global average (0.7 out of 1.0). Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Zimbabwe have been the largest improvers over the past five years, while in Burundi, Kenya and Mauritania citizens' access to justice has worsened the most.


According to the World Justice Project's (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, in terms of a 'Peaceful and effective functioning of their civil justice systems for ordinary people', Botswana, Ghana, Senegal and South Africa are the only African countries that obtain the same score or higher than the global average of 0.6 (out of 1.0), while Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia and Madagascar constitute the worst performers on the continent. In terms of the 'Effective enforcement of civil justice', Ghana, Malawi and Zambia are the best performers, while Cameroon, Egypt and Madagascar are the worst.

African countries: Access to justice, scores (2016)



African countries: difficulty to obtain assistance from courts, % of respondents (2014/2015)

Source: Afrobarometer



According to the WJP's 2017 Global Insights on Access to Civil Justice report, less than 60.0% of respondents in Ethiopia and Tunisia consider that the legal process was fair. In four countries: Senegal (90.9%), Malawi (73.5%), Madagascar (72.2%) and Burkina Faso (71.4%) the percentage of respondents who thought the process was fair was higher than the global average (66.4%).

In four countries - Madagascar (86.1%), Tunisia (70.8%), Senegal (63.6%) and Malawi (61.8%) - the percentage of respondents who thought that the process to resolve their legal problem was slow was higher than the global average (59.6%). Côte d'Ivoire is the best performing, with only 36.4% of respondents considering the process was slow.


According to 2014/2015 surveys from Afrobarometer, for the respondents that had contact with the courts in the past year, more than half reported difficulties to obtain assistance from the courts.

For the respondents who had contact with the courts in the past five years:

- 35.4% of them found the courts' necessary costs and fees too high.
- 43.3% considered the required legal processes and procedures too complex.
- 40.2% could not obtain the necessary legal counsel or advice.
- 34.6% thought the judge did not listen to their side of the story.
- 55.1% encountered long delays in handling or resolving the case.

IV. Health: consistent progress but slowing down

According to the 2017 IIAG results, the African average score in *Health* is the second highest of the 14 IIAG sub-categories. However, although the sub-category has shown consistent progress since 2007, almost a third of countries have registered decline since 2012.




In 2016, three out of the five best performing countries in *Health* are islands (Cabo Verde, Mauritius and Seychelles), along with Libya and Rwanda, the latter being the sixth most improved country since 2007.

The five worst performing countries are CAR, Chad, Madagascar, Somalia and South Sudan.

Since 2012, African average progress has slackened for most of *Health* indicators, especially so in *Undernourishment*. *Immunisation* even registers deterioration over the last five years.

At the continental level, *Child Mortality* is the fourth most improved indicator in the entire IIAG (out of 100 indicators) over the decade. However, the pace of improvement has been slower over the past five years. Of the five highest scoring countries in 2016, three are North African (Egypt, Libya and Tunisia) and two are islands (Mauritius and Seychelles). The five worst performing countries are Angola, CAR, Chad, Sierra Leone and Somalia.



In *Maternal Mortality*, the five countries that score the highest in 2016 are either North African (Egypt, Libya and Tunisia) or island countries (Cabo Verde and Mauritius). The five worst performing countries are CAR, Chad, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Sudan.



In *Immunisation*, the top six performing countries are Mauritius, Morocco, Rwanda, Seychelles, Tanzania and Tunisia. The five lowest scoring countries are CAR, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Somalia and South Sudan.

Basic Health Services: a growing dissatisfaction

Over the past ten years, Africa’s performance in *Basic Health Services*, which assesses the extent to which the public are satisfied with how governments are handling the improvement of basic health services, has deteriorated. The decline has even accelerated in the past five years highlighting the growing dissatisfaction of Africa’s citizens. 20 of the 33 African countries covered by this indicator have deteriorated over the last decade. Algeria, Burundi, Liberia, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Tanzania declined by more than -20.0 points, and Ghana, Madagascar and Mozambique by more than -30.0 points. In 2016, the best scoring countries are Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Swaziland, while the worst scoring are Madagascar, Morocco and Tunisia.



Additional Afrobarometer findings, not included in the IIAG results, confirm this concerning trend.

According to Afrobarometer, in 14 of the 36 African countries covered, representing 37.6% of the continent’s population, more than 30.0% of respondents surveyed in 2014/2015 found it either ‘difficult’ or ‘very difficult’ to obtain medical treatment in the past year.

The worst cases are Egypt, Liberia, Morocco and Sudan, where more than 40.0% of respondents experienced difficulties in obtaining medical treatment.


The West African Ebola outbreak (2014-2016): critical access to sanitation

Source: MIF

The Ebola outbreak first reported in West Africa in March 2014 quickly became the deadliest occurrence of the disease since its discovery in 1976. Between March 2014 and January 2016, almost 11,500 people were reported as having died from the disease in six countries: Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the United States (US).

The rapid spread of Ebola in West Africa was exacerbated by weak health systems and poor hygiene and sanitation practices. This is reflected in the region's performance in the indicator *Access to Sanitation*, composed of the sub-indicators *Access to Improved Sanitation* and *Open Defecation Sanitation*.

African regions: Access to Sanitation average scores (2016)



Equitable access to health and out-of-pocket health expenditure

Source: World Bank

Out-of-pocket health expenditure comprises direct payments made by households to providers of healthcare and other health-related goods and services.

The level of out-of-pocket can be seen as a proxy of the equity of the health system of a country: the higher the proportion of out-of-pocket health expenditure, the less equitable the health system of a country is likely to be.


In 2011, the share of out-of-pocket payments in total health expenditure was 48.0% in lower income countries (annual per capita incomes of less than \$1,025) compared to only 14.0% in countries with annual incomes higher than \$12,476 per capita - where expenses are mainly taxes or premiums paid to private insurance, social security and government agencies providing health services. The global average for out-of-pocket health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure was 18.2% in 2014.

Of the 53 African countries covered, nine had a level of out-of-pocket health expenditure higher than 50.0% in 2014, ranging from 75.5% to 50.8%: Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Morocco, Egypt, Eritrea, South Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire.

Only 11 countries had a level of out-of-pocket health expenditure lower than the global average in 2014 (18.2%), ranging from 17.5% to 2.3%: Congo, Gambia, Lesotho, São Tomé & Príncipe, Malawi, Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and Seychelles.

In terms of the percentage of the population pushed below the \$1.90 poverty line by out-of-pocket health expenditure, Nigeria, which had the second largest level of out-of-pocket health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure (71.7%) in Africa in 2014, constitutes the most dramatic case. 3.7% of the Nigerian population were pushed below the \$1.90 poverty line by out-of-pocket health expenditure in 2009.

African countries: population pushed below the \$1.90 (2011 \$ purchasing power parity) poverty line by out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure, % of total population (latest data year 2007-2014)



V. Education: a concerning trajectory




In a continent where 41.0% of the population is under 15 years old, in 2015, progress in the IIAG *Education* sub-category has almost come to a stop over the last five years.

Most of the best performing in 2016 are island countries: Cabo Verde, Mauritius and Seychelles feature in the top five scoring countries. With São Tomé & Príncipe, they obtain scores well above the average score for Africa (48.3) in 2016. The five worst performing countries are CAR, Chad, Guinea, Somalia and South Sudan. Even though they still score well above the 2016 African average, two out of the three countries experiencing the largest deteriorations over the last decade are 'Arab Spring countries': Libya and Tunisia.

The decennial progress of the indicators *Primary School Completion*, *Secondary School Enrolment*, *Tertiary School Enrolment* and *Literacy* has slowed down since 2012.


More worryingly, the indicators *Education Quality* and *Educational System Management* have experienced a deterioration over the past five years, threatening to reverse the progress over the decade.

In terms of *Education Quality*, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda and Tunisia are the five highest scoring countries in 2016, while CAR, Somalia and South Sudan score 0.0.



Regarding *Human Resources in Primary Schools*, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sierra Leone and Tunisia are the four best performers in 2016, while the worst performers are CAR and Malawi.


In *Primary School Completion*, Algeria, Cabo Verde, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco and Seychelles are the six highest scoring countries, while CAR, Chad and Eritrea show the worst performance.



In the Education Index, part of the Human Development Index (HDI), Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa constitute the top three scoring African countries. Four North African countries feature in the top ten performers: Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, while Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Niger and South Sudan are the worst performing countries.

According to the Human Development Data (variable 'Primary school dropout rate'), more than 60.0% of primary school students dropped out in Madagascar, Mozambique and Rwanda in 2012.

Of the 23 African countries covered for the 'Adjusted primary math/reading score' indicators in 2005, Kenya, Madagascar and Mauritius obtain the highest scores in maths, while Mali, Mauritania and Niger are the worst performing. Regarding reading skills, Kenya, Seychelles and Tanzania are the best performers, while Malawi, Namibia and Zambia score the lowest.




Weak human resources in schools and primary school dropouts: a strong relationship

When parents from poor households perceive education to be of low quality (physical condition of schools, teacher punctuality, learning outcomes), they are less willing to make sacrifices to keep their children in school.

There is a strong downhill linear relationship between the IIAG indicator *Human Resources in Primary Schools*, and the variable 'Primary school dropout rate' from the Human Development Data. The correlation coefficient is -0.8 for the year 2012.

Sources: UNDP, MIF

African countries: primary school dropout rate and *Human Resources in Primary Schools*, correlation (2012)




Citizens' dissatisfaction is growing

Citizens' dissatisfaction with how the government is addressing educational needs is growing, as reflected by the increasing decline of the IIAG indicator *Education Provision* over the past decade. 19 countries, more than one third of the continent, register an increasing deterioration in this indicator. The largest improvers since 2007 are Egypt, Namibia and Niger. The largest deteriorations have been experienced by Ghana, Lesotho and Madagascar, with Ghana increasing its pace of deterioration over the last five years.

The five best scoring countries in 2016 are Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia and Swaziland, with the lowest scoring countries being Morocco and Tunisia.


According to Afrobarometer surveys, 12.7% of people surveyed in 2014/2015 considered that it was 'very difficult' or 'difficult' to obtain the services needed from teachers or school officials in the past twelve months.

Africa: *Education Provision* average score (2007-2016)



African countries: difficulty to obtain public school services, % of respondents (2014/2015)

Source: Afrobarometer




Education and health public delivery in South Africa: 44% dissatisfied

Asked about the government's performance on education and health, only one third of South African respondents gave a positive rating while 44.0% gave a negative score.

Only 17.1% of respondents thought that the government was trying its best to deliver good services and that service delivery had improved under its service, while 80.6% considered that service delivery had not improved, with 16.2% considering that service delivery was worse under this government than it had been under the apartheid government.

South Africa: how is the government doing on service delivery? (2016)



Source: GGA


Mismatch between education and health inputs and public satisfaction with the outcomes: a matter of growing expectations?

Source: MIF

The 2017 IAG data confirms varying results between official data or expert assessments, and perception data. In the *Education and Health* sub-categories, Afrobarometer perception-based indicators assessing the public's satisfaction with governments' handling of education and health services are the only ones experiencing deterioration both over the decade and accelerating their pace of decline in the last five years.

At the country level, the mismatch is particularly striking in the case of North African countries. Even though the North African region average score for *Health* is the highest in 2016, countries such as Algeria and Tunisia, which feature in the top ten performing countries in this sub-category, obtain their worst scores in the *Basic Health Services* perception indicator.

Africa: Education, Health, Education Provision and Basic Health Services, average scores (2007-2016)



VI. Welfare: good on poverty, less so on social exclusion

According to the 2017 IAG results, Africa's progress in the *Welfare* sub-category has not been linear and has recently been marginally slackening.

Most poverty and social security-related indicators register progress, namely *Poverty*, *Narrowing Income Gaps*, *Welfare Services* and *Social Protection & Labour*, or recovering from decline, such as *Poverty Reduction Priorities*.


However, *Social Exclusion* presents an increasing deterioration and has dropped by -2.5 points since 2007. Even though this deterioration has been mainly driven by Libya, it also concerns Burundi, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius and Namibia.

Poverty and welfare: public perceptions register progress

Source: MIF

In the 2017 IIAG, all the variables originating from public perception data pertaining to poverty and welfare (*Living Conditions, Food Deprivation, Water Deprivation, Cooking Fuel Deprivation, Living Standards of the Poor and Narrowing Income Gaps*) register better trends, on average, since 2012. All of them improve over the last five years.

Africa: Welfare public perception variables, average scores (2007-2016)



Infrastructure development: slow and unequal

Expenditure: In 2011/2012 (latest data year available), only four countries allocated more than 10.0% of their general government expenditure to transport and communication infrastructure: Uganda, Algeria, Rwanda and Kenya (16.9%, 11.9%, 11.0% and 10.2%, respectively).

Many countries are further investing in infrastructure development. Rwanda and Tanzania have augmented their 2017/2018 fiscal year budgets by about +7.0%, with a significant part allocated to infrastructure development. Rwanda is investing on the construction of a new airport and the improvement of the existing one.

Delivery and perceptions: The 2017 IIAG results show that, coming from a low base ten years ago in 2007, *Infrastructure* growth on the continent is accelerating.

Progress in the indicator *Transport Infrastructure* has contributed to the positive trend of the *Infrastructure* sub-category, with 35

countries having registered improvement in the past ten years. However, one of its underlying measures, the sub-indicator *Road & Bridge Maintenance* assesses the extent to which the public are satisfied with how the government is maintaining roads and bridges. More than half (51.3%) of the citizens surveyed in 35 African countries considered that the current government is handling the maintenance of roads and bridges 'very badly' or 'fairly badly'.

Water & Sanitation Services registers on average a decline over the decade. However, the trend is reversed over the last five years with 18 countries registering an improvement in the most recent period.

Digital & IT Infrastructure and *Access to Improved Water* sustained progress throughout the decade has slowed in the last five years. Attention needs to be paid to the indicator *Electricity Infrastructure*, which is showing a consistent and growing deterioration at continental level.

1.2 Increasing demands on public services

1.2.1 21ST CENTURY NEW CHALLENGES

I. Africa's demography-specific toll


Growing population

From 1950 to 2015, the population in Africa, now the fastest growing in the world, grew by more than +400.0%. In the next twenty years, Africa's population growth will account for half of the total world population growth.

Growing at an average rate of +1.6% per year, Africa's population is expected to continue rising until 2100.

Between now and 2050, Africa's population will more than double, from 1.2 billion to more than 2.5 billion. During that period, half of the world's population growth will be concentrated in nine countries, five of which are in Africa (DRC, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and the US).

By 2050, 26 African countries are expected to double their current population size. By 2100, six of them are projected to increase it by more than five times: Angola, Burundi, Niger, Somalia, Tanzania and Zambia.



Younger population

Africa is already the youngest continent in the world. In 2015, more than 60.0% of Africa's population is below age 25, with 41.0% being under 15. The percentage of Africans under 25 will fall only slightly, to 57.1% in 2030 and to 50.4% in 2050, remaining a higher percentage than in other world regions.

This strong demographic growth will predictably put significant strain on African public services. The delivery of services such as the

traditional government functions (security, justice, rule of law), as well as basic welfare needs (education, health), will have to meet a demand in expansion due to growing population numbers. On top of that, increasingly young populations will require specifically larger amounts of national expenditures allocated to education, culture, sports, employment opportunities, basic services and housing.

II. Multiple, intertwined and simultaneous challenges

Piling up on these current demands, the 21st century poses new multiple challenges to public services. More so than in any other part of the world, Africa is facing all these challenges simultaneously.

Though achieving better results than most other regions, Africa's macro-economic growth remains outpaced by the demographic surge and has been mainly commodities-export led. Unable to lower the number of poor people, this growth also appears damaged by two main characteristics: widening inequalities and the failure to create enough local job opportunities.

The number of poor people is still growing

The share of poor people in Africa, those living on less than \$1.90 a day, fell from 57.0% in 1990 to 43.0% in 2012 (last year of data available). But Africa still displays the slowest poverty reduction rate at global level.

As Africa's population has grown at an annual average of +2.5% during roughly the same period (1990-2015), the result is an upsurge of the absolute number of poor people by more than 100 million, from 288 million in 1990 to 389 million in 2012.

Inequalities are widening, especially in resource-rich countries

Sub-Saharan Africa's average inequality is higher than in other developing regions.


Of the ten countries with the highest Gini coefficients (100.0 represents absolute inequality) in the period 2010-2015 in the HDI dataset, six are African: Botswana, CAR, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia.

For the 46 African countries for which there is data, the unweighted average Gini coefficient amounts to 43.5. The five most unequal countries raise the continental average: Botswana, CAR, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia, all of them with a Gini coefficient above 55.0. The countries with the lowest income inequality levels are Mali, Mauritania and São Tomé & Príncipe.

According to a 2017 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on income inequality trends in sub-Saharan Africa, even if the average Gini coefficient for sub-Saharan Africa has decreased by -3.4 percentage points from 1991 to 2011, the level of inequality across the continent remains highly heterogeneous.

Inequality increased in resource-rich Central and Southern African countries, whereas it declined in mainly agricultural economies in West and East Africa. Countries with already high inequality either remained stable or worsened.

African countries: Gini coefficient (2010-2015 average)




Source: UNDP

Economic growth has been mainly jobless

Africa's economic growth has failed to generate sufficient jobs to match the increasing demand.


Due to the exponential growth of the population, while the continent's absolute number of employed people increased by +62.9% since the beginning of the century, the percentage of employed population has only increased marginally: +1.6% from 2000 to 2017, the equivalent of less than +0.1% per year.

Africa: employment-to-population ratio, % (2000-2021)



Source: ILO

In 2017, the African average for youth unemployment reached 13.6%, more than twice that of adults (6.2%). South Africa, despite being the second largest African economy, is unable to provide jobs for more than half of its young people. Moreover, approximately 60.0% of jobs in Africa are vulnerable and only 19.0% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa covered by social insurance.



Security threats are multidimensional

Security has been deteriorating on the African continent: in the last five years, *National Security* was the most deteriorated sub-category out of the 14 in the IIAG.

Since the beginning of the century, the number of terrorist attacks on the continent has increased by over +764.8%.

Transnational organised crime – ranging from counterfeiting, illegal logging, mining and fishing, crude oil theft, trafficking in humans, organs, weapons, cultural property and natural resources, cyber-security – threatens Africa's human security and development.

Food insecurity is persistent

Mainly due to conflicts and natural hazards, 164.4 million people are estimated to have been affected by food insecurity on the continent in 2016. Of those, 65.7 million people were in situation of crisis, emergency and famine.

The African countries with the highest levels of population in crisis, emergency and famine in 2016 were Ethiopia (9.7 million), Nigeria (8.1), Malawi (6.7), DRC (5.9), South Sudan (4.9), Sudan (4.4), Zimbabwe (4.1), South Africa (3.9), Somalia (2.9), Burundi (2.3), CAR (2.0), Mozambique (1.9), Kenya (1.3) and Chad (1.0).

In addition, food prices are rising due to rising energy prices, increased use of grain in biofuel production, and the impact of climate change.

In 2016, record food staple prices aggravated the situation of vulnerable populations in areas already affected by constrained food access such as Southern African countries, Nigeria and South Sudan.

Meanwhile, the 2017 IIAG results show that the sub-category *Rural Sector* has, worryingly, registered deterioration over the past five years. Due to limited irrigation coverage and an average declining investment in the agricultural sector, the agricultural value added is still low. Only 5.0% of agricultural land in Africa is irrigated, compared to 41.0% in Asia and 21.0% globally.

Climate change impact will be massive

As the continent with the most climate-vulnerable societies, ecosystems and agrosystems, Africa is expected to be one of the hardest hit by climate change.


African countries are characterised by an already warmer climate and areas which are more exposed to climatic hazards such as rainfall variability, poor soils and flood plains.

Global sea level rise is projected to reach between 0.2 to 2.0 metres by 2100, which creates higher risk of flooding, erosion, storm surges and intense rainstorms, on a continent where

more than a quarter of the population live within 100km of the coastal zone.

Global warming of 2 degrees Celsius will contribute to drought and desertification, increasing the proportion of Africa’s population at risk of undernourishment to 50.0%.

The effects of climate change are already manifest in the continent, and irreversible. Nowhere in the world is there more need of action against climate change than in Africa and besides international commitments, there must be African-specific solutions and prevention mechanisms.



1.2.2 MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORKS: NEW 'DUTY SHEETS'

In 2014 and 2015 Africa committed to global and continental frameworks that define the tasks and deliverables of 21st century public services towards a structural, social and environmental transformation of the continent:

- At global level: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and the Paris Agreement.
- At continental level: the Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (CAP), the Agenda 2063 and the African Development Bank (AfDB) High 5s for Transforming Africa.

I. Global frameworks and agendas: the new SDGs and the Conference of Parties' (COP) commitments

United Nations (UN): the 2030 Agenda: 17 SDGs

The 2030 Agenda adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015 with one overarching aim: 'leaving no one behind', encompasses 17 SDGs which are the product of a wide consultative process that involved vertical integration at local, national, regional and global levels, and horizontal integration of public and private sector, civil society, academia, etc.

Following the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000, the 2030 Agenda expands both the priorities and the geography of the development agenda. It encompasses economic, environmental, and social development, and shifts the focus from just low and middle-income countries to all countries and all stakeholders.

The 17 SDGs translate into 169 targets covering economics, social development, and environmental protection.



The Paris Agreement on climate

At the Paris UN Climate Change Conference 21 (COP 21) in December 2015, parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change reached an agreement to combat climate change and accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a sustainable low carbon future.

So far, with the exception of Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mozambique, South Sudan and Tanzania, all African countries have ratified the Paris Agreement.

Key goals of the Paris Agreement:

- Strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping the global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
- Increase the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change, and make finance flows consistent with a low Greenhouse Gas emissions and climate-resilient pathway.

II. African specific frameworks and agendas

The CAP: six pillars

The CAP was developed by the AU High-Level Committee on the Post-2015 Development Agenda through a consultative process that started in November 2011 and was endorsed by African heads of state in 2014.

The consultative process brought together stakeholders at national, regional and continental levels, from the public and private sectors, parliamentarians, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and academia.

The CAP was framed around MDGs' perceived flaws as being fundamentally donor-led; missing out on crucial dimensions of

development such as climate change, quality of education and human rights; neglecting the poorest and most vulnerable; and paying little attention to locally defined and owned definitions of development and progress.

Under the CAP, Africa's development priorities are organised in six pillars: Structural Economic Transformation and Inclusive Growth; Science, Technology and Innovation; People-Centred Development; Environmental Sustainability Natural Resources Management and Disaster Risk Management; Peace and Security; Finance and Partnerships.

AU's Agenda 2063: 20 Goals

Endorsed by heads of state in 2015, Agenda 2063 aims at materialising Africa's vision of 'An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena'. For the African Union Commission (AUC), implementation of the SDGs will happen through the implementation of Agenda 2063.

Agenda 2063 is the result of a double approach:

- A stakeholder consultation involving: the public and private sector, academics and think tanks, CSOs, planning experts, Africa diaspora, youth, women, media, AU organs, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), etc.
- A technical assessment involving situation and trends analysis, scenario planning and a review of current national and continental frameworks (the Lagos Plan of Action, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, the AU/New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Science & Technology Consolidated Plan of Action, the Accelerated Industrial Development, the Abuja Treaty, the NEPAD, the Minimum Integration Programme, Africa's Afro-industry & Agribusiness Development initiative).

Agenda 2063 includes three components:

- The Vision, encompassing the AU Vision, the Solemn Declaration Framework and the Seven African Aspirations.
- The Transformative Framework, encompassing 20 goals and 30 priority areas, indicative strategies, implementation arrangements, communication strategy, and capacity development needs.
- Ten-Year Implementation Plans.

Agenda 2063: seven African Aspirations

1. A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.
2. An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's renaissance.
3. An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law.
4. A peaceful and secure Africa.
5. Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics.
6. An Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential offered by people, especially its women and youth and caring for children.
7. An Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner.

Agenda 2063: 20 Goals

1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens
2. Well-educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation
3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens
4. Transformed economies
5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production
6. Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth
7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities
8. United Africa (federal or confederate)
9. Continental financial and monetary institutions are established and functional
10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa
11. Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched
12. Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place
13. Peace, security and stability are preserved
14. A stable and peaceful Africa
15. A fully functional and operational African Peace and Security Architecture
16. African cultural renaissance is preeminent
17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life
18. Engaged and empowered youth and children
19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful coexistence
20. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development

The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023) is the first in a series of five ten-year plans over the fifty-year horizon towards 2063 and sets 12 Fast Track Programmes and Initiatives.

Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Plan: 12 Fast Track Programmes and Initiatives






1. Integrated High Speed Train Network
2. African Commodity Strategy
3. Continental Free Trade Area
4. Pan-African E-Network
5. African Passport and free movement of people
6. Silencing the Guns
7. Grand Inga Dam Project
8. Annual African Forum
9. Single Air-Transport Network
10. African Outer Space Strategy
11. Pan-African Virtual University
12. Continental Financial Institutions

The AfDB Ten-Year Strategy (2013-2022) and High 5s For Transforming Africa (2015-2025)

In 2013, the AfDB Board approved a Ten-Year Strategy covering the period 2013-2022. The Strategy overarching objectives are the achievement of inclusive growth and the transition to green growth, to be implemented through five operational priorities: infrastructure development; regional economic integration; private sector development; governance and accountability; and skills and technology.

In addition, the Strategy highlights three areas of special emphasis: Gender, Fragile states, and Agriculture & Food security.

In 2015, President A. Adesina set down a new agenda to be reached by 2025, grounded on the High 5s for Transforming Africa.

Priority area	Goal/Objective 2025	Priority area	Goal/Objective 2025
Light up & power Africa 	UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY + 162 GW electricity generated + 130 million on-grid connections + 75 million off-grid connections	Integrate Africa 	REGIONAL MARKET Building regions infrastructure Boosting intra-African trade and investments Facilitating movement of people across borders
Feed Africa 	AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION + 150 million people adequately fed + 100 million people lifted out of poverty + 190 million hectares with restored productivity	Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa 	ACCESS TO SOCIAL & ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES Creating 80 million jobs Building critical skills Improving access to water and sanitation Strengthening health systems
Industrialise Africa 	ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION Industrial contribution to GDP increased by 130% 35 special economic zones supported 30 Public-Private Partnerships developed and strengthened		

Source: AfDB

III. What role for African public services?

Coherent harmonisation of the various frameworks

Senior African statisticians, the AUC Department of Economic Affairs, the RECs and partner institutions have developed an integrated and coherent approach to the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 goals:

- 78 indicators address both Agenda 2063 and the SDGs;
- 69% of the SDG targets overlap with Agenda 2063; at the indicator level, 67% of the SDG indicators overlap with Agenda 2063.

2030 Agenda Goals	Agenda 2063 Goals	AfDB High 5s
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens 4. Transformed economies and job creation 5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 8. United Africa (federal or confederate) 	 Feed Africa
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life 	 Light up & power Africa  Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 2. Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation 16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent 17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life 18. Engaged and empowered youth and children 	 Light up & power Africa  Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens 5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production 10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa 17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life 	 Light up & power Africa  Feed Africa  Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa  Industrialise Africa
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 	 Integrate Africa  Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 6. Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa 	 Light up & power Africa  Industrialise Africa
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 2. Transformed economies and job creation 12. Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels 16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent 17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life 18. Engaged and empowered youth and children 	 Industrialise Africa  Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 4. Transformed economies and job creation 5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production 6. Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth 8. United Africa (federal or confederate) 10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa 19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence 	 Light up & power Africa  Industrialise Africa  Integrate Africa

2030 Agenda Goals	Agenda 2063 Goals	AfDB High 5s	UN
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 8. United Africa (federal or confederate) 16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent 20. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development 	 <p>Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa</p>	
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa 12. Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels 16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent 	 <p>Improve the quality of life for the people of Africa</p>	
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 4. Transformed economies and job creation 5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 12. Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels 16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent 		
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 12. Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels 		<p>Paris Agreement</p> 
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Transformed economies and job creation 6. Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 		
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities 		
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched 12. Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels 13. Peace, security and stability are preserved 17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life 18. Engaged and empowered youth and children 		
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all 4. Transformed economies and job creation 10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa 12. Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels 19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence 20. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development 	 <p>Integrate Africa</p>	

Domestication into national plans

Following the recommendations of the UN, AU and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), all these different, often overlapping international frameworks must be integrated vertically and translated at the national level.

Achievement of the milestones detailed in the Agenda 2063 needs 'domestication' of the tasks by countries' public services:

- Aligning national visions to the 21st century tasks,
- Leading, coordinating and participating in the resource mobilisation process and allocation efforts,
- Leading, coordinating and participating in the execution of the 21st century tasks,
- Leading and coordinating the monitoring and evaluation processes.

For effective implementation and monitoring of the SDGs by the public service, the OECD High-Level Political Forum on Getting Governments Organised to Deliver on the SDGs stressed the importance of two elements:

- High-level political support from the 'centre of government', allowing for mobilisation of the collective expertise of the public service;
- A 'whole of government' approach, enabling horizontal coordination and cooperation from across public services.

'Domestication missions' collaborate with governments to ensure incorporation of the contents of Agenda 2063 into national strategic and action plans, programmes and budgets, and to prompt action at all levels of society.

32 African countries have already received domestication missions from the AUC, while others have opted for domestication without support.

'DOMESTICATING' OF THE SDGs IN RWANDA

Rwanda has undertaken several strategies for integrating the SDGs into its national planning framework:

- Domestication of the SDGs into national frameworks:
 - Conducting a gap analysis to determine areas of divergence and convergence of existing national frameworks and the SDGs;
 - Integrating and adapting missing SDG indicators into national planning documents and long-term vision.
- Popularisation of the SDGs: Translating the SDGs into the native language, Kinyarwanda, and engaging in consultative processes.
- Institutionalisation of the SDGs.

Resource mobilisation

Resource mobilisation can be domestic or external, from governmental budget to diaspora remittances. To guarantee country ownership of the process, the primary pathway for financing must be government revenue: domestic resource mobilisation is meant to contribute from 70% to 90% of the financing of Agenda 2063 on average per country.

Domestic resource 70-90% of financing

- Government budget reallocation
- Increased government taxation
- Maximising resource rents (natural resources, tourism assets, etc)
- Savings mobilisation
- Capital market widening, deepening and regionalisation
- Commercial bank finance
- Controlling inefficiencies/losses in public services (infrastructure losses, expenditure management, procurement efficiency, value chain losses)
- Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)
- Trade in goods and services
- Curtailing illicit financial flows
- Crowd funding
- Philanthropy

External resource 10-30% of financing

- Official Development Assistance (ODA)
- Debt relief
- Bilateral and strategic partnerships (Africa-European Union (EU), Africa-US, Africa-China, Africa-India, etc)
- Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
- PPPs
- Trade in goods and services
- Global carbon tax
- International financial market
- Diaspora remittances and savings
- Crowd funding
- Philanthropy

1.3 Local and non-state actors: a growing role in public service delivery

1.3.1 PUBLIC ACTORS: CITIES AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES

I. Urban demand: exponential growth and specific requests

In 2015, 39.5% of Africa’s population, around 472 million citizens, were living in urban areas. By 2020, the continent’s urban population will amount to 560 million, 41.4% of the total population. By 2050, it is expected to almost triple to 1.3 billion.

Africa has the world’s fastest urban population growth rate (+3.4% in the period 2015-2020). All ten countries in the world with the fastest current urban growth rates from 2015 to 2020 are African: Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

These growing urban populations are requesting specific public delivery in health, education, transport, housing, safety and

security, water and sanitation, waste management, cultural life and entertainment.

Moreover, the current trends show that in Africa the fastest urban growth will be in intermediate-sized cities, who tend to lag behind their larger counterparts in institutional and development capacities.

The continent’s fast urbanisation growth can have positive or negative impacts: it can either lead to economic growth, transformation, and poverty reduction, or, alternatively, to increased inequality, urban poverty, and the proliferation of slums.

Cities: delivering public services to populations often bigger than countries

In 2018, the 20 biggest cities of the continent currently manage populations bigger than many countries. Cairo, Africa’s most populous city, manages a population that is larger than each of the 36 least populous countries on the continent.

Selected African cities: population, millions (2018)					Source: UNDESA				
Cairo	≈	Tunisia	+	Togo	Dar es Salaam	≈	New Zealand	+	Swaziland
19.8		11.7		8.0	6.0		4.7		1.4
Lagos	≈	Somalia	or	Chad	Khartoum	≈	Denmark		
14.8		15.2		15.4	5.6		5.8		
Kinshasa	≈	Guinea	or	South Sudan	Kano	≈	Kuwait		
13.1		13.1		12.9	3.9		4.2		
Johannesburg	≈	Eritrea	+	Liberia	Ibadan	≈	Puerto Rico	or	Uruguay
10.0		5.2		4.9	3.4		3.7		3.5
Luanda	≈	El Salvador	or	Nicaragua	Kampala	≈	Botswana		
6.3		6.4		6.3	2.2		2.3		

II. Local authorities: a complex and diverse landscape, little financial autonomy

Decentralisation models

Decentralisation -> transfer of (part of) the central government functions to sub-national units or levels of government.

Degrees of decentralisation

Deconcentration: opening a branch office in another region.

Delegation: tasking a sub-national government to carry out functions.

Devolution: allowing sub-national government to take over functions autonomously.

Types of decentralisation

Political: aims to give citizens and elected representatives more power in public decision-making. It involves transfer of power and authority to sub-national units.

Administrative: seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. It involves the transfer of the delivery of social services – namely education, health, social services – to sub-national units.

Fiscal: increases the revenues of sub-national governments through tax-raising powers and grants, and the expenditure autonomy of sub-national governments.

Economic: through privatisation and deregulation, governments shift responsibility from public functions to the private sector, or community groups, cooperatives, private voluntary associations, and other non-government organisations, also in areas such as service provision and administration.

The AU promotes a more comprehensive decentralisation to achieve Agenda 2063

The 2014 African Charter on Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development is the reference for decentralisation policies. However, the Charter has to date been ratified by only three countries: Burundi, Madagascar and Namibia.

Within the AU, the Technical Committee on Public Service, Local Government, Urban Development and Decentralisation gathers Ministers of Housing and Urban Development, and the High Council of Local Authorities reflects the voice of local governments in the deliberations of the AU.

UN-Habitat specific guidelines and agenda

The UN-Habitat's Governing Council adopted the International Guidelines on Decentralisation and Strengthening of Local Authorities in 2017 and the International Guidelines on Decentralisation and Access to Basic Services for All in 2009.

The Habitat III Conference (Quito, Ecuador, 2016) signed the UN's New Urban Agenda setting a new global standard for sustainable urban development with three main operational enablers: local fiscal systems, urban planning, and basic services and infrastructure.

'Domesticating' the SDGs

In 2016 and 2017, 12 African countries, accounting for 6,483 Local and Regional Governments (LRGs) submitted national voluntary reviews on the 'localisation of the SDGs'. The involvement of LRGs happened at different levels: in five countries - Benin, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda - LRGs fully participated in the consultation process, whereas in Egypt, Morocco and Zimbabwe the LRGs were just mentioned in the national reviews.

In **Benin**, LRGs are revising local plans to make SDGs a condition to access national funding for municipalities.

Sierra Leone involved 19 local councils to integrate the SDGs into their district-level and municipal development plans.

Egypt has adopted the City Prosperity Index to monitor the implementation of SDG 11 in 35 cities.

Nigeria shared the responsibility of mapping and data supply for SDG indicators with regions.

- **Kaduna State** has integrated the SDGs into its State Development Plan for 2016-2020. Since 2015, Kaduna State has concluded two general household surveys, two annual school censuses, a GDP survey, and an agricultural survey.

Every African country has at least one sub-national level of government. There is no direct relation between the size of a country's population and the number of its administrative units. Both Equatorial Guinea and Tanzania had 30 sub-national administrative units in 2010, with very different sizes of population: over 0.9 million in Equatorial Guinea and over 46.0 million people in Tanzania.

Since 1990, sub-national administrative units in 25 African countries have increased by at least +20%. Eight have more than doubled them between 1990 to 2010, among which are Guinea (from 14 to 341), Niger (from 35 to 256) and South Africa (from 53 to 284).

Selected African countries: administrative units having increased by at least +20% (1990-2010)

Country	Administrative units type	Number of administrative units	
		1990	2010
Ethiopia	District	556	736
Guinea	Sub-prefecture	14	341
South Africa	Municipality	53	284
Niger	Municipality	35	256
DRC	Territory	132	216
Ghana	District	65	170
Tanzania	District	119	149
Uganda	District	34	112
Congo	District	79	101
CAR	Sub-prefecture	51	71
Kenya	District	47	70
Gabon	Department	37	50
Mali	Cercle	40	49
Burkina Faso	Provinces	30	45
Senegal	Department	30	45
Nigeria	States	22	37
Togo	Prefecture	21	35
Equatorial Guinea	District	17	30
Tanzania	Region	25	30
Malawi	District	24	28
Sudan	States	9	25
Cabo Verde	County	15	22
Chad	Prefecture	14	22
Côte d'Ivoire	Region	10	19
Senegal	Region	10	14
Benin	Department	6	12
Congo	Region	10	12
Zimbabwe	Province	8	10
South Africa	Province	4	9

Source: Renewable Energy and Decentralization

However, actual powers and responsibilities wielded by the different levels of government differ widely.

Despite the wave of decentralisation policies during the 1990s and of constitutional reforms in the 2000s, the actual implementation and devolution programmes and plans has been incomplete, inconsistent and sporadic, with some exceptions (e.g. Morocco, South Africa).

Decentralisation: better public service delivery or increased inequality?

In **Ethiopia**, decentralisation has reportedly improved public service delivery: net enrolments in education, access to basic services in health such as antenatal care, contraception, vaccination rates and deliveries by skilled birth attendants have improved. Child mortality rates have fallen from 123 per 1,000 live births in 2005 to 88 in 2010, and primary net enrolment rates rose from 68% in 2004/2005 to 82% in 2009/2010.

In **Sierra Leone**, the creation in 2014 of decentralised District Ebola Response Centres (DERC) made it possible to contain the epidemic by relying on social structures and networks established in local communities. The provision of a focal point for partners to work through in the field was regarded as one of the DERC's most important contributions to the fight against Ebola.

Meanwhile, in **Uganda**, decentralisation reforms implemented in the 1990s contributed to growing inequality and inefficiency in education provision. A study of two districts shows that, as the central government controls more than 90% of their local budget, local governments are severely constrained by the lack of funds and have no say on development priorities. Moreover, higher levels of private and donors' funding in certain districts led to variable education provision amongst districts, and thus higher inequality levels.

In 2009, **Botswana** transferred the management of clinics and primary hospitals from local to central government (Ministry of Health). Centralisation came with difficulties, such as delays in delivery of drugs and low maintenance of equipment and hospitals.

Financial autonomy for local authorities lags far behind global averages

Sub-national government revenue, % of total public revenues & % of GDP (2013)		
Region	Revenues	
	% of public revenues	% of GDP
Africa	12.9	3.3
Asia-Pacific	35.0	10.4
Eurasia	25.5	8.2
Europe	27.7	12.0
Latin America & the Caribbean	21.2	5.8
Middle East & West Asia	9.8	3.2
Northern America	63.1	22.7

Source: UCLG

Africa's sub-national government revenues, both as percentage of total public revenues and of GDP, are the second lowest after the Middle East & West Asia region.

In 2017, Tanzania devolved 21.8% of public revenues to its sub-national governments, followed closely by Uganda and Mali (18.2% and 14.0%, respectively). Meanwhile, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Malawi, Niger and Togo are all below 6.0%.

Local financial independence: mostly limited

In **Ghana**, the District Assemblies are tasked with raising taxes, while the District Assemblies Common Fund ensures that funding from the central government reaches each district, based on a needs-based equalisation formula. While providing only 37.0% of district income, this system ensures that local government receives a guaranteed amount of income which can be used at its discretion, thus providing some amount of financial independence.


Ethiopia's fiscal decentralisation guarantees to each level of government the capacity to finance its own development. Fiscal decentralisation remains limited however as central government controls 80.0% of income resources, such as taxes on international trade, leaving only 20.0% for the regions.

In **Nigeria**, the oil revenue redistribution system benefits all levels of governments. It is a complex intergovernmental transfer system indicator-and-derivation-based. The country allocates no less than 13.0% of oil revenues to nine producing states by derivation. The rest (87.0%) is pooled with other fiscal revenues and redistributed across all states. Of the pool, about 47.3% is allocated to states and municipalities based on a formula that considers factors such as population size, social development efforts and revenue-raising efforts. The remaining 52.7% is allocated to central government.


Source: World Bank

Nigeria: distribution of oil revenues, % of total oil revenues (2008)

Monthly oil revenue allocation



Federation Account allocations



Source: NREGI, UNDP

1.3.2 NON-PUBLIC ACTORS: DONORS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Partly to answer an exponential demand, partly to substitute failing public supply, a growing range of non-state actors have become key providers of public goods and services. Foreign bilateral and multilateral donors have for a long time played a key role in delivering security, health and education, to an extent that may have sometimes prevented national governments from sufficiently owning these key public policies. Private sector, as well as a complex galaxy of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), are equally extending their involvement in these sectors, sometimes themselves also crowding out national public services.

I. In security

International donors remain engaged to provide support for trans-national security

In February 2018, the International High Level Conference on the Sahel, under the auspices of the EU, the UN, the AU and the G5 Sahel group of countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) received a pledge of \$509 million from international donors to support a 5,000-strong G5 Sahel Joint Force – a military partnership designed to fight terrorism and organised crime in the African Sahel region.

G4S: the largest private employer in Africa

The British G4S is the largest private security firm worldwide, with operations in more than 125 countries and 657,000 employees. It operates in over 25 countries in Africa and employs over 110,000 people, making it Africa’s largest private sector employer. G4S provides outsourced services in safety and security for embassies, banks, telecoms, transport and expertise in clearing mine fields.

Private security is on the rise

African countries have witnessed an exponential growth of private security providers, whether multinational players or small-scale local enterprises. High unemployment, the downsizing of national armies, growing inequalities and instability, urbanisation trends and the development of mining, oil, gas and telecom sectors, increase the demand and make private security an appealing employer.

Vigilante groups play a growing role in local, remote, unstable areas where public security forces are mostly absent. According to the International Crisis Group, they can be far more effective than state actors in providing local security, often enjoying greater legitimacy among communities, and being more efficient in identifying, tracking and combatting insurgents. However, if not correctly managed by governments, they may act as local militias pursuing narrow ethnic agendas, may morph into predatory and quasi-criminal agendas, and often prove hard to demobilise when no longer necessary.

II. In health

One fifth of ODA to Africa goes to health


According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), in 2016 21.2% of the ODA to Africa has been allocated to the health sector. Almost half of the health ODA (48.3%) is allocated to population policies including HIV/AIDS control, whereas 43.6% is allocated to the basic health sub-sector. The lowest share is

allocated to the general health sub-sector (8.1%).

Ten countries absorb 59.4% of the total ODA allocated to health in Africa in 2016. For four of these, health ODA represents more than 40.0% of the total ODA they receive: South Africa (43.5%), Zambia (43.1%), Uganda (41.1%) and Nigeria (40.3%).

Africa: health ODA by sub-sector, \$ million gross disbursement (2016)

Source: OECD



Selected African countries: top recipients of health ODA, \$ million gross disbursement (2016)

Source: OECD

Nigeria	1,075
Tanzania	872
Kenya	834
Ethiopia	791
Uganda	746
Mozambique	657
DRC	649
South Africa	572
Zambia	452
Malawi	421
Top ten recipients	7,067


The top ten donors are, in order, US (38.2%), Global Fund, the UK, GAVI (Vaccine Alliance), International Development Association (IDA), EU, Germany, Canada, France and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (1.2%).

In 2016, the share of total World Health Organization (WHO) disbursement allocated to Africa was the second largest (21.0%) after Asia's (26.0%).

Civil society: a strong presence

CSOs play a key role in health provision across the continent, from small scale NGOs to larger actors such as the Gates Foundation. In the health sector, which is a key focus of the Gates Foundation, the Foundation works in ten countries, Burkina Faso, DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia, and mainly in the fight against infectious diseases, malaria, HIV and tuberculosis. The Gates Foundation has recently committed to invest \$5.0 billion between 2017 and 2022 in Africa in support of health and anti-poverty initiatives.

The relative size of public and private health provision in Africa




The sub-Saharan African average for 2014 for total health expenditure that is private is 57.4%. Only South Asia has a level of private health expenditure that is higher than that of Africa (68.8%).

Private sector in health: a growing business opportunity

As lifestyles progressively change on the continent, non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, cardio-vascular pathologies and cancer are spreading. Those who can afford it often travel to places such as India, Turkey, Gulf countries and Europe. The lack of health systems in the continent is seen as a growing opportunity for private healthcare investments. A 2012 report by the International Finance Corporation estimated that the potential market for healthcare in sub-Saharan Africa is high, as in 2012-2022 some \$25-35 billion would be needed in investment in physical healthcare assets, including hospitals and clinics.

African countries: private health expenditure, % of total health expenditure (2014)



Private expenditure level is even higher than 70.0% in the following countries: Sierra Leone (83.0%), Guinea-Bissau (79.5%), Sudan (78.6%), Mali (77.1%), Cameroon (77.1%), Uganda (75.1%), Nigeria (74.9%) and Côte d'Ivoire (70.6%).

It is lower than 30.0% in Algeria (27.2%), Libya (26.5%), Cabo Verde (25.3%), Swaziland (24.3%), Lesotho (23.9%), Equatorial Guinea (22.9%), Congo (18.2%) and Seychelles (7.8%).

Queen Mamohato Memorial Hospital in Lesotho: a costly Public Private Partnerships (PPP) experiment

In 2006, the government of Lesotho launched a PPP to upgrade its public health structures. A private sector consortium (Tsepong) was contracted for designing, building and operating the main hospital and a network of urban clinics for 18 years.

The hospital was built at a cost of \$153.0 million, financed through a mixture of public and private funds and support from international institutions including the World Bank. The government of Lesotho put in \$58.0 million in direct finance (capital payment plus 'enabling works' such as sewage system and electricity). Tsepong put in \$474.6 in equity capital, plus a \$94.9 million loan from the public Development Bank of South Africa. Registered as a private sector contribution, the loan was signed by the government of Lesotho as a guarantor. Worth ten times the annual budget of the health ministry, the loan constituted a risk for the government.

A 2014 report by Oxfam and the Lesotho Consumer Protection Association showed that the PPP hospital and its three filter clinics:

- cost \$67.0 million per year – at least three times what the old public hospital would have cost today – and consume more than half (51.0%) of the total government health budget
- have required a projected 64.0% increase in government health spending over the next three years
- have diverted urgently needed resources from primary and secondary healthcare in rural areas where mortality rates are rising and where three-quarters of the population live
- are expected to generate a 25.0% rate of return on equity for the PPP shareholders – this rate is underwritten by taxpayers' money
- are costing the government so much that it would reportedly be more cost effective to build a brand-new district hospital to cater for excess patients rather than pay the private partner to treat them.

III. In education


Donor support: less than 7% of total ODA

Education accounts only for 6.4% of the total ODA to Africa in 2016. The largest share of education ODA is allocated to post-secondary education (31.1%), followed by basic education (29.5%) and education policy training/research (22.2%).

The lowest share is allocated to secondary education (17.2%).

Africa: education ODA by sub-sector, \$ million gross disbursement (2016)

Source: OECD



Selected African countries: top recipients of education ODA, \$ million gross disbursement (2016)

Source: OECD

Ethiopia	314
Morocco	277
Tanzania	179
Mozambique	165
Egypt	162
Nigeria	155
Tunisia	136
Ghana	131
Senegal	128
Algeria	106
Top ten recipients	1,752

Ten countries absorb almost half (48.9%) of the total ODA allocated to education in Africa in 2016. Of these countries, Algeria has the largest proportion of education over total ODA (49.4%), and Egypt the lowest (4.6%). For three countries education represents more than 10.0% of the total ODA they receive (Senegal 15.3%, Tunisia 13.0% and Morocco 10.4%).

The top ten donors of education ODA are, in order, France (18.3%), US, Germany, International Development Association, UK, EU, AfDB (3.6%), Japan, Canada and Norway (2.5%).

Civil society: reaching out to vulnerable groups

CSOs have traditionally been present in Africa in all areas of education.

Africa Educational Trust (AET) is present in Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda to support people excluded from educational opportunities due to conflict, discrimination or poverty. AET works in collaboration with local communities, Ministry of Education officials and local organisations to provide formal or alternative education and basic skills training, including projects aimed at reducing poverty and illiteracy among women, children, disabled people, those who have suffered displacement and instability, and those in nomadic and pastoralist communities. In over 50 years, AET has helped more than 750,000 disadvantaged children and young people from Africa to access education and training.

AET's projects:

- **Radio Education:** Radio broadcasts and recorded lessons on CDs and MP3s, which are accessible to anyone with a radio, allowing people to learn without having to leave the safety of their home. Radio Education enables people to gain basic literacy and numeracy skills within six months.
- **Accelerated Secondary Education for Women:** An accelerated secondary school programme for women to achieve a secondary school certificate without undertaking four years of full-time study. The adapted course is offered part-time, with classes only taking up two or three hours a day, lasting two years. This allows women to earn an income and fulfil any family and household obligations alongside their studies.

Private sector in education: a growing potential for investment, sometimes controversial

Gaps in the quality and access to public education in Africa have been plugged by private entities, from local faith-based and community schools in remote villages or slums, to international groups offering both low- and more often high-cost education in big cities.

The role of private education throughout the continent has grown, due to demographic shift, rapid urbanisation, the increased use of technology, and the emergence of a middle class. A recent report by Caerus Capital notes that one in four young African students—66 million people—are projected to be enrolled in a private school by 2021, corresponding to a potential investment estimated between \$16 to \$18 billion.



Private education in Africa: some controversy

In Kenya, privately owned schools in slums have been accused of deepening the country's inequality.

In Uganda, the Mark Zuckerberg- and Bill Gates-funded Bridge International Academies were closed by authorities after they were accused of a lack of proper licensing.

In Liberia, the Partnerships for Schools program was criticised for privatising public education even as the government defended the program as a bold move to transform educational systems.

Private education provision: higher than average



The sub-Saharan African average of primary education pupils enrolled in private institutions in 2014 was 11.4%, a higher level than in any other region but Latin America & the Caribbean (19.3%). In Middle East & North Africa, East Asia & Pacific, North America and Europe & Central Asia private education accounts respectively for 9.2%, 8.7%, 7.9% and 7.7%.

Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea even display a primary private enrolment level (as a percentage of total number of children enrolled in primary education) higher than 50.0% (88.8% and 58.7%, respectively).

Eight African countries have less than 2.0% of primary education pupils enrolled in private institutions: Lesotho, Burundi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Malawi, Algeria, Cabo Verde and São Tomé & Príncipe .

In sub-Saharan Africa, 20.5% of secondary education students on average in 2014 were enrolled in private institutions, above the average levels displayed in Latin America & the Caribbean (19.6%), East Asia & Pacific (17.1%), Europe & Central Asia (13.9%), Middle East & North Africa (7.9%) and North America (7.8%), but more than twice less than the average for South Asia (48.9%).

In four countries, more than half of secondary education students are enrolled in private institutions: Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mauritius and Zimbabwe. Four countries have less than 5.0% of secondary education students enrolled in private institutions: Lesotho, São Tomé & Príncipe, South Africa and Swaziland.



Section

02 _

Assessing the Current Supply of Public Services

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
2.1 Main characteristics of African public services

2.1.1 PUBLIC EMPLOYERS: A CONTINENT-WIDE LACK OF CAPACITY

Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators (WWBI): a forthcoming (2018) dataset from the World Bank

The WWBI is a new dataset that constitutes the World Bank’s attempt to fill the gap in quantitative data on the characteristics of public sector employment and wages. For the purpose of showcasing it in this report, the World Bank has kindly provided the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s (MIF) Research Team with the country-level data for the African countries covered and averages for world regions, which in this report have been compared against the unweighted average for the African countries for which there is data. The WWBI will be published in 2018. The MIF wishes to thank the World Bank for sharing with us their data ahead of their publication.

I. Public service: still mainly a small employer



Public employees: 3.0% of the total population on average, lower than in other world regions

The average level of public employees for the 11 African countries for which there is data in 2015 amounts to 3.0% of their total population. This is lower than for other world regions: North America (9.1%), Europe & Central Asia (7.7%), South Asia (5.5%), East Asia & Pacific (4.9%) and Latin America & the Caribbean (4.2%).


Egypt, Botswana and South Africa have the highest rates (6.9%, 6.4% and 4.7%, respectively), though all are lower than Europe & Central Asia and North America. Four countries have less than 2.0%: Burundi, Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea (1.3%, 1.3%, 1.0% and 0.9%, respectively).

Public employees: less than 12.0% of total employment on average


The average for the 26 African countries for which there is data in the period 2009-2015 (using the latest data year available) on the size of the public sector as a percentage of their total employment is 11.6%. This is less than half the average level for Europe & Central Asia (24.9%), and only slightly higher than the average for Latin America & the Caribbean (9.8%).

In ten countries, the public sector represents less than 5.0% of the total employed: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda.

In five countries only the public sector represents more than 20.0% of the total employed population in the country: Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Seychelles and Tunisia.



African countries: public sector, % of paid employment (latest data year 2009-2015)




Public employees: almost one third of paid employment on average

The average for the 26 African countries for which there is data in the period 2009-2015 (using the latest data year available) on the size of the public sector as a percentage of their paid employment reaches 31.9%, almost the same level as in Europe & Central Asia, and quite above the levels displayed on average by East Asia & Pacific, South Asia, North America and Latin America & the Caribbean (29.5%, 27.8%, 23.6% and 16.7%, respectively).

In seven countries the public sector represents 40.0% or more of their total paid employees: Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mauritania, Seychelles and Tunisia. For five countries, the public sector accounts for less than 20.0% of the total number of paid employees: Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Rwanda and Uganda.

II. Cost of public employees: higher than other regions, with large country disparities




Cost varies between 2.7% and 29.0% of GDP, and is on average higher than other developing regions

On average on the continent, compensation of government employees as a percentage of GDP amounts to 8.6% in 2015, according to the World Bank. This is slightly higher than Latin America & the Caribbean and South Asia levels (7.9% and 6.8%, respectively), but below Europe and North America.

Less than one third (16) of the 52 African countries covered allocate more than 10.0% of their GDP to the salaries of public employees: Libya (29.0%), Lesotho (21.6%), Zimbabwe (16.5%), Swaziland (14.2%), Namibia (13.9%), Morocco (12.6%), Angola (12.5%), Tunisia (12.2%), South Africa (11.5%), Liberia (11.4%), Cabo Verde (11.3%), South Sudan (11.2%), Algeria (11.1%), Mozambique (10.9%), Djibouti (10.8%) and Botswana (10.4%).

Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda allocate less than 5.0%.



Cost varies between 7.4% and 56.2% of government expenditure, and is on average higher than other world regions

On average on the continent, the compensation of government employees as a percentage of government expenditure amounts to 29.0% in 2015. This is higher than in other world regions: Latin America & the Caribbean (28.4%), East Asia & Pacific (28.4%), North America (27.4%), South Asia (24.8%) and Europe & Central Asia (23.2%).

Five countries allocate even more than 40.0% of their government budget on the salaries of their public employees: Zimbabwe (56.2%), Swaziland (44.7%), Tunisia (44.3%), Libya (41.9%) and Angola (40.3%).

Nine countries spend less than 20.0%: Guinea (19.6%), Gambia (18.7%), Uganda (18.5%), Kenya (18.3%), Seychelles (17.9%), Niger (17.0%), Rwanda (13.7%), Congo (12.4%) and Equatorial Guinea (7.4%).

III. Personnel in health, education and domestic security: far from enough

Health: only three countries with at least one doctor per 1,000 people

According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the African average (calculated using the latest data year in the period 2012-2016 for the 26 countries for which there are data) is 0.45 physicians per 1,000 people.

Only three African countries have at least one physician per 1,000 people: Libya, Mauritius and Tunisia, with a physician-to-population ratio of 2.09, 2.00 and 1.29, respectively.


While Libya has the highest physician-to-population ratio in Africa, Tanzania has the lowest (0.02). Ahead of Tanzania, Somalia and Chad have the lowest densities of physicians per 1,000 population (0.03 and 0.04, respectively).

The highest physician-to-population ratios are found in North African countries, and in small islands: Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as Cabo Verde, Mauritius and Seychelles feature in the top ten countries.

African and selected non-African countries: density of physicians per 1,000 population (latest data year 2012-2016)

Source: WHO


Physicians per 1,000 population



Education: more than 40 pupils per teacher in sub-Saharan Africa

Pupil-teacher ratio in primary education (2014)


World region



In sub-Saharan Africa in 2014, there are more than twice as many pupils per teacher in primary schools than in Europe & Central Asia and in North America.

Of the 45 countries covered (latest data year 2012-2016), 19 have a pupil-teacher ratio in primary education higher than the sub-Saharan average of 41.7. Of these, five have ratios higher than 50.0: Central African Republic (CAR) (80.1), Malawi (69.5), Chad (62.4), Rwanda (58.3) and Mozambique (54.7).

African countries: pupil-teacher ratio in primary education (latest data year 2012-2016)




Domestic security: lower than anywhere else

Produced by the International Police Science Association (IPSA) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the World Internal Security and Police Index (WISPI) measures indicators of internal security worldwide and ranks countries according to their ability to provide security services and their security performance.

The 'Capacity domain' of the WISPI assesses whether the level of resources devoted to internal security in a country is sufficient

to deal with existing and future internal security issues. The 2016 average for the 29 African countries covered amounts to 0.551 (out of 1.000).

Algeria obtains one of the five best global scores in capacity, ranking 5th with a score of 0.968. Four out of the five worst performing countries are African: Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, and Uganda.



According to the 2016 WISPI, the sub-Saharan African density of security force providers (which accounts for police, private security and armed forces) is noticeably lower than any other region (less than 700 per 100,000 people), while Middle East & North Africa has the largest rate (over 1,800 per 100,000 people).

Middle East & North Africa has the highest police density (629 per 100,000 people), as well as the highest level of private security force providers (881), nearly eight times higher than in sub-Saharan Africa, which has the lowest number of private security force providers, 115 per 100,000 people.

At country level

There are 219 police officers for every 100,000 Nigerians, below the sub-Saharan Africa region average of 268. There are an additional 71 private security workers per 100,000 people, which is one of the

five lowest private security force rates, compared to other countries covered by the WISPI.


Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has one of the smallest police force rates of any country in the Index, with approximately 100 officers per 100,000 people, well below all regional averages.

Similarly, Kenya has a small police force, with 99 police officers per 100,000 people, compared to all regional averages. Kenya also has a small private security industry, with 136 private security employees per 100,000 people.

The size of the police is also small in Uganda, with a police officer rate of 110 per 100,000 people. This is a lower police force rate than all regional averages.


2.1.2 PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: WHO SERVES AFRICA

I. More women in the public sector



In the 26 African countries covered by the World Bank in the period 2009–2015 (using the latest data year available) the number of female public employees as a percentage of total female paid employees is higher than the number of male public employees as a percentage of total male paid employees (35.5% and 30.8%, respectively). Compared to other regions, the African average

for females is only lower than that of Europe & Central Asia and South Asia. In five countries, Chad, Egypt, Mauritania, São Tomé & Príncipe and Seychelles, the number of female public employees as a percentage of total female paid employees is at least 10.0 points higher than that of male public employees.




In the 26 African countries for which there is data in the period 2009-2015 (using the latest data year available), the average percentage of female public paid employees (33.9%) is +3.3 percentage points higher than that of female private paid employees (30.6%). Compared to other regions, the African averages are only higher than those of South Asia (28.6% and 19.0%, respectively).

At the country level, in 17 countries the percentage of female public paid employees is higher than that of female private paid employees: Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania and Tunisia.

In four countries the percentage of female public paid employees is even more than 10.0 points higher than that of female private paid employees: Chad, Egypt, São Tomé & Príncipe and Seychelles.

Contrary to this, in nine countries (Burkina Faso, DRC, Ethiopia, Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius, Togo and Uganda) the percentage of female public paid employees is lower than that of female private paid employees. The most striking case is Togo, where the percentage of female public paid employees is -17.4 points lower than that of female private paid employees.


II. Public employees are better educated than private



In the 23 African countries covered in the period 2009-2015 (using the latest data year available) employees with secondary and tertiary education constitute on average the largest shares of public employees (38.5% and 36.2%, respectively).

Compared to other regions, the African average share of public employees with no education (8.3%) is only lower than that of South Asia (10.4%). Primary education level (17.0%) is nearly 4.0 points higher than in East Asia & Pacific, which has the second largest share (13.1%). Tertiary education is the lowest of all regions (36.2%).


In three countries only, more than half of the public employees have tertiary education: Tanzania, Ethiopia and Ghana (69.1%, 65.7% and 52.9%, respectively). On the other hand, in five countries, more than 20.0% of the public employees have no education at all: São Tomé & Príncipe (43.0%), Chad (23.1%), Malawi (20.8%), Mali (20.7%) and Liberia (20.6%).



Moreover, public employees are better educated than private employees. Compared to other world regions, the African average share of private employees with tertiary education is the lowest. The African average percentage of public employees with tertiary

education is more than three times higher than that of private employees (36.2% compared to 10.4%). In all of the 23 African countries covered, the percentage of public employees with tertiary education is higher.

III. But the private sector is younger than the public




In 26 African countries for which there is data in the period 2009-2015 (using the latest data year available), the average level of public employees as a percentage of total employment for the 25-64 age group is the highest (13.5%). There are only six countries in which

the percentage of public employees between 15 and 24 is higher than 10.0%: Botswana, Ethiopia, Mauritius, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles and Tunisia.

In seven countries, the percentage of public employees between 25 and 64 is higher than 20.0%: Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland and Tunisia.

At the regional level, the African average percentages of public employees aged between 15 and 24 and aged between 25 and 64

(5.4% and 13.5%, respectively) are lower than those of other world regions, apart from Latin America & the Caribbean (4.3% and 11.5%, respectively), whereas for those aged 65 or older, the average for African countries (4.7%) is higher than the averages for Latin America & the Caribbean and also South Asia (4.3% and 3.4%, respectively).



Public paid employees are, on average, +6.2 years older than private paid employees (38.4 and 32.2, respectively).

In fact, in all African countries for which there is data the median age of public employees is higher than private. The most extreme cases are those of Egypt, Morocco and Tanzania, whose median age of public paid employees is +11.0 years higher than that of private paid employees.

The African median age of public paid employees (38.4) is nearly -6.0 years lower than the averages for Europe & Central Asia and North America (44.0 and 43.5, respectively). It is also twice the median age of Africa's population (19.4)

2.2 Outstanding challenges

2.2.1 MOTIVATION: JOB SECURITY RATHER THAN FINANCIAL REMUNERATION


I. Wages: general dissatisfaction

In a 2017 survey by the University of Nottingham, University College London and University of Southern Denmark of 23,000 public servants across ten developing countries including Ghana, Malawi and Uganda, most public servants say they are dissatisfied with their salaries but acknowledge they would not find it easy to get a better-paid job in the private sector.


In Ghana, Malawi and Uganda, only 9% to 16% of public servants are satisfied with their salaries. For those dissatisfied (between 84% and 91%), almost half (41% to 53%) are aware they would not easily find a better-paid job in the private sector.

The WWBI capture relative wages within government across a standard set of occupations. This data provides estimates of pay progression, an important incentive for worker motivation and performance and is based on the wage survey conducted by the International Comparison Program (ICP) of 2011.

African and non-African countries: proportion of civil servants who believe their salary is satisfying, sufficient and competitive, % of respondents (2017)




African countries: senior government official to secretary, relative wage (2011)



Of the nine countries for which there is data in the latest wage survey conducted by the ICP in 2011, Tanzania and Kenya reward senior government officials +14.0 and +9.7 times more than secretaries, while Namibia and Uganda give senior government officials a wage that is only +4.0 and +3.8 times larger than secretaries.

African countries: senior government official to payroll clerk, relative wage (2011)



In all six countries covered, senior government officials are paid at least five times more than payroll clerks: Côte d'Ivoire, Swaziland, South Africa, Algeria, Uganda and Ghana.

Ghana: reasons for joining the public sector, % of respondents (2016)



According to a 2016 survey in Ghana, the main incentive for joining the public sector is job security for the majority of respondents (63.7%). Other reasons for joining the public sector are being part of the public sector (34.1%) and the salary and benefits (32.6%).

Source: Hulme et al

Public sector: the preferred choice of Egyptian youth

Findings from the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) round of 2012 show that 70% of youth (15-29) expressed preference for jobs in the public sector. The majority expressed willingness to work in the public sector because they consider public sector jobs to be 'a haven of stability'. Many young people also see public sector/government as 'an employer of trust' especially in terms of insurance and pension payments.

II. Insurance and social security: key non-monetary incentives

Besides salaries, insurance and social security are key non-monetary incentives, even if Africa's average is still very low.


Compared to other world regions, Africa has the lowest percentage of public employees with health insurance or social security: with a share of 54.1%, Africa is below Europe & Central Asia (58.3%) and far below East Asia & Pacific, Latin America & the Caribbean and South Asia, in which over 70.0% of public employees are insured.

However, for the 13 African countries covered in the WWBI dataset

(2009-2015, using the latest data year available for each country), the average percentage of public employees who have either health insurance or social security amounts to almost double the percentage of private employees (54.1%, compared to 27.8%).

Morocco has the highest percentage of public sector employees with insurance or social security (81.0%), whereas in Chad only 5.3% of public employees have insurance or social security.

African countries: public and private employees with insurance or social security, % of total employees (latest data year 2009-2015)



Boosting public service attractiveness: merit-based system and equal pay in Zambia

The Zambian government has instituted comprehensive human resource management reforms introducing a merit- and progression-based system for appointments and promotions to all public service positions and decentralising human resources functions to lower levels.

Public service has also adopted and implemented an integrated competitive remuneration strategy which seeks to achieve the 'equal pay for equal work' principle over a ten-year period. A comprehensive job evaluation and regrading exercise has been undertaken and implemented as the initial step, with the application of a single spine salary structure.

The implementation of this strategy has made the public service more competitive in terms of pay, thus attracting more talent from the private sector.

Ghost public servants: DRC

'Ghost working' is a fraud in which retired, deceased or non-existent public servants are recorded on the public payroll and paid salaries. Africa reportedly loses millions of dollars annually through payments to ghost workers.

Recent literature (2017) shows that assembling accurate health worker records can help governments understand health workforce characteristics and use data to direct scarce domestic resources to where they are most needed. In response to workforce management and compensation issues, the DRC's government implemented iHRIS, an open source human resources information system. In Kasai

Central and Kasai Provinces, the Ministry of Public Health identified over 11,500 verified health workers. Most iHRIS-registered health workers (57% in Kasai Central and 73% in the rest of Kasai Provinces) reported receiving no regular government pay of any kind (salaries or risk allowances). Payroll analysis showed that 27% of the health workers listed as salary recipients in the electronic payroll system were ghost workers, as were 42% of risk allowance recipients. As a result, the Ministries of Public Health, Public Service, and Finance reallocated funds away from ghost workers to cover salaries and risk allowances for thousands of health workers who were previously under- or uncompensated due to lack of funds.

2.2.2 CAREER PATH: LOW MERITOCRACY IMPACTS PERFORMANCE


I. Recruitment and advancement: strongly linked to political and personal ties

The 2011 African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, ratified by 16 African countries, provides a comprehensive framework to guide the African public sector in delivering the continents' major development goals. Article 19 specifies that recruitment of persons into the public service in Africa must be 'based on the principle of merit, equality and non-discrimination'.

In practice, only one country, Mauritius, earns the maximum score (100.0) for appointing and evaluating civil servants based on professional criteria according to the Global Integrity (GI) Africa Integrity Indicators (AII). Although Somalia and Sudan have constitutional requirements stipulating how civil servants should be recruited, according to the source there is no adherence to this provision. In Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Morocco and Zimbabwe, constitutional requirements on civil servants' recruitment are not strictly adhered to.

African countries: in practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria, scores (2017)

Source: GI



Countries are scored on a five-level scale in increments of 25.0 points (out of a maximum score of 100.0)


Public sector recruitment: the case of Egypt

According to findings from the ELMPS round of 2012, 13.8% of young people working in the public sector found their jobs through relatives and friends. 60.1% of youth working in government and 58.5% of youth working in the public sector have fathers themselves employed in government and the public sector.


In the 2017 survey of 23,000 public servants across ten developing countries including Ghana, Malawi and Uganda, recruitment appears to be the most subject to political and personal connections, followed by promotions and pay rises.

According to the same survey, public servants for whom political and personal connections were important for recruitment are less motivated to work hard and to serve the public, are less committed to staying in the public sector, are lower performing and are less satisfied with their jobs.

African and non-African countries: proportion of civil servants who attribute at least some importance to political connections for their recruitment, promotion or pay rises, % (2017)




African and non-African countries: proportion of civil servants who attribute at least some importance to personal connections for their recruitment, promotion or pay rises, % (2017)



African and non-African countries: the negative effects of politicised recruitment of civil servants, regression coefficients (2017)



African and non-African countries: the negative effects of personal connection-based recruitment of civil servants, regression coefficients (2017)



Public Service Commissions (PSCs)

PSCs are independent bodies that regulate and manage human resources within the public sector. PSCs advise and, in some cases, are responsible for the meritocratic recruitment, assessment and promotion of public servants, to protect public service from patronage and political interference.

Association of African Public Services Commissions (AAPSComs)

AAPSComs gathers PSCs from 13 countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). It was established in 2008 to share experiences and best practices to promote good governance and improve service delivery on the continent. The key objectives of AAPSComs include the development and implementation of common capacity building strategies and programmes in order to recruit and retain well-trained, professional and skilled public servants.

The PSC in Ghana: embedding merit and performance-based practices

Ghana's PSC is established under the Constitution to operate independently in the performance of its functions. The Commission is directly involved in the recruitment and appointment of the top three layers of officers (Chief Director, Director and Deputy Director) in public institutions.

The Commission is consulted by Governing Councils for the various services on recruitment and appointments.

The Ghana PSC has recently reviewed its human resource management policy framework and manual with a view to creating a service which emphasises a merit- and performance-based culture with citizen orientation.

Performance contracts: best practices from Kenya and Rwanda

In **Kenya**, the government introduced performance contracts in the management of public service (state corporations, government ministries and departments) in 2004. The overriding objective is to free managers from unproductive and uncoordinated activities so that they can focus on what matters: the results, in line with the overall National Vision 2030 and the Citizen Service Delivery Charters. The Kenya School of Government also plays a critical role in ensuring that the performance culture is sustained through continuous professional development.

In **Rwanda**, the government developed home grown solutions drawing on Rwandan culture and practices to adapt development programs to the country's needs and context. To ensure accountability of local governments after the 2000 decentralisation reforms, '*Imihigo*' (performance contracts) was introduced in 2006. '*Imihigo*' has been credited with improving accountability and quickening the pace of citizen centred development activities and programs. The practice of '*Imihigo*' has subsequently been extended to ministries, embassies and public service staff.

Libya: a dangerous vacuum

Between 70% and 85% of the formal workforce in Libya are employed in the public sector.

There is no clear mechanism for employment in the public service. Employment is secured mostly through executive appointment, often influenced by nepotism and '*wasta*', translated roughly as influence.

Promotions and incentives are not tied to performance, but mostly based on favouritism and interference by political figures.

In a 2012 survey, 93% of respondents agree or strongly agree that favouritism in the recruitment process of public servants affects program implementation. Poor quality of public sector employees is directly linked to mismanagement of resources, the lack of trust in public institutions and the rise of non-state actors (NSAs) and militia groups to fill the vacuum of public service delivery.

II. Mobility: mainly inexistent, whether within or outside the public service

In most cases at global level, employment protection for public servants is considered as the best way to guard them from political interference. A questionable side-effect is that generally public servants spend most of their working life in the public service.

According to recent surveys of public servants (2000-2014) the average civil servant in Ghana has spent almost 16 years in civil service and the average civil servant in Nigeria almost 17 years, of which respectively around 12 and 13 years were spent in the same organisation.

In Nigeria, only a small minority of civil servants change organisations frequently. Almost 80% of staff had moved only once in the service while 8% moved four or more times. Only a quarter of staff are satisfied with the number of transfers they have had, and almost half wish for a higher internal mobility.

The survey also shows that the number of transfers within the civil service seems more dependent on political connections than

on ability. While years of schooling is negatively correlated with the number of moves, the correlations with the network measures (number of family members working in the organisation or service, number of 'community' members working in the organisation or the service, and a dummy indicator of whether the official knows their boss socially outside of the organisation) are all positive.

African and non-African countries: characteristics of civil servants, averages (2000-2014)

	Ghana	Nigeria	Indonesia	Pakistan
Age	43.5	.	41.5	41.5
Years in service	15.5	16.8	15.6	14.8
Years in current organisation	12.1	12.7	14.8	13.4

Source: Rogger, D.

2.2.3 WORKING ENVIRONMENT: VERY DIVERSE WITH ALMOST NO RESOURCES AT LOCAL LEVEL

Available surveys of public servants in Nigeria (2010) and Ethiopia (2013) show that the amount of responsibility of public servants, their level of independence and quality of management, and the availability of equipment and information flows vary considerably according to the level of government. The local level is the most affected by shortages of resources and equipment.

I. Responsibility and knowledge: an information gap on public service constituents

Depending on the nature of their work and level of government, public servants serve different amounts of populations and sizes of geographic areas. On average, local governments in Nigeria operate in an area roughly the size of Greater London (1,569 km²), but with a far smaller population (apart from Lagos State). Ethiopian regional officials serve citizens across an area equivalent to 56 Londons.

However, public officials are not always fully aware of the population they serve. In a 2017 study, when local governments were asked about the population they serve, the average public official in Ethiopia overestimated it by a quarter. Some think they are serving two or three times the number of citizens they actually are.


Public service delivery outcomes improve with better information: evidence from the Ethiopian education sector

A 2016 study shows that public service delivery outcomes improve in response to better information. A programme run within the education public service to improve information flows led to a +2.3 percentage-point increase in the enrolment of 7-14 year-old children in primary school. This amounts to 17.0% of the remaining gap towards universal primary education. Furthermore, there is significant evidence of an improvement in the pupil-teacher ratio, with an average reduction of 1.6 pupils per teacher as a result of the programme.

II. Independence and quality of management: finding the right balance

Latest research (2017) using surveys of public servants (2010-2013) show substantial differences in the numbers of managers in the public service, a variable that is likely to impact management practices, work processes, and the working environment of public servants. For instance, in Nigeria, the proportion of managers operating within the service (one for every 1.2 non-managers) is ten times higher than in Ethiopia (one for every 13.0 non-managers).

In Nigeria, high heterogeneity across the different levels of government is confirmed by a public-sector version of the World Management Survey, which shows a strong variation in the quality of management between the federal organisation and state governments. The same variation is also exhibited within the same state (Kaduna) and across the same level of government (Federal Government).



III. Equipment and resources: for many, no Internet access nor electricity at all

The availability of equipment such as computers and of resources, such as the Internet and electricity, is key. The proportion of staff with a computer they have regular permission to use for work is highest at the federal level in Nigeria (38%), while it is strikingly low at local level in both Nigeria (6%) and Ethiopia (8%).

In Ethiopia, local governments had 21% of working days with Internet access, equivalent to only one day in a working week. Three-quarters of managers surveyed stated that the absence of equipment or funding for equipment were the major bottlenecks to being able to utilise information technology.

In Nigeria, local governments had Internet access on only 3% of days on average, with many governments having no access at all. In five of the 18 local governments surveyed, managers stated that they never had access to electricity, and half the organisations only had power for half the day on average. Across the local-level, only three public servants out of ten have access to vehicles for work.

Variation within states: local governments in Kaduna State

Of the six local governments surveyed in Kaduna State, the number of hours of available electricity during a working day goes from zero in one local government to continuously available in another. Similarly, the proportion of public officers with access to a computer varies widely across the six local governments. Half of the organisations have no access to the Internet and the other three have at least 15 hours a day. Each of these statistics echoes the degree of heterogeneity in facilities across local governments, even within a single state.

2.2.4 SKILLS: THE CHALLENGE OF RETAINING AND BUILDING TALENT

I. Brain drain: the key challenge

By the end of 2013, about 85% of the total sub-Saharan African emigrants were in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Estimated at 6.0 million in 2013, the total number of migrants in OECD countries could rise to 34.0 million by 2050. In 2013, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) hosted about 50.0% of the total sub-Saharan African diaspora. Almost one-third of Cabo Verde’s population and about 10.0% of Mauritius, São Tomé & Príncipe and Seychelles’ population live outside the country.

Brain drain, which is the emigration of skilled nationals, results in a depletion of skilled human resources in their country of origin. An estimated 70,000 skilled professionals emigrate from Africa each year.

At its worst in the health sector

Brain drain is particularly pervasive in the health sector. In too many African countries, there are more locally born physicians residing outside their country than in it.

In 2015, the number of African-trained International Medical Graduates (IMGs) practising in the US reached 13,584, a +27.1% increase from 2005. This is equivalent to about one African-educated physician migrating to the US per day over the last decade. In 2015, 86.0% of all African-educated physicians working in the US were trained in Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa .


It costs each African country between around \$21,000 and \$59,000 to train a medical doctor. Nine countries - Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia

and Zimbabwe - have lost more than \$2.0 billion since 2010 from training doctors who then migrated. Annually, it is estimated that Africa loses around \$2.0 billion through brain drain in the health sector.

Destination countries do not pay for the cost of training African doctors they recruit. One in ten doctors working in the UK come from Africa, allowing the UK to save on average \$2.7 billion on training costs, followed by the US (\$846.0 million), Australia (\$621.0 million) and Canada (\$384.0 million). In total, these four top destination countries have saved \$4.6 billion in training costs for the Africa-trained doctors they have recruited.

African countries: African-educated physicians working in the US (2005-2015)

Source: Duvivier et al



The African Union (AU) migration policy framework (2018-2027)

In order to curb the brain drain, the AU recommends to:

- Counter the exodus of skilled nationals, particularly health professionals, by promoting the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) strategy for retention of Africa's human capacities and generating gender-responsive economic development programmes providing gainful employment, professional development and educational opportunities to qualified nationals in their home countries.
- Counter the effects of brain drain by encouraging nationals abroad to contribute to the development of their country of origin, through financial and human capital transfers, such as short and long-term return migration; the transfer of skills, knowledge and technology, including in the context of programmes such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Migration in Development for Africa Programme (MIDA) and activities of International Labour Organisation (ILO), WHO and other relevant agencies.
- Establish policies for the replacement of qualified persons who have left their country of origin, including strategies to attract the diaspora and retention policies.
- Maximise the contribution of skilled professionals to the continent by facilitating regional and continental mobility.

II. Capacity building: more attention is needed, including from partners

The AU Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration urges member states to "undertake systematic, comprehensive and evidence-based capacity development of public service programs to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of public service administration".

AU Leadership Academy (AULA) - 2016

Working in concert with member states and relevant institutions worldwide, AULA aims at developing and delivering innovative capacity building solutions for the AU decision-making, policy and programme development within the framework of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

The AULA targets AU Staff, AU elected officials, Permanent Representatives Council members and staff of the embassies accredited to the AU, young African citizens wishing to pursue careers in the AU and its Institutions, civil servants in African member states and Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Continental initiatives

African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) - 1964

Established by African governments with support from UNESCO, CAFRAD serves as a centre of excellence to support governments' actions in capacity development and innovation in public administration for improved service delivery. CAFRAD also provides a platform for the directors of schools and institutes of public administration and management who meet every two years to address subjects of common interest and challenge. CAFRAD currently has 36 member states and is headquartered in Tangier, Morocco.

African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) - 1991

Initially established to build human and institutional capacity for achieving economic development and good governance in Africa, ACBF now serves as the Specialised Agency for Capacity Development and coordinates with the AU Commission and other specialised agencies in developing the AU's capacity and building strategies to achieve the continent's SDGs. Since its establishment, the foundation has worked in empowering governments, parliaments, civil society, private sector and higher education institutions in over 45 countries, and six RECs.

African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) - 1971

AAPAM is a continental institution that promotes best practices, excellence and professionalism in public administration and management in Africa. It has a wide network of membership comprised of individual, corporate and government members.

- It promotes excellence in the African public services through the Innovative Management Award and Gold Medal Award.
- It has formed the Young Professionals Network (YPN), the African Public Sector Human Resource Management (APS-HRMnet) and the recently launched AAPAM Women in Public Service Network. The YPN was established in 2006 to cater for young professionals entering the public and civil service. The objective is to integrate young people into the public service as future leaders. Since it was established, the network has provided skills, ethics and techniques to address the challenges of young people entering the public service. So far, it has sponsored more than 100 young professionals in the civil service across the continent, to attend conferences where they advocated for issues relating to young professionals in the public sector.

At country level, 40 countries have established institutions specifically dedicated to training public servants: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Addressing the shortage of public teachers

According to UNESCO, sub-Saharan Africa faces the greatest challenge in terms of teacher shortage. The region accounts for two-thirds of the new primary teachers needed globally by 2030 (around 6.2 million): it will have to fill almost 4.0 million vacant posts and create around 2.3 million new primary teaching positions. The shortage is driven by the general increase in school-age population and the specific need to raise the number of teachers in some countries such as Niger (185,200 more teachers), Mali (137,800), Burkina Faso (123,200) and Senegal (114,700).

Teacher Education and Professional Development (TEPD) in Kenya: TEPD is a joint initiative between donors and private

organisations (Cisco, Microsoft) and the government of Kenya to improve the quality of teachers. It aims to improve the quality of instruction in all 23 teacher training colleges in Kenya. To date 8,000 tutors and educators, and 32,000 current and future teachers have been trained.

N-POWER in Nigeria: The N-Power program aims to equip young unemployed graduates to assist in improving inadequacies in public services like education, health and civic education. The government has partnered with private stakeholders (e.g. Learn Africa, Microsoft, MTN Foundation and Samsung) for curriculum development and ICT provision for training of over 500,000 unemployed graduates as teaching assistants in primary schools.

Teacher Training Programme (LTTP) in Liberia: Liberia's 14 years of civil war destroyed public service delivery, including education infrastructure and left a generation of students with no access to formal education. By the end of 2003, 30% of public schools and 24% of community schools were destroyed. Funding for education was a major challenge after the civil war. Many teachers in public schools lacked the required capacity to teach. Still less than 50% of pre-primary staff are qualified, only

63% of primary school teachers are qualified, and less than 34% of secondary school teachers hold the minimum qualification for their position. Donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have provided most of the teacher training in the first decade following the civil war. LTTP is a donor and NGO-driven initiative funded by USAID and FHI 360 to train current and new teachers to improve education delivery.



SPOTLIGHT

Building public services in post-conflict settings: a specific challenge

Fragile and post-conflict settings present specific challenges to governance and public service delivery. If addressed effectively, they can benefit state building and improve state capacity.

Somaliland

In 2009 the government of Somaliland established the Civil Service Institute to train public servants in line with its national development priorities. As part of the reforms process, the government of Somaliland has a partnership with Ethiopia Civil Service University. Under the initiative, the government sends civil servants to Ethiopia to undertake bachelor's and master's programmes to develop their capacity and learn from how the Ethiopian civil service operates. In 2017, 20 civil servants who had undergone training in Ethiopia graduated and returned to the country to assist the government in improving public service delivery.

South Sudan

In 2011, the AU and three Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states - Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda - put in place programmes to help the new Government of South Sudan work from the beginning of statehood. The initiatives provided 1,200 civil servants (1,000 from the AU and 200 from IGAD countries) in public administration, financial management, health, education and other strategic areas, to be deployed in key government institutions at all levels, with public service contracts to assist in building the South Sudanese public service and public service delivery.

Liberia

Emerging in 2006 from a 14-year civil conflict, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's government was faced with the challenge of building almost from scratch an efficient public service. Capacity was identified as a major challenge by a 2005 report finding that, of the 19,635 persons surveyed in 33 agencies and institutions,

only 12.5% had a first degree and 1.9% post-graduate degrees.

The new government instituted key capacity building initiatives:

- The Liberia Emergency Capacity-Building Support Program: Liberians from the diaspora were appointed to Ministerial and other high-level positions in the government.
- The Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN): senior Liberian Expatriates were invited into the country and engaged on fixed term contracts (between one to 18 months) to undertake specific reforms initiatives.
- The President's Young Professional Program (PYPP): the PYPP was implemented to create career and professional opportunities for young Liberians to serve in the public service. As of March 2016, 72 young professionals had completed the program and another 25 had just begun. About 90.0% of the program alumni either continue to work in government or are studying on government scholarships while others have risen to become department directors or Assistant Ministers.
- Building on the success of the PYPP, the Emerging Public Leaders (EPL) Program has been launched to form a Pan-African network of 500+ young leaders in public service by 2022. The program aims to generate civil service leaders by creating a tipping point for meritocratic and effective civil service throughout the continent. The EPL model is built on a strong partnership with governments and local partners, where young people are recruited and placed in key government positions for two years. The program is currently expanding to Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea.

2.2.5 INTEGRITY: A POTENTIAL LOSS OF RESOURCES AND AN OBSTACLE TO ACCESS



I. Corruption in African public sector: among the highest at global level

Linked to mainly commodities export-based economies, and with a lower than average level of wages, Africa's public sector has been the target of corruption, making Africa one of the world regions with the highest levels of actual and perceived corruption.


The World Justice Project (WJP), through its variable 'Absence of corruption', measures the forms of corruption in the public sector (executive, judicial and legislative branch, police and military). In 2017/2018, sub-Saharan Africa has the second most corrupt public sector of all regions, only ahead of South Asia.

Transparency International (TI), with the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), measures the level of perceived corruption in the public sector according to country experts and business people. Sub-Saharan Africa is perceived as the region with the most corrupt public sector (32 out of 100).

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), through its Public Sector Corruption Index, measures to what extent public sector employees grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use. It confirms the relatively high level of public sector corruption on the continent in 2016, however slightly decreasing since 2010.




For V-Dem the countries with the highest levels of public sector corruption are Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia. Those in which public sector corruption levels have increased the most in the past decade (2007-2016) are Burundi, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi and Mauritania. On the other end of the spectrum, the countries with the lowest levels of public sector corruption are Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Rwanda and Seychelles. The countries in which public sector corruption levels have decreased the most are Benin, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and Tunisia.



Although according to V-Dem data corruption levels seem to be slightly declining since 2010, according to Afrobarometer, in 2014/2015 for almost 2/3 of Africa's population (58.2%) the level of corruption in the country has increased 'somewhat' or 'a lot' since the year before. Concerningly in Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Africa corruption is perceived to have increased for more than 70.0% of the population.

African countries: population believing the level of corruption increased over the past year, % of respondents (2014/2015)



Source: Afrobarometer


II. Public procurement: a high risk of corruption

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) sub-indicator *Tendering Process* assesses the extent to which bids from competing contractors, suppliers or vendors are invited through open advertising of the scope, specifications and terms of the proposed contract, and whether the criteria by which bids are evaluated are available for scrutiny.

This variable has registered deterioration on the continent over the last decade, even worsening in the last five years. In 2016, nine countries - Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe - score 0.0. Only three countries reach the best possible score of 100.0: Kenya, Liberia and Rwanda.

The infrastructure sector is particularly vulnerable to corruption as it involves large sums of public resources and complex projects, direct control by the government, multiple players and contractual links, technical capacity gaps, and a deep-seated culture of secrecy.


African countries: Existence of competitive bidding in major public procurements, scores (2017)




100.0 75.0 50.0 25.0 0.0

Source: GI

III. Petty corruption and bribery: denying access, and increasing inequality level



Source: Afrobarometer and TI




The police and the courts are perceived as the most corrupt public services

Almost one in three Africans reported to have paid a bribe to get assistance from courts (30.8%) or to avoid a problem with the police (29.3%).


Access to other public goods such as school services, health treatments or access to documents has also been hindered by bribe requests.

African countries: people who paid a bribe to request assistance or avoid a problem with the police, % of citizens who had contact with the police (2014/2015)



Within the police services, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have the most corrupt public servants while Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa have the least corrupt.

African countries: people who paid a bribe to get the needed assistance, % of citizens who had contact with the courts (2014/2015)



Within the courts, Egypt, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco and Sierra Leone have the most corrupt civil servants, while Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius and Namibia have the least corrupt.

Nigeria: total bribes equivalent to over a third of the combined federal and state education budgets

The findings of the first ever large-scale household survey on corruption in Nigeria, held by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2016, show that almost one in three Nigerian adults pay bribes when in contact with public officials.


They pay an average of six bribes per year, equivalent to about 13.0% of an average annual salary.

It is estimated that a total of roughly 82.3 million bribes were paid in one year, for approximately \$4.6 billion in total, equivalent to over a third (39.0%) of the combined federal and state education budgets in 2016.

Men and young adults appear more vulnerable to bribery than other groups.


Police officers are the type of public servants to whom bribes are most commonly paid, followed by prosecutors.

Nigeria: prevalence of bribery in selected types of public officials, % (2016)



African countries: Education Quality & Corruption Perception Index, correlation (2017)

Source: MIF and TI




Higher bribery rates are associated with lower levels of services and worsened inequalities. According to Transparency International, corruption in the education sector makes the offer more expensive, more limited and of poorer quality, as suggested by the strong positive correlation of +0.7 between the 2017 IIAG indicator

Education Quality and the 2017 CPI. Petty corruption, by imposing an extra illegal fee to access a public service, disproportionately targets the poorest, as they have limited access to alternative private services.

IV. Political interference: widespread, impacting results

According to GI's All, of the 54 African countries, Ghana is the only country to record a score of 100.0 out of 100.0, where civil servants operate freely without political interference.




Nigeria's public servants: most frustrated by the politicisation of public administration

'If you could let the Head of Service/Mr. President know one thing about working in the service, what would it be?'

In the Nigeria Survey of Civil Servants 2010, more than 60.0% of responses across all levels of government were united in their frustration with the politicisation of the bureaucracy, with political interference seen as a possible cause of many of the failings of the service.

Senior public servants expressed concern about the mutual distrust between public servants and political office-holders, and the conflict this creates.

Nigeria: most frequent issues raised by public servants, % of respondents (2010)



Source: OHCSF



SPOTLIGHT

AU and recs public officers: who are they

I. African Union Commission (AUC)

As of August 2016, the Commission had 1,612 employees (659 regular and 953 short-term) including those at headquarters and regional offices.

According to the AUC financial report for December 2014, audited in 2016, the headquarters constituted the biggest bulk of the AUC expenses for all regional offices: \$201.0 million out of a total budget of \$238.0 million. 44.3% of the budget for the headquarters was spent on employee salaries and benefits.

The AUC has 5% of the employees of the European Commission (EC) (32,000), for a staff budget of 4% of the 2018 EC budget (\$2.6 billion, officials and temporary staff).

AUC Headquarters expenses, \$ (2014)

Staff salaries	\$74,000,000
Operations	\$80,000,000
Employee benefits	\$15,000,000
Total expenses	\$201,000,000

Source: AU

Recruitment

Type of appointment

Mode of recruitment

Political and Special Appointments



Made by elected officials

Regular Appointments



Competitive recruitment processes
(open to citizens of 55 AU member states)

Continuing Regular Appointments (after five years of regular employment)

Fixed-term Appointments

Short-term Appointments

Consultancy

Special Services Appointment

General Services Categories:

- First Category: Administrative, clerical, maintenance and paramedical staff
- Second Category: Auxiliary staff

Source: AU


Employment of youth: no specific programme

Positions at the AU and its organs are advertised and subsequently filled by African professionals. Unlike other regional bodies, the AU does not have a Young Professional Programme, therefore the majority of young African professionals are left out of the recruitment process and are not given equal opportunity for employment.

For any given position, young professionals have to compete with other professionals from the 55 member states of the AU. Some with far more advanced educational qualifications than others.

Junior Professional Officers (JPO) are mutually beneficial arrangements where a member state sponsors one of its citizens to be seconded for employment by a partner institution, the AU in this case.

II. Regional Economic Communities (RECs)



The Arab Maghreb Union's (AMU) six divisions employ 40 employees, including 15 senior executives; one has a doctorate, and the other 14 have master's degrees. All have been with AMU for at least six months—either as experts or diplomats. Although AMU requires five senior employees from each country to perform their functions effectively, the Union only employs three per country.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) employs 99 professional employees and 130 support employees,

for a ratio of 1:1.3. Assistant Secretary General's Office Program employs 16 professionals, followed by Administration and Investment Promotion and Private Sector (14 each). Technical cooperation and resource mobilisation only employ two professional employees. COMESA's goal is to have 200 professional employees and 200 support employees.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) employs 313 professionals, of which 242 are females and 71 are males; and all professional employees' contracts exceed six months.


Of the professional employees, 21 have doctorate degrees, 124 have master's degrees, and 56 have bachelor's degrees. Within ECOWAS, the largest employers of professional employees are Political Affairs and Peace and Security Commission (83), and General Administration and Conference (42). The Energy and Mines Commission has three professional employees, while the Education, Science and Culture Commission employs four employees.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) employs a total of 147 staff, of which 90 professional employees. Of these, 46 are women, for a ratio of almost 1:1. The two largest employers of professional employees are the Directorate of Finance and Administration (19) and the Directorate of Budget and Finance (27). Eleven professional employees hold a doctorate, whereas the remaining 79 hold master's degrees.

Staff recruitment

The East African Community (EAC) and AMU, whose mandates are political, mainly recruit staff based on citizenship or political considerations (by setting implicit or fixed quotas for each member state), either through secondments by their governments or by political appointments. COMESA and SADC, mandated with trade integration, recruit staff mainly through competitive processes; this

is also the case for IGAD, 80% of whose staff is recruited competitively. ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which aim for a mix of politics and competition, have adopted a formula that combines both recruitment modes, but the balance still tilts in favour of political considerations.



Management recruitment

AMU has a rotation system for the secretary general with national quotas for senior professional personnel.

ECOWAS has a rotation system for the president of its commission, national representation of commissioners, and competitive and professional appointments with recognition of member state representation.

EAC has a rotation system for the secretary general, and its staff are recruited on a professional and competitive basis, with respect for the equity of member states.

SADC has a competitive recruitment system, in which member countries nominate candidates for executive secretary, who are interviewed by the Council of Ministers; all other management positions are advertised, and candidates are interviewed by a panel consisting of member states.

Inadequate staffing

A recent survey (2013-14) showed that all RECs expressed concern about inadequate staffing as well as lack of funds, and in some cases, the procedures to recruit required staffing levels. All the RECs indicated the need to strengthen links between their secretariats and member states. Although all member states must contribute towards the operation of the REC to which they belong, most fall short in paying the necessary dues. Consequently, development partners have funded 40% to 60% percent of their budgets. The only exception is AMU, which is fully funded by its member states.



Section

03 _

Building a Sound Contract Between Citizens and Public Service Providers

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3.1 Drawing the social contract


3.1.1 THE NEED FOR A STRONG DEAL

The demographic prospects, the 21st century's new and existing challenges and growing expectations from citizens put a significant strain on African public services and call for a social contract to be drawn between public service providers and citizens. Built on trust, this contract will also be key to guaranteeing ownership of public policies.

Through the social contract, citizens consent to state authority, limiting some of their freedoms in exchange for protection of universal human rights and security. Citizens also consent to pay taxes as a contribution to cover the cost of delivering public goods and services. The public authorities, on the other hand, commit to provide public services that meet the needs and demands of their citizens, and to be accountable for these.

A social contract has two components. The first component consists of the contract between citizens-customers and public service providers, where the supply meets the demand. Domestic resource mobilisation and the tax system constitute the basis to establish this part of the social contract, that requires counting the demand through improved vital statistics, establishing tax collection systems and delivering public services.

The second component is accountability: taxpayers become stakeholders through the tax contract, as electors are stakeholders through their ballot. And as governments are accountable to all citizens who have elected them, public service providers become accountable to taxpayers. This part of the contract requires improved processes to strengthen transparency and accountability, and more ways for citizens to monitor, oversee and take part in public delivery.



The effect of state taxation on governance



Immediate effect	Intermediate effect	Governance outcomes
State focused on taxation	State motivated to promote greater prosperity to stabilise or increase the tax take	More responsive
	State motivated to improve tax administration	More capable
Taxpayers become more politically engaged	Taxpayers organise themselves to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. resist taxation 2. monitor taxation 3. monitor spending 	More accountability
Fiscal bargaining	Taxation becomes more acceptable, predictable and efficient	More responsive and capable
	Better public policy based on debate and negotiation	More responsive and capable
	More scrutiny of spending	More accountability
	Strengthening of legislature relative to executive	More accountability

Source: ODI

Non-resource taxation and governance: a positive correlation

Sources: MIF, WGI, ICTD/ UNU-WIDER

African countries: non-resource taxation as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Overall Governance and Government effectiveness, correlations (country averages 2000-2015)



The positive correlation coefficient (country averages 2000-2015) suggests that a higher level of non-resource taxation (taxation not derived from extractive sectors) is closely associated with higher *Overall Governance* scores (+0.6) and higher government effectiveness (+0.6), as well as with higher spending on education (+0.8) and on health (+0.7).

3.1.2 TAX COLLECTION: THE PATH TO AUTONOMY AND OWNERSHIP

I. External Financial Flows: still almost half of domestic revenues

The total value of External Financial Flows to the continent still represents the equivalent of 42.0% of domestic tax revenues: respectively \$182.8 billion and \$436.8 billion.

Africa: financial flows and tax revenues averages, current billion \$ (2005-2017)

Source: AfDB, OECD, UNDP

			2005-09 average	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016(e)	2017(p)
Foreign	Private	Inward foreign direct investments	48.7	46.0	49.8	49.4	53.1	56.0	51.3	56.5	57.5
		Portfolio investments	10.5	28.5	21.6	34.3	23.0	21.3	15.7	6.5	5.2
		Remittances	41.7	53.1	59.6	64.3	63.7	67.2	64.8	64.6	66.2
	Public	Official Development Assistance (net total, all donors)	42.6	47.8	51.6	51.8	56.8	54.3	51.0	50.2	50.9
		Total foreign flows	143.6	175.4	182.7	199.8	196.7	198.8	182.8	177.7	179.7
Domestic	Tax revenues		351.9	458.2	512.7	561.5	541.0	506.4	436.8		

Donor support: a perverse dependence?

Due to the availability of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and resource rents, African states lacked the incentive to expand their sources of financing, which led to under-utilising their tax potential. The current African Union Reform Panel recognises that externally-provided budget and project support create a 'moral hazard for recipients', as it prevents the speedy exit from aid dependence and the shift of accountability internally.

II. Tax revenues in sub-Saharan Africa: only about 15% of GDP



Average tax revenues (resource + non-resource, excluding social contributions) are only about 15.0% of GDP in Africa, compared to 23.5% in OECD countries (in the period 2000-2015). Only six African countries – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa – collect revenues (resource + non-resource) that are similar or exceed the OECD average. In terms of non-resource revenues (excluding social contributions), the African average for the period 2000-2015 amounts to 13.7% of GDP. In resource-rich

countries non-resource revenues are generally much lower, ranging from 7.6% in Angola to 2.1% in Equatorial Guinea, respectively around twice and seven times smaller than the African average. After peaking at \$561.5 billion, total domestic revenues declined by -23.6% (in current prices) between 2012 and 2015, mainly due to the fall in commodity prices, even though total domestic revenues for non-resource-rich countries increased by +9.6% to \$93.8 billion, mainly due to an increase in direct taxes (+12.0%) and indirect taxes (+8.0%).

African countries: tax revenues, % of GDP (2000-2015)

Source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER





Tax revenue: 30% to 50% of Africa's total tax liability not collected?

Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (2016) describe domestic resources as the “largest untapped source of financing to fund national development plans”.

A 2016 McKinsey report estimates that 30% to 50% of Africa's total tax liability is not collected as Africa's total tax opportunity is between \$415 billion and \$620 billion annually.

Tax collection could increase by between \$120 billion and \$300 billion annually by 2025, provided that governments are able to overcome several structural challenges, including high levels of informality in business, fraud, non-payment, late payment and tax avoidance.

Tax reform in Rwanda

With the Rwanda Revenue Authority (1997), the government has widened the tax base, improved taxpayer education, enhanced compliance enforcement, introduced electronic billing machines for Value Added Tax (VAT)-registered taxpayers, improved audits and enacted laws to penalise tax evasion.

From 2000 to 2014, total domestic revenue as a share of GDP rose by about half.

Consequently, government spending on health increased from 4.2% of GDP in 2000 to 7.5% in 2014. External resources for health declined from their highest value, 67.0% in 2009, to 46.0% in 2014.


III. Tax collection capacity: weak results

Tax effort is the ratio between what a country collects in taxes (tax share of GDP) and its tax collection capacity. The average tax effort in sub-Saharan Africa is higher across all its income categories than in other regions. Despite higher tax efforts than richer countries, African countries, however, collect lower taxes as a percentage of GDP,

meaning that their high tax effort is mainly driven by low capacity for tax collection.

Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Uganda exert the same level of tax effort as high-income countries across other world regions, but in practice collect as low as one fourth of taxes over GDP.

Tax effort (2011-2012)



African and non-African countries: tax effort and tax collection, correlation (2011-2012)



Cost of tax collection: more than double that of Latin America & the Caribbean

With almost the same average size of tax staff per 1,000 population, the average cost of tax collection in sub-Saharan Africa is more than double that of Latin America & the Caribbean.

Data compiled within the framework of the Doing Business survey show that businesses operating in sub-Saharan Africa are expected to make 38 payments per year (compared to 12 in OECD countries) and are expected to spend an average of 314 hours per year to comply with their tax obligations (compared to 175 hours in OECD countries).

In Nigeria for example, the average number of hours a company spends annually paying taxes is nearly three times higher than the regional average.

Tax performance indicators, averages (2012-2013)

Region	Average cost*	Average tax staff*
East Asia & Pacific	1.17	0.41
Central Asia & Central Europe	1.18	0.94
Latin America & the Caribbean	1.30	0.33
Middle East & North Africa	1.06	0.45
South Asia	1.51	0.26
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.01	0.32
Western Europe	0.92	1.08
United States & Canada	0.97	0.69

* Average cost (% of tax collection): ratio of tax authority budget to collected revenue; average tax staff: ratio of tax authority staff to 1,000 population.

Source: ACBF

Property and land taxes: the key to local autonomy

Local taxation depends mainly on land and property taxes. Many African governments miss out on this potential. Although property and land prices have risen, the official valuation remains weak or inexistent. In Nairobi, property is currently being taxed on property valuations from 1982.

In the absence of appropriate management tools (e.g. cadastres) and of a regular update of the tax base, property tax yield remains low. In 2015, the average for the 14 African countries with data on property taxes as a share of GDP is 0.5%, almost one fourth of the OECD average for 2014 (1.9%). The African countries with the highest levels are Morocco (2.0%), South Africa (1.5%), Mauritius (1.0%) and Senegal (0.5%).

In **South Africa**, provincial governments provide local authorities with administrative support and training to assist with valuation, issuing bills and collection. Property tax contributes about one fourth of the annual budget for the country's eight metropolitan councils.

In contrast, **Sierra Leone** and **Liberia** together have fewer than 50 property evaluators for a combined population of 10 million.

In **Madagascar**, the National Land Program was initiated in 2005 to modernise and decentralise land governance. This was achieved through the introduction of land certificates, the establishment of communal land offices to oversee local-level

land administration, the computerisation of existing land and surveying services, the renewal of land laws and the training of decentralised land management staff.

As a result, 546 to 1,550 local governments established land offices with at least one land officer, the cost of land certificate was reduced from \$500 per title to around \$14 and the average processing time went from six to ten years to around seven months. From 2005 to 2014, local government land offices issued 96 thousand land certificates, compared to the previous system which produced 2,000-3,000 land titles per year.



SPOTLIGHT

Informality and corruption: the denial of any social contract

The average size of the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa is currently estimated at 42% of gross national income, ranging from 28% in South Africa to 60% in Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Building the social contract requires reducing informality.

'Formalisation' incentives

Source: ACBF

Benin: the Taxe Professionnelle Synthétique (TPS)

In 2014 Benin introduced the TPS for micro and small enterprises (MSEs). As a result, signing up for the tax register and commercial register is done in one place, the MSEs are taxed on turnover rather than on rental value and tax calculation has become more transparent and predictable.

Zimbabwe: the Presumptive Tax Model (PTM)

The PTM is key for taxing the informal economy sector. Introduced in 2005, the PTM targets transportation business owners, hairdressing salons, informal traders, cross-border traders, restaurants, liquor stores, cottage industries and commercial waterborne vessels.

Zimbabwe: Presumptive Tax Model (2015)		Presumptive tax (\$ per quarter for each vehicle)
Omnibuses	8 to 14 passengers	150
	15 to 24 passengers	175
	25 to 36 passengers	300
	37 passengers and above	450
Taxi-cabs	All	100
Driving schools	Class 4 vehicles	500
	Class 1 and 2 vehicles	600
	More than 10 tonnes but less than 20 tonnes	1,000
	More than 20 tonnes	2,500
	10 tonnes or less but with combination of truck and trailers of more than 15 but less than 20 tonnes	2,500

Tax officials and corruption: a wide-spread malfunction

The 2015 Global Corruption Barometer shows that 37% of respondents in 28 sub-Saharan African countries think that most or all of the officials in tax administration are corrupt. Tax officials rank as the fourth most corrupt group, preceded only by the police, business executives and government officials.

Over half of respondents in Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria, thought that tax officials were 'most' or 'all' corrupt. In only four countries less than 20% of respondents share this sentiment: Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho and Mauritius.



SPOTLIGHT


A majority of African citizens in favour of paying for public services

In the 36 African countries covered, only 13.9% of the citizens surveyed consider that 'it is not wrong at all not to pay for government services'. Of the overwhelming majority of 81.6% who think that it is wrong not paying for government services, half think that it is understandable, and the other half believes it is punishable.

In ten countries, more than half of the respondents think that 'not paying for government services is both wrong and punishable': Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Togo.


In only five countries, more than 25.0% of respondents think that 'not paying for government services is not wrong at all': Gabon, Lesotho, Malawi, Sudan and Uganda.

Africa: right or wrong, not paying for government services, % of respondents (2014/2015)



African countries: right or wrong, not paying for the government services, % of respondents (2014/2015)

Source: Afrobarometer




3.2 Meeting the demand

3.2.1 STEP ONE: STATISTICAL CAPACITY, CIVIL REGISTRATION, VITAL STATISTICS

Effective public service delivery needs accurate, comprehensive and updated national statistics, together with reliable civil registration systems for identifying the demand and granting access to citizens.

I. Statistical capacity: still weak, especially in poverty indicators



According to the 2017 World Bank 'Statistical capacity' indicator (a composite score assessing the capacity of a country's statistical system), Egypt and Mauritius are the two best African performers, while Eritrea, Libya and Somalia have the weakest statistical systems.

Selected African countries: top and bottom ten performers in Statistical capacity, scores (2017)

Top ten performers		Bottom ten performers	
Country	Statistical Capacity Score/100.0 (2017)	Country	Statistical Capacity Score/100.0 (2017)
Mauritius	85.6	DRC	46.7
Egypt	83.3	Equatorial Guinea	45.6
Seychelles	78.9	Angola	45.6
Malawi	77.8	South Sudan	43.3
Rwanda	77.8	CAR	38.9
Senegal	76.7	Gabon	36.7
Morocco	76.7	Comoros	30.0
South Africa	75.6	Eritrea	28.9
Uganda	74.4	Somalia	23.3
Benin*	73.3	Libya	22.2

* Burkina Faso also ranks 10th with a score of 73.3

Source: World Bank

Global Integrity (GI) Africa Integrity Indicators (All) measures the capacity of National Statistics Offices (NSOs) to produce detailed and timely data on poverty. In 2016, of the 54 countries covered only seven obtain the best possible score (100.0) - Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa and Togo - while 20 countries have no capacity at all (reflected by the lowest score, 0.0): Algeria, Angola, Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho,

Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia. The All also measures the capacity of NSOs to produce detailed and timely data on employment. In 2016, only six countries obtain the best possible score - Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Egypt, Malawi, Mauritius and South Africa - while 13 countries have no capacity at all: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

'Leaving no one behind': sub-national data are key


The absence of sufficiently granular information has traditionally made it difficult for governments to address spatial inequality. Inequalities widen within low- and middle-income countries, even as their overall poverty rates experience sharp declines. The strong inclination towards national-level averages risks masking sub-national variations such as hotspots of deprivation in rich countries and pockets of affluence in poor countries.

If governments and their development partners aim to succeed in 'leaving no one behind', they must adopt a sub-national perspective, and avoid the 'tyranny of averages'.

To ease the burden of acquiring spatial data, AidData has developed a data integration and extraction tool called GeoQuery, allowing spatial data from various sources to be analysed beyond and within geographic national boundaries.

AFRICAN COUNTRIES: STATUS OF NATIONAL STATISTICAL ORGANISATIONS WEBSITES (2016)

Source: MIF



Although the majority of African NSOs have an official website, only 20 provide data in a machine-readable format. Many countries publish data online only in PDF files or as images from print publications.

Even though data may be available online from NSO websites, it may often be out of date. In 2014, a quarter of African NSO websites had not been updated with new information for over a year.

- **Availability**
Existence of an official NSO website
- **Online Data Accessibility**
NSO website data is in a machine-readable format
- **Active Outreach to Users**
NSO active outreach via newsletter or social media engagement
- **None**

	●	●	●		●	●	●		●	●	●
Angola	x	x	x	Ghana	x	x		Mauritania	x		
Benin	x	x	x	Guinea-Bissau	x	x		São Tomé and Príncipe	x		
Cabo Verde	x	x	x	Lesotho	x	x		Senegal	x		
Egypt	x	x	x	Morocco	x		x	Sierra Leone	x		
Kenya	x	x	x	Mozambique	x	x		South Sudan	x		
Malawi	x	x	x	Niger	x		x	Swaziland	x		
Mauritius	x	x	x	Tunisia	x	x		Tanzania	x		
Namibia	x	x	x	Burkina Faso	x			Togo	x		
Nigeria	x	x	x	Cameroon	x			Zambia	x		
Rwanda	x	x	x	CAR	x			Zimbabwe	x		
Seychelles	x	x	x	Congo	x			Burundi			
South Africa	x	x	x	Equatorial Guinea	x			Comoros			
Sudan	x	x	x	Gabon	x			Côte d'Ivoire			
Uganda	x	x	x	Gambia	x			Djibouti			
Algeria	x		x	Guinea	x			DRC			
Botswana	x		x	Liberia	x			Eritrea			
Chad	x		x	Madagascar	x			Libya			
Ethiopia	x	x		Mali	x			Somalia			

The Government Performance Index (GPI) in South Africa: revealing spatial inequalities

The GPI, developed by Good Governance Africa (GGA), exemplifies the potential of sub-national-level data. The GPI ranks South Africa's 234 local and metropolitan municipalities using 15 indicators across three key areas: service delivery, economic development and administration. A municipal-level index sheds light into the diverse spatial inequalities within a

country. For instance, in 2016 only 66.0% of households in the province of KwaZulu-Natal had electricity, compared to 80.3% at the national level. 20.0% of the population did not have access to piped water in the Eastern Cape, compared to 1.0% of the population in the Western Cape.

South Africa: service delivery by province, municipal averages (2016)

Households with no form of sanitation, % (2016)		Households without piped water, % (2016)		Households with access to electricity, % (2016)	
Gauteng	3.0	Western Cape	1.0	Western Cape	92.0
Free State	4.0	Gauteng	2.0	Free State	89.0
Western Cape	4.0	Free State	2.0	Limpopo	87.0
Mpumalanga	6.0	Northern Cape	3.0	Mpumalanga	85.0
Limpopo	7.0	North West	7.0	Gauteng	84.0
North West	8.0	Mpumalanga	10.0	Northern Cape	84.0
Northern Cape	9.0	Limpopo	13.0	North West	83.0
KwaZulu-Natal	10.0	Eastern Cape	20.0	Eastern Cape	76.0
Eastern Cape	14.0	KwaZulu-Natal	25.0	KwaZulu-Natal	66.0

Source: GGA

II. Civil Registration and Vital Statistics: only seven countries with a complete birth registration system

The issue and possession of birth and death certificates is key to allow individuals to engage in civic, professional, business and personal activities and transactions: admission into schools and hospitals, nationality, formal employment, vote or run for electoral offices, buy and transfer properties and access financial and legal services. In most countries, to be excluded from civil registration is almost equivalent to being excluded from public services.


The Africa Programme on Accelerated Improvement of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics (APAI-CRVS)

The APAI-CRVS of the three pan-African institutions, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), is a framework for CRVS initiatives on the continent. APAI-CRVS, whose secretariat is in the African Center for Statistics at UNECA, is implemented based on biannual conferences of the African Ministries responsible for CRVS. To date four conferences have taken place since 2010.

According to 2017 All indicators related to civil registration, only seven African countries have a fully functioning birth registration system - Algeria, Cabo Verde, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Togo and Zambia, while Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Somalia have none at all. The 47 remaining countries, which do not have a complete birth registration system, account for 88.4% of the African population.


Meanwhile, 11 countries only have a fully functioning death registration system - Algeria, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sudan and Zambia, while five countries have none at all: Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Somalia.

African countries: Existence of a birth registration system, scores (2017)



100.0 75.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 Source: GI

African countries: Existence of a death registration system, scores (2017)



100.0 75.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 Source: GI

3.2.2 LEAPFROGGING: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATIONS

Making the best use of Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) for development is unanimously present in the recent multilateral frameworks. STI development is in one of the six pillars for Africa in the Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, is one of the key Goals of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023) of Agenda 2063, and features in Goal 17 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In a continent where more than 60.0% of the population is under 25, developing STI is certainly key.


STI in Rwanda's VISION 2020

VISION 2020 is the framework which aims to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country, with a services-oriented and knowledge-based economy, and into a leading innovation hub in the East African Community (EAC). VISION 2020 also aims to generate a large quantity of jobs for an increasingly better qualified young population.

The investment in the overall knowledge economy has been significant. Rwanda spends around 5.0% of its GDP on education and launched an Innovation for Education Fund in 2012. The Smart Rwanda Master Plan, a 2015-2020 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) plan, aims to increase private sector's involvement, narrow the digital divide, improve e-government and engage the youth in digital society. The National Commission of Science and Technology, set up in 2012, provides the government with advice on science, technology, research and innovation.

In terms of impact, in the global ranking of the Global Innovation Index (GII), Rwanda has moved up 19 ranks from 2014 to 2016 (from 102nd to 83rd out of 127 countries and territories). From 2000 to 2016 the share of mobile phone subscriptions has increased from 0.5% to 74.9% and the percentage of individuals using the Internet has increased from 0.1% to 20.0%.

African countries: Global Innovation Index (2017)



Source: Cornell University, INSEAD, WIPO

The 2017 GII measures the innovation performance of 127 countries and territories around the world. The average for the 29 African countries covered amounts to 25.4 (out of 100.0), far below the global average of 37.1. The five best scoring African countries are Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia. The worst performing African countries are Guinea and Togo.

Even though no African country obtains a score higher than the global average, of the 17 economies identified as 'innovation achievers' in the 2017 GII report, nine are African: Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda.

I. E-government: potential leapfrogging towards access and accountability

E-government is the use of ICTs for more efficient and effective government, better access to government services, greater public access to information, and making governments more accountable to citizens.

There are four distinct criteria of e-government:

- a secure government intranet for more efficient interaction among governmental agencies (e-organisation);
- web-based service delivery (e-services);
- e-commerce for more efficient government transaction activities (e-partnering);
- and digital democracy for more transparency and accountability of government (e-democracy).


E-government pros:

- improves efficiency in mass processing tasks and public administration operations;
- improves services, as it allows a greater understanding of user requirements;
- helps achieve specific policy outcomes (e.g. sharing of information in the health sector can improve resource use and patient care). However, the sharing of personal information will raise privacy protection issues;
- can be a major contributor to public management modernisation and reform;
- can help build trust between governments and citizens by enabling citizen engagement in the policy process, promoting open and accountable government and helping to denounce and prevent corruption.

The E-Government Development Index (EGDI), as part of the United Nations (UN) E-Government Survey 2016, measures the readiness and capacity of national administrations to use ICT to deliver public services.

The top ten scoring African countries for e-government are Botswana, Cabo Verde, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Seychelles, South Africa and Tunisia. From a regional perspective, Africa continues to lag far behind the global average (0.49). Of the four levels in which country scores are organised, no African country features in the very-high-EGDI level (scores between 0.75-1.00). Mauritius, Morocco, Seychelles, South Africa and Tunisia are the only African countries featuring in the high-EGDI level (scores between 0.50-0.75). 26 out of the 32 countries in the low-EGDI level are African (scores between 0.00-0.25).


African countries: E-Government Development Index (2016)



Source: UNDESA

E-Government Development Index, regions and countries by level (2016)

Source: UNDESA



The Online Services Index, a component of the EGDI, assesses the national online presence of all 193 UN member states. The top five African performers are Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania and Tunisia, while the worst five performers are CAR, Djibouti, Eritrea, São Tomé & Príncipe and Somalia.

Q SPOTLIGHT



The digital divide challenge: 75% of Africa's population still offline

The digital divide points to inequalities both in physical access to ICTs, as well as in the resources and skills needed to effectively use such technology. 'Leaving no one behind' requires an integrated public policy approach that ensures that e-government strategies go hand in hand with efforts to bridge the digital divide. This means improving access to high-speed broadband connection through reliable and high-quality infrastructure, as well as building a more holistic approach that considers the social, economic and environmental factors to advance digital inclusion.

According to the 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), over the decade Africa has registered improvement in all the digital

and ICT-related indicators, with the largest improvements in *Mobile Phone Subscribers* and *Household Internet Access*. However, about 75% of people in Africa are still offline compared to 20% of Europeans. Three African countries feature in the top ten countries at global level with the largest offline populations: DRC, Ethiopia and Nigeria.

Even though disparities in physical access to the internet have been reduced due to progress in mobile broadband infrastructure and smartphones, disparities in intensity – frequency and extent of internet use - are worsening. The gender gap in internet connectivity also appears to be widening. If the current trends continue, 71% of female Africans will still be offline in 2020, compared with 48% of men.



The Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (TII) is one of the three components of the EGD. As a proxy of how far a country's telecommunication infrastructure network is from serving its entire population, the TII can shed some light onto the pervasiveness of a country's digital divide, at least in terms of physical access to technology.

The 2016 African average is far below the global average (0.17, compared to 0.37). Only five African countries obtain a score higher than the global average - Botswana, Libya, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa - while the worst performing African countries are Burundi, CAR and Eritrea.


Online public services targeting specific vulnerable groups: Africa is lagging far behind

Online government services targeted to vulnerable groups reflect a country's commitment to alleviate the digital divide, ensuring that the poorest also benefit from the progress in the areas of ICTs and e-government.

According to the UN E-Government Survey 2016, Africa is only ahead of Oceania in terms of the number of countries that provide online services for the poor, persons with disabilities, immigrants, women and youth. In terms of online services for older persons, Africa and Oceania both have the lowest number of countries that provide them.

Number of countries providing online services to vulnerable groups (2016)

Source: UNDESA



II. Innovation for public service delivery: the 'last-mile' challenge

The 'one-stop-shop': the Huduma Programme in Kenya

The Huduma Programme, launched in 2013 as part of Kenya Vision 2030, established a one-stop-shop network of service centres, called Huduma, to provide citizens with access to various public services and information. By grouping different government departments under one roof, it increased the ease and speed of service delivery, reduced costs, and provided better services. To integrate service delivery, the Programme established five 'one-stop-shop' channels: Huduma centres,

Huduma Web Portal, Huduma Mobile Platform, Huduma Call/Contact Centre and Huduma Payment Gateway.

The first Huduma Centre opened in November 2013 in Nairobi's Central Business District and offered 20 government services. Nowadays, a total of 45 Huduma Centres all over the country serve 30,000 customers daily and provide 55 government services, ranging from the issuance of initial identity cards and birth certificates to the registration of limited companies and student loan applications.

Improved access: using drones

In **Rwanda**, the American start up Zipline partnered with the government to launch the world's first commercial drone delivery system, transporting medical supplies to remote hospitals by air. Since December 2016, the company has dispatched more than 4,000 units of blood products to hospitals from Zipline Muhanga, the distribution centre that serves 21 hospitals across Western Rwanda. A second distribution centre is planned to open to serve the eastern part of the country.

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, a new Drone Academy set up in 2018 by the country's biggest power provider, Ivorian Electricity Company, is training pilots to inspect the electricity network. The aim is to train 20 drone pilots to slash the inspection times of the 25,000 kilometres of high-voltage lines across the country, as well as to lower the costs significantly. Before, all inspections were done by helicopter or by teams on the ground. While the cost of purchasing a helicopter is around \$620,000, with each one-hour flight costing around \$1,850, a drone costs less than \$2,500 to purchase with low upkeep costs.

Zipline in Rwanda: remote medical supply delivery by drones

Source: Zipline



In terms of impact, the delivery time of an emergency blood supply is reduced from at least three hours by road to around 30 minutes or less.

Mobile technology to build smarter rural infrastructure

6.5 million of unpaved roads affect 3 billion of individuals globally. Mobilized Construction is an innovative company that attempts to make use of real-time road quality data to create micro-contracts for

community-led road repairs. Mobilized Construction's value proposition is based on the immediate tangible impact that repairing roads creates: lowering cost repairs, creating jobs and increasing the climate resilience of rural communities.

3.3 Building trust and ownership

3.3.1 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration Article 3, points 6 and 8, calls for transparency and accountability: 'The Member States agree to implement the Charter in accordance with the following principles:

(3.6) Professionalism and Ethics in Public Service and Administration;

(3.8) Institutionalising a culture of accountability and integrity and transparency in Public Service and Administration.'

Accountability and transparency are also set as one of the guiding principles of Agenda 2063:

'Making sure that the outcomes / goals of Agenda 2063 are attained requires that every stakeholder be held accountable and the processes for linking the stakeholders and their constituents together are predictable and open.'

I. Open government in Africa: too many Indices point to a low and decreasing level

Open government refers to government practices where citizens can access the documents and proceedings of the government to allow for effective public oversight.

Key to open government is transparency. Transparency is a means for achieving accountable government that measures and tracks the outcomes of its actions and takes responsibility for the results by letting people see the internal government flows and investigate whether their representatives have met their expectations. Data openness is a prerequisite for transparency, and is being promoted as part of the open government initiatives.

The Open Government Partnership (OGP)

Launched in 2011, the OGP is a multilateral and multi-stakeholder initiative for governments' commitments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance.


OGP has seven global principles:

- effective participation
- transparency and accountability
- open data
- opening and reusing public information
- simple and easy-to-understand language
- collaboration and co-creation
- inclusion and diversity.

To become a member of OGP, participant countries must endorse a high-level Open Government Declaration, produce an action plan developed with public consultation, and commit to make independent reports on their progress. Since 2011, 'over 70 participating countries and 15 sub-national governments have made over 2,500 commitments to make their governments more open and accountable'.

In 2018, only 11 African countries are members of OGP: Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Tunisia.


African countries: Open government, scores (2017-2018)



Source: WJP

The 2017-2018 African average for the 'Open government' factor of the Rule of Law Index, by the World Justice Project (WJP), is well below the global average (0.42 and 0.54, respectively). Ghana, South Africa and Tunisia are the highest scoring African countries, while Egypt, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe are the lowest scoring, hence being the least open African governments.

African countries: Open Data Barometer (2016)



Source: WF


The Open Data Barometer (ODB), produced by the World Wide Web Foundation (WF) as a collaborative work of the Open Data for Development network and with the support of the Omidyar Network, assesses the prevalence and impact of open data initiatives around the world.

The 2016 African average for the ODB overall score is less than half the global average (respectively 14.58 and 32.50 out of 100.00). The highest scoring African countries are Kenya, South Africa and Tunisia. At the global level, they only rank 35th, 46th and 50th, respectively. The worst performing African countries are Mali, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the last five rankings globally.

The first pillar of the 2017 Open Budget Survey (OBS) is the Open Budget Index (OBI), which assesses the budget transparency of countries based on whether eight key budget documents are made available to the public. The OBI average global score for the 102 countries surveyed in both 2015 and 2017 has decreased from 2015 to 2017, mostly driven by sub-Saharan African countries, whose regional average fell by -11 points between 2015 and 2017.

While in previous OBI iterations sub-Saharan African countries made strong gains in budget transparency, the decline in 2017 is largely due to countries publishing fewer budget documents. Five sub-Saharan African countries saw their OBI scores decline by more than -30 points: Botswana, Cameroon, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia.

African countries: Open Budget Index (2017)



Source: IBP

Changes in Open Budget Index scores (2015-2017)

Region	Regional Average OBI		
	2015	2017	Change*
East Asia & Pacific	41	44	3
Eastern Europe & Central Asia	54	55	1
Latin America & the Caribbean	50	50	1
Middle East & North Africa	21	20	-1
South Asia	42	46	5
Sub-Saharan Africa	39	29	-11
Western Europe & the United States	74	73	-1
All countries	45	43	-2

Comparison of the 102 countries that were evaluated in both the 2015 and 2017 Open Budget Surveys.
*Changes in Table may not tally due to rounding

Source: IBP

The average for the 39 African countries (including North African countries) covered by the OBI 2017 amounts to only 25 (as opposed to 42 for the 115 countries covered at the global level). Five countries obtain a score of 50 or higher in 2017: Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. Three countries made no budget documents publicly available at all: Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho and Niger.

South Africa's robust performance in budget transparency

With a score of 89, South Africa ranks 1st in the OBI 2017, tied with New Zealand.

South Africa has consistently been a strong performer in budget transparency. In 2017, it was one among the only 11 countries that published all eight key budget documents. Compared to 2015, one area of improvement has been the presentation of more information in the Executive's Budget Proposal,

including data showing the impact of different macroeconomic assumptions on the budget.

South Africa's overall success in budget transparency was mainly driven by the commitment of the first post-apartheid government. Another important aspect was the long tenure of Trevor Manuel, the Finance Minister from 1996-2009, who helped institutionalise and legislate a set of open practices, which now infuse the culture of the Treasury.


II. Accountability: many commitments, yet to implement

In order to ensure public trust, governments must ensure accountability. Accountability appears as a target or a strategy in Goals 10, 11, 12 and 20 of Agenda 2063's First Ten-Year Implementation Plan.

In the 2017 IIAG, the *Accountability* sub-category, measuring the levels of corruption and accountability on the continent, scores the lowest of 14 sub-categories (35.8 out of 100.0). Barely any progress has been made in the last decade.

The indicator *Accountability of Public Officials* captures the level of accountability of public officials and the degree to which there are penalties if public officials abuse their positions. During the past decade, the African average for this indicator has deteriorated by -0.3 points, with a worsening pace of decline over the last five years.

The countries that show the highest levels of *Accountability of Public Officials* are Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa, while the countries that register the lowest levels are Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe.



With levels of transparency and accountability on the African continent either declining or barely progressing, different initiatives push forward integrity measures in the public service.

At global level: commitments and instruments

Commitments

SDG 16, target 16.4: 'By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime':

- Indicator 16.4.1 Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current \$).

SDG 16, target 16.5: 'Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms':

- Indicator 16.5.1. Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months.
- Indicator 16.5.2. Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months.

Instruments

- United Nations Convention Against Corruption - 2003
- Financial Action Task Force - 1989

At African level: commitments and instruments

Commitments

Agenda 2063 - Goal 12: Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels.

- National commitment: 'At least 70% of the public acknowledge the public service to be professional, efficient, responsive, accountable, impartial and corruption-free'.
- Continental commitment: 'At least 70% of Member States are implementing the African Charter on the Values and Principles

Instruments

- The AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (CPC) - 2003

The CPC sets the basis for the fight against corruption in the areas of prevention, criminalisation, international cooperation and asset recovery. It also created an Advisory Board on Corruption within the AU, which is responsible for promoting and encouraging the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption measures on the continent, for advising governments, for collecting and analysing information and for submitting a report on the progress made by each State Party, among other functions.

The CPC has been ratified by 37 African countries, excluding Angola, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, CAR, DRC, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, São Tomé & Príncipe, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland and Tunisia. Other regional protocols also exist, strengthening the fight against corruption at the regional level, such as the SADC Protocol Against Corruption and the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption.

- The African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration (ACVPPSA) - 2011

The ACVPPSA entered into force in 2016 and calls on several instances for integrity within the public service. In Article 3, the Charter sets as one of its principles 'Institutionalizing a culture

Domestic implementation of public integrity legislation and measures in Rwanda:

- Creation and publication of a list of persons convicted of acts of corruption, ensuring that those persons are not appointed to public office, in accordance with the law.
- Strengthened coordination through the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council, enabling the various authorities involved in the fight against corruption to define their roles and activities more clearly.
- Creation of a system of declaration and verification of assets in order to combat illicit enrichment, shared with other African States as part of bilateral cooperation.

of Public Administration and the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption'.

The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan also established within the sources of finance for the implementation of Agenda 2063 the curbing of illicit financial flows and the reduction of inefficiency and governance/corruption-based financial leakages and wastages.

of accountability and integrity and transparency in Public Service and Administration'. Recurring from this principle, several articles promote public service integrity.

36 countries have signed the Charter and 16 have ratified it: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, São Tomé & Príncipe, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia.

- The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) - 2003

The APRM is a voluntarily-acceded self-monitoring instrument to ensure that the policies and practices of participating member states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards.

Member countries use the APRM reports to self-monitor all aspects of their governance and socio-economic development in all branches of government – executive, legislative and judicial – as well as the private sector, civil society and the media. One of the organisation's pillars is Good Economic Governance, where the fight against corruption and money laundering is encompassed.

37 African countries are members of the APRM, with the exception of Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, CAR, Comoros, DRC, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

3.3.2 CITIZEN OWNERSHIP: THE CORNERSTONE

I. Bottom-up integrity instruments

Improving public service integrity at the institutional level is important progress, but these instruments may clash with local social contracts and informal arrangements. Social beliefs, expectations and mind-sets may influence day-to-day forms of corruption. If social norms establish that the purpose of obtaining office is to provide for one's connections, then social networks can perpetuate the norm of corruption, as argued by the World Bank.

A Chatham House paper claims that social norms drive the solicitation of bribes in Nigeria, and corrupt behaviour is rationalised as a response to the choices and pressures that people face. For example, in the health sector, years of deficit in public funding for healthcare, embezzlement and financial mismanagement have led to an availability and quality crisis in the sector. This has fostered a

culture of routine demands for bribes by health workers and extortion in public healthcare settings to keep services going. Most people believe that health employees should ask for payment, even though knowing it is illegal, as they think this transaction is necessary for the running of the public institution.

Hence, anti-corruption efforts involve a mind-set revolution, and changing the social norm about corruption constitutes a collective action challenge.

Citizenry has indeed been active with bottom-up anti-corruption approaches, either by being directly involved in anti-corruption efforts or by mobilising the citizens to do so.

Corruption Watch, South Africa

In South Africa, the citizenry created Corruption Watch in 2012 to enable ordinary citizens to report any corruption they witness in both the private and public sectors. The organisation provides a platform for reporting corruption, investigates reports of acts of corruption, researches patterns and hot spots of corruption and builds campaigns that mobilise people to take a stand against corruption.

Civil Society Network Against Corruption (CSNAC), Mauritius

The CSNAC was created in 2002 to break the chain of corruption by working towards an anti-corruption culture and promoting transparency, accountability, integrity and rule of law. The CSNAC promotes anti-corruption initiatives in the fight against corruption among citizens and advocates and supports the implementation of anti-corruption policies and best practices.

II. The budgetary process: participation is key, from building to monitoring

Transparency and open government data relevance becomes even stronger when there are effective mechanisms in place for citizen participation. If citizens are able to make use of budget information to take part in the decision-making process, the value of transparency becomes stronger. Transparency without genuine opportunities for citizens to participate, particularly marginalised or vulnerable groups, may benefit elites rather than address social inequalities.

Public participation in the budget process has the potential to play a central role in 21st century social contracts, paving the way for citizen participation that goes beyond merely voting in periodical elections. Allowing citizen participation in the budget process is, indeed, part of the historical design of representative democracy.

The second pillar of the Open Budget Survey, Participation, scores public participation in the budget process. None of the 115 countries covered by the 2017 Survey display adequate opportunities for public participation and four only display limited opportunities, none African.

Participation in the budget process, countries by score levels (2017)

Participation levels - OBS 2017	Number of countries
Few or no opportunities (score: 0-40)	111
Limited opportunities (score: 41-60)	4
Adequate opportunities (score: 61-100)	0

115 countries have been surveyed

Source: IBP

The majority of opportunities for public participation in the budget process are in the executive branch during the formulation of the budget and in the legislature during its approval. Few countries have multiple participatory mechanisms, but most countries (94 out of 115) have at least one such mechanism.

Parliament: a key role in budget oversight

The third pillar of the Open Budget Survey assesses the role of oversight institutions in the budget process, which constitute a fundamental source of accountability. The Open Budget Survey 2017 focuses on legislatures, supreme audit institutions, and, for the first time, Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs).

Liberia has an IFI, the Legislative Budget Offices (LBO), created by law in 2010. At the outset, the relationship between the LBO and the national legislature was difficult. While the status and role of the LBO has improved, its resources are not wholly adequate for its tasks, namely to carry out independent macro forecasts or policy costings.

Kenya's legislative budget office, the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), is responsible for macroeconomic, policy and budget analysis, serving both the budget and other sector committees. The 2010 Constitution, conferring Parliament virtually unlimited budget amendment powers, made it necessary to have a stronger and larger PBO. Even though its staff has grown to 24 staff in 2018 (plus three service staff), this is almost half of 43 staff the office requested in 2013. Despite its limitations, Kenya's PBO is relatively independent and publishes its own macroeconomic forecasts that challenge those produced by the executive.

Countries with budget participation mechanisms (2017)



Average country Participation scores by OBI level (2017)

Open Budget Index level	Average Participation score (out of 100)
Low (OBI score 0-40)	5
Limited (OBI score 41-60)	13
Sufficient (OBI score 61-100)	24

115 countries have been surveyed


Source: IBP

The second pillar of the Open Budget Survey 2017 reflects the main principles on public participation in public finance proposed by the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, inclusiveness, timeliness, openness and sustainability. Countries with a higher OBI score tend to have, on average, a higher Participation score.

Participatory budgeting in Yaoundé (Cameroon)

Participatory budgeting allows the population to define the destination of part or the totality of public resources and help to oversee the implementation of the agreed budget. In 2006, Yaoundé VI was the first municipality in Yaoundé to implement participatory budgeting. Not all municipalities have adopted it, Yaoundé I and III have never done so.

The purpose of implementing participatory budgeting in Yaoundé was to tackle corruption, boost citizen participation in the decision-making process, as well as help the municipal authorities to engage with the population. In terms of impact, the participatory budgeting process in Yaoundé led to the construction of much needed infrastructure projects to poor neighbourhoods, such as a water tap which serves a community of 50,000 people in Yaoundé IV. Apart from improving basic services, participatory budgeting in Yaoundé has also had a positive impact on municipal-citizen relations, citizen participation, fiscal transparency and local tax revenues. The introduction of participatory budgeting in Cameroon, although in its infancy, paves the way for a new social contract between the municipality and the population, aiming to place the aspirations of citizens at the forefront of local development.



Source: IBP

The Participation average score for the 39 African countries covered in the Open Budget Survey 2017 is 7 (out of 100). Only three countries obtain a score higher than 20: Ghana, South Africa and Uganda, while 14 countries score 0: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, São Tomé & Príncipe, Sudan and Swaziland.



ACRONYMS

GLOSSARY

REFERENCES

NOTES

PROJECT TEAM

ACRONYMS

AAPAM	African Association for Public Administration and Management	GPI	Government Performance Index
AAPSComs	Association of African Public Services Commissions	HDI	Human Development Index
ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation	IBP	International Budget Partnership
ACVPPSA	African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration	ICP	International Comparison Program
AET	Africa Educational Trust	ICT	Information and Communication Technology
AfDB	African Development Bank	ICTD	International Centre for Tax and Development
All	Africa Integrity Indicators	IDA	International Development Association
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
APAI-CRVS	Africa Programme on Accelerated Improvement of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics	IFI	Independent Fiscal Institution
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism	IGAD	International Authority on Development
APS-HRMnet	African Public Sector Human Resource Management	iHRIS	Open Source Human Resources Information System
ART	Antiretroviral Treatment	IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
AU	African Union	ILO	International Labour Organization
AUC	African Union Commission	IMGs	International Medical Graduates
AULA	African Union Leadership Academy	IOM	International Organisation for Migration
CAFRAD	African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development	IPSA	International Police Science Association
CAP	Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda	IT	Information Technology
CAR	Central African Republic	JPO	Junior Professional Officers
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	LBO	Legislative Budget Offices
COP	Conference of Parties	LRGs	Local and Regional Governments
CPCC	Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption	LTTP	Liberia Teacher Training Programme
CPI	Corruption Perception Index	MBA	Master of Business Administration
CRVS	Civil Registration and Vital Statistics	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
CSNAC	Civil Society Network Against Corruption	MIDA	Migration in Development for Africa Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	MIF	Mo Ibrahim Foundation
DERC	District Ebola Response Centres	MSE	Micro and Small Enterprises
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
EAC	East African Community	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
EC	European Commission	NGOs	non-governmental organisations
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	NRGI	Natural Resource Governance Institute
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	NSA	Non-state actors
EGDI	E-Government Development Index	NSO	National Statistics Office
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit	OBI	Open Budget Index
ELMPS	Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey	OBS	Open Budget Survey
EPL	Emerging Public Leaders	ODA	Official Development Assistance
Eq. Guinea	Equatorial Guinea	ODB	Open Data Barometer
EU	European Union	ODI	Overseas Development Institute
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	OGP	Open Government Partnership
GGA	Good Governance Africa	OHCSF	Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation
GI	Global Integrity	PBO	Parliamentary Budget Office
GII	Global Innovation Index	PPP	Public-Private Partnership
GPE	Global Partnership for Education	PSC	Public Service Commissions
		PTM	Presumptive Tax Model
		PYPP	President's Young Professional Program
		RECs	Regional Economic Communities

SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
STI	Science, Technology and Innovation
STP	São Tomé & Príncipe
TEPD	Teacher Education and Professional Development
TI	Transparency International
TII	Telecommunication Infrastructure Index
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
TPS	Taxe Professionnelle Synthétique
UCLG	United Cities and Local Governments
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNU-WIDER	United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research
US	United States
VAT	Value Added Tax
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy
WWBI	Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators
WF	World Wide Web Foundation
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WISPI	World Internal Security and Police Index
WJP	World Justice Project
YPN	Young Professionals Network
2030 Agenda	2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

GLOSSARY

Agroecosystem: organisms and environment of an agricultural area considered as an ecosystem.

Brain drain: net cost of human capital flight for the sending country, as opposed to brain gain, the benefit of human capital flight for the recipient country.

Bribery: offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action. Bribery can take the form of gifts, loans, fees, rewards or other advantages.

Citizenry: group of people who live in a particular city, town or area of country.

Civil registration: system by which a government records the vital events (births, marriages, and deaths) of its citizens and residents.

Civil service: typically a restricted body of public officials within the public service tasked with supporting the political executive (however there is no standard definition of civil servant or civil service as employment arrangements vary between countries).

Civil society: citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is voluntary and autonomous from the government.

Compensation of government employees: all payments in cash, as well as in kind (such as goods and housing), to employees in return for services rendered, and government contributions to social insurance schemes such as social security and pensions that provide benefits to employees.

Corruption: abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand or petty corruption, depending on the amounts of money lost, and can come in many forms, including bribery, embezzlement, extortion and nepotism.

Decentralisation: transfer of (part of) the central government functions to subnational units or levels of government.

Digital divide: economic and social inequality with regard to access, use and impact of ICTs.

Domestication mission: incorporation of Agenda 2063 into the national strategic and action plans, programmes and budgets.

E-government: use of ICTs for delivering government information and services to citizens.

External Financial Flows (EFFs): foreign private and public flows ranging from Official Development Assistance, portfolio investments and inward foreign direct investments.

Food insecurity: household-level economic and social condition of limited or uncertain access to adequate food.

Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs): investments made by a company or individual from one country in another country.

General government expenditure: spending or expenditure including all government consumption, investment and transfer payments.

Ghost worker: someone recorded on the payroll system, but who does not work for the business.

Gini coefficient: measure of income inequality that condenses the entire income distribution for a country into a single number between 0 and 1: the higher the number, the greater the degree of income inequality.

Governance: (As defined by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation). The provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.

Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs): money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised, including commercial tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and abusive transfer pricing, criminal activities, and corruption.

Imihigo: performance contracts.

Informal economy: activities and income that are partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation and observation.

Localising SDGs: implementation of the SDGs at the community, household and individual level.

Non-state actor: individuals and groups that hold influence and which are wholly or partly independent of state governments.

Open data: data that can be freely used, re-used and redistributed by anyone.

Open government: government practices into which citizens have the right to access documents and proceedings in order to allow for effective public scrutiny.

Out-of-pocket health expenditure: households' total direct payments for healthcare goods and services at the time of purchase.

Participatory budgeting: the process by which citizens decide how to allocate part of a public budget, being able to identify, discuss and prioritise public spending projects.

Persons of working age: range of ages during which people are, or seek to be, economically active, depending on national contexts.

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs): contracts between a private party and a government entity for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance.

Public sector: (as opposed to private sector) portion of the economy composed of all levels of government and government-controlled enterprises.

Public servants and public service employees: all persons (public officials) employed by public authorities in public organisations at three levels: federal or national, regional (state or provincial), local (municipality or county).

Public service: totality of services organised under public authority (such as healthcare, education, police, infrastructure, public works, water and sanitation); the sector of government employment tasked with delivering these services.

Public social protection: policies and programmes designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by promoting efficient labour markets, diminishing people's exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to manage economic and social risks, such as unemployment, exclusion, sickness, disability and old age.

Resource mobilisation: process through which countries raise and spend their own funds to provide for their people – the long-term path to sustainable development finance.

Statistical capacity: capacity of a country to collect, analyse and share quality data about its population and economy.

Social contract between citizens and the state: when citizens consent to state authority limiting some of their freedoms in exchange for protection of universal human rights and security. Citizens also consent to pay taxes to contribute to the cost of delivering public goods and services. Public authorities, on the other hand, commit to provide public services that meet the needs and demands of their citizens, and to be accountable for them.

Tax or taxable capacity: predicted tax-to-gross domestic product ratio that can be estimated empirically, taking into account a country's specific macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional features, which all change through time.

Tax effort: index of the ratio between the share of the actual tax collection in gross domestic product and taxable capacity.

$$\text{Tax effort} = \frac{\text{Tax-to-GDP ratio (ratio of actual tax collections as a percentage of GDP)}}{\text{Tax capacity (estimated on economic and institutional characteristics i.e. levels of income, inflation, informality)}}$$

Total employment: total number of individuals aged 15 and above who hold a paid or unpaid job during a specified period, including self-employed people.

Total paid employment: total number of individuals who hold explicit or implicit employment contracts which give them a basic remuneration that is not directly dependent upon the revenue of the unit for which they work, therefore excluding self-employed workers.

Unweighted average: arithmetic mean where each of the data points contributes equally to the final average.

Urbanisation: increase in the proportion of people living in urban areas compared to rural areas.

Vigilante: civilian or organisation acting in a law enforcement capacity (or in the pursuit of self-perceived justice) without legal authority.

Vital statistics: the total calculation of vital statistics (birth, marriages and deaths) through the civil registration system.

Wasta: employment secured mostly through executive appointment, often influenced by nepotism.

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NOTES

The focus of this report is to produce data driven facts and figures on public service in Africa. This research publication does not intend, by any means, to be exhaustive. The topics and data selected are those that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation finds the most relevant.

This report makes use of the latest available data from a wide range of sources. A reference list containing all the sources used for this document is provided at the end of the report. Sources used are not always the primary data sources.

Where necessary, additional notes on the data used are added to the relevant infographics or with the source in the reference list. Data were correct at the time of research (the last access data for each variable is provided in the references). In some cases, the numbers may not add up to the total due to rounding. If numeric values are not provided accompanying their respective country names, these are listed alphabetically (and not in order of magnitude).

This report provides comparisons of regional averages. The composition of regions may vary according to source. When data in the report is presented disaggregated for North African and sub-Saharan African countries, for regional comparability reasons this is done reflecting the choices made at source.

African averages in this report are calculated using the latest data years available from source at the time of last access. As not all sources provide data for all African countries, some averages may not include data from all countries. This is usually made explicit in the analysis. Please see the sources for full details.

Data for Morocco may or not may include Western Sahara depending on the source.

Definitions such as those of youth or public officials may vary according to source. Further clarifications about these are provided either in the relevant text or in the reference list.

Unless indicated otherwise, GDP statistics are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank, and population statistics are taken from the 2017 revision of the World Population Prospects from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). For population projections, medium variant estimates are used.

Dollars are US dollars unless indicated otherwise. If the unit of a variable is in constant US dollar prices, the reference year is indicated.

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is an annual statistical assessment of the quality of governance in every African country, produced by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. The IIAG focuses on outputs and outcomes of policy, and is used throughout this report as a measure of public service delivery across the continent. To distinguish the IIAG, all measures from the IIAG included in this report are italicised, as opposed to measures obtained from other sources.

All the data included in this report are publicly available apart from the Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators (WWBI), a forthcoming (2018) dataset by the World Bank on the characteristics of public sector employment and wages. The WWBI data are drawn from primary sources (the World Bank's International Income Distribution Database (I2D2), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the International Comparisons Program (ICP) wage survey), and from secondary sources (the

International Labour Organization's (ILO) employment database (ILOSTAT), and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) dataset on the wage bill). The World Bank has kindly provided the Mo Ibrahim Foundation with the country-level data for the African countries covered and world regional averages. The Foundation wishes to thank the World Bank for sharing their data ahead of their publication and contribute to this report.

The information for the case studies drawn from the International Budget Partnership's (IBP) Open Budget Survey (OBS) 2017 has been provided directly by the IBP team. The Foundation wishes to thank IBP for contributing to this report.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation is committed to making data freely available and accessible. We welcome and encourage any accurate reproduction, translation and dissemination of this material. The material must be attributed to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, but not in any way that suggests that the Foundation endorses you or your use of the material.

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In post-conflict countries, public services often need to be completely rebuilt

In Ethiopia, local governments have only 21% of working days with Internet access, equivalent to only one day in a working week

Financial autonomy for local authorities is lagging far behind global averages

In ten countries – Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda, public sector represents less than 5% of total employment

There are more than 40 pupils per teacher on average in sub-Saharan Africa

There are 219 police officers for 100,000 people in Nigeria

In 14 of 36 surveyed countries about one third of people find it either 'difficult' or 'very difficult' to obtain medical treatment

DRC and Kenya have some of the smallest police force rates globally, with around 100 officers per 100,000 people

In Africa on average, public employees are better educated, older, and include more women compared to the private sector

70% of Egyptian youth wish to join the public sector, as a "haven of stability"

The median age of public paid employees in Africa is 38.4, almost twice the population median age (19.4)

In Namibia and Uganda, the wages of senior government officials are up to four times higher than secretaries'

The average civil servant in Ghana spends around 12 years in the same organisation

Land and property taxes are key to local autonomy

The average public official in Ethiopia overestimates by a quarter the number of citizens they serve

75% of Africa's population is still offline

Africa loses around \$2.0 billion annually through brain drain in the health sector

Corruption in the African public sector is second highest globally, after South Asia

Young, poor, urban males are more likely to pay a bribe for public services

Ghana is the only country where civil servants operate entirely freely without political interference, according to Global Integrity

The number of employees in the AU Commission is only 5% of those employed by the EU Commission (1,612 vs 32,000), for a budget equivalent to 4% of the EU Commission budget

In Africa, external financial flows still represent almost half of domestic revenues

30% to 50% of Africa's total tax liability remains uncollected

The average size of the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at 42% of gross national income, reaching 60% in Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe

A majority of African citizens are in favour of paying for public services

22% of Africa's population who had contact with a public service in 2015 said they paid a bribe, mostly to the police and the courts

Only seven African countries have a complete birth registration system

In Nigeria, roughly 82.3 million bribes were paid in 2016, equivalent to 39% of the combined federal and state education budgets

In e-government, Africa lags far behind the global average

In Rwanda, the delivery time of an emergency blood supply with drones is reduced to 30 minutes from three hours by road

Many Indices point to a low and decreasing level of open government practices in Africa

Over the past decade, the African average for the Accountability of Public Officials has deteriorated, with the pace of decline worsening over the last five years

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